Before snow again sheaths the ranges of the Grand Atlas in the heart of French Morocco a campaign of pacification that began in 1907 will end in the complete pacification of that North African protectorate. Not only will it mark the end of twenty-six years of bitter fighting, not only will it open to colonization every square mile in an empire the size of Texas, but this year’s fighting will add materially to France’s might as a great military power. On the day that the columns march back to the garrison cities, France will have at her disposal the cream of the Army of North Africa for service overseas should the war drums sound on the borders of Continental France. Those troops were the finest shock troops under the tricolor in the World War, the famous Moroccan Division, with the French Foreign Legion the spearhead of the division.
While the above statements may smack of prophecy they are founded on the unanimous forecasts made by the military authorities in Morocco at the close of the 1932 campaign. At the beginning of that campaign in May, 1932, the dissident area in the Grand Atlas sector was a parallelogram approximately 170 kilometers from west to east and 90 from north to south. At its end in October it was 90 kilometers in length and 65 in width.
It was the privilege of the writer, as an unofficial observer armed with credentials from the Navy Department, to witness the operations of two of the three mobile groups in the 1932 campaign. Not since the late Colonel Nelson Margetts, U.S. Army, had observed the Riff campaign in 1925-26 in the role of a newspaper correspondent, had any officer of the American services witnessed the Army of North Africa in the field. To equip myself as an observer I had studied the Riff campaign and the history of Morocco’s pacification, the modified organization and tactics employed in Morocco, and at headquarters in Rabat had studied maps and other data. My credentials, and the personal interest taken in my mission by Brigadier General Francois Pillon, the Military Attaché of the French Embassy in Washington, proved an open sesame. With unvarying courtesy every request was met, staff officers and staff cars placed at my disposal, and in my two months’ stay I covered a major part of the old Riff terrain, made two visits to the front, and traveled more than 4,000 miles through Morocco.
The Grand Atlas sector.—High up in those legendary peaks of the Grand Atlas, which cut through the heart of Morocco from northeast to southwest, is the home of the most formidable tribes of the great Berber race. It is in a chaotic terrain whose highest ranges tower up to a 13,000-foot elevation, with deep and narrow valleys that are practically isolated from each other, with roaring gorges and knife-like passes. Except where there are growths of giant cedars and clumps of liveoak, it is for the greater part bare of vegetation other than scattered bush. It is strewn with giant bowlders, and the ranges sweep up from the valleys in steep escarpments. In the valleys are partridge and guinea hens; in its streams trout and gold dust; and in its cedar forests wild monkeys large as mastiffs. It is a terrain to challenge the craft of the best of Alpine troops, built for ambuscades, hell on the toughest of shoe leather. In summer the thermometer registers a hundred in the shade at noon. Arctic conditions, with heavy snow, prevail from late in October until May.
Since the French first began their occupation of Morocco in 1907, the Berber tribes of the Grand Atlas have fought fiercely to maintain their independence. For generations before they had as fiercely resisted the rule of the Sultans. No finer fighting troops have ever resisted the advance of the French columns in North Africa. Most formidable of the confederations is that of the Ait-Haddidou. At the launching of the 1932 campaign, the Ait-Raddidou (Ait meaning family) were surrounded by the friendly Ait-Shokmane on the north, the Ait-Isha on the northwest, the Ait-Yahia on the south, and Ait-Moghad on the east. In the apt phrase of the Commandant Superieur of Morocco, General Hure, these confederations were "like a mattress" in their protective enclosure of the Ait-Haddidou.
Twenty thousand regulars and irregulars were opposed to the 12,000 rifles of the Atlas tribesmen and a bandit rabble, of which we shall hear later, when I arrived in Morocco in July, 1932. White, brown, and black troops under the colors of France faced mountain eagles that neither gave nor asked quarter. When I left Morocco early in September the converging mobile groups of Generals de Loustal, Goudot, and Giraud had practically stripped away the "mattress." Every planned objective had been taken. The strongholds of the Ait-Haddidou lay within range of the French artillery.
