STRATEGY
THE NAVAL SITUATION.—In conjunction with the German offensive by land, many believe that the Germans are ready to attempt a great naval offensive. However, there is no evidence that the Germans are preparing to send out their fleet. Such action seems improbable since the Allies have become so strong through the arrival of American units, including a large number of destroyers. It is felt that the Germans would surely lose and then would be at the mercy of an Allied landing.
The forces of the Allies on the sea are working in as perfect harmony as they now are on land and there is no opportunity to catch the staff unprepared. It is more probable that the Germans are ready to conduct other forms of naval warfare by means of auxiliary submarines and raids by cruisers and destroyers accompanying mine draggers in an effort to clear mines from the channel along the Belgian coast and in the North Sea. They may also send a Corsair cruiser into the Atlantic in an effort to aid the submarines operating spasmodically in mid-ocean and on the American coast.
It is reasonably certain that the Germans intend to concentrate their efforts upon their present method of submarine warfare, maintaining U-boats now in the Mediterranean, now in the North Sea, now on the French coast, now west of Ireland and now on the American coast, depending upon the information as to ocean traffic and also in an effort to scatter the Allied anti-submarine forces. The Germans recently have been operating largely in the Mediterranean. It is easier for the U-boats to leave Pola and Cattaro than German ports.
To-day the submarines are very inactive, due to the ideal summer conditions for hunting the enemy. Few ships are being torpedoed and no mines are being laid. This is no reason for ceasing preparations to combat the U-boats, since things change quickly on the sea. At any moment the Allies may need an abundance of good weapons. Valuable cargoes are still being lost. The price of the assurance of the safe arrival of American troops consists in unrelenting vigilance and constant preparedness.
Rumors About German Fleet.—The rumors that the German fleet is coming out may be caused by the great desire of the Allied Navies that it should do so. The only way to make it come out, it is believed, is to bomb the enemy bases from the air until it is safer to come out than to remain in harbor. The place for a start is the Adriatic.—Washington Evening Star, 21/6.
THE WAR AT SEA.—Perhaps the most telling commentary on the German claim that they cannot find the British Fleet is in the Admiralty announcement made this week, that on the second anniversary of Jutland numerous anti-submarine and escort patrols were carried out in home waters, and long reconnaissances were made across the North Sea. That is fact. The stuff the Huns throw to the winds from their wireless stations is fiction. There are yet some people who appear to think that because the Allies do not or cannot force a naval battle on the enemy, therefore our fleets are not accomplishing their work to the fullest extent. Such people have no knowledge of the naval history of their country, and they fail to appreciate what naval work is and what is expected of our seamen. Lord Jellicoe once said, that it was the business of the navy to keep the ring, or, in the language of the boxing contests, to see fair play between the combatants actually engaged inside the ropes. This, indeed, is one of the duties of the navy, but it is far from being all or the greater part of that which it is called upon to do.
It is essentially the function of the fleet to destroy the naval forces of the enemy, but with this object in view unnecessary risks will not be taken by wise and experienced commanders. Certain advantages accrued to us from the battle of Jutland, and it would be most injudicious, and perhaps suicidal, to throw these away. That battle was not fought under such conditions as we should have chosen ourselves. The next battle at sea should be. The Germans have been forced into a position from which, if they elect to fight again, they must come out and do so in the circumstances we choose. All that has happened since the battle was fought has been making towards this result. If they had believed the battle of Jutland to be a real victory, or to point to the probability of their achieving a victory, they would not have allowed two years to elapse without an attempt to repeat it. What they really did was to substitute for a settlement of the question of superiority by a fleet action the unlimited submarine warfare which they have now come to regard as a failure. In the meanwhile the movement of their fleet in the North Sea has been restricted by mines; by sea and air our scouts carry on upon the fringes of their protected waters, and our convoys pass virtually unmolested across the North Sea. They may be obliged to make another effort to dispute the sea supremacy, but if they do it will be in even more disadvantageous surroundings than was the case two years ago.
Rear Admiral Gleaves, who is at the head of the American transport and cruiser operations, made an interesting statement recently which has an important bearing upon the question of possible German activity in the North Sea. He repeated the statement made by Secretary Daniels, in April last, that more than 150 vessels and between 35,000 and 40,000 officers and men of the United States Navy are now in European waters, and added that the navy itself, so far is the personnel is concerned, had been quadrupled since the war began. Of this large force and its potential reserve a squadron of battleships under the command of Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman is with Sir David Beatty, and this squadron can be added to if it should be deemed necessary to increase the battleship force which is at present watching the High Sea Fleet, prepared to pounce upon it at short notice. The spirit of co-operation which inspires the officers and men of the British and American navies was referred to not long since in an exchange of messages between the First Lord and Mr. Daniels, and Admiral Sims in an interview insisted that for the word "co-operation" that of "consolidation" might well be substituted. A bright spot in the tragedy of this war, wrote Mr. Daniels, is the mutual appreciation of the men in the two naval services, and Sir Eric Geddes, in reply, testified also to the cordial relations which existed between the two navies. Here there is a guarantee not only of the effectiveness of the team work which is being carried out in the battle fleets, but of the good results which may confidently be expected therefrom should it be put to the test of battle.
It is not alone in the naval unity of the Allies or in the accession of strength given by the American ships that the force under Sir David Beatty ready to meet the High Sea Fleet has been considerably strengthened during the past two years. In what respect, then, it will be asked, have the Germans utilized this period to increase their naval power against the day when it may have again to be tried in conflict? In actual material their squadrons have been added to by ships completed since July 1, 1916, but to no great extent. Nothing, indeed, to compare with what has been added on the other side. Nor is it likely that in the ships of the Russian Baltic Fleet so far, at all events, as the larger units are concerned, can they hope for any large increase in numbers or power. In the first place the Russian ships are in no state for immediate use and, again, there may yet be patriotism sufficient in the remnants of the Russian Navy to prevent their being used by the Germans.
It is quite well in this connection to consider the remarks of Captain Persius, perhaps the most judicious and probably the best informed of the German naval writers. He certainly does not share the view of his master, the Admiral of the Atlantic, that "the nimbus of British sea supremacy has been forever destroyed." On the contrary, although he speaks of the success of the German Fleet at the battle of Jutland (success, we may suppose, in escaping without worse loss), he is unable to see that it brought about any change in the situation in the theaters of war. He points out to his countrymen that the British mercantile flag is not banished from the seas of the world, and he might have added that, in spite of the "U" boat menace, thousands of our ships and those of our allies continue to cross the seas, and thousands of troops are carried across the oceans with scarcely any loss whatever. That would be, indeed, strange if British naval domination had been completely shaken, or if it were likely that a second battle of Jutland would succeed in bringing about the consequences, claimed in Germany for the first.
Captain Persius' comment on the story of Jutland so far as it has yet been told, is a warning to his countrymen not to expect very great things even if the High Sea Fleet should put out again. This is what he says:— "To-day, on the anniversary of the battle of Jutland, it is opportune again to realize how seriously Great Britain is to be taken as an enemy. She has never yet lost a war. She has triumphed at the end of every campaign. She is now sacrificing blood in streams." He speaks also of the displeasure and indignation felt by many German seamen at the boasting which appears in the German press, for they know that if another sea battle should occur all their skill and strength will be needed even to secure a drawn battle. It is more than likely that the situation may presently assume such a character that it will oblige the Kaiser or his military advisers to send the fleet to sea as a gambler's last throw. But if used in this way the foreboding which Captain Persius put into words will probably cause the issue of the fleet to be but one of a series of actions in which other forces will take part and in connection with which the sea battle will be merely an incident.—Army and Navy Gazette, 8/6.
THE JUTLAND ANNIVERSARY.—By A. Pollen.—In dealing with the anniversaries that fell last week, I intended—but space forbade—touching on the aspect of the Battle of Jutland which has not yet, I think, been discussed, and, in making notes for it, read through with great interest Mr. Ourd's chapter on the battle in his recently published work. The author writes with enthusiasm and a literary skill which makes it contagious. It is refreshing and comforting to have the story of the sea war retold to us with the ring of victory in every line. And behind it all there is an apostolic purpose worthy of the theme. Mr. Hurd's motive in writing is to make the world's debt to the British Fleet so patent an affair that, when all is over, we may ever continue to hold the navy's work in grateful memory. But, greatly as I desire the end this very engaging writer has in view, I am far from sure that, in adopting the method of indiscriminating praise, he has chosen an effective means for securing it.
For really, when it comes to our North Sea strategy, to Jutland, to the submarine campaign, and for that matter every other aspect of our naval policy, our author will have it that, from 1914 till 1917, our course was a continuous miracle of perfection. The author clearly has no doubts at all. There is nothing Lord Fisher planned that Nelson would not have endorsed; there is no course of Lord Jellicoe's that the greatest of all seamen would not have been proud to follow. Some critics, he tells us, have asserted that had true doctrine been acted on, the German fleet would have been destroyed and the submarine peril removed. "It may be argued," he says, "that Nelson would have gone into the German ports in spite of all risks and attacked the German fleet in its nests." Heaven forbid that anyone should prescribe limits to the nonsense that "may" be argued. But surely it is a simple fact that no one of sense ever has so argued, and that the lament over the survival of the German fleet was occasioned, not by failure to attack it at anchor, but by its unfortunate escape on May 31 two years ago. Curiously enough, while Mr. Hurd mentions six comments on the famous battle—none of which he tells us has stood the test of time—he entirely omits to mention the master issues raised. First, does the threat of torpedo attack constitute that superior force in the presence of which alone a British admiral is justified in retreating? Secondly, why, as the rear battle squadron got into action at 6.17, did not the leading divisions open fire before 6.30?
Policy and Organization.—The book, it seems to me, would have been more useful if it had dealt with these and other naval issues with greater frankness. Every one who writes about war during war is necessarily in a dilemma. He must be on his guard not to help the enemy. It is his duty to encourage as well as to inform his readers. With the splendid spectacle which the valor, the self-sacrifice, and the devotion to duty which the British on the sea have shown in the last four years, he would have to be a poor spirited creature indeed, not to be in a constant temptation to dwell only on the greatness of what he describes, and to deal with the men and the measures they adopt in terms of praise alone, and of superlative praise at that. But surely those who have made a special study of naval war are at times justified in pointing out where policy is weak, or preparations inadequate, or organization defective. Our government which runs the war is, after all, civilian. It is civil opinion in the end that alone can secure right military action. The fact that we have completely changed our naval policy, by changing the organization that creates and controls it, seems by itself to prove that criticism has been neither merely destructive nor altogether without valuable results. And to acknowledge our great defects of organization does not belittle but enhances the great things the seamen have done.
A Problem in Deployment.—If the views set out above are sound, it is no disservice to the general cause to make, from time to time, a careful and dispassionate examination of past events because, though it is exceedingly unlikely that the conditions arising in one action will be reproduced, even approximately, in another, still an inquiry may exhibit a principle in working that will assist towards its better future application. With this object in view I propose to examine one of the two main issues arising out of the battle fought two years ago. The first of them, which may be called the torpedo problem, has perhaps been as adequately discussed as the information at our disposal makes possible. But the second raises questions to which much less consideration has been given. Let me recall the broad facts of the situation between 6 and 6.50p. m., of which a rough indication is set out in the diagram.
We know from the dispatch that the Grand Fleet was coming down to the battlefield on a SE. by S. course, in six divisions, with the first squadron, under Admiral Burney, on the western flank. About a mile would separate the divisions from each other. At four minutes to six, Lion and Marlborough saw each other at a distance of between ten to eleven thousand yards. At that time the head of the German line was 14,000 yards from Sir David Beatty, bearing approximately as indicated. Beatty, it will be remembered, changed course to the east and went full speed. He sighted Admiral Hood with three battle cruisers at 6.20, ordered Hood to take station ahead of him, and changed course at 6.25 in support. Hood was then closing on to the German van, and firing at a range of 8000 yards. Beatty apparently kept this course until approximately 6.50, having thrown the head of the enemy line into complete confusion.
In the meantime at 6.17 the western divisions of the Grand Fleet—which were to become the rear when the single line was formed—had come into action at a range of 11,000 yards. These ships must, therefore, have crossed Sir David Beatty's track at a point about three and a half to four miles astern of him. They accordingly got into action at once, probably with the German center. The rest of the Grand Fleet did not open fire on the main force until 6.30, by which time, if the line was formed, they would have been approximately in the position shown in the sketch. For at 6.50, Sir David Beatty tells us, the battle cruisers were clear of the Grand Fleet, the leading ships of which "bore NNW. from him at a distance of about three miles." In the sketch I have shown Beatty's course "AA," the German course "CC," and have indicated the line “BB" to show successive known positions of the Grand Fleet.
Now the point on which we are absolutely ignorant is how the Grand Fleet got from its original position at 6 o'clock into one which it apparently held at 6.30, when it opened fire. What seems to be quite clear is that, though the rear of the line must have crossed Sir David Beatty's track, it was not on the battle cruisers, nor the enemy's van, that the fleet deployed. The result was that between 6.10, when Sir David had closed the range to 12,000 yards, until bad light made gunnery impossible, he was unsupported, except by whatever period of fire Marlborough and her consorts had been able to maintain between 6.17 and breaking off to keep station with the divisions ahead. At 6.30, as at 6.50, the leading battleships were at least 3000 yards away from the battle cruisers, and consequently, at nearly that much greater range from the enemy.
Certain things should be noted in regard to these events. By 6.50 the visibility, Sir David Beatty tells us in his dispatch, "at this time was very indifferent, not more than four miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that, after 6 p. m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favorable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly." Had it been possible, therefore, for any squadron of the Grand Fleet to have fallen in behind the battle cruisers, they would have had the enemy under fire at ranges diminishing from 12,000 yards to 8000, from 6.10 to say, till 6.40, and this in extraordinarily favorable gunnery conditions. As it was, by the time they did get into action—that is, after 6.30—the conditions were all against effective gunnery. "The mist," said the commander-in-chief, "rendered range-taking a difficult matter." "Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. Towards the van, only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to twelve."
Further it was not till nearly 7 o'clock when the leading ships of the fleet turned south, that the Germans, having us now behind them began the great torpedo attacks which were decisive. At any rate it was at 6.54 that Marlborough, the only ship touched by a torpedo, was hit. From the wording of the commander-in-chief's dispatch, it would appear certain that it was now that the enemy's plans of evasion—torpedo volleys and smoke screens—were put in force. “After the arrival of the British battle fleet," says the commander-in-chief, "the enemy's tactics were of a nature generally to evade further action, in which they were favored by the conditions of visibility." "(He) constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens, as the effect of the British fire was felt."
