The Constitution says, “The Congress shall have power to provide and maintain a navy.” After many years of niggardly appropriations the Congress has finally provided us with one of which the whole nation is proud. The people know our ships are equal or superior to any. What they do not know is whether we are progressing as a fighting machine.
Ships are steaming more miles, firing more practices, engaging in more tactics and fleet problems than was thought possible a decade ago. In fact we are constantly “proving” the Navy by demonstrating that our ships can steam at high speeds for great distances, that our aircraft can patrol the sea at night, hundreds of miles from their bases, and that our ships and men are able to stand a great deal of punishment. Does it necessarily follow that we are “improving” by all this, that the personnel are keeping pace with the ships and making the most of their opportunities? Isn’t it possible that this which we consider improvement is nothing more than an increase in the number of modern ships and superior equipment provided by the Congress?
A navy may best be compared to a major league baseball team in which the players are the ships, the team is the fleet. Fleets and ball teams are costly, they manufacture nothing, they produce nothing, they justify their existence only when they are engaged with their opponents and winning.
Ball teams go south in the winter solely to enable them to play better ball when the season opens. Does the Navy train in peace time solely to enable it to fight better when the day of real battle arrives? If your answer is “yes,” answer these questions: A turret officer is soon to fire short- range battle practice, a practice for the “preliminary training of officers and men.” He has in his division the best gun pointer on the ship, a boatswain’s mate of 16 years’ service and very shortly to be retired. Does he use the boatswain’s mate to fire or a promising young “boot,” one who has many more years of potential service?
How many ship’s officers other than the captain do you see handling the ship these days?
Why is the demand for junior officers on capital ships increasing yearly?
The answer: The Navy is demanding results in peace time.
The division officer of course used the boatswain’s mate. It’s up to him to get hits and who will know or give him credit if he gives the young “boot” the chance? It’s hits that count. Can a captain be blamed if he makes all the landings and conns during maneuvers? No. If his ship is handled in a slipshod manner, no one will ask him whether the conning officer has had previous experience. Capital ships have found that by utilizing junior officers in places formerly filled by enlisted men (and which would be filled by enlisted men in time of war) they can squeeze out a few more hits than the year before; hence the increasing demand for more Naval Academy graduates.
Even a little thought on the subject will convince the most skeptical that the prime objective of the U. S. Navy in this year of peace is show results. Actually, as individuals, we are striving largely to avoid criticisms whereas our function should be only to train. I contend, results per se have little bearing on our ability to wage successful warfare unless the organization producing the results is maintained. It is not what a navy did yesterday, it is what it can do today and tomorrow that is of consequence.
One of our ships fires a long-range battle Practice in the spring and attains the highest score ever made. The officers and men are jubilant; the rest of the Navy rejoices because it proves we can shoot. What happens? Three months later probably half the officers and crew of that very efficient vessel are scattered to the four winds. What matters then the good score?
Every ship must complete its schedule, starts off the gunnery year by firing the elementary practices. It continues throughout the year with increasingly difficult ones until the whole schedule of gun firings, torpedo firings, power runs, sound practices, division practices, force tactics, maneuvers, fleet problems, etc., is completed. By June 30 all reports must be in and filed, the slate wiped clean, so that it can fire another practice for “the elementary training of officers and men.”
As a fighting unit of a fighting machine, that vessel should, the following year, show improvement over the year before. Does it? It usually does not, because a large percentage of those officers and men who as individuals received beneficial training are transferred to other ships and to other duties. The ship as a whole is not benefited and the cycle of training must be resumed. It is as if a ball team, upon reaching near perfection in the middle of a season, should shift the positions of half its players or replace them with players from other teams. Would that be conducive to good teamwork?
The reason for this frequent changing of personnel goes back to the days before the World War when the fleet was small and scattered; when maneuvers consisted of a few “squads right and left”; when aircraft were nonexistent; when the master-key method was considered the last word in controlling fire; and when our newest ships were still propelled by reciprocating engines. Its personnel, while well grounded in the fundamentals of a seagoing profession, had relatively little need for the enormous technical knowledge required in so many subjects today.