The Ait-Haddidou, which must almost unaided face the brunt of the 1933 campaign, are typical of the best of the sedentary tribes of the Grand Atlas that live in fortified villages on the protected southern slopes of the mountain chains in winter. When the snow disappears they range the watered valleys where they grow wheat, corn, and vegetables, and drive their herds to the pasturage of the high plateaus. It is a stern existence at the best and, to fill the family larder and win loot that can be translated into the price of a smuggled rifle, they have for generations raided far and wide, swooping down on convoys, and at times dashing into the towns of the pacified areas hard by to carry off Europeans for ransom.
Two alien elements, the nomadic tribes of the south and bandit hordes, had for years disputed the sway of the sedentary tribes. To the first there was the magnet of water and forage that they could not find in summer in the arid slopes of the Anti-Atlas range far to the south. To the second the fastnesses of the Grand Atlas were the last remaining sanctuary. They were the deserters from the native troops, professional brigands, and all the cutthroats of Morocco that had been driven and harried there by the orderly progress of pacification. Both elements were fighters to the death, irreconcilables who sent back the native envoys of the French with severed hands. Both were ready to war with equal ease of conscience against the sedentary tribes who have resented their intrusion into a sector of limited resources, or against the French columns. The closing-month of the 1932 campaign saw the bandit element crushed in an epic fight with the French Foreign Legion. Today French troops are administering the final blow to the nomadic tribes of the Anti-Atlas while the main columns are operating against the Berbers in the Grand Atlas. One may wonder that in the quarter-century of occupation these two dissident spots have survived. Political considerations, the World War, the Riff campaign, and the French policy of fighting only when peaceful negotiations have failed, largely account for the comparatively slow progress.
France's Moroccan policy.—The French first entered Morocco in 1907, crossing the eastern border from Algeria to avenge the atrocious murder of a French surgeon at Marrakesh. In the same year, under unusual circumstances, General Drude landed a strong expeditionary force at Casablanca on the Atlantic seaboard. French engineers were installing harbor works in that then obscure port for the Sultan. Over a narrow-gauge track stone was hauled from the quarries to the harbor. One Mohammed ould el Hadj, an aspirant for the governorship of Casablanca, was on the ridge to the south of the town, pondering on the advisability of seizing office by a sudden attack. His followers were wavering when the whistle of the engine sounded shrill in their ears. In Morocco a whistle is the equivalent of the Bronx cheer, or the raspberry. At the head of his enraged followers Mohammed raced into the town and struck off the heads of the nine French engineers. That incident sealed the fate of French Morocco. It is a striking coincidence that the French conquest of Algeria in 1803 was precipitated when the Dey of Algiers contemptuously struck the French Consul in the face with his fan during an argument about a minor commercial affair. On such incidents has the French conquest of North Africa been built. General d’Amade succeeded Drude and in 1908 Lyautey, France’s great colonial genius, came upon the scene with a brilliant record as a soldier and administrator in Indo-China, Madagascar, and Algeria.
Almost from the first, when Lyautey took over command, his policy was expressed in the slogan “Maroc Utile.” It should be those areas most important for economic development that should be brought to heel first. Along the seaboard from Rabat to Mogador, then east from Rabat to the Algerian border, his columns enforced order, brought security to a country that had never known the word. Rich granaries, seemingly inexhaustible mineral deposits now mark that line of march. Behind the columns roads followed, rivers were bridged, cities sprang into being, and colonists worked wonders in the neglected fertile areas.
The World War stripped Lyautey of his regulars, and under another leader all of conquered Morocco might well have plunged back into anarchy. Sixty per cent of the Legionnaires in North Africa were of German birth. With them as his spearhead, re-enforced by the old territorials that were grudgingly sent from France, Lyautey not only held his pacified territory but extended its boundaries. There is grim romance in the fact that for four years the German-born Legionnaires followed Lyautey, loyal not to France, but loyal to the flag of the Legion.