There was evidently something, then, in the situation or in the way it was met, that saved the German fleet from our gunfire, just at the one period when it could have been made really destructive. That the rear got into action before the van, is in itself an extraordinary circumstance, and it seems plain that, to take a numerous fleet into action in single line, presents difficulties to-day as acute as they were in the era of masts and sails. This fact is worth emphasis because the evolution of the Nelsonian battle is easily traced. The things that distinguish it from so heart-breaking a fiasco as Mathews' action, Bying's, or the Battle of the Saints, on the one hand, and the "Glorious First of June" on the other, were twofold. First, the tactical plan was made with the single object of bringing the force into battle with the utmost rapidity, which involved it being directed straight at the points chosen for attack without preliminary maneuvers and, secondly, the execution of the plan, after the commander-in-chief had made absolutely certain that his second in command and every subordinate had mastered his intentions completely, was left to the untrammelled discretion of these responsible for the separate divisions.
Battle Cruisers in Action.—The fact that Sir David Beatty was not supported at this critical period does not, of course, give rise to the assumption that he might and should have been. Until all the circumstances are known, any such inference from the bare facts should be unwarranted. But it remains a poignant regret that the support could not be given, for, viewed as a move taken with the expectation of such support, the vice admiral's tactical decision at 6 p. m. was of an exceptionally brilliant order. When the battle cruiser type was first designed, its purpose was announced to be twofold. It was to be a ship that would combine such force and speed as would enable any enemy's scouting screen to be both driven off and pierced; conversely, it would itself protect the screen of which it was a part, from disturbance. Its second purpose was to be a superlative unit in the protection or attack on the lines of sea supply. The dispatch of Invincible and Inflexible to the Falkland Islands was an example of the latter form of strategy, and the German raids on the East Coast exemplified yet a third purpose to which such vessels could be put. Both sides employed them as advanced scouting forces on the 31st of May.
It was reserved for Sir David Beatty to employ the difference in speed between his squadron and that of the enemy to create a tactical situation in a fleet action which, could it have been improved, would have led to the enemy's annihilation. So to employ these vessels called, it is needless to say, not only for that "correct strategical insight and appreciation of situations." with which the commander-in-chief duly credited him, but for a firmness of resolution and a grasp of right war-like principle of very exceptional order. Two of his vessels had been lost earlier in the day, and it is not known whether or not he knew at the time that it was accidental shots and not the wholesale piercing of their thinly protected sides that accounted for their destruction. In any event, having lost two ships out of six when the range was 14,000 yards, it might well have been supposed that he was likely to lose a far higher proportion when he decided to close, first to 12,000 and then to 8000. But there are two things that must be remembered. First, in closing the range materially he did the best thing possible for the defence of his ships; for he added, perhaps, incalculably to the efficiency of his own gunfire. Secondly, while—even with this point in his favor—he took an immense risk, it was incurred for the sake of bringing about the crushing decision which he, no doubt, realized must be obtained in the next half hour or probably not at all.
To those who are conversant with the discussion that followed, the two knot increase in speed which Dreadnought possessed over the King Edwards, this episode of crumpling the head of the German line is exceedingly interesting. It was made possible by the possession, not of a 10 per cent, but of a 30 to 40 per cent superiority in speed over the opposing force. For a parallel to it we should have to go a long way back in history. Possibly there would be no precedent at all until we come to the work of the high speed triremes of the Athenians and the victories which their superior oarsmanship obtained in the Peloponnesian war. In strict analysis this startling use of the battle cruisers was a containing movement. It was the essence of the Beatty stroke that it created the opportunity for the main fleet.
Indeed, is not the revolution at Whitehall itself the most astonishing of all the things the navy has done? It was effected at the most critical period of the war, despite exhortations not to swap horses in mid-stream. It is not our least conspicuous nationality to fear theory, to dislike order, and to distrust system. And this is seemingly an old trait. Shakespeare must have had the opponents of the staff system in mind in writing Ulysses' speech in Troilus and Cressida:
They tax our policy and call it cowardice;
Count wisdom as no member of the war;
Forestall prescience and esteem no act
But that of hand: the still and mental parts—
That do contrive how many hands shall strike,
When fitness calls them on; and know by measure
Of their observant toil the enemies' weight,—
Why, this hath not a finger's dignity:
They call this "bed-work," "mappery," "closet-war":
So that the ram, that batters down the wall,
For the great swing and rudeness of his poise,
They place before his hand that made the engine;
Or those, that with fineness of their souls,
By reason guide his execution.
—Land and Water, 6/6.
SUBMARINES AND AMERICA.—Although the war has now been in progress for nearly four years, and submarines have played a prominent part from the beginning, comparatively little is known about the enemy's underwater craft. It is true that the naval text-books contain a mass of information on this subject, but most of it is admittedly of a conjectural nature, and it is impossible to say where positive knowledge ends and pure guesswork begins. Several eminent authorities have presented us with tables in which the German submarine flotilla is analyzed and classified with marvellous detail. As a rule, these tables show, not only the total number of submarine vessels now in service, but each distinctive type, with its dimensions and other characteristics. We have recently come across one such table compiled mainly from data furnished by M. Maxime Laubeuf, the distinguished French designer. In it the German submarines are roughly divided into three groups—ocean-going, special service, and coastal, but each group is subdivided, and the three together comprise no fewer than 16 different types, the approximate dimensions, speed, endurance, armament, etc., being given in each case. The whole forms a comprehensive survey of the enemy's submarine resources as they are supposed to have existed a few months ago, and it is easy to see that an immense amount of patient research has been devoted to the preparation of this analysis. But when this much has been said, the question still confronts us: How much do we really know about Germany's submarines? Even before the war that country was singularly successful in keeping its naval secrets, and it is a remarkable but incontestable fact that every German warship launched since 1907 is still more or less a "mystery ship." In certain cases deliberately misleading data were circulated by the German naval authorities, particularly in reference to the armament and armor protection of their all-big-gun ships. As for their submarines, the only boat of which authenticated details were ever made public was the U-1. A few weeks before the outbreak of war it was officially stated in Berlin that 28 submarines had been completed, while "others are under construction." The total may have been incorrect, but the fact remains that with this meagre scrap of information our official knowledge of the German submarine flotilla begins and ends.
We are not, suggesting that our own naval authorities are equally in the dark. On the contrary, were they so minded, they could certainly tell us many interesting things about the subsequent expansion of Germany's underwater fleet, approximately how many boats have been built, the division of types, and the distinctive features of each. But such knowledge is denied to the lay student. Naval officers whose work in the anti-submarine service has given them unequalled opportunities of observation, readily admit the difficulty of identifying hostile submarines sighted at sea. The smaller types, especially the UC and UB mine layers, can, as a rule, be spotted at once, owing to their characteristic outline; but it is notoriously difficult to "place" the large ocean-going submersibles which are encountered far out at sea. When the "commercial U-boat" Deutschland arrived in American waters nearly two years ago, naval officers who saw her come in and afterwards inspected her at fairly close quarters, formed the most divergent estimates of her displacement, speed, etc. Some calculated the displacement at 1000 tons, others put it as high as 3000 tons, and she was credited with various speeds ranging from 10 to 18 knots. The same thing happened when the U-53 appeared at Newport, R. I., in October, 1916. Every officer had his own opinion of her size and offensive qualities, but, unfortunately, it was found on comparison that no two opinions agreed. Even when in surface trim and seen near at hand, a submarine is not easy to classify. In the majority of types a considerable part of the length is hidden, as also is the beam. A fairly safe guess may be hazarded as to the caliber of whatever guns she may mount, though even here a complication is involved by the special short models supplied for submarine service, and at a distance a 35-caliber 4.1-inch might well be mistaken for a 14.pounder, and vice versa. We may add that the most explicit and circumstantial descriptions of "submersible cruisers," i. e., .vessels of 2000-3000 tons or more, having been sighted in mid-ocean, were forthcoming at a time when, as the authorities had good reason to believe, none of these vessels had been completed in Germany. The advent of hostile submarines in American waters has been expected ever since the United States became a belligerent, and we may be sure that they would have been sent many months ago had Germany been in a position to spare them. The long period of immunity enjoyed by American coastal shipping suggests that the enemy had all he could do to maintain his home flotillas at full strength. The raiders that made their appearance off the Virginia Capes recently are believed to have been two in number; at any rate, there is no evidence yet to hand of the presence of more. So far nothing definite is known publicly with regard to the type of these two boats. Very possibly one of them represents the submersible cruiser class, but the round voyage itself is well within the compass of smaller boats, as was proved by the exploit of U-53 some twenty months since, but this boat remained off the coast only for a single day, her fuel supply apparently being too limited for a longer sojourn. In the present instance the two German vessels may be respectively a fighting submarine and a tender, the latter carrying a reserve of fuel, ammunition, and other essential supplies for the use of the former. It was reported some time ago that the Deutschland and several other vessels originally built as commercial submarines had been converted into ocean-going auxiliaries. Designed as they were for a large cargo capacity, they could carry enough fuel, torpedoes, etc., to keep a fighting consort well supplied for a considerable period, and it is not improbable that the relationship between the two submarines reported off the American coast is such as we have indicated above.
This may be an experimental raid, which, if successful, will be followed by attacks on a larger scale, the enemy arguing that as the anti-submarine defence in American waters is not so well developed as that in European waters, it will pay him to withdraw some of his boats from Europe in order to use them across the Atlantic. Be this as it may, the fact that such a diversion has been attempted clearly proves the failure of the main German submarine campaign. With all their experience on this side of the Atlantic the Germans must know that two submarines, however powerful they may be, are quite incapable of interfering to any serious extent with the great volume of shipping that now enters and clears American ports. To conduct even a partial blockade of the Atlantic coast of the United States would necessitate the employment of at least 50 submarines. But Germany cannot spare anything like that number, and we must therefore conclude that in dispatching two submarines to the American coast her object was not to make a serious attack on United States shipping, but rather to create alarm in that country and delay the departure of those troops and supplies which are so urgently needed by the Allies in France. In all likelihood this raid will have a precisely opposite effect, for the Americans are not easily intimidated, and the spectacle of war brought to their own shores will, undoubtedly, spur them on to even greater exertions.—The Engineer, 14/6.
THE SUBMARINE CRUISER.—In making a departure from its usual practice of reticence in regard to the sinking of German submarines, the Admiralty could not have selected any better occasion than the destruction of a U-boat of the so-called cruiser type. The vessel which was put down by one of our own submarines in the latitude of Cape St. Vincent, on May 11, is believed to be the first of Germany's new cruising submersibles to be accounted for. The loss of the boat is admitted in Germany, and there can be no doubt that it will be regarded as a serious blow by the German naval authorities. In the first place such a vessel takes a longer time to build than the smaller types of the underwater boats, and requires more labor and materials in the making. This class therefore cannot be turned out in the numbers which is known to have been the case with those of smaller dimensions. There are fewer of them and the loss is therefore the heavier. Secondly, these vessels must carry larger crews, and when as in this case all those on board are sent to the bottom, it must deprive the German Navy of a considerable body of trained and experienced officers and men. The submarine losses in personnel are known to have had a disturbing effect in Germany, and the non-return of the crew of one of these larger vessels will help to accentuate that feeling. Again, it has been manifest from the boasts and vaporings of German writers that great hopes have been placed upon the work which these formidable vessels were expected to accomplish by interference with, and molestation of, the Atlantic traffic. Such hopes must receive a disagreeable set-back when the destruction of this vessel comes to be widely known in Germany. It is clear, moreover, it was thought these larger vessels would be found more difficult to deal with than their forerunners. It must be admitted that, judging by the depredations which the Emden and her sisters were able to achieve, these anticipations of a longer and more deadly life for the cruising submersible were not without some foundation. This anticipation has also been cut short by the sinking of the underwater vessel on May 11. The occurrence does not lose in significance by the fact that the Admiralty have connected it with Cape St. Vincent, a locality already made famous by British naval exploits.
Conjecture has been rife in connection with the characteristics of these submarines of the so-called cruiser type. This is the description adopted by the Admiralty, and, it may be assumed, with good reasons. It is indeed somewhat of a misnomer to describe these vessels as "submersible cruisers," and cruising submersibles would probably be nearer the mark. Their development is the natural outcome of experience, and has followed the same lines which evolved the destroyer from the torpedo-boat and the fast cruiser from the destroyer. With each step upwards from numbers to greater size and power something is gained and something lost, and when the balance is struck it is by no means certain whether there is an assured advance. With a larger displacement the radius of action of the boat is increased, but she presents a larger target both above and below water to the gun or torpedo. Greater deck space permits of a larger gun mounting and a weapon of larger caliber. These boats are said to carry what is equivalent in German ordnance to a British 6-inch gun. There is, indeed, no technical or mechanical obstacle to mounting a still heavier piece, but there are limitations to the use of a heavy gun in a submarine. Again, a greater height between decks, and more beam, enable the provision of better accommodation for the crew, and for a larger crew. But if the ship is sunk the loss is greater, and it may well be that some sixty or seventy skilled underwater fighters went down in this cruising submersible. With the installation of steam engines, with which the French experimented before the war, the reduction in weight makes possible the use of higher-powered machinery, greater propulsive efficiency, and more speed on the surface. But it does not necessarily follow that the maneuvering qualities of the vessel are advanced; she has a larger turning circle, and probably submerges at a slower rate. Drawing more water, she cannot operate in moderate depths, although as against this it must be said that she can withstand greater pressures and therefore make deeper descents, either to avoid obstructions or for safety. The demand for higher speeds and augmented fighting power obviously followed upon the supply to merchant ships of guns and the advent of fast anti-submarine craft. The underwater cruiser is capable of making long-distance passages and has considerable enduring mobility. She can therefore remain a longer period from her base.
Among the advantages which the Germans hope to attain by the development of the cruising submarine is undoubtedly a modification in the method of fighting the underwater vessel's foes. It indicates probably a change in tactics. Hitherto the submarine has rather avoided surface fighting. Its guns were for use against its victims, its defence lay in its power of submersion. But now the gun armament of the German submarines may in some cases be superior to that of the vessels by which they are chased, it is quite likely that they may assume the offensive and try their chance on the surface before using their diving powers. Hitherto the destroyer has been regarded as the most useful agent in anti-submarine warfare. There is not much difference, however, between the sea-keeping qualities of the destroyer and the submarine, and in ocean fighting at long ranges the former will present the larger target to the gun. This aspect of the subject leads to another view of the problem as influenced by the arrival of the cruising submarine. Long before the war it was predicted that the antidote to the submarine would be another type of submarine, and this theory found support in high naval quarters. Then with the opening of hostilities and the experience of action, the idea went out of favor and other methods were suggested and employed. Manifestly some of these methods cannot be so effective in the case of the submarine which operates many thousand miles from its base as in that of the smaller types. But Germany has no monopoly in submarine development, as is made plain by the Admiralty report on Sunday. The announcement is made that the German submarine was sunk by one of our "Atlantic escort submarines" in the latitude of Cape St. Vincent. Note first that the escort submarine was on her way to meet a convoy in the Atlantic, and, secondly, that the action took place in the latitude of Cape St. Vincent, a phrase which might mean anywhere on that parallel between Europe and America. The British submarine, then, was also a long-distance boat, and it is fair to assume that running with merely her periscope showing she caught the German vessel travelling awash and promptly torpedoed her. The Admiralty would not have revealed the details referred to had it been against the national interests. The German cruising submarine must expect in future wherever she goes to meet British vessels of her kind, and it may be that in this way the real effective remedy for the menace will be found.—Army and Navy Gazette, 1/6.
