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Convinced that his country would be the next target of the Communists, Thailand’s Prime Minister deployed the Queen’s Cobras regiment, right, to Vietnam in 1967 and, since then, has increased the number of Thai troops there to 12,000. As America disengages from Vietnam, Thailand’s 100,000-man Army, its politics and its proficiency, will exert increasing influence on developments in Southeast Asia.
As the United States disengages from Vietnam, the task of defending Indochina is falling increasingly upon the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and its allies. Anxious glances are being cast in the direction of Southeast Asia to look for some power to fill the vacuum being left by the U. S. departure. Increasingly, observers are beginning to look at Thailand, which presently has 12,000 troops stationed in Vietnam and unknown numbers operating in Laos and Cambodia, in the hope that perhaps the kingdom might provide a viable counterbalance to North Vietnamese military might. Thailand, a land of 32 million people which is regarded by many observers as holding the key to the future of Southeast Asia, was once the dominant power in the area and to date has been a haven of relative peace and tranquility amidst its troubled neighbors.
Considerations of Thailand’s ability to assert itself as a major force in Southeast Asia inevitably lead to a look at the kingdom’s armed forces, the dominant element of which is the 100,000-man army. The basic questions which immediately arise concern the quality of the army, the capabilities of its officers, and numerous other inquiries relating to effectiveness. U. S. military men are familiar with Samuel Huntington’s concept of professionalism, as stated in his The Soldier and the State. Professionalism is herein defined as in
corporating Huntington’s three tenets—a high degr of corporateness, expertise, and responsibility. Mot over, having the creed of civilian supremacy over th( military inculcated in them since an early age, they art somewhat skeptical of the professional qualities of wha1 they see as "political armies” such as Thailand’* When faced with the task of providing militat) assistance to a "political army,” a military assistant command will frequently attempt to remold its diet1 along U. S. military organizational lines and instill tfr U. S. military ethic in the belief that this will increa: the host army’s efficiency and quality. This is an if correct approach, and by attempting to remake an arm* such as that of Thailand in the U. S. image, the Unit States is only weakening that army and failing in i role as an advisor.*
Thailand, like many other Asian nations, has a largh amount of professionalism in its officer corps, but is a professionalism that is distinctly Thai in flavor an4 adapted to fit the needs of Thai society. There are mafl)t factors present in Thai life and in the Thai charactd which inhibit the growth of Western style profit sionalism in the officer corps, but superimposing i foreign system oriented toward Western values wd not solve the problems resulting from these factors. T understand this argument it is necessary to look deepd into the roots of Thai professionalism, the factof* affecting it, and its present nature.
Thai professionalism has its roots deep in Thai hi*' tory, for when the Thais migrated into Southeast from their home in the Chinese province of Yunna11 they were already organized for war. During the reig11 of King- Trailok (1448-88), the population was f°(_ mally divided into civil and military divisions. Trailok1 son, King Rama Thibodi II (1491-1529), introduce1 reforms in the art of war and the method of con scrip tion. Throughout the Ayutthaya era (1350-1767), d1*
*See "Buildup of U. S. Military Is Reported In Thailand,” U. S. N*vl Institute Proceedings, this issue, pp. 114-115.
military function was widely distributed in Thai society, and a feudal warrior class which was expert in the practice of the martial arts, never developed.
The first step towards true professionalism was taken by King Mongkut, Rama IV (1851-68), when he founded a military pages’ corps trained by English officers from India. Thus the basis was laid for a professional attitude toward military affairs.
During the reign of King Chulalongkorn, Rama V (1868-1910), professionalism became a reality,f A major step forward was the founding, in 1887, of the Royal Military Academy. Initially, open only to the sons of officers, candidates were admitted at an early age, and studied for six years before being given a commission. To increase the quality of leadership and expertise, officers were sent to Europe at staff colleges for training.