Safely through one crisis, the fate of Maroc Utile trembled in the balance seven years later. Over from the Spanish frontier on the north swarmed the armies of Abd-el-Krim in 1925. His Riffians were equipped with modern rifles and grenades, and alien adventurers served the artillery and machine guns that he had captured in mass from the Spanish. It was late in 1926 when Marshal Petain’s forces ended that menace. Lyautey was back in France, but his slogan has been followed unerringly by his successors. Not only has he forced his will as a colonial genius in that land but the columns today are fighting under his modification of tactics and organization that differ widely from those of the continental army. The name of Lyautey is still one to conjure with in Morocco. His aptness for striking phrases is to be found in his description of Morocco as “A cold country where the sun is very hot!”
The progress of pacification.—In the next five years following the Riff war, the Moyen Atlas and wide strips in the south came back to the Sultan’s banners through pacific or military measures. The whole terrain along the northern frontier was reorganized to cope with any future Abd-el-Krim and, through close co-operation between Spain and France, the country from the Rabat-Meknes-Fez-Oudjda line north to the Mediterranean was stripped of unauthorized arms. This much accomplished, the cordon now began to tighten around the dissident warriors of the Grand Atlas and along the Saharan border. France had served notice that banditry and raids, both there and in the unpacified regions of the south, were facing a reckoning.
The release of troops from those areas that could now be classed as part of Maroc utile made it possible to inaugurate intensive military activities in the three disaffected areas—the Grand Atlas, the Anti-Atlas, and the Tafilelt oasis region. It is a matter of striking interest from the Military point of view that Lyautey’s conception of the fighting methods best adapted to Moroccan warfare has proved brilliantly successful in the past two years whether employed in the chaotic mountain terrain or in the sweeping plains of the south with their great oases.
Organization and tactics.—It would be well to review briefly the most salient points of the modified tactics and organization that were originally devised along fundamental lines by Marshal Lyautey, and that are now universally employed in Morocco whether in mountain or desert Warfare. In 1919, Marshal Lyautey required all high-ranking officers on their arrival under his command to take a special three months’ course in Moroccan tactics. Heavy losses had been incurred by two recently arrived units who fought along the lines standardized in France. When Marshal Petain, however, assumed command during the Riff campaign he employed metropolitan divisions by groupment of divisions. It must be remembered that his enemy was equipped with modern arms, and in great numbers, and consequently frontal actions by groupments of divisions on an extended front were possible. This form of parallel action had the virtue of preventing dangerous infiltration between the attacking groups. Parallel action, similar to that of the World War where the lines stretched from the sea to Switzerland, has been aptly described as “the tactics of the rich.”
With the close of the Riff campaign the necessity for economy of forces became a powerful factor in the swing away from the parallel type of action to Lyautey’s concentric action, in combined action of three or more mobile groups. The typical North African combat is along a comparatively narrow front. The mobile group, with its simplicity and flexibility, is admirably adapted to North Africa. In reality it is a mixed brigade of the Alpine type and its very designation connotes mobility and offensive power. It is mainly built around infantry battalions and is devoid of such rigid units as divisions, brigades, and regiments. With the battalion as the organic unit the mobile group is thus endowed with a mobility and suppleness of employment that permits its expansion or contraction at will, its division into groupments, and its immediate breaking up into columns and detachments as occasion requires.
The typical mobile group comprises six battalions of infantry, from three to six batteries ranging between 65 and 155 mm. in caliber and embracing both mountain pack guns and guns of position, one to two squadrons of cavalry and two aviation escadrilles. Eventually, as the operations reach their peak of intensity, armored cars, tanks, and engineer detachments are added. The above comprise the regular troops. In addition, of course, are the service units, comprising the combat train, transmission detachment, light ambulance, and munition sections, and the convoy with its trains, administrative convoy, and such minor units as the veterinarian service, money, mail, and military police. Still in addition are the irregulars, the highly efficient Goum with its mounted and dismounted warriors, the Mokhanzi or gendarmerie, and the men recruited from recently pacified districts, partisans armed with a rifle and a limited amount of ammunition.