SIR ROSSLYN WEMYSS ON SEA STRATEGY.—In view of the appearance of German submarines off the American coast a representative of the Associated Press in London called on Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, First Sea Lord, who said:
"If I were inclined to bet I should say there has not been more than one submarine off the American coast. I may be wrong, but this is the impression I have formed. That conclusion fits in with my interpretation of the enemy's object. The Germans merely made a demonstration with the hope of causing us to decentralize our efforts to put down the submarine. We must fight the U-boat in the narrow seas. In other words, we must centralize, concentrating all our forces in what is really the decisive area. The Germans, in sending one of their so-called submarine cruisers to the American coast, thought to raise an outcry in the United States against the policy which is now being pursued of fighting the submarines in the narrow seas. Well, I judge both from official information and telegrams in newspapers that they have already failed in their purpose."
The conversation then passed to the manner in which the American naval forces have co-operated with the Allies in the European war. Sir Rosslyn continued:
"You know, of course, that for more than a year past American men-of-war have been operating from Queenstown. It has also been known for some time that there are American ships in the Mediterranean. I do not think it can be regarded as a secret from the Germans that American men-of-war are also acting against the enemy off Gibraltar. This co-operation constitutes a remarkable testimony to the strategic insight of the American naval authorities, who also have not hesitated to send battleships to the join the Grand Fleet in the North Sea."
Discussing the relation of the two navies Admiral Wemyss said:
"On the broad lines of strategic policy complete unanimity exists. Admiral Benson and Admiral Mayo have both visited us and studied our naval plans. No officers could have exhibited a keener appreciation of the naval situation. Our relations could not be more cordial. The day-to-day procedure is of the simplest. Every morning I hold a conference with the principal officers of the naval staff, and Admiral Sims is present as the representative of the United States Fleet, joining freely in the discussion of the various subjects which arise. At sea the same spirit of cordial oc-operation exists—extremely cordial I should like to say. We have fortunately a common language and common traditions, which have done much to assist us in working together. The American officers and men are first rate. It is impossible to pay too high a tribute to the manner in which they have settled down to this job of submarine hunting, and to the intelligence, resource, and courage which they have exhibited.
"This submarine business will not have any effect on a transport movement which, judged from the standpoint of a seaman, has no parallel in modern history. A year ago the enemy was boasting that his submarines would prevent the American troops from being moved to Europe, but neither the threats nor the performances of the U-boats have affected the movement. That is a very remarkable fact which, judging by the German newspapers, is producing a great impression in Germany. Not so long ago the falling off in sinkings of tonnage was explained by the enemy as being due to the fact that there were few ships to attack. And now in face of that statement the American troops are coming across the Atlantic by tens of thousands and are moving up to the firing line.
"At the same time war supplies in great variety are being brought across the Atlantic with comparatively small losses, and the food position in the British Isles is actually more satisfactory to-day than it was a year ago. In spite of the submarines we have got rid of the queues; the people are contented, and the general situation so far as it is influenced by the naval effort has improved, although the enemy has been making his maximum attack on every ship afloat, British, Allied, and neutral. These results have been achieved by adherence to the only sound strategic principle—concentration of effort.—Reuter.—London Times, 18/6.
RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS.—Just as the enemy seems bound to get the Russian Baltic Fleet, so it seems almost certain that he is either already in possession of the Black Sea Fleet, or must shortly be so. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, so far as we know, consists of ships similar in type to the Gangoot, though not quite so fast. They are three in number, and so have a broadside fire of thirty-six 12-inch guns. If the Goeben is fit for service, and these ships are officered and manned by Germans, they would constitute an exceedingly formidable squadron. If the four fast cruisers, laid down just before or at the very beginning of the war at the Nikolaieff works, have been completed, the value of the battleship force would be very greatly enhanced. The Black Sea Fleet included also nine modern destroyers. Put the whole together, and there is clearly a unit of sea-power which could create a very awkward situation in the Mediterranean—if once it got to sea. For, according to the latest edition of that invaluable work, Jane's Fighting Ships, the Austrians laid the keels of two new battleships immediately after the declaration of war, and two more a year later. There has been ample time to finish all four. Before the war, Austria had four dreadnoughts finished, and if these could join forces with the former Black Sea Fleet and the Goeben, a single fleet more powerful than any Allied fleet in the Mediterranean would be constituted.
The question, of course, is: Can the Black Sea Fleet clear the Dardanelles? We know that the Goeben did so a few months ago, though she lost her consort in a mine field on her return, and was thought to have struck a mine herself, but the fact remains that she was not destroyed, and that, unless means of closing the Dardanelles have since been found, the sortie may be repeated.
The situation to-day, then, seems to possess for the Germans many of the characteristics of that of two years ago. They have suffered a reverse at sea far more serious than the surrender to Washington, because it puts a final stop to every hope of victory by submarine. If in 1916 they were impelled to seek a fleet action to restore their credit, the elements of compulsion in the same direction are, therefore, ten times stronger than they were. If they possess the eight powerful fast vessels that Russia built or was building in the Baltic and have added, to the limit of their own building capacity, to their fleet since Jutland was fought, they are probably relatively stronger than they were, in spite of the Grand Fleet having been strengthened by the new vessels we have constructed and by the American division which has joined us. The Germans certainly possess a vastly greater number of submarines than two years ago, and must have learned something of how to use them in battle. In the Black Sea, if they have the Russian ships—dreadnoughts and fast cruisers—they have a force which, if it could join hands with the Austrian fleet, would create an entirely new situation in the Mediterranean, one which might call for the diversion of English or American battleships to that sea to secure an adequate supremacy. It is, take it for all in all, a situation full of potentialities, and it may well happen that, before many weeks have passed, the center of interest will pass once more from the war on land to the war at sea.—Land and Water, 30/5.
LESSONS OF THE WAR
SPEEDY AND AGILE SHIPS BEAT U-BOATS EFFECTIVELY.—Naval Consulting Board Reports on Devices Offered to Combat Submarine Warfare, Declaring Few Efficacious and Practicable—Bases Strongly Protected to Prevent Raids.—The various methods employed for the protection of voyaging ships from submarines are interestingly discussed in a bulletin just issued by the Naval Consulting Board, of which Thomas A. Edison, Hudson Maxim, Howard E. Coffin and other men of constructive and inventive genius are members.
The conclusion reached by the board is that the immunity of a vessel to submarine attack is very largely dependent upon its speed and also its maneuvering ability. The percentage of vessels having speeds of 15 knots or more, and which have suffered from submarine attacks, is very small, while the loss of slow vessels, having speeds less than that of a submerged submarine, is practically 100 per cent of those attacked.
Craft of high speeds quickly pass beyond the range at which a high percentage of torpedo hits can be scored, but slower boats give the submarine ample opportunity to take careful aim and to score a hit with almost every shot.
A ship steaming at 20 knots will cover a distance of half a mile in one minute and a half, while it will require three minutes for a ship at 10 knots to cover the same distance. This shows the greater chance to escape which the high speed ships have when the submarine has finally maneuvered into a position for the proper aiming of a torpedo.
Quick maneuvering of a ship has frequently been effective in dodging a torpedo.
None of the suggestions involving the use of screens for protection against submarines has received the approval of the Navy Department or of the merchant marine. No effective means has been found to destroy a torpedo in flight or to divert one from its course.
Improved smokeless combustion is important in protecting vessels from submarine attacks, as the point of lookout on a submarine is close to the water and the position of a vessel at a distance can be determined by observing its smoke which floats high in the air.
Under favorable positions of wind and position smoke screens are valuable in saving vessels from torpedo attack.
Vessels may obtain relative invisibility also by methods of painting. Ships are sometimes "camouflaged" to resemble the sea, and various devices are used to conceal their character, size and identity. Designing ships with a low freeboard and eliminating masts, smokestacks and superstructures helps to reduce their visibility.
The destructive effect of exploding mines or torpedoes may be greatly diminished by special hull construction. The multiplicity of watertight compartments in any hull design tends to add to the vessel's safety.
Air cells and watertight compartments decrease the convenience and carrying capacity of the different types of vessels. The problem, therefore, is to find out how much capacity the designer is justified in sacrificing to increase the safety from torpedo attack. Cargo-carrying submarines are expensive to build and operate, and are inefficient.
The answer of the Naval Consulting Board to the question, "Why are not submarines destroyed before they reach the open sea?" is as follows: "The submarine bases are very strongly protected by land batteries, aeroplane observers and large areas of thickly mined waters, extending to such distances that the largest naval gun cannot get within range of the bases. Nets when laid are promptly removed by the enemy. In spite of these facts, there is now going on a continuous attempt on the part of the allied navies to entrap or otherwise defeat the submarines as they emerge from the protected areas.
Aircraft of all sorts are used for detecting the presence of submarines. Operated either from shore or from larger ships they are sometimes very effective. Under favorable conditions a submarine is discernible from aircraft flying at a proper height, even though the submarine is submerged to a considerable depth.
While many devices which depend upon optical means of detection, such as special forms of mounted telescopes and field glasses, have been suggested, experienced and alert lookouts have proved the most serviceable. Without such men no optical device appears to be of value, and at night or in bad weather such devices are apt to be unreliable.
Contrary to the general impression that submarines are not effective against submarines, allied submarines have been successfully used in destroying U-boats. In operating against hostile submarines the searching submarine may remain totally submerged and take observations by thrusting up the periscope every few minutes, or it may remain on the surface and only dive when the enemy submarine is sighted.
A submarine is most vulnerable to attack from gunfire when it is on the surface recharging the storage batteries. The gases rising during this operation are stifling, and in giving vent to them several minutes are required to close the hatches and submerge. A submerged submarine can be reached with ordinary service shells only by high angle fire, because at low angles they ricochet on the surface of the water.
Because of the powerful effect of any submarine explosion on all neighboring bodies depth charges provide a simple means of destroying or crippling an undersea boat. When it has been even approximately located the setting off of a heavy charge of high explosive, well submerged within about 50 feet of the submarine will bring about this result.
The rapid development and improvement of the depth bomb and the increased carrying capacity of the modern high powered hydroairplane have made possible a new type of bombing hydroairplane, designed to carry a considerable number of bombs, each containing a heavy charge of high explosive.—N. Y. Herald, 24/6.
THE SAFETY ZONE FOR THE SUBMARINE.-By Percival A. Hislam.—That the existence of German and Austrian submarines is daily becoming more uncomfortable and hazardous is well recognized now by everyone except those enemy subjects who are still able to find cause for satisfaction in the much subdued boastings of Admiral von Capelle. Since the beginning of 1915 the counter-measures in operation against the U-boat have been multiplied not only in number but also in variety, and they now include—to mention but a few of them—surface chasers, destroyers and drifters, submarines, aircraft, cement-logged ships sunk in the mouths of their bases, and vast mine fields of which one alone, stretched across the northern exit from the North Sea, covers an area of no less than 22,000 square miles.
The "chivvying" of the U-boat has been so greatly accelerated of late, and has proved so remarkably successful against U-boats in the awash or submerged condition, that it is rapidly becoming a problem for the Germans whether, after all, the surface is not the safest place for their undersea boats. Before examining this somewhat paradoxical proposition, let us glance briefly at the history of the U-boats tactics. After the sinking of the Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy had put Allied warships thoroughly on their guard, the submarines turned their attention to merchantmen and did most of their work on the surface. Only a decimal percentage of merchantmen in those days were armed, so that a U-boat could usually secure a victim by firing a warning round to bring her to, a boat's crew being then sent aboard to place two or three bombs and open the sea-cocks.
The arming of merchantmen forced the Germans to change these tactics. A submarine is very susceptible to damage, and it is the constant aim of U-boat commanders to avoid the risk of it. This spirit has naturally reached its highest development in the German submarine service, whose traditions, such as they are, have been built up almost entirely upon the sinking of defenceless merchantmen and the murder of non-combatants. The consequence was that as the arming of merchantmen was developed the submarine showed less and less inclination for surface work, and depended to a much smaller extent upon the gun and more upon the torpedo. Broadly speaking, this was in the merchantman's favor, because the torpedo is costly and often erratic, and may be avoided if its track be sighted in time, while the U-boat's capacity for destruction per voyage was greatly reduced owing to the small number of missiles that could be carried. This has been met to some extent by increasing the size of the boats, some of which now store as many as 20 torpedoes.
On the other hand, driving the U-boat under water added considerably to the difficulties of the hunt. Great increases in the surface patrols became necessary to take advantage of the fewer appearances of the U-boat on the surface. The hydrophone, an instrument for the detection of submerged sounds (both as to their direction and approximate distance) was rapidly improved to meet the situation. Aircraft were requisitioned in large numbers for scouting and bombing work, and kite balloons are frequently attached to convoys to give early warning of the neighborhood of a U-boat, whether on the surface or submerged. The systematic development of the mine field has further added enormously to the hazard of the submarine's work.
The speed and maneuvering power of specialized "chasers" are now so great, and the destructive force of the depth bomb so wide-spreading, that it virtually amounts to suicide for a U-boat to dive within sight of one of these craft. Let us take the actual position when the two spot each other. The submarine—this is a point most often overlooked—is probably not inferior in armament to anything except really up-to-date destroyers. The usual armament for submarines is either one 4.1-inch 35½-pounder and one 3.4-inch 22-pounder, or a pair of either of these weapons; but a year or so ago Germany began putting into service vessels armed with two 5.9-inch 101½-pounders and two 3.4-inch, as compared with which we have to consider the three 4-inch 31-pounders of British and four 4-inch 33-pounders of United States destroyers building early in the war. Admiral Benson, chief of operations, declared last September that Germany was believed to have boats of 5000 tons in service, and M. Leygues, French Minister of Marine, stated in May that the Germans were "about to launch a new series of submarine cruisers of great size." Either of these craft would probably carry a considerable heavier armament than that already enumerated.
Gunpowder is of use only on the surface; and it looks as if the Germans had begun to find the underseas too warm for them. A "super-submarine" is better armed than an average destroyer or chaser, and infinitely better than the drifters that have been employed against the U-boats in such large number, and owe their success to the weapons they can bring to bear on a submerged vessel. A well-armed U-boat that meets an Allied surface warship may either fight or dive. She cannot dive and at the same time maneuver to avoid ramming. During the diving operation she is at the mercy of the other's guns without possibility of reply; and when she has submerged, her worst enemy, the depth bomb, will begin to play about her.