In those days, war was considered improbable, and in the era of good feeling then existing between nations, units were sent throughout the world to show our flag. Crews were away from home for long periods of time. On their return it was considered fitting and necessary that they rotate with home-based ships and with billets ashore. It is true that in those days an officer or man was almost equally at home on any ship.
We find a different picture now. War is everywhere in the air. Our fleet is large and concentrated and never ventures far from its bases. Warships contain some of the most complicated mechanisms on earth. Aviation has become a considerable arm of the fleet. As a fleet is increased in size and types, the problems arising in maneuvering it increase proportionately. Time is required for any person to familiarize himself with his new duties unless he happens to be a specialist in his particular field. Yet, in spite of the enormous changes that have taken place, we shift our personnel between ships, and between sea and shore billets, as in the past. With what results?
It results in a fast tempo in the Navy. Fast because much must be accomplished by the individual during his brief tour of duty if his imprint is to be left behind. And how better show an imprint than to point to “results achieved”? It is far easier and more natural to focus attention on tangible items than to endeavor to bring to the seniors’ notice merely a well-trained, properly-indoctrinated organization, but none the less intangible.
It results in our losing sight of the vital fact that training is paramount and substituting, for a sound program of training, a schedule heavier than the one of the year before.
It results in no individual being as thoroughly efficient in his job as he should be if the fleet were suddenly called on to do battle.
It results, unless the organization doing the training is to do the fighting, in a waste in ships, ammunition, fuel, money, and human endurance—at least some of which are not replacable.
Is it possible to reduce the present fast pace and still keep the fleet at an equal or greater efficiency? It is. The remedy lies in permanency of personnel and herewith are submitted three suggested remedies.
First suggested remedy.—All type commanders and above remain at sea in the same billet for not less than 4 years, preferably for 6 years. Few, at first glance, will agree with this recommendation. But stop and consider for a moment the great responsibilities resting upon the commander in chief of the fleet of a great power. No other position in the world is comparable. Certainly not that of a general of the armies who, through error, may lose tens of thousands of men. Men are replacable, ships are not—in the time allowed. It is inconceivable a whole army could suddenly be wiped out; it is probable a whole fleet could be lost, thereby leaving the country open to invasion. Therefore, doesn’t it follow that the Navy should give its commander in chief all aid possible? Certainly it should allow him time in office to study and digest all the multitudinous subjects of which a commander in chief must be cognizant, such as, the composition of the forces of the most probable enemy; personal characteristics of their high ranking officers; their language, religion, history, economic advantages or handicaps, merchant marine, trade routes; the relative tenacity of their people; the location of their bases and fortifications; weather likely to be encountered in the possible theaters of operation; the enemy’s probable plans of operation; our own fleet’s strength and fitness and methods of checkmating him; the likelihood of additional enemies or allies; and liaison with the Army. Most important of all, give the commander in chief time in office to learn the use of those magnificent weapons the Congress has furnished him; to learn not only the science but the art of war and not, because of lack of time, force him to follow in the footsteps of his prececessors.
One or two years is insufficient.
A fleet ready to do battle is a complex organization. In spite of great advances in communications, it is expected much will be left to the discretion of the type commanders. If so, it becomes imperative that they think along the same lines as the commander in chief, and that they be thoroughly conversant with the capabilities and limitations of the types they command. Hence the suggestion all type commanders and above remain at sea not only until they have become familiar with their new duties but until the fleet has had the opportunity of reaping the benefits of their increased proficiency.
A more smoothly running navy would result. Policy changing would become less frequent; the same mistakes would not be made twice, and those who are to carry the great responsibilities would be learning.
The present method is comparable to a ball team changing its coach every Monday morning.
It is true that fewer would be called, fewer could reach the supreme command, but the Navy would profit. After all, the Navy is not, or should not be, run for the benefit of any individual or individuals.
Second suggested remedy—All other officers remain at sea for three years performing the same duty during that period. Officers below the executive officer of individual ships could be shifted as desired. This should not be difficult to obtain and is carried out by at least one other great naval power. All officers of a ship would arrive together and be detached together. Some will argue here that a vessel would be crippled unless we have an overlapping of officers. I, on the contrary, believe a ship manned by average officers would be fully ready to become an integral part of the fleet if it were given just two months to operate at the will of the commanding officer, providing the officers’ time was not taken up with multitudinous reports and paper work. In that time all officers could become familiar with the ship and get her “feel” in handling. They could study reports and past performances, instruct the crew, test the organization, fire elementary practices, engage in minor tactics with other similar types, and try out all those things they would like to but seldom have the opportunity of accomplishing. Then for 2 years and 10 months we would have a fighting unit better than any we possess today. This procedure, naturally, would require one-third of the ships to be “out of the fleet” for 2 months every year. But remember, two-thirds of the fleet would always be ready.