In the 1932 campaign the writer spent a week with the Confins-Saharan mobile group, the largest of the three. Its composition at that time was as follows:
6 Infantry battalions
2 Artillery groupments
5 Cavalry squadrons
1 Light tank company
1 Motorized squadron
1 Motorized mounted company
2 Aviation escadrilles
Its total strength at the time was 9,000 of all ranks, including 1,500 of the suppletive native troops, and 3,000 animals. In contrast to this powerful unit, the equivalent of two re-enforced marine brigades, the Marrakesh mobile group at the beginning of the operations had the following strength:
7 Infantry battalions
7 Artillery batteries
2 Cavalry squadrons
2 Aviation escadrilles
It is further worthy of note that, when a maximum of four mobile groups were in the field only one, the Confins-Saharan, employed motorized units and tanks.
It will be seen from the above that the size and composition of the mobile group follows the dictates of terrain, strength of enemy forces, and the problems of supply in its particular zone. Within it is a groupment of all arms of the necessary services which has the power to maintain itself, to fight independently, and to impose its power against the maximum resistance which it may meet in its zone of action. Another factor entering into its strength and composition, as well as the fact that it is one of two or more mobile groups moving in converging action on an enemy zone, is that it normally operates against an enemy of little cohesive organization, little depth of formation, and inferior in arms. Still another factor is based on stern experience. Marshal Bugeaud, who laid the first foundation for the tactics of North African warfare in the conquest of Algeria, laid down the doctrine that a force of 7,000 was the maximum necessary to defeat the greatest possible reunion of rebellious tribesmen. Experience in the Grand Atlas warfare, as well as in the desert country, has further demonstrated that, in a radius of twenty kilometers, a mobile group will rarely be opposed by more than 4,000 rifles. Concentration of such a force is the maximum figure for two reasons, the difficulty of supply, and the reluctance of the dissident tribes to leave the specific area in which their strongholds are located.
Recurring again to the value of the concentric action on which the group mobiles are based, French authorities declare that its employment impresses the enemy by the menace it places on his communications, and its separation of enemy forces. One of its cardinal principles is that each mobile group, or column, must be strong enough in the concentric movement to withstand the possible shock of all dissidents within the zone of action.
Application to the Marine Corps.—The history of the past expeditionary campaigns of the Marine Corps presents a striking similarity to the past and present operations in French Morocco. Almost without exceptions these expeditions have been pitted against troops with little organization, little facilities for supply, lacking depth in formations, inferior in arms, masters in ambush and infiltration. The present organization of the Marine Corps deals in the terms of divisions, brigades, and regiments. It is worthy of serious study whether these three units should not be boldly discarded as unsuitable to the most efficient performance of Marine Corps missions. With the mobile group as a pattern the strength and composition of an expeditionary force could be clearly determined. Operations in the past fields of Haiti, Nicaragua, Vera Cruz, and Santo Domingo present strongly variant problems. Terrain, expected resistance, supply problems are known factors on which the strength and composition of a Marine Corps mobile force could be accurately determined should its employment be necessary.
Strip this mobile force of such unwieldy units as divisions, brigades, and regiments. From the pooled forces of the expeditionary organization select the necessary number of infantry battalions, mountain or pack batteries, field batteries, light tank companies, aviation squadrons, engineer detachments, and other special troops. Call it a mobile force. Send it into the field with a maximum of mobility, flexibility, power to maintain itself, to fight independently, and give it, according to its specific task and mission, a strength of troops and arms to impose its power against the maximum strength that it will meet. With the units that are left behind there will be the nucleus for a new expeditionary force. Whether this force will operate independently, or as the landing force in connection with fleet operations, matters little. The same principles of composition and strength apply in either case. Its simplicity and its wide deviation from the rigid rules imposed in divisional and brigade organization commend it for serious consideration. Many marine officers would welcome a radical departure from a force now built along conventional army lines.