And what if she stays on the surface and fights it out? In gun-power she is probably superior; she presents a much smaller target, and her exposed parts are probably fairly well armored, while those of a destroyer are very unlikely to be; she probably makes as steady a gun platform as her opponent; and her speed is probably sufficient to enable her to avoid ramming if her gunfire permitted the other to attempt such tactics. The main consideration tending to drive her under water will be the knowledge that if she is badly holed she may be sunk or rendered incapable of diving; yet her adversary runs at least an equal risk of being sunk, and is not able to dive at all. Besides, if they are at anything like close quarters and the U-boat does dive, her doom is as certain as anything well can be.
Can it, then, be regarded as altogether paradoxical to argue that the safest place for enemy submarines is on the surface? I think not; and from the way the Germans are arming their latest boats they seem to think the same. Obviously, a submarine that can stand up to a destroyer in open fight, and can resist the temptation to dive, will need something above the grade of the average present-day destroyer to deal with her.—Scientific American, 6/6.
THE ROLE OF THE KITE-BALLOON IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS.—By Robert W. Neeser.—The student of naval tactics will search the books on that subject in vain for references to the use of kite-balloons in major operations at sea; yet this ungainly creature that sits tailwise in mid-air, can hardly be said to be the product of the present war. The French used war balloons as early as 1794, in their operations against the Austrians, to the dis-comfiture of the latter, who denounced them as "an insidious form of attack" and declared that all balloonists who fell into their hands would be treated the same as spies. During the Franco-Prussian War, the French had recourse to the use of balloons after the investment of their capital, for communicating with the outside world, and these balloon sorties so vexed the Prussian military commanders that they sought by every means possible to invent guns for use against the "blockade runners."
The old-fashioned spherical gas balloon, however, had many defects, even when anchored as a stationary observation platform. The chief drawback was its natural instability. In a dead calm it would revolve continually owing to the tendency on the part of the cable holding it to untwist itself, while in a breeze the balloon oscillated backwards and forwards so violently that it rendered any satisfactory observation work practically impossible. During the siege of Port Arthur, the Japanese for the first time made use of an elongated type of kite-balloon, manufactured out of the remains of an unsuccessful airship, but, while the new model gave good results, it was evident that much still remained to be done before the observation balloon could be depended upon as a reliable arm of the military and naval service.
Before the outbreak of the European war, the kite-balloon was not looked upon with favor by any of the military or naval powers, except Germany and Austria. The French army in 1914 had a number of spherical balloons, but these could not compete with the more stable "drachen ballon" with which the invading forces were equipped. Fortunately for the Allies, the Belgian government had a specimen "drachen" which it had purchased from Germany some time previous, and this, as soon as it became apparent how greatly superior the kite-balloon really was, was copied by the various allied services until they themselves could devise something better. It was in this way that the French, after experiments held at the front under actual war conditions, produced their famous Cacquot balloon. Thanks to the ingenuity of the French inventors, the Allies thereby obtained the service of a kite-balloon which not only embodied all the good qualities of the "drachen ballon," but in addition proved capable of being used in a high wind besides offering greater facilities for observation.
At sea, the use of kite-balloons was unknown until the year 1916, when the constantly increasing activities of the German submarines caused the Allied navies to resort to novel measures for combating this new pest of the seas. The British naval airmen were the first to venture experiments in this new field, and the trials were so satisfactory, notably in the case of the "sausage" which spotted for the "Queen Elizabeth" when the latter was firing across the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to reach the Turkish forts on the Asiatic shore of the straits, that the French also decided to adopt the "ballon captif " as a recognized type of naval aircraft.
It is evident that the advantages offered by these aerial observation posts in extending the range of vision of the naval lookouts charged with the duty of reporting the presence of the enemy's submarines, could not be overlooked. Anchored over some shore station, the observers surveyed a considerable area of the waters adjacent to the roadstead, inlet, channel, or sound, which they were assigned to watch. On the water, the role of the kite-balloon was the same, only instead of being anchored on terra firma, the end of the cable would be made fast to the deck of some trawler or fast steaming patrol vessel cruising on the surface of the sea. In this way the range of vision of the mast-head lookout on the warship could be trebled or at a height of two or three hundred yards, the "horizon" of the aerial observer extended for a distance of about thirty miles.
It is from this lofty perch that the presence of floating mines, of obstructions, of vessels in distress, and of hostile submarines, are thus discovered. A U-boat cruising on the surface becomes plainly visible to the aerial observer at a distance of several miles, while the foamy streak of the periscope's wake cannot remain unnoticed for any length of time. The kite-balloon, by its mere presence therefore, causes the enemy's commerce raiders to seek the protection of the ocean's depths. In this way the submarine's offensive powers are curtailed almost immediately from the moment that it comes within the "zone" of the kite-balloon. This prevents the German commander from coming to the surface to use his deck guns, and this factor alone is an extremely important one. If, on the other hand, the enemy persists in coming nearer in order to use his torpedoes, he can carry out his "approach" only beneath the surface, and here again the aerial observer has the advantage. While running submerged, the submarine must come to the surface occasionally in order to take a sight with its periscope. This maneuver, however, instantly betrays the submarine's movements to the observer and permits him to warn the patrol-boat, either by signal or telephone, of each change in course, or of the direction from which a torpedo has been fired (in case the submarine commander decides to strike by launching one of his subsurface missiles) long before the captain on the man-o'-war's bridge can himself see the threatened move. The kite-balloons have also been found useful in connection with the all-important operations of mine-sweeping and of guiding the convoys and merchant vessels through navigable waters. Naturally the usefulness of the kite-balloon depends upon the continuance of daylight and upon the very essential atmospheric conditions as regards visibility.
The British Navy solved the problem of housing its kite-balloons at sea by the creation of "balloon transports" such as were first used during the naval operations in the Dardenelles. In the coastwise operations, such as have characterized the anti-submarine war of recent years, the French have found themselves confronted with a different problem which they met with their usual ingenuity by basing their naval balloons on the various shore stations that dot their coast. At each of these "centers" fully equipped aerodromes were organized, with hangars containing the inflated balloons ready for instant service, and depots fitted with the necessary machinery and personnel for inflating and repairing the fragile silken envelopes. It takes only a few minutes, after a strange sail is reported on the horizon, to bring the kite-balloon out of its hangar, attach the end of its cable to the stern of a towing vessel, place on board of the latter the aeronautical detachment assigned to duty with that balloon, and dispatch the observer on his aerial reconnoissance. Officers commanding the patrol vessels charged with the duty of towing the kite-balloons have reported that this operation in no way affects the navigation of their ships, nor handicaps them in the least, and this enables the balloons to be used at sea for long periods or until the patrol vessel returns to one of the many shore stations equipped with aerodromes, when the kite-balloon is "landed" as easily as it was "launched" in the first place.
Up to the present time, there has been no occasion to use kite-balloons in connection with fleet operations, but who can tell whether in the next great naval battle of the war, their co-operation may not become essential, not only for reconnoissance purposes but also for the satisfactory control of the fire of the main-battery guns? On land, the co-operation of the "sausages" has been found necessary to the success of every major operation against the enemy's lines. It seems only logical that at sea their role should be the same, namely to act as an aerial eye for the admiral, whom modern naval science has doomed to direct his fleet from within the steel walls of an armored conning tower, as well as for the naval gunner, whom the tremendous power and range of modern weapons has destined to fight an enemy below the horizon.—Scientific American, 13/7.
GERMANY'S LOST ILLUSIONS.—By Arthur Pollen.—An astute French statesman remarked, when war broke out, that the folly of Germany could be measured by the fact that, by combining Russia and Great Britain against her, she had set out to attack the "two great intangibles." Russia seemed to be protected by the vastness of her territory and the simplicity of her political organization; Great Britain by her ocean girdle. The epithet has long since been proved untrue of our northern ally. But it is still true of Great Britain; and for the reason that it is true of us, it is true also of the ally that joined us when Russia was on the eve of collapsing—America.
Now, when the military force of Germany, relieved of pressure on the Eastern front, can concentrate its entire weight against us in the West, it is wholesome to bear in mind the truth that still remains in Monsieur Cambon's aphorism. It recalls to our recollection the fact that primarily and ultimately, the war, like its great predecessor a century ago, is for us a sea war; and that though our military contribution has been upon a colossal scale, the essential truth remains that, in winning or losing in a war with Great Britain, it is in what happens at sea, and not what happens on land, that the issue will be found. And that truth is incalculably more obvious when America is allied to us in the West with her resources in men only just beginning to appear in the field of war, and with Japan allied to us in the East, whose man-power has not yet been touched at all.
It is this fundamental truth that made the situation a year ago so intensely grave. For we were within measurable distance of being beaten at sea by the submarine. And it is because the submarine is becoming week by week a lesser danger, and because week by week the shipping of the Alliance is increasing much faster than it can be destroyed, that we shall do well to remember that, whatever our anxiety in watching, the titanic struggle, while it must be decisive for Germany if Germany fails, will be far from being decisive for the Alliance if Germany were to succeed.
There is all the more reason why we should bear this truth in mind, because the clearer headed Germans can see it for themselves. There has recently become accessible to us the full text of three very significant statements. The first is von Kühlmann's speech to the Berlin Chamber of Commerce, delivered on the occasion of his reporting and defining the German peace with Rumania. Next, there is Herr Dernburg's article in the Neue Freie Presse dealing with the American threat of the after-war boycott on raw materials. Lastly, there is Erzberger's defence against those who attacked him and his advocacy of the "No Annexation" resolutions passed a year ago in the Reichstag.
Von Kühlmann's speech is, naturally enough, a rhapsody over Germany's colossal apparent triumph in Russia, the Ukraine, and Rumania—a triumph the economic results of which are to be realized by a ruthless exploitation of the conquered peoples, carried out in perfect agreement with Austro-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Though the prospect is dazzling, he adds that the Germans would make a very big mistake if they contented themselves with extending their economic base on the European continent, and were satisfied if they simply put themselves into a position to compete "numerically" with such units as the United States of America.
"These are not the aim and conclusion of our development, the Rhine flows into the North Sea, and the mightly Elbe, the artery of Central Germany, points us in the same direction. All these effort. . . .will in the long run be a spur and incentive to German trade to gravitate towards the first element of all great and really free trade, the free seas. To prepare this trade, to serve and strengthen its cause is the ultimate and highest aim of all the work and all the efforts, which have been brought before your mental vision to-day. When victory and peace shall have been won in this greatest of all wars, thanks to the valor and tenacity of the German people, and the genius of their leaders, and German merchant ships, built of German steel shall again sail the free seas under the black, white, and red stripes, then, the German merchant will prove to the world that, in these years of sacrifice, he has only become more capable, more ready for peaceful competition with every nation, and not unworthy of the proud motto: Nulli Secundus."
So that, unless his country can, when war is over, get back to pre-war conditions at sea, then all Germany's war efforts must have been wasted.
Herr Dernburg is far more specific. Except for Germany's apparent monopoly of potash, he has to admit that neither Germany nor any of the neutrals subservient to her, produces any of the raw materials of which the rest of the world has need. Whereas the British Empire, the United States, and the South American republics that have declared war against Germany, practically monopolizes the raw materials, without which German industry is helpless. Peace, therefore, when it comes, he says, must include the fair rationing of these raw materials between all the nations. He notes that the Nonferrous Metal Act, and wholesale purchasing of wool clips and crops have already made state monopolies of many of these essentials to German industry. The treaty of peace, then, must not merely guarantee a freedom for the Germans to trade on an equality with others in all these countries, it must provide compulsory powers of allocation to Germany of her share of these highly desirable products! And it dawns on the puzzled Dernburg that this means a "League of Nations for the universal world provision of a humanity suffering from an impoverishment of raw materials." Perhaps we shall not all agree upon the definition of "humanity." The Allies will be able to look after themselves and their friends, and the German claims to be included in "humanity" will certainly require strict proofs. Dernburg evades this point, and proceeds:
"A thing of this kind (i. e., this economic League of Nations) cannot be obtained in the event of a peace won purely by force. It requires peace by understanding for which we are now, as always, ready, but which can only be concluded when our opponents have arrived at a similar position of reason. Our goodwill has not advanced us much in this direction. To-day the task which we must pursue with all our might is to bring about this condition of reason by force of circumstances."
The German mind is surely a strange thing. Dernburg realizes as clearly as any man can that peace obtained by force—such, for instance, as a German victory in France—will not bring them what Germany wants, i. e., a League of Nations, based on equality of economic supply. He also realizes that this can only come by a peace by "understanding." "Let us, then," he says, "go forward with all our might—i. e., by force of circumstances—to bring about not a peace won by victory, but a condition when they, like us (the Germans) will attain to that sweet reasonableness which makes some other kind of peace possible."
Erzberger has to deal with his critics with one hand tied behind his back. He cannot say, for instance, that Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria, are beaten already, nor can he reiterate what he hints, viz., that the warning he uttered in October, 1916, as to the result of unrestricted U-boat warfare, has proved him to be right and his critics wrong. It has made an irreconcilable opponent of America without disposing of the other irreconcilable, England. Germany is left, then, still needing a peace by understanding, but is further off than ever from any possibility of getting it. The people are being fooled by being told that the military successes are decisive victories, and their war passion excited by the prospects of annexations and indemnities. But the truth, he says, is that the bulk of Germany wants only German rights, and that annexations, in the interest of scientific frontiers, have no meaning in these days of long-range guns and aeroplanes; and that all this talk only postpones the only finish of the war that can help his country.
Now it seems to me quite a remarkable thing that three men, so different in origin, experience, and environment, should show agreement on an issue so fundamental as this. They all see as clearly as possible that the thing Germany must have—or perish—is exactly the thing which cannot be obtained by force of arms on land. If Germany is to turn her conquests in the East into permanent realities profitable to herself, she must first come to a working agreement with all the rest of the world. Without wool, cotton, rubber, hides, vegetable oils, and a host of other products, she cannot regain that industrial vitality without which the exploitation of the Russian and Rumanian conquests will be impossible. Without a free sea, no internal industry can bring national wealth. Now, these two indispensable things—raw materials and free sea commerce—do not follow automatically from the only kind of victory dangled before the German vision.
If Germany could conquer the armies of Italy, France, England, and America on land, and beat all our fleets, too, then the countries of the outer world would have to come to the same kind of "peace by understanding" with Germany to which Russia, the Ukraine, and Rumania—not to mention Poland and Finland—have already been driven. But there is no prospect of sea victory on this or any other scale. Max Cohen, indeed, will have it still that the U-boat will win; but he speaks to a formula in which no one trusts. It is significant that Erzberger while speaking respectively of the efficiency and the gallantry of the submarine personnel, is under no illusions as to any chances of submarine victory. Dernburg is silent on the subject altogether, and Kühlmann, while talking glibly of the freedom of the seas, suggests no means by which the rest of the world is to be free of the peaceful use of the seas, if Germany is to remain free to renew her piratical sabotage whenever she thinks fit.
The growth of German opinion on these subjects will be well worth watching. It is something, at any rate, to have a Secretary of State admitting that it is peace on sea and not peace on land that Germany needs, and one of the foremost of her political thinkers asseverating that peace on sea is not a thing that can be the fruit of land victory.—Land and Water, 20/6.