Despite the growth of the officer corps as a professional body, its members were never removed from politics. Historically, all politicians were soldiers, and while there was a formal distinction between the titles and paraphernalia of civil and military officials, military
officers often held high political positions. A 19^ decree placed the crown prince at the head of the arnw forces, and the highest positions continued to be f£' served for the royal princes trained in the militai) academies of England, Germany, and Russia. Roy* favoritism showed itself in other ways which contrib uted to a rising level of discontent within the offit£l corps during the early part of the 20th century.
By 1932, the officer corps had a high degree 0 corporateness, expertise, and responsibility to the co# try, yet it was a dissatisfied group. Between 1851 1932, the distinction between civil and military officii had become formal and functional, and a class of pfff fessional officers emerged. The officers were frustrate^ however, because of the lack of opportunity for a^ vancement to the highest levels of command and b! continued budget cuts. On 24 June 1932, a coup 1^ by both civil and military officials overthrew the nW lute monarchy and instituted in its place a form ol parliamentary democracy with the king as a cons11 tutional monarch. Initially after the 1932 coup, mil' tary rule was not dominant, but in 1933 it becafl1' apparent that the army was the decisive factor in ai? bid for power.
Between 1938 and 1944, Phibul Songkhram, ^ officer who had played a significant role in the couf and the army were in firm control, with Pri^ Banomyong, a lawyer and leading intellectual, and group of civilians ruling briefly during the 1944-19J period. Since 1947, the army has been in firm contfc of the government, beating down attempts in 1949 June 1951 by rival military leaders to seize power. Tf military’s latest move in politics has been the 18 vember 1971 coup in which the Parliament was d!> solved and martial law instituted. The coup did n° change the real locus of power in Thai governmef1' as Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and Gene<‘J Praphas Charusathien have remained in firm control 0 the country.
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Throughout these political machinations, the arm itself has remained on the sidelines, as has the offi^ corps. While it is the deciding factor in any bid n power, the officer corps usually only watches, for TW; coups are generally tame affairs in which only select^ units participate in a show of force. The army is n£l seizing power from any group. The peaceful coup b* become .the accepted way for a shuffle in the natioi1 top leadership. Technically, Thailand’s present govcrf ment is not a military dictatorship, but a viable fod of collective leadership in which the army plays tb leading role. The military has entered politics becau- the political and institutional structure of the sock1' proved incapable of producing any other body capab' of running the country effectively.
Professionalism in the Royal Thai Army 49
Thai society, owing to a combination of religious, social, and political factors, has never been conducive to the production of strong leadership among the population. The mass of the people still live in small villages and desire only a benevolently paternal form of government which looks after their needs and interferes as little as possible in their daily lives. Buddhism, the religion of more than 93% of the people, is a gentle faith which provides both a justification for the submission to authority and a moral basis for hierarchy. Noninvolvement in the struggles of society is fostered by the necessity of each individual working his own way to Nirvana. Concurrently Buddhism justifies the status quo, for, according to doctrine, everything is the way it is, and people occupy the positions they are in, because of their conduct in past lives. There is no drive to achieve positions of leadership, for the religion is not supportive of striving. Villagers have shown themselves to be highly reluctant to assume any of the leadership positions.
In the past, all power radiated from the king. Royal princes occupied positions of responsibility, and among the people there was no desire to participate in government. The exception to this was the small group of civilian activists who were educated abroad and later joined the military in the 1932 coup. The bureaucracy was content to serve higher authority.
The political body in Thailand is made up of about one per cent of the total population. Even among this group, interest in politics and political leadership is limited to a small elite which has shown itself more capable of factional squabbling than of viable administration. With the demise of the monarchy as the locus of power, the available elements of society which could provide a substitute for the king’s strong leadership were extremely limited. When the civilian sector proved unable to lead the country, the military was forced to do so. Since that time the military has become established as the legitimate ruling power of the country, and there simply is no move of significance to replace it with any other element of society. The military embodies the characteristics of benevolently paternal rule desired by the vast majority of the population and so the Thai see no reason for replacing it with anything else.