The present situation.—With the advent of 1932 there were left, as noted before, three areas of dissidence in which various factors had compelled the French to postpone intensive measures until the time Was more propitious. One of them was the oases region of the Tafilelt, lying close to the Algerian and Saharan borders in the southeast, a stretch of terrain approximately 50 km. in length from north to south and 8 km. in width from east to west, lying between the rivers Ziz and Gheris. For years it had served as an ideal base for enemy raids across the caravan routes to its east and west from the Sahara to the Atlantic seaboard. In 1932 its fierce tribesmen recognized a notorious bandit, Belkacem, as their leader, and Belkacem, emboldened by his growing fame, had proclaimed himself as the true Sultan of Morocco.
Four converging columns under the command of General Giraud wiped up the Tafilelt in January, 1932, in a campaign so skillfully executed and under such dramatic circumstances that it deserves recounting in a separate article. With the Tafilelt now a pacified area, the French were free to devote all necessary troops to reducing the most formidable of the dissident areas, that of the Grand Atlas, The close of the 1931 operations had left a parallelogram approximately 170 km. in length from east to west and 90 km. in width from north to south still unsubdued.
Four mobile groups began the operations in May, later reduced to three by the withdrawal of the western, or Marrakesh group, on June 15. This left the Confins-Saharan group, under General Giraud, on the eastern side of the parallelogram, the Meknes group, under General Goudot, on the eastern half of the northern sector, and the Tadla group, under General de Loustal, on the western half of the northern sector. The maximum strength employed' ranged about 23,000 with the irregular or suppletive troops in each group totaling about 1,500 but varying from time to time according to the specific mission. The French chieftains computed the dissident tribes opposing their force by the number of tents in the entire zone, with an average of ten persons per tent, or a total of between 15,000 and 20,000. Of this number, with an average computation of three rifles per tent, between 4,500 and 6,000 bore arms. In addition, however, there was opposed an element of almost equal strength, comprising nomadic tribes from the AntiAtlas and bands of professional brigands, deserters from native units, and other irreconcilables, bringing the number under arms up to a total strength of 10,000.
The operations had two main objects, the reduction of the tribes of the Ait-Isha by a drive towards the east, and by a drive towards the west by converging action of the Meknes, Tadla, and Confins groups, investment of the central or Ait-Haddidou tribes to a point where the 1933 operations would realize the surrender of this formidable confederation. In short, the operations were planned to constrict the encirclement of the area and at the same time to drive wedges between the various confederations so that each could be handled in detail and deprived of the power of mutual support. Success early attended the co-ordinated operations of the Marrakesh and Tadla groups on the western and northwestern sector, and the units of the former were then either transferred to the Tadla group or withdrawn into reserve.
Through aerial photographs the high command had an accurate knowledge of the vital enemy points, such as market places, water sources, fortified villages, and paths of communication. The occupation of points that controlled inter-communication between the confederations of tribes, and of their main water and pasturage areas was given great weight in the plans.
The story of the resulting campaign, to which the French prefer to give the name of “police operations,” is one of intelligent planning and brilliant execution. Always converging on some designated sector of the dissident area, always supporting each other with intelligent and self-sacrificing co-ordination of effort, the campaign marched relentlessly on to its full accomplishment. At its end late in September General Hure’s command had won command of those areas held by the allies of the Ait-Haddidou confederation, and had completed the encirclement and isolation of that confederation, the backbone of the dissidence in the Grand Atlas. In addition, through an epic attack in the battle of Tazigzaout, the Second Regiment of the Foreign Legion crushed forever the power of the renegade bands that mustered approximately 6,000 rifles. This battle was fought at a height of 2,600 meters in a chaotic country where growths of giant cedars and thickly strewn bowlders nullified the aid of aviation and severely restricted the supporting fire of artillery.