ATLANTIC
NEW YORK TROOPS DESCRIBE U-BOAT ATTACKS ON SHIP.—Soldiers’ Letters Tell How American Destroyers Ended Submarine with Bombs.—German submarines provided plenty of thrills and excitement for the men of the Twenty-seventh division, formerly the New York National Guard, after the transports that carried them to France entered the war zone, according to letters from New York boys reaching this city yesterday. Three times in the course of a few days the U-boats bobbed up in the path of the troop ships, only to be driven off by the watchful destroyers before they could do any damage. One of the submarines was put out of business.
The persistence with which the U-boats hovered about the transports indicated, in the opinion of the men on board, that the commanders of the undersea craft had been ordered to make special efforts to sink the troopships. The New York soldiers got their first thrill a few minutes after the convoyed transports entered the war zone, early Sunday evening, a periscope appearing suddenly in the midst of the transports about three hundred feet from a vessel carrying a cargo of T. N. T.
The soldiers say the periscope had barely showed itself before the naval gunners began deluging the spot with shells, forcing the U-boat to submerge. The instant the periscope was sighted, according to the letters, the "abandon ship" signal was sounded, and in a few minutes the soldiers were in life preservers, ready to plunge into the sea if it became necessary. Two evenings later, about the same hour, another periscope was sighted less than 100 feet from the ship laden with the high explosives. The destroyers immediately opened fire, one of them circling around and dropping depth bombs over the spot where the periscope had vanished.
Two dozen depth bombs were sent below and presently the black, oily bubbles that came to the top told the story of the destruction of another Hun submarine and its crew. The transports were in sight of land late in the afternoon a few days later when two more U-boats were seen in the wake of the convoy. One of the submarines fired a torpedo, which went wide of its mark, and then the destroyers and submarines engaged in a lively encounter, the result of which was not known to the writers. The letters told of the fleet of French airplanes that came out to strengthen the guard about the transports.
NAVY HEADS DOUBT SINKING OF U-BOATS.—Although there have been various reports recently of the destruction by patrol vessels and armed steamships of one or more of the German submarines operating off the Atlantic coast, it was learned authoritatively to-day that the Navy Department is without evidence that would justify the belief that any of the sea wolves have been accounted for.
In discussing the many reports which have been circulated about the destruction of the U-boats since they first appeared on American waters, nearly a month ago, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt said this situation is merely a repetition on a small scale of the experience of the British Admiralty.
Mr. Roosevelt had before him the quarterly report of the Admiralty on submarine losses, the items included being only those who were considered of sufficient credibility to warrant consideration. Taking 100 typical reports, Mr. Roosevelt explained that 50 per cent of them had been dismissed by the British authorities as "highly improbable." After careful rechecking, 20 per cent of the submarines reported sunk were listed as "possibly damaged." Only 13 per cent of the total were recorded as "known to have been sunk."—N. Y. Herald, 21/6.
SUBMARINE CHASER ON MAIDEN TRIP SINKS ENEMY SUBMERSIBLE.—Officers of Vessel Tell of Exploit Off Coast of France—Steamship Brings 201 Passengers.—An account of the sinking of an enemy submersible by an American submarine chaser a few miles off the coast of France on May 20 was brought to the United States last night, following the arrival of a French steamship at an American port.
The submarine chaser was on her maiden voyage to France and was in charge of Ensign Maurice Verbreach, of No. 2045 Gates Avenue, Brooklyn, and Ensign Anthony van den Heuvel, of No. 61 East End Avenue, Manhattan. They were passengers aboard the French steamship, which reached this country last night with 30 officers of American submarine chasers among her passengers. These officers are returning home after having delivered their vessels safely on the other side of the Atlantic.
Ensign Verbreach said that early on the morning of May 20 while en route with their submarine chaser to a French port they sighted an American patrol vessel, aboard which were the survivors of an American steamship which had been sunk by an enemy underseas boat. Half an hour later, he said, they encountered the German submarine which had sunk this ship. The enemy was about a mile off, but the submarine chaser at once opened fire on her. No time was given to the Germans to fire a torpedo. Thirty shots were fired at the submarine before she disappeared.
Half an hour later an American destroyer came in sight and signalled that the submarine chaser had destroyed the enemy boat. "For good measure, we have dropped two depth bombs where the submarine went down," the destroyer signaled.—N. Y. Herald, 24/6.
AMERICAN STEAMER PURSUED BY U-BOAT.—An American steamer arriving here June 20 from a Central American port reported that at 4 p. m., June 19, 180 to 200 miles south of Sandy Hook, she sighted a submarine and was pursued by the U-boat.
The captain said that he put on full speed, zigzagged and escaped by outdistancing the U-boat. His ship carried 57 passengers.
This is the first report of the appearance of a German raider so far north since ships were sunk off the Jersey coast in the latter part of May.—Evening Star, 20/6.
PURSUED OFF SOUTH CAROLINA.—A coastwise passenger steamship which arrived here late June 19 encountered a German submarine at 1.35 p. m. June 18 off the coast of South Carolina, it was learned to-day, but made good her escape because of superior speed and her wireless calls for help, which apparently forced the submarine to give up the chase.
Officers of the steamer sighted the submarine as it came to the surface less than a mile off the port bow. It started full speed for the ship, at the same time diving. The steamer immediately was put on a zigzag course and when the submarine came to the surface again it was nearer, but for some reason did not fire. Wireless calls for help were being sent out rapidly and the U-boat quickly gave up the chase, apparently fearing the appearance of patrol vessels.
Only two passengers were aboard the steamer.—Evening Star, 20/6.
U. S. S. STEAMER "SCHURZ" SUNK IN COLLISION OFF CAROLINA.—The Committee on Public Information issues the following:
The Navy Department is informed that the U. S. S. Schurz collided with the steamer Florida at 440 a. m., June 21, and sank 10 miles southwest of Cape Lookout, off the North Carolina coast, at 6.40 o'clock. Manuel Gouveia, Jr., seaman second class, was killed, but all the other members of the crew are reported saved. They were picked up by a steamer and are on their way to an Atlantic port. Gouveia enlisted at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, April 29, 1917, and gave as his next of kin, father, Manuel Gouveia, Honolulu.
The Schurz was the former German vessel Geier, which was taken over by this Government. She was a steamer of 1600 tons, 255 feet long.—Official Bulletin, 22/6.
June 25—Masters of vessels arriving at Norfolk, Va., report the presence in West Indian waters of a fast and heavily armed German raider.—Literary Digest, 6/7.
RETURNING TROOPSHIP SUNK.—The British transport Dwinsk, under charter to the United States, was sunk without warning by an enemy submarine about 700 miles off the Delaware Capes last Tuesday morning, A report of the sinking was contained in an undated special cable despatch to the Herald which later proved to be from the Herald correspondent at Bermuda.
There were no troops on board the Dwinsk, which was returning from abroad. She carried a crew of 148 officers and men, 67 of whom are reported missing. Eighty-one have been rescued, two boatloads of survivors having been landed at this port, one at Hampton Roads and one at Bermuda.
Seventeen of the crew of the Dwinsk were picked up last Wednesday by a schooner bound from Halifax to Bermuda and were landed at the latter port yesterday. The rescue was made in latitude 39 degrees 50 minutes, longitude 63 degrees. They had been in an open boat about 24 hours when rescued.
Survivors landed at Bermuda said the submarine was not sighted until after a torpedo had struck the vessel. The crew took to the boats as the transport began to settle. They declared it would have been useless for them to have attempted to use the ship's guns against the Hun raider.
After launching a torpedo the submarine appeared on the surface and fired nineteen shots into the Dwinsk, they said.
There was much speculation in shipping circles here last night regarding the identity of the submarine which destroyed the Dwinsk. It was not known whether she was one of the German submersibles which recently preyed upon American shipping off this coast and was returning to her European base, or whether she was operating exclusively in mid-Atlantic. The consensus, however, was that in view of the fact that the sinking was far outside the European zone of submarine activity, the U-boat was bound for a German base on the other side of the Atlantic after her operations in American waters were brought to an end.
How successfully the Navy Department has safeguarded the movements of transports with American troops is evidenced by the fact that German submarines have been able to sink only four of these vessels, three returning from Europe and one eastbound. To offset these sinkings upward of one million United States soldiers have been transported from American ports to France.
The list of transports in the United States services which have been sunk by enemy submarines is the Antilles, the President Lincoln and the Dwinsk, all of which were returning to this country from Europe when destroyed, and the Tuscania, which was sunk while bound from an American port to Europe.
The Dwinsk was originally the C. F. Tietgen, built in 1897 by Harlan & Wolf, Limited, of Belfast, for the Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company, Limited. She was later taken over by the Holland-American line, and her name changed to the Rotterdam. Later still she came into the possession of the British Government, and was converted into a transport with the name of Dwinsk. She was a twin screw steel steamship of 8173 gross tonnage. Her length was 469.5 feet, her beam 53.1, her depth 22.3. No information as to her movements since she was put into the British service is available.—N. Y. Herald, 25/6.
SAILORS FROM SUNKEN SHIP RESCUED AT SEA.—A boatload of 24 sailors from the steamship Dwinsk, sunk by a submarine off the Atlantic coast, was landed this morning by a fishing vessel at Shelburne, N. S., says a message from that port to-day. The men were picked up 60 miles south of Seal Island, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. They had been drifting for eight days, surviving on a small quantity of bread and water.
Previous reports of the destruction of the Dwinsk, a British ship under American charter, said she was sunk June 18, 700 miles east of the Delaware Capes.
New York, June 28.—The landing of 24 survivors from the steamship Dwinsk at Shelburne, N. S., to-day definitely accounts for all but two boatloads of the crew. The Dwinsk was a troopship, returning to the United States. She had no soldiers aboard.—Evening Star, 28/6.
DESTRUCTION OF CANADIAN HOSPITAL SHIP.—Despite the fact that she was traveling without a convoy, with all lights burning, and all distinguishing marks of a hospital ship plainly visible, the Germans torpedoed the Llandovery Castle, a Canadian hospital ship, on the night of June 27, while she was returning to England from Halifax. The attack occurred about 70 miles from land, and the fatalities were very heavy, although, fortunately, no wounded were on board. It is surmised that the German submarine commander mistook her for the American hospital ship Comfort, as he probably thought she was about due; and this surmise is further borne out by the statement of the Hun captain to the survivors that he suspected there were aviators on board. It will be recalled that when the voyage of the Comfort was first broached, some weeks ago, and it was proposed to send her over without escort and relying solely upon the protection due her by international agreement, the Berlin Lokal Anzeiger issued this sinister inquiry and threat, which seems to be echoed by the captain of the submarine.—Army and Navy Register, 6/7.
U-BOATS SUNK—Destruction in European waters of German submarines by British transports and by American and British destroyers convoying them was described by passengers who arrived here yesterday on an English liner. The transports, one of which was carrying 7000 American soldiers to Europe, accounted for three of the U-boats, and the destroyers sank the other two, according to the voyagers. Officers of the liner confirmed their stories.
The passengers witnessed the torpedoing of the 5436-ton British freighter Orissa, which was part of their convoy, when the fleet was approximately a day out, steaming west from the British Isles. The Orissa, bound in ballast for the United States, was sent to the bottom by an unseen submarine. A moment later, however, an American destroyer in the protecting fleet detected the undersea boat below the surface and dropped a depth bomb, making a direct hit, according to the story related here. The same evening a U-boat was sighted by the passenger vessel, whose gunners sank it by shell fire.—Washington Evening Star, 5/7.
TRANSPORT "COVINGTON" TORPEDOED.—The American army transport Covington, homeward bound, after landing several thousand soldiers in France, was torpedoed and sunk in the war zone on the night of July 1, with a loss of six of her crew. All the other men, with the ship's officers, have been landed at a French port. Neither any army personnel nor any passenger was aboard. The Covington was struck at 9.17 p. m., on Monday, July 1, while proceeding with a fleet of other transports convoyed by destroyers. The submarine was not sighted. The transport remained afloat until Tuesday, when efforts were made by another vessel and two tugs to tow her to port, but she was too badly damaged to keep afloat.
"The torpedo struck forward of the engine room bulkhead," the Navy Department's report said, "and the engine room and fire room were rapidly flooded. With its motive power gone, the vessel was helpless, and, facing the possibility of the torpedoing of another ship in the convoy, the Covington was temporarily abandoned. This was done in excellent order, and the officers and the crew were taken on board a destroyer. The submarine was not seen. At daybreak, the captain, several officers, and a number of members of the crew, returned to supervise salvaging operations. Another vessel and two tugs took the Covington in tow in the effort to get her to port, but she was too badly damaged to keep afloat, and sank."
The Covington was formerly the Hamburg-American liner Cincinnati, which was laid up at Boston, and taken over when the United States entered the war. She was 608 feet long, of 16,539 gross tons, and had a speed of 15½ knots, and was built at the yards of Blohm & Voss, in Hamburg, in 1908.
The Covington is the second of the great German liners seized at the outbreak of the war to be sent down by Germany's submarines, and is the third American troopship to be destroyed. All were homeward bound. The Hamburg-American liner President Lincoln was sunk last May 31, and the Antilles, formerly a Morgan liner, was sent down last October 17.—Nautical Gazette, 13/7.
U-BOAT OFF ATLANTIC COAST.—A German submarine, appearing 300 miles off Cape Race on July 6, captured the Norwegian bark Manx King and ordered the crew of 19 to take to the boats, it was learned to-night when the survivors were brought here on board a British steamship, which picked them up at sea. The survivors said they did not know what became of the bark, whether she was sunk or converted into a raider by the Germans.
The Manx King, which is a vessel of 1729 gross tons, left a United States Atlantic port about two weeks ago. She is the first craft which has been reported as encountering a U-boat so far north in the Atlantic.
The crew explained that they became so excited at meeting a submarine that they promptly obeyed the order to abandon the bark. Pulling away rapidly, they were overtaken by darkness before seeing what disposition had been made of the sailing vessel. None of them reported having heard any explosion.
The Manx King was built at Stockton, England, in 1884. She was registered at Fredrikstad as owned by T. Wilhelms and Axel Jacobsen. She was commanded by Captain Helgesen.—N. Y. Herald, 13/7.
EFFECT OF THE GERMAN U-BOAT RA1D.—If the German submarine raid begun off the Atlantic coast on May 25, was designed to intimidate American shipping it failed signally of its purpose. During the interval while the raiders were destroying 10 American vessels, totaling 26,000 tons, American shipbuilders were turning out 21 new vessels, totaling 130,642 deadweight tons, or over 100,000 tons more than the totals losses. Further than this, the spirit of determination aroused in the shipbuilding and shipping industries will continue to react against the enemy until final victory is won.—Marine Engineering, July.
U-BOAT THOUGHT SUNK BY GUNS OF STEAMER 1500 MILES OFF THE CAPES.—A German submarine which attacked the American steamer Lake Forest, 1500 miles off Cape Henry, while she was returning from a recent voyage to Europe, is believed to have been sunk by the steamer's guns after a two-hour running fight, according to information received here to-day in marine circles.