What changes actually occur among ships’ officers? A certain vessel, after leaving the builders, joined the fleet on October 28, 1937. Within a period of 8 months the following officers were detached and replaced out of an original complement of 9: the commanding officer, the engineering officer (twice), the first lieutenant, the torpedo officer, and the assistant engineering officer. Six changes in a complement of 9 within 8 months.
Third suggested remedy—So far as possible, keep intact the entire crew of combatant ships for 3 years.
The present annual turnover is about 85 per cent. It is responsible for the necessity of continual reorganization; for crews being always in a state of flux and never attaining that degree of efficiency of which they may intrinsically be capable; for the blight of the “short-timer”; for the necessity of operating at times shorthanded in highly important ratings; for the natural tendency to transfer the undesirable rather than to train, disrate, or discharge him; for excessive and unnecessary drilling received by some while others receive too little; for a lowering of morale because men do not feel they are permanently attached; and finally for the necessity of beginning all over each year as if no member of the crew had ever engaged in a practice of any kind before.
It will be found that the outstanding ships of the past and present, the winners of the gunnery, engineering, and athletic trophies, the happy ships, have been those in which by some fortuitous circumstances the officers and crews have remained relatively intact for several years. To what heights might not a vessel reach if, from the Captain to M.Att.3c, all remained for three full years?
Remedies have been suggested; detailed plans to carry them out are beyond the scope of this article. As regards officer personnel, the problem is simple. Having no contracts with the government they can be detailed in any manner or method found to be most advantageous to the Navy as a whole. There will of course be more officers in the higher ranks than there are positions to be filled. Weeding out is necessary and is in conformity with the present drastic selection laws. What method could be more painless than one automatically retiring all those not obtaining commensurate commands within a specified time?
Greater difficulties can be foreseen with enlisted personnel because of short enlistments, changing rates, discharges, deaths, desertions, and new construction. A broad study of the problem is necessary. That great improvement over present methods could be made, no one will doubt.
If the proposed remedies were carried out, one can easily visualize a fleet in which the fundamental and, in fact, only reason for its existence has not become obscured; a fleet in which one will have time to learn, retain, and teach those practices of good seamanship which are the foundation of a naval profession; a fleet in which excuses are not required for failure to obtain a hit less than the year before, provided training and indoctrination were properly carried out; a fleet that receives maximum returns on energy expended; a fleet that puts training and learning on a higher plane than peace-time scores; a fleet in which the great majority of its personnel are not looking forward to the day of their detachment; and, finally, a fleet that is actually preparing for war.
When we entered the last war, kindly Britain kept the enemy from our shores while we prepared by making 90-day officers out of college boys, by recommissioning old ships, by building new ones, by a general exodus from the shore establishment and a reshuffling of the forces afloat. It is a generally accepted belief some happy act will again occur while we make the necessary preparations. Perhaps so. Perhaps again, our first hint of impending hostilities will be in the form of a radio from the Army in Honolulu “Enemy attacking in force; can hold out no longer than ten days.”
Such is the fashion, nowadays.
★
All training in method is systematically aimed at co-ordination of effort. This judgment results from training according to method. But the captain’s judgment requires more training and a higher order of intelligence back of it because of the greater variety of conditions that influence its action. It is a curious fact that where judgment and understanding have most to do with efficiency, the systematic effort of our organization towards their development is weakest. The training of subordinates is good. It receives the attention and criticism of skill wherever found in the organization. The same is not true of higher training. Rank is removed from criticism. Peace is apt to foster apathy towards the requirements of war. The training of the subordinates to the efficient performance of his duties is of great importance, the training of rank to the efficient performance of high duties of the great command is of the greatest importance. The one is provided for, the other neglected. Both are essential to the employment of the navy as a whole, as a single instrument.—Schofield, “Training for War Command.”