Staff planning to the most minute detail; constant supervision by the high command; perfect co-operation between the mobile groups; installation and maintenance of an ample chain of supply in the face of handicaps of terrain and climate; these factors were brilliantly handled. The troops themselves, both regulars and suppletives, fought at all times with splendid élan and superb endurance. Their speed in the building of posts in occupied territory, construction of roads and telephone lines was remarkable. That foot or mounted troops, facing a highly mobile enemy, could operate efficiently in the chaotic terrain of the Grand Atlas is in itself remarkable, yet artillery up to the 155-mm. guns, light tanks, armored cars, and motorized units acquitted themselves brilliantly.
Measured in territory, the 1932 campaign reduced the dissident area from 170 km. in length and 90 in width to one of 100 in length and 65 in width. Roads and posts followed this advance into an almost trackless country, and all lulls in the exhausting advances were utilized to the full in such construction. The posts were garrisoned for the winter with six months’ supply, and the officers of the Bureau of Native Affairs busied themselves in political preparations designed to convince the tribes of the Ait-Haddidou confederation of the futility of resistance.
The campaign of 1933.—In accordance with plans designed to bring complete pacification to Morocco before the winter of 1933 sets in, the French launched an expedition against the nomadic tribes of the Anti-Atlas early in February. While details of its success are lacking, occasional dispatches from Rabat indicate that it has been vigorously prosecuted. Fighting in an elevation of 6,000 feet, where the great lack of water and intense heat complicate the operations, the French have found it hard going, but there is little doubt that this hornets' nest will be reduced. In the meantime the remaining dissident area of the Grand Atlas is doomed to fall, and the confident predictions of the Etat Major in Rabat that there will be no remaining dissident bloc in all Morocco seem destined to be fulfilled.
Men and arms.—No story of the operations now in progress would be complete without observations on the forces involved, their respective arms, and their most striking characteristics. The Berbers of Morocco have extreme mobility and endurance. Their fighting men carry only a rifle or carbine, a poniard for close work, and seldom more than 20 or 30 rounds of ammunition. On foot they cover between 4 and 5 m.p.h. in difficult terrain. Countless times they have proved their bravery; but artillery fire, tanks, and planes impress them greatly. Their greatest defect is the lack of tenacity; but, despite their puzzling lack of perseverance when the tide of battle is beginning to flow in their favor, they have the offensive spirit in a high degree. In action their small and dispersed groups, making skillful use of broken terrain, offer small and fleeting targets. They are most dangerous when a French column allows its units too great dispersion, neglects adequate security measures, or for any reason is thrown in disorder. Under any such condition they will launch a surprise attack with great rapidity with rifle fire at short range, following with hand-to-hand combat with their deadly poniards. Once within 400 yards their attack is a deadly one. With few rifles capable of rapid fire, and a limited amount of ammunition, their fire is lacking in density but remarkably accurate. Choosing their own terms of combat, skilled in guerrilla tactics, with highly developed rapidity of displacement and maneuver, born to ambuscade and infiltration, and brave to a fanatical degree, they are a formidable enemy. Their firearms embrace captured, abandoned, and smuggled rifles of modern make.
When one contrasts the meager equipment of the Berber with the modern equipment of the French troops it would appear that a man armed with but a rifle and poniard could not hope to put up an effective or prolonged resistance to troops armed with modern artillery, both field and pack, grenades, machine guns, automatic rifles, and supported by light tanks, armored cars, and aviation. Yet a consideration of the tactics, terrain, and mobility involved throws a different light upon the matter.