Captain Herbert R. O. Johnson, United States Naval Reserve officer in command of the ship, has been commended to the Navy Department for having sunk the U-boat by officers associated with him in the Naval Reserve. Details of the fight, however, are yet unavailable. The Lake Forest was formerly the War Fox, and was taken over by the United States Shipping Board on the Great Lakes soon after she was launched.—Washington Evening Star, 11/7.
ARMY SUPPLY SHIP SUNK; TEN OF CREW OF 92 ARE MISSING.—The Westover, 4270 Tons, Torpedoed in War Zone, Navy Announces.—The American steamship Westover, an army supply ship manned by navy men, was torpedoed and sunk in the war zone July 11, while bound to Europe, the Navy Department was advised to-night by Vice Admiral Sims.
Ten officers and men of the crew of 92 are missing.
No details were given in the Navy Department's brief announcement, and the circumstances under which 82 officers and men of the crew were rescued are not known. Nor was there any announcement as to whether the submarine was sighted and fired upon by the armed guards on the steamer.
The Westover was 4270 net tonnage, and was last reported at an Atlantic port on May 27. She came from the Pacific coast, having left Tacoma and Seattle April 22. She was 420 feet long and 54 feet broad.
U. S. CRUISER "SAN DIEGO" SUNK.—Announcement by the Navy Department to-night that the United States armored cruiser San Diego had been sunk to-day off the Long Island Coast indicated that German submarines may again be operating in American waters. The cause of the vessel's destruction and the casualties that may have resulted were unknown at a late hour.
The vessel itself was not regarded as a serious military loss. If she was a victim of enemy submarines, however, it is obvious that the U-boats are in the transport lanes and close to the entrance of New York harbor, for the San Diego went down 10 miles southeast of Fire Island.
Until the statements of survivors definitely establish that the vessel was sunk by a torpedo there will be a possibility that she struck a drifting defense mine or was sent down by accidental internal explosion or otherwise.
The only formal statement issued by the department was based on first reports. It follows:
The Navy Department has received reports from the third naval district stating that the U. S. S. San Diego was sunk 10 miles southeast of Fire Island light at 11.30 o'clock this morning. One officer and two boats' crews were landed at life-saving station No. 82, on Long Island. Other survivors are in boats and four steamers are standing by.
"So far as can be ascertained, there appears to have been no loss of life. The cause of sinking has not yet been determined. The San Diego was an armored cruiser of 13,690 tons displacement and carried a complement of 1114 officers and men. She was 502 feet long and had a speed of 22 knots. Her main armament consisted of four 8-inch guns in turrets and fourteen 6-inch guns. She was built at San Francisco in 1899.
The San Diego is the first major warship to be sunk by Germany's U-boat and the first war craft to be sent down in American waters.
The San Diego served for years as flagship of the Pacific Fleet and she and similar craft have been found very valuable in connection with convoy work, although classified as of limited military value for ordinary naval operations.
The ships of this type were built a number of years ago and do not contain modern devices to protect them from submarine attacks.
The San Diego was bound from the Portsmouth, N. H., Navy Yard for New York when she was sunk. Captain H. H. Christy was in command, and on board were 51 officers, 1030 enlisted men and 63 marines. The vessel had been undergoing repairs at the navy yard.
Late to-night the Navy Department would add nothing to this statement and officers professed to have no information as to the cause of the loss of the number of survivors. It was apparent, however, that officials were prepared to hear that some lives were lost despite the optimistic tone of the initial dispatches.
The return of the underseas raiders was not unexpected, since the sinkings of May and June had shown that the German Admiralty was capable of carrying submarine warfare to the very doors of America. The San Diego was the first major warship to be lost since the country entered the war. None but commercial coastwise ships fell prey to the submersibles on their first raid, and in the war zone none but destroyers, transports and small patrol boats have been successfully attacked.
Despite reports of attacks on other ships and that warnings had been sent to coastwise shipping to keep close to the coasts, naval officials steadfastly maintained they had no information on which to believe that the submarine had come again.
The official dispatches to the Navy Department to-night were so far behind the news reports of the disaster and so lacking in details that little official opinion could be formed. The popular effect of the loss of the San Diego on the psychology of the national capital, however, was the cause of a great deal of comment.
It aroused a war spirit and a popular commotion far exceeding the news of the great drive by American troops in France, which as a proposition of military importance is of vastly more concern than the loss of a comparatively unimportant ship and the loss of probably very few lives, if any.
It may be stated that all the agencies which the Navy Department has at its command for hunting the submarines are in action and officials are still entirely confident of their ability to protect the coasts. If another raid has been started with the object of a popular agitation to cause the return of American naval forces in the war zone it undoubtedly will prove in that respect a failure.—Baltimore American, 25/7.
NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL
Air raids on Zeebrugge, Bruges and Ostend have been very numerous, inflicting considerable damage. Direct hits have been observed on German vessels in the canal and important store sheds.—London Times.
TWENTY-ONE GERMAN DESTROYERS PENNED UP AT ZEEBRUGGE.—Twenty-one German destroyers, a large number of submarines and numerous auxiliary craft are penned in the Bruges canal docks as the result of the recent British naval operations at Zeebrugge, the German submarine base on the Belgian coast.
Thomas J. Macnamara, Financial Secretary of the Admiralty, made announcement in the House of Commons to this effect to-day, and said that the operations were more successful than at first had been supposed. He added that the German craft were now the subject of constant bombing.—Evening Star, 20/6.
SUBMARINES VS. U-BOATS.—A Successful Ram.—During a patrol off the east coast a British submarine sighted the double periscopes of an enemy craft some distance away to port, and made full speed for them, hoping to ram before the U-boat could dive sufficiently to evade the attack. Our boat got there in time and her stem cut through the plates of the enemy and remained imbedded. Both craft endeavored to extricate themselves, and the German, by using his ballast tanks, came almost to the surface, bringing our craft with him. During the next minute and a half the U-boat drew away apparently in great difficulty. He was apparently making frantic efforts to keep afloat. Once his periscopes and conning-tower came up on the British vessel's quarter in such a position as to show that he was very much down by the bows and with a nasty list to starboard. Then with a shudder the U-boat sank.
For 25 minutes, on another day, a British and German submarine played hide and-seek, each maneuvering for position to sink the other. Our boat eventually got her position and sent out a torpedo, which narrowly missed. Eight minutes later a second torpedo struck the enemy close to his stern, which, a few seconds afterwards, was seen to come clear out of water with smoke hanging round it. Then the conning-tower appeared, and the U-boat took a sudden perpendicular dive.—London Times, 25/6.
FEWER SUBMARINES IN THE CHANNEL.--The following semi-official statement was issued to-day:
Submarine activity has much diminished in the western and central areas of the English Channel since the British naval forces succeeded in bottling up the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend, and since the aerial squadrons completed by their bombardments the disorganization of these bases. It seems, moreover, that the total number of submarine attacks has been considerably diminished, which is to be explained by the severe losses inflicted on the enemy in the course of the last months.—Reuter.—London Times, 15/6.
DESTROYERS IN FIGHT OFF BELGIAN COAST.—Four British torpedo-boat destroyers fought a long-range engagement with a German destroyer force off the Belgian coast on Thursday evening. The action was broken off before any decisive results were attained. An official statement issued to-day by the British Admiralty recounting the affair says:
"On the evening of June 19 four of our destroyers while patrolling off the Belgian coast sighted eight enemy torpedo-boat destroyers. Our destroyers proceeded on an easterly course at full speed, engaging the enemy at long range.
"After the action had lasted a quarter of an hour the enemy was joined by three more torpedo boat destroyers, whereupon our force fell back on their supports. The enemy did not follow, and the action was then broken off. No damage was sustained by any of our vessels."
Berlin.—The Admiralty to-day announced that German torpedo craft of the Flanders flotilla engaged British destroyers on the evening of June 27 off Ostend. The clash took place while the Germans were on patrol.
Hits it is stated were observed on two of the enemy destroyers. The British destroyers, it is added, withdrew after an engagement of a half hour, steaming out of sight at high speed through an artificial fog. The Germans sustained no casualties nor damage to their craft. The admiralty statement reads:
"On the evening of the 27th portions of our Flanders torpedo forces when patrolling off Ostend were engaged with British destroyers. After half hour's fight the enemy destroyers withdrew, escaping out of sight by developing fog.
"Hits were observed on two of the enemy destroyers. Our boats returned to their bases without loss or damage."—Sunday Star, 30/6.
SEAPLANE FIGHT NEAR HELIGOLAND; ONE HUN DOWN.—German airplanes attacked a British naval squadron north of Heligoland Bight on June 19, the British Admiralty announced to-day. The German machines made no hits and one seaplane was destroyed. The text of the Admiralty statement follows:
"A British squadron while on reconnoissance north of Heligoland Bight on the morning of June 19 was attacked by German airplanes. No hits were made by the enemy. One enemy seaplane was brought down and destroyed by gunfire."
The official statement on aerial operations to-night says:
"Low clouds and rain interfered with flying on June 19 and the enemy aircraft showed little activity.
"Nine German machines were destroyed during the day and two were driven down out of control. One of our machines is missing."—N. Y. Herald, 21/6.
TWO BRITISH SUBMARINES DAMAGED, BERLIN SAYS.—Two British submarines were badly damaged by bombs and machine-gun fire during an encounter with German seaplanes on Saturday afternoon off the mouth of the Thames, according to an official statement issued at Berlin. The statement reads:
"Two squadrons of seaplanes severely damaged British submarines C-35 and C-51 by bombs and machine gun fire off the mouth of the Thames Saturday afternoon. Enemy destroyers endeavored to tow in the submarines, but the C-35 when last seen, was in a sinking condition."—N. Y. Herald, 10/7.
BRITISH SUBMARINE DAMAGED.—A British submarine was slightly damaged and one officer and five men were killed when the craft was attacked by German seaplanes off the east coast of England on July 6, according to an Admiralty statement issued to-day. The text of the statement reads:
"A British submarine was attacked off the east coast of England on July 6 by five enemy seaplanes, which dropped bombs and directed machine gun fire at the boat. One officer and five men were killed. The submarine, slightly damaged, was towed back to her harbor."—N. Y. Herald, 10/7.
GERMAN SHORE BATTERIES DESTROY U. S. MOTOR LAUNCH.—The Navy Department has been advised that motor launch No. 3429, after assisting a French destroyer to tow an American seaplane, came within range of German shore batteries and was immediately fired upon and sunk. Men of the crew, with life conveyances, began swimming toward shore. Three were picked up on the Allied shore unhurt but exhausted. Assistant Surgeon Albert Mason Stevens, United States Naval Reserve force, and Philip Goldman, quartermaster, second class, were only able to make shore on the German side, and they were seen to have been taken prisoners by German soldiers. The other two members of the crew, Charles Joe Tatulinski, seaman, second class, United States Navy, and John Peter Vogt, seaman, second class, United States Navy, are unaccounted for.
Albert Mason Stevens, assistant surgeon, United States Naval Reserve force. Mrs. Katherine S. Stevens, wife, 2226 Loring Place, New York City.
Philip Goldman, quartermaster, second class, United States Navy. Julius Goldman, father, 234 East One Hundred and Sixteenth Street, New York City.
Charles J. Tatulinski, seaman, second class, United States Navy. John Tatulinski, father, 6215 Fullerton Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio.
John Peter Vogt, seaman, second class, United States Navy. Mrs. Albertine Brown Vogt, mother, 3042 North Rampart Street, New Orleans, La.—Official Bulletin, 13/7.
U-BOAT DIES IN 40 MINUTES.—Within 40 minutes recently a British submarine accounted for a German U-boat. The story in brief is:
10.30 a. m.—Sighted enemy submarine, so dived and altered course.
10.47 a. m.—Enemy picked up in periscope.
10.50 a. m.—Again altered course.
10.52 a. m.—Stern tube torpedo fired.
10.53 a. m.—Sharp explosion heard.
11.10 a. m.—Came to surface and sighted oil right ahead with three men swimming in it. Two were picked up, but the third sank before we could reach him. Dived. Survivors stated that submarine U— was hit just before the conning-tower.—Washington Evening Star, 15/7.
U. S. NAVAL FLYER, MISSING MONTH, IS GERMAN PRISONER.—Ensign George Roe, of Scituate, Mass., an aviation pilot in the American Navy, has been captured and is imprisoned at Camp Landschut, Germany, the Navy Department was advised to-day by Vice Admiral Sims.
Ensign Roe was last heard from in a cablegram from Admiral Sims on June 4. He had made a forced landing 18 miles off the coast of Holland, when his seaplane developed engine trouble.
The account of Roe's experiences, which came by mail, says he left England on a long distance reconnoissance fight along the enemy coast, piloting a British seaplane. He was accompanied by another machine. Arriving eight or ten miles off shore, his machine developed engine trouble and he was forced to alight on the water after signalling his comrade that he would make repairs and follow him.
Soon afterward, two enemy seaplanes were sighted and the British machines gave battle. When few shots had been exchanged the Germans flew away in the direction of the German coast. Returning, Ensign Roe's companion could not locate him, and he was forced to return to his station because of a shortage of gasoline.
At eight o'clock that night a pigeon arrived at the royal air force station bearing this message from Roe:
"On water, attacked by three Huns."
This was the last information from him until it was ascertained he was a prisoner. Roe on January 2 was detailed from the naval air station at…..Pensacola, Fla., for duty with the naval aviation forces in France.—N. Y. Herald, 6/7.
BRITISH MINE FIELDS IN NORTH SEA.—Grip on German Navy.—Some anxiety has found expression in the neutral press about the British prohibited zones in the North Sea, and uncertainty appears to be felt regarding the exact location of the mine fields. There should, indeed, be no doubt about the matter, for the Admiralty have defined in the most specific terms the limits of the prohibited and dangerous areas. To make these perfectly clear the annexed chart has been carefully prepared from the information contained in the notices to marines issued by the hydrographer of the navy on January 3 and April 26 of this year.
It will be unnecessary to repeat the information given in the Admiralty announcements in which the limits of the areas are defined by lines drawn between specified parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude; the shaded portions on the chart speak for themselves. It will be seen that there are three marked areas of varying shapes and different extent, placed in such a manner that while one bars the southern exit from the North Sea and another the passage between Scotland and Norway, the third makes egress from the Heligoland Bight difficult and dangerous. The position of the mine fields has not invariably been depicted with accuracy in the plans shown in British and American papers, and to this circumstance may be due the apprehensions of the neutrals. The actual location and limits of each danger zone as given in The Times from the hydrographic notices should afford a fair warning to the peril attending those who stray into these zones instead of using safer routes. If mines are found elsewhere, as in the Kattegat or in the waters between the Skaw and the coasts of Norway and Sweden, these must have been laid by Germany. While this country has taken every reasonable precaution to lessen inconvenience and risk to neutrals when she has made provision for her own security, Germany has strewn her destructive machines broadcast with a total disregard of the laws of nations and the dictates of humanity.