Having been ruled by an absolute monarch for nearly 700 years prior to the 1932 coup, the Thais have a need for strong central authority which civilian elements of Thai society have not been able to provide. Only the army now has both the talent and the organization capable of leading the country down the difficult road to modernization and providing the strong central authority the Thais find necessary. Without dwelling on the rectitude of this judgment or its conse
quences for future Thai government, the issue at hand is to what extent the officer corps’ rule of the country has politicized it and affected its fighting capability and professional qualities.
To a Western observer, the separation of the military and civil spheres is a necessity for the growth and maintenance of professionalism; but the Thai case shows that such a belief does not take into account the realities of the individual culture being dealt with, for it is based on the assumption that the sole purpose of an army is to ensure the defense of the nation against outside threats. In Thailand, the army exists not only for national defense, but also for political reasons. It has always existed for such reasons. Its structure and philosophy reflect this dual role; while in some ways they detract from the growth of corporateness, expertise, and responsibility, they in no way preclude it.
The heart of the army’s program of socialization for the young officer is Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, the same school founded by King Chula- longkorn. Here the future leaders of Thailand’s army are taught the values of duty, honor, nation. The entire curriculum and life style are oriented toward producing professional officers who will become the elite of the army officer corps. Corporateness, expertise, and responsibility become a way of life, and nowhere is participation in politics either taught or sanctioned.
After graduation and a period of service, assignment may be made to the Command and General Staff College, followed at a later date with attendance at the Army War College. At the highest levels of military education are the Armed Forces Staff College, to which 35 senior officers selected from the three armed forces are sent annually, and the National Defense College, organized in 1955 along the same lines as the U. S. National War College. The level of instruction given is similar to that provided in equivalent U. S. service schools, and Thai officers are quite capable of launching actions covering the whole spectrum of military operations.
Officers are taught to orient themselves toward action and leadership, qualities not in abundance owing to a variety of cultural and religious factors. The officer corps has a great deal of cohesion, seeing itself as the guardian of the nation’s fate and honor, and it feels responsible for the future well-being of the nation. As David Wilson, author of The Military in Thai Politics has noted, officers are
. . imbued with this spirit, along with a somewhat limited view of moral and political virtue, and a tendency to act rather than to reflect, the Thai officer does not long hesitate to press his case and that of
UP| PHOTO
Iti 1968, a Buddhist monk sprinkled sacred water over troops of the Black Panther Division prior to their departure for duty in Vietnam. The ceremony, which took place at the entrance to the imperial palace in downtown Bangkok, illustrates the dilemma of the individual soldier: how to honor the teachings of the gentle Buddhist doctrine without diminishing his commitment to fight for his country.
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the army itself. What is good for the army is good for the country. His ethics make few demands on restraint or patience, and his conception of virtue sustains self-confidence that is reinforced by his experience as an army officer who is seldom ques- doned or challenged by subordinates. In short, be tends to be decisive, active, and assured.”
Having a philosophy of action amidst a societf content to live life slowly day by day, and a prepondet' ance of power to accompany this philosophy, the Th;li officer necessarily becomes involved in more than h1 military duties. This does not mean that his militaf)
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Professionalism in the Royal Thai Army 51
duties must decline in quality as a result, for Thai officials of all types traditionally have used their position to their advantage while continuing to perform their official duties. This is a practice sanctioned by Thai society. One aspect of the Buddhist doctrine of karma is that everything is the way it is, and people occupy the positions they are in, because of their conduct in past lives. If an official gains a certain position, it is because of his merit gained by living properly, and he may use that position for his own betterment. Hence auxiliary activities, while seen by a Westerner as detracting from a Thai officer’s legitimate duties, are actually a part of those duties, but a part which is not sanctioned by the Western ethical code. It cannot be said that simply because an officer uses part of his time in nonmilitary activities, he is any less professional. Indeed, Western officers engage in similar activities during their off-duty hours. The difference is that officer participation in political and economic activities in Thailand is institutionalized and legitimate.
An excellent example of this fact is noted in the structure of the Thai government and its connections with the armed forces high command. Figures 1 and 2 show the framework of the Thai armed forces as it exists on paper.
What should be readily apparent is that most of the officer corps, while being a