Of the arms employed by the French troops in Morocco there are two of outstanding interest to an American observer. The Chatellerault automatic rifle will challenge comparison with that of any other nation, and the unbounded confidence of the troops in this weapon speaks volumes for its fine points. Next in interest to any force that may be charged with expeditionary operations is the French Schneider Canon de Montagne, 75 mm., model 1919. I saw this weapon in action in a minor operation, and later a demonstration showed that it can be put into action in 2.5 minutes from the time its seven parts were resting on the backs of seven mules. There are many qualities and characteristics that are strikingly similar between this Schneider gun and the 75-mm. navy pack howitzer. Only in the rifle are the French forces in Morocco inferior to the Springfield, and in skill of firing the American is far in the lead.
As to troops, the French forces comprised in its regular units a picturesque group of fighting men who rank with the best in courage and efficiency. Moroccan and Algerian Tirailleurs, Moroccan and Algerian Spahis, Senegalese, detachments of the Colonial Marine Infantry and Artillery serving in key positions, and the Foreign Legion are the regular units employed. The backbone of each mobile group was the units of the famous Legion, comprising infantry battalions, mounted and motorized squadrons of the cavalry regiment of the Legion, mounted infantry companies, and one battery of 75-mm. field guns.
Two factors enter into the heavy proportion of the Foreign Legion in Moroccan operations. Its superior training and discipline, its twenty-five years of Moroccan fighting, and its unblemished record for valor give to each mobile group a seasoned and war-wise stiffening for the native troops. Secondly, the policy of the French in Morocco to regard the operations as “police operations,” not to be dignified by the term of “war,” frowns upon the use of regular white French troops in guerrilla warfare, and keeps at a minimum opposition that would be aroused in France if the occasional casualty lists were other than those of the aliens of the Legion and native troops.
Of the native regular troops the Spahis probably rate the highest in steadfastness and fighting ability. Long association with the Foreign Legion, both in the field and near-by barracks, has built up a strong mutual respect. Of the Tirailleuis, the Moroccans enjoy the reputation of being the most mobile troops in mountain warfare, renowned for their climbing ability and equal to the Berber in mobility. The Senegalese, born to war, easy of command, courageously loyal to their French officers, are nevertheless handicapped in mountain warfare, but excellent in the plains.
Easily the best of the irregular or suppletive troops are the Goums, an exceedingly picturesque unit. There are 100 Goums in Morocco, averaging 120 men to a Goum, with two-thirds mounted and one-third on foot, and they are but little below the best of the regular native troops in fighting worth. They are recruited by their respective Caids, serving two years in the initial and one year in subsequent enlistments. They are officered by lieu" tenants of the French cavalry who, he' cause of the isolated character of the service, are restricted to two years’ service with a Goum. In addition to carbine and saber, each Goum has two heavy machine guns which give them defensive power as support in the screen of irregulars that precede the advance or attack of a column. The Mokhanzi are very similar to a gendarmerie organization. Last of all, the partisans are literally hired by the day, manning small security posts or operating in the screen of a large column, and armed with a carbine and 100 rounds.
The widespread use of irregular troops in Morocco is a tribute to the psychology of their French masters. In battle they take the first brunt of resistance, allowing more rapid progression of the regular troops and conserving their employment-
Summary.—To wage war in Morocco, whether it be in the formidable terrain of the Grand Atlas, or in the desert stretches, requires a maximum degree of mobility- Certain factors stand out from my observations as the most striking. The independence of motor transport until the roads have caught up with the military advance) the stripping of loads of all unessential) the development of powerful automatic weapons and artillery that can follow the troops in any terrain; construction of roads and posts to a remarkable point of speed) the universal employment of pack animal transportation; the use of the lightest possible tentage, mess, and baggage equipment consistent with military necessities) the motorization of units; the hardening of troops to a maximum marching performance; the universal use of clever camp expedients; the reduction of bivouacking to an ordered science; the development and maintenance of a remarkably high morale and camaraderie; these are the points that come freshest to my memories of two unforgettable months in Morocco.