It will be instructive to trace the progress by which the British Government has been brought to the inevitable stage of mine warfare imposed on it by the action of the enemy, and to consider in what respect the measures which have been taken may affect the action of the German Navy. These vast mine fields must offer considerable restriction to all movements in the North Sea, and should to a large extent hamper the egress of the Germans from their ports in the Bight and on the Belgian coast. The Southern mine field and the barrage at the Dover Straits serve as a protection to the entrance to the Thames, and block the way to the English Channel. At least, it should have become necessary for enemy underwater as well as surface craft to move more cautiously in those waters. The great mine barrier completed this month supplies a similar obstruction to the wider passages, of the ocean pathways round the north of Scotland. It should make it particularly risky for submerged vessels of all sizes and types to attempt to follow this route. At what cost it has been prepared, and in what number of mines has been used in its construction, has not been revealed.
The grip on the German Navy is made more comprehensive and complete by the third mine field, originally laid during the third year of the war, but the limits of which were readjusted and modified last January. This extends from the neighborhood of the Dutch coast to that of Denmark, and encloses as it were by a deep semi-circular dangerous zone the waters of the Bight. The measure thus taken, while it was far from blocking the exit of the High Sea Fleet from its defended ports, reduced the military value of the German mine fields and hampered the movements of the enemy vessels in that area. It restricted the excursion of the submarines, although it did not prevent the main fleet from putting to sea, but in every way it controlled the German freedom of action. Taken in conjunction with the other mine fields north and south, any attempt on the part of the German submarine to reach the Atlantic is made more difficult, and as all vessels must more or less keep to the routes and channels left clear the work of the British patrols should be considerably simplified. It is possible, of course, to sweep a passage through any mine field, but this is not speedily done, is a very risky operation in face of an alert, powerful force, and in the case of the northern mine field, so far from the German ports, should be exceedingly hazardous. To make assurance doubly sure, the Admiralty have given notice restraining the movement of all vessels in the routes and channels which have been left clear northwards for merchantmen. Virtually all traffic through the passage northwards is to be suspended after dark under stringent regulations and at great risk to those who disregard the clear instructions of the authorities. Altogether the measures now taken appear to have been broadly conceived, and indicate that restraint will be vigorously applied.
The policy of laying mine fields and defining prohibited areas was not pursued by this country until some time after the outbreak of war. When the Amphion, was destroyed by a mine, dropped by the Konigen Luise, Mr. Churchill said that the Admiralty were not at all alarmed or disconcerted by such incidents, as they have been expected and were prepared for, but, at the same time, he strongly deprecated the methods of the enemy in scattering these machines indiscriminately about the sea. On August 23, 1914, the Admiralty announced that, while reserving to themselves the utmost liberty of retaliatory action against this new form of warfare, they had not so far laid any mines during the war. It was not until October in that year that the Admiralty felt compelled to establish a mine field at the southern end of the North Sea, and, in announcing it as a counter measure, described its limits, which roughly ran from the Belgian coast to the Goodwins. It is now known that the mines used at that time were not sufficiently effective or powerful, nor were the old cruisers which had been fitted as mine-sowers before the war fast enough for their purpose. By the spring of 1915 these deficiencies had been to a large extent, remedied, but for some reason or another the Admiralty, though strongly urged to mine the North Sea, abstained from any further steps in this direction. It was not, indeed, until further changes took place at Whitehall that the policy of mine-laying commended itself to those in authority, with the result which has already been described.—London Times, 5/27.
TRANSPORTS SUNK BY SUBMARINES.—British Ship Carpathia Hit Off Irish Coast—The British steamer Carpathia was torpedoed in the Atlantic on Wednesday, it was announced here to-day.
The Carpathia was sunk off the Irish coast as she was bound out. Very few persons were on board her.
The Carpathia sank after she was torpedoed, according to the Central News.
Three torpedoes were fired at the Carpathia and all hit the vessel. Splendid discipline was maintained. The survivors were in the water two hours, the Exchange Telegraph Company says, when picked up by the steamer which brought them into port. The Carpathia disappeared very quickly.
Five persons were killed in the Cunard liner, through a torpedo entering the engine room. The remainder of those on board took to the life boats. All the passengers on the Carpathia were saved. They include 36 saloon passengers and 21 from the steerage.
The British transport Carpathia, 13,603 tons gross, has been sunk by a German submarine off the Irish coast while outward bound from a British port, it was learned here to-day.
The Carpathia was owned by the Cunard Line. Prior to the war she was engaged in transatlantic service.
Although in the service of the British Government for several months, the Carpathia has been used as an American troop transport. Her last departure from an American port was in June. The Carpathia was built in 1903 at Newcastle, England.
It was the Carpathia which answered the wireless S. 0. S. call of the White Star Liner Titanic in April, 1912, when that vessel hit a submerged iceberg on her maiden voyage to New York and was sunk with heavy loss of life. The Carpathia picked up and landed at New York 866 survivors of the Titanic.
The Carpathia was also one of the first merchant steamers to appear in American waters armed against submarines.—Balto. American, 20/7.
TRANSPORT "BARUNGA" LOST.—The British transport Barunga has been sunk by a submarine, the Admiralty announced this afternoon. There were no casualties.
The Admiralty statement /leads:
"The transport Barunga, formerly the German steamer Sumatra, outward bound from Australia with unfit Australians on board, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine on Monday. There were no casualties."
There was not the slightest sign of panic when the Barunga was torpedoed.
The 700 unfit troops aboard lined up as though on parade until taken off. Aid speedily arrived. The transport remained afloat nearly an hour after she was attacked. The Barunga was a steamer of 7484 tons gross, built in Flensburg in 1913. She was 482 feet long, 62 feet beam and 29 feet depth. She was owned by the British Government.—Balto. Sun, 20/7.
BALTIC AND KATTEGAT
MINING OF THE KATTEGAT.—With reference to British mines in the Kattegat and the unfounded allegation that British mines had been laid in Swedish territorial waters, the British Minister at Stockholm announces that British mines were laid out in the Kattegat in April in order to destroy German submarines. No mines, however, were laid down at less than 35 feet under the surface, and consequently they are not dangerous for ordinary commercial shipping.
On the other hand, the British naval authorities have learned that a German light cruiser, accompanied by destroyers, between May 12 and May 15 operated east of the Skaw and evidently spread out mines.
The British naval authorities point out in the most decisive manner that no British mines have been laid in Swedish territorial waters.—Exchange Telegraph Company.—London Times, 17/6.
MEDITERRANEAN
FRENCH TRANSPORT SUNK.—A Paris dispatch states that on the night of May 10-11 (believed to mean June 10-11) the transport Santa Anna, from Bizerta for Malta, was torpedoed and sunk. Of the 2150 soldiers and native workmen on board 1512 were saved.—Literary Digest, 6/7.
U-35'S RECORD TOLL OF SHIPPING.—The German submarine U-35, commanded by Captain Arnauld de la Perrière, had sunk 196 vessels in the Mediterranean, aggregating 500,000 tons. Further particulars are now at hand regarding these sinkings, which took place in a period of two and a half years. The U-35 destroyed in 30 months' time 2 warships, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 5 transports, 124 freight steamers, 62 sailing vessels, and 2 fishing craft.—Nautical Gazette, 29/6.
ADRIATIC
AUSTRIAN DREADNOUGHT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SUNK.—The suspicion increases that the Austro-Hungarian dreadnought Prinz- Eugen, torpedoed by Commander Rizzo and Ensign Aonzo at the same time that the Szent Istavan went to the bottom, followed her sister ship.
Aviators report that the ship is absent from all Austrian ports offering a safe anchorage. Moreover, this fact is significant that aviators flying over the Adriatic three hours after the torpedoing saw, 42 miles north of the spot where the Szent Istavan went down a second large vessel sunk. The best hypothesis is that the Prinz Eugen strove to reach Pola and sank midway.
Of the four Austrian dreadnoughts only the Viribus Unitis remains. Of the smaller ships the Austrians have lost the Wien, have had to transform the Budapest into a hospital ship, and had the Ersherzog Franz Ferdinand damaged when Commander Pellegrini sank the dreadnought Tegethoff in Pola harbor.
The sinking of these ships by a handful of Italian heroes has vastly diminished the importance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Germans, even though they should manage to appropriate the latter, will be inferior in strength to the Allied Mediterranean forces.—Sunday Star, 30/6.
BLACK SEA
RUSSIA’S FLEET.—The advantages acquired by our enemy through the collapse of Russia include the ships of war, which might fall into her hands in the Black Sea. This is a subject which has been ably dealt with recently by Mr. Arthur Pollen, who shows the additions which they would make to the German Fleet, unless they are destroyed or seriously damaged by their Russian crews, who, however, seem to be too apathetic and demoralized to take any steps to prevent the ships falling into German hands. The four powerful dreadnoughts, the Poltava Sevastopol, Petropavlovsk, and Gangoot, which had been laid down in 1911, were in full commission shortly after the declaration of war; in 1912 or 1913 four battle cruisers, Borodino, Somail, Kinburn, and Navarin, were laid down and were near completion when the revolution broke out. In addition to these vessels there are two modern light cruisers of 4000 and 5000 tons with a speed of 27 knots, and four others of larger size were laid down and due for completion by 1916, which should have been ready for sea a year ago. Besides these vessels there are two pre-dreadnoughts and two protected cruisers of some value. "Hardly less important to the vessels named above," says Mr. Pollen, "are the destroyers of the 1912 programme, 36 in number, all of which I believe were at sea early in the war."
This sketch of the Russian Baltic Fleet shows that, assuming the ships to be captured intact, they would be an important addition to the German Baltic Fleet of 24 ships, and if the battle cruisers are available, they would be an even more welcome supplement, for it would double the German battle cruiser squadron now supposed to consist of only four vessels. These additions to the German fleet would go far towards equalizing the rival navies in the North Sea; but the Allied Naval Council, we may be sure, will take care that our naval superiority is maintained beyond a peradventure, to use an expressive Americanism, and in the United States Fleet we have an important reserve.—United Service Gazette.
RUSSIAN SHIPS IN THE BLACK SEA.-It appears from news published in German newspapers that the two Russian ships which got away from Sebastopol before the arrival of the Germans are dreadnoughts. They are the Volia and Svobodnaya Rossya, which were respectively called Alexander III and Empress Catharine II before the Revolution, and were laid down in Black Sea yards in 1911. They, therefore, constitute a naval force to be reckoned with, the spirit in the Russian Black Sea being against the Germans, as it has been all along. What the enemy is discovering is that these ships are a serious obstacle to the resumption of free and uninterrupted sea transport in these waters, so necessary to the exploitation of the Ukraine as well as to the development of German plans for extending German influence into the heart of Asia. In the meantime the Russian Government has made a protest against "flagrant" violations by the enemy of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in the Black Sea. From it one learns that a "U-boat" is "on guard" before Novorissisk, in the harbor of which lie the Vola and Svobodnaya Rossya. Above them, too, fly low enemy hydroplanes. How long will this tragi-comedy be played? The Russian Government will do better to use the ships and batteries at Novorissisk in destroying the symbols of German watchfulness and power than in appealing to the first clause in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to the effect that "Russia and Germany have decided to live in the future in friendship and harmony."—Army and Navy Gazette, 8/6.
The Volia and Svobodnaya Rossia were two of three dreadnoughts known as the Volia class. They carry 10 or 12 12-inch guns, and were laid down in September, 1911. The Svobodnaya Rossia (originally called Empress Catherine II) has a displacement of 24,000 tons, and the Volia (originally the Emperor Alexander III) a displacement of 22,435 tons. They were built at Sebastopol and Nikolaieff respectively, and are fitted with Parsons turbines and Yarrow boilers.—London Times, 30/5.
SOVIET WANTS THE BLACK SEA FLEET.—The Ukrainian delegates at the Russo-Ukrainian peace conference in Kieff demanded that the Russian Black Sea fleet participate with Germany against the Allies. This demand was supported by Mr. Maximoloff, the Ukrainian Minister of War.
The Soviet Government's delegates rejected the demand, and semi-official advices received in Moscow say that Mr. John Joffe, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, and the Bolshevik commander of the Black Sea fleet, Sablin, have been advised that Russia will not consent.—N. Y. Herald, 20/6.
RUSSIA SURRENDERS BLACK SEA WARSHIPS.—German Ultimatum Accepted.—The news circulated yesterday by the wireless stations of the Russian Government included a communication from M. Trotsky to the chief commissary of the fleet at Novorossisk ordering the return of the Black Sea fleet to Sebastopol by June 10 [Monday last].
M. Trotsky explains that in a note of May 23 Herr von Kühlmann categorically demanded the return of all Russian ships from Novorossisk to Sebastopol. If they returned German troops on the Ukrainian front would not advance over the boundary line, and after the conclusion of a general peace the ships would be returned to Russia. In an ultimatum sent on June 5 Herr von Kühlmann agreed to guarantee that before a general peace was concluded Germany would not use the ships, and as their return was "a fundamental condition of all further agreements between Germany and ourselves for the cessation of hostile action and for negotiations," their return was ordered.
In a message to M. Yoffe at Berlin M. Tchitcherin complains that German troops have crossed the boundary line [from the Ukraine] and had attempted to cut up the Tsaritsyn railway.—Admiralty, per Wireless Press.—London Times, 14/6.
WASHINGTON FEARS RUSSIAN FLEET IS NOW GERMANY'S.—A new and important phase of the problem of intervention in Russia was disclosed to-day by the admission of officials of the Navy Department that much .apprehension exists among the Allied governments over the fate of the Russian Navy.
By extending her domination Germany has not only opened the way to new resources in men and supplies but probably has profited by the acquisition of the Russian Navy.
What this means may be gathered from the fact that Russia, in spite her isolation from the high seas in the west, has ranked next to Japan as a naval power.
If Germany has succeeded in obtaining possession of the Russian fleet, built and building, among them ships of the most modern type, her strength has been augmented 25 per cent. With the additions which have been made to the German Navy since the beginning of the war from German shipyards it will outrank that of the United States.
This possibility is one of the disturbing elements in the calculations of the Allied naval strategists. Since the collapse of the Kerensky regime and the setting up of the Bolshevik Government constant efforts have been made to ascertain the fate of the Russian Baltic and Black Sea fleets, but in the wave of turbulence that has swept over Russia these have been unavailing. There have been reports from time to time that some of the Russian ships have been sunk by their crews to prevent them from falling into German hands. There also have been reports that negotiations were afoot between German agents and Bolshevik representatives for the sale of the Russian ships. There have even been reports that the vessels have been recalled to safe havens by the Bolsheviki. What actually has become of them is unknown. The supposition is, however, that they, or a large number of them, have come into the possession of the Germans and are to be reckoned with henceforth as parts of the German fleet.
Navy Department officials were disposed to-day to accept the optimistic statement of Sir Eric Geddes on the submarine situation. Concerning the German capacity for turning out submarines there is much uncertainty. There are a variety of reports, the extreme rates of launchings ranging from five a day to three month. Whatever the actual rate of construction may be American naval officials reflect the British point of view, that although constant vigilance may be required, the threat of the submarine menace will not interfere with the prosecution of the war.—N. Y. Herald, 12/7.
“MEDJHIDIEH" RESTORED TO TURKS.—The Turkish cruiser Medjhidieh, which was sunk by a mine on April 3, 1915, outside of Odessa, and subsequently raised by the Russians and incorporated in the Russian fleet, left Odessa in the early part of May for the purpose of rejoining the Turkish naval forces of which it will again form a unit.—Nautical Gazette, 29/6.
PACIFIC
JAPANESE BATTLESHIP BLOWS UP.—Five Hundred Members of the Crew of 960 Officers and Men Lose Their Lives.—The Japanese battleship Kawachi, of 21,420 tons displacement, blew up and sank in Tokoyama Bay, 150 miles northwest of Nagasaki on July 12. Five hundred members of the crew lost their lives.
The battleship Kawachi was built in Kure in 1912. She carried a complement of 960 officers and men. The warship was 500 feet long, 84 feet beam and drew 28 feet of water. Her armament consisted of twelve 12-inch guns, ten 6-inch guns, eigth 4.7-inch guns and twelve 12-pounders. She also was equipped with five 18-inch torpedo tubes.—Balto. American, 17/7.
U-BOATS AND SHIPPING
ALLIES NOW HAVE SUFFICIENT SHIPS—The opinion expressed by Vice Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, to the Associated Press last week that the submarine activity of the Germans off the Atlantic coast of the United States should not be taken very seriously, as the Germans probably would not attempt to block the American shores, resulted to-day in the following statement being issued at American naval headquarters:
"The activity of the German submarines on the American coast is a manifestation of the failure of the enemy's submarine campaign. The enemy has a limited number of submarines, and his only chance of employing this available number successfully is to concentrate their operations on the focal points of Allied trade. All shipping which supplies the Allied armies must converge in the areas in the vicinity of England and France.
"Every submarine which operates far afield, as off the extensive coast of America, simply means less losses to the Allies, because it is one less submarine where shipping is heavy and therefore harder to protect. If the Allies could in any way influence the enemy they would encourage him to send his submarines to these areas distant from the critical areas.
"Such activities will, of course, result in the loss of some ships—losses will undoubtedly go on until the end of the war. What we are concerned about is whether the losses the enemy inflicts are critical—are more than we can stand. As long as they are kept below the critical stage they could go on indefinitely and not affect the war.
"The situation to-day is that there is sufficient tonnage available to meet the Allied demands and it is constantly growing larger. At the present rate of construction it will continue to grow larger even if the submarine losses increase. The enemy's high command knows these basic facts only too well, as is evidenced by their desperate attempts to force a decision on land before the full weight of American intervention can be brought to bear.
"From the enemy press it is evident that these futile submarine raids in remote areas, such as raids on the American coast, the bombardment of Monrovia and the activities in the Azores, cannot have any effect on the outcome of the war and are carried on to deceive their own public as to the submarine campaign. The German public is led to believe by cleverly constructed press accounts that their submarines operate at pleasure in all parts of the world. The fact remains that the Allies have command of the seas—subsurface as well as surface."—Evening Star, 19/6.
HOW THE U-BOAT IS BEING DEFEATED.—The accompanying diagram, showing a year's decline in shipping losses due to U-boat piracy, is based upon one which was issued by the British Admiralty with the last monthly returns of losses of British, Allied and neutral merchant tonnage "due to enemy action and marine risk." The diagram covers the year from April, 1917, when the ruthless U-boat warfare started, to May, 1918. The statement for April of this year shows that the losses reached a total of 305,102 gross tons, of which 220,709 tons were British and 84,393 tons were Allied and neutral ships. These April figures show a decrease of 94,371 tons compared with the preceding month of March, and a decrease of 588,775 tons compared with April, 1917, when the German U-boats struck their heaviest blow. It will be noted that the average fall in the rate of sinkings was rapid at first and later was not so marked; although it is still proceeding. It should be noted, moreover, that the reduction in losses has been far more rapid for Allied and neutral ships than it has for British.
Of great interest in connection with this diagram is the recent announcement by the Secretary of the Ministry of Shipping of the total tonnage of steamships of 500 gross tons and over that have entered and cleared ports of the United Kingdom, from and to ports overseas. For the present year the total in gross tons for January was 6,336,663; for February it was 6,326,965; for March, 7,295,620 tons, and for April, 7,040,309 tons. It should be noted in connection with these figures that they embrace all United Kingdom sea-borne traffic other than coastwise and across channel.—Scientific American, 22/6.
CONVOY SYSTEM CUTS U-BOAT TOLL TO ONE PER CENT.—Sinkings Since January, 1917, Less Than 1.29 Per Cent, Says Sir Leo Money.—London, Tuesday.—Speaking in the House of Commons to-day Sir Leo Money, parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Shipping, said the percentage of vessels lost while homeward bound to the United Kingdom since January 1, 1918, was rather more than one per cent. The losses of food vessels for the same period was less than 1.4 per cent.
The result of the convoy system, Sir Leo said, continued to improve. Since January, 1917, when the system was put into effect, 42,000,000 gross tons had been convoyed to British and French ports with a loss up to June 29 of 1.29 per cent. This includes loss by the dispersal of convoys through bad weather.—N. Y. Herald, 7/10/18.
OUR ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTIVITY.—Information is imported from an authoritative source that there are now between 4000 and 5000 vessels of various types operating against the German submarine, and of these craft this country has furnished only a small percentage. The destroyer continues to be the main reliance against the enemy submarine warfare, and every effort must continue to be made in producing as many of these boats with as little delay as possible that we may do our part in driving the submarine from its fields of operation. Vice Admiral Sims has estimated that the Germans are able to keep not above 10 per cent of their U-boat fleet in action on the average, which means until recently anywhere from 15 to 20 submarines actually at work in the Atlantic, North Sea, and the English Channel, and in the last few months these figures have been greatly reduced. That officer entertains no apprehension that the submarine will accomplish anything worth while by the invasion of American waters and believes there is still less likelihood of bombardment of seacoast cities, which would be suicidal. The Germans are finding it increasingly difficult to achieve anything which can be regarded as profitable from the military point of view on account of the operation of the submarines, and it is Vice Admiral Sims' theory that the enemy will shortly abandon this phase of warfare. The most effective means of combating the submarine remain the adoption of the convoy system, the development of an efficient depth charge, and the invention of devices which would enable surface vessels to follow the submerged submarine by sound.—Army and Navy Register, 6/7.
U-BOAT LOSSES.—A Paris dispatch states that the Under-Secretary of the navy, in a statement to the Deputies, declared that two-thirds of the German submarines launched are already at the bottom of the sea, and that they are being destroyed twice as fast as they are built.—Literary Digest, 6/7.
BRITISH AND U. S. HALF-YEARLY SHIP OUTPUT.—The British Admiralty announced last week that during June 134,159 gross tons of merchant shipping were completed in the United Kingdom yards and entered for service. The record of British shipyards for June fell below that of May, when a total of 197,274 gross tons was entered for service. That was the highest figure for any month during the last year. In June steel and wood ships totalling 280,400 deadweight tons were completed and delivered in the United States to the Shipping Board. Of the June output, steel ships total 262,900 tons and wood 17,500 tons. This is a new record of production for the United States, and comes within 15,000 deadweight tons of the world's record for any one month made by the British yards in May.
The June production for the Shipping Board exceeds that of May, the previous high mark in American shipbuilding, by 21,159 deadweight tons.
Comparative figures in gross tons on ship construction in the United States and the United Kingdom during the first six months of the present year are as follows:
1918 United States United Kingdom
January 64,795 58,568
February 117,601 100,038
March 117,145 161,674
April 163,050 111,533
May 194,464 197,274
June 201,425 134,159
Total 888,480 763,246
VESSELS REPAIRED IN BRITISH YARDS—The coordination of British ship repair yards resulted in restoring to service from August 3, 1917, to April 25, 1918, an aggregate of 16,150,000 gross tons of shipping. In accomplishing this feat the greatest economy of resources has been observed and not a stroke of work has been done on a vessel in dock that could be done afloat. Labor and material were also economized to the greatest possible extent and only work of an imperative necessity to refit the vessel for sea service was carried out—Marine Journal, 29/6.
BRITISH SALVAGE.—Operations under the navy are raising many merchant ships sunk in shoal water.—The Engineer, 21/6.
WAR'S TOLL OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING.—The Liverpool Journal of Commerce has attempted to compute the number of neutral ships sunk through war's causes up to March 31, 1918. According to its tabulation, German submarines were responsible for the sinking of the following neutral vessels:
Of the 1153 ships mentioned in this table, Norway has lost in all 635 ships. Denmark 172, Sweden 124, Spain 66, Holland 60, and Greece 55. In the case of the United States only the eleven vessels are included which were sunk prior to the time diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off. Apparently American vessels sunk, after that date and prior to our actually declaring war against Germany, have been included by the British authorities in the list of Allied shipping lost.
In addition to the above sinking by submarines, 184 neutral vessels have been sunk by mines, Norway again being the heaviest sufferer, with 70 vessels. Neutral vessels have also been sunk to the number of 27 by the action of enemy cruisers and raiders. The number of neutral ships which have perished by enemy action by submarine, mine, and cruiser enemy attack, up to March 31, 1918, amounts, therefore, to 1364, aggregating 2,131,521 gross tons.—Nautical Gazette, 6/6.
HEAVY U-BOAT LOSSES.—The latest information to reach this country through neutral sources shows that the effectiveness of the anti-submarine operations undertaken by the Allied navies is being brought home daily to the German naval authorities.
Not a week passes—according to a Scandinavian correspondent—without submarines failing to return to their bases, while others stagger home badly damaged. In one month alone a large number of submarines failed to return to their bases, while at one port no fewer than six vessels returned so badly damaged that they had to be drydocked immediately and practically refitted—work which took so much time as to cause congestion in that particular area. The correspondent also states that the condition, physically and mentally, in which the crews return has caused considerable anxiety. According to a report in the Munchner Neuste Nachrichten of a lecture by Commander Rose, whose name as a German submarine commander is well known, the lecturer stated that the moral effect of the British "wasser bomben" (water bombs or depth charges) was great, particularly on an inexperienced crew, in consequence of the “hellish din of their explosion." That is the first German admission of the fact that inexperienced crews are employed on German submarines, but it lends added significance to the statement made by another U-boat commander that a great many of the German submarine losses were due to the fact that many of the crews are not properly trained, some going to sea within six weeks of entering the service. Crews of U-boats admit that the defence of the British Mercantile Marine has improved so considerably of late that an attack by gunfire on a vessel is only undertaken with extreme care. There is a lack of enthusiasm among the U-boat crews, whose morale has steadily declined, and has caused considerable anxiety in high German naval circles.
SUBMARINE SUNK BY STEAMSHIP.—After having fought a successful engagement with a U-boat in the morning, a British steamship was attacked the same evening by another German submarine, which she beat off after narrowly escaping being torpedoed. In the first fight the submarine, which was armed with two guns, one fore and the other aft, opened a rapid fire on the steamer, but the shots fell wide. The vessel replied with her single gun, and after her third round saw the submarine submerge. A few minutes later a torpedo passed just under the ship's stern as she was "zigzagging." Then the submarine again broke surface, and, steaming at high speed, reopened fire. The ship's gunners replied and struck the U-boat's conning tower and after gun. Shortly afterwards the U-boat took a decided list, and, rolling heavily, sank in a couple of minutes. Those on board the British steamer thought that one of their shots had struck a vital part and had caused her to founder.—London Times, 24/6.
LAST QUARTER SHOWS GREATEST TOLL OF U-BOATs.—Within the past three months the number of German submarines destroyed has been greater than during any similar period since the beginning of the war. Depth charges have played an important part in putting an end to the activities of U-boats.
Details of the sinking of three German submarines, two of them by British submarines, recently became known in London. A British patrol boat on a moonlight night sighted an enemy submarine on the surface about half a mile away. She was apparently recharging her storage batteries.
Dropped Depth Charges.—"Full speed ahead," was the command of the patrol boat captain, but by the time the boat reached the spot the submarine had disappeared. The British craft immediately dropped six depth charges. Quantities of oil came to the surface soon afterward and then cries for help in German were heard. The patrol boat searched for survivors of the submarine, but was able to rescue only one of the enemy.
While on patrol duty "somewhere" off the east coast a British submarine sighted the periscope of an enmy U-boat and started for it under full speed. Before the German could submerge the Britisher had rammed it. The British submarine cut through the plates of the enemy boat and stuck there. Both boats endeavored to extricate themselves. The German came almost to the surface, carrying the British submarine along. Finally the U-boat got away. She made desperate efforts to keep afloat but finally sank. The British submarine was not damaged.
On another day British and German submarines played hide and seek for nearly half an hour, each maneuvering for a position to attack the other. The Britisher finally fired a torpedo but missed. A few minutes later a second torpedo went home, striking the German close to the stern. With smoke pouring out of the hole made by the torpedo, the stern of the U-boat came to the surface. Then the conning tower appeared. A few seconds and the U-boat took a perpendicular dive leaving a trail of oil and a whirl in the sea, indicating the rush of water into space. There were no survivors.—Evening Sun, 19/7.
BRITISH SHOOT DOWN 3856 GERMAN AIRPLANES IN YEAR, WHILE LOSING ONLY 1094.—Foe's Loss on Western Front is More Than Three to One—Allied Air Superiority Expected to be Even Much More Pronounced as America's Forces Arrive.—London, Saturday.—In one year on the British Western front the Royal Air Force has accounted for 3233 enemy airplanes. In the same period the naval airmen shot down 623, a total of 3856. An official statement dealing with these operations says:
"The Royal Air Force during the year beginning July 1, 1917, on the British Western front destroyed 2150 hostile machines and drove down out of control 1083. In the same period the air force units working in conjunction with the navy shot down 623 hostile machines.
"During this period 1094 of our machines were missing. Ninety-two of these were working with the navy.
"On the Italian front from April to June, 1918, the British destroyed 165 hostile machines and drove down six out of control. Thirteen of ours were missing.
"On the Salonika front between January and June, 21 hostile machines were destroyed and 13 were driven down out of control. Four of ours were lost.
"From March to June in Egypt and Palestine, 26 hostile airplanes were destroyed and 15 were driven down out of control. Ten of ours were missing.
"In all the theaters of the war the British air superiority and strength progressed rapidly and continuously. From this it is safe to assume that when the new factor of America's output, both aircraft and personnel, enters the situation in the fighting zones the aerial ascendency of the Entente Allies should give them very great advantages."—New York Herald, 14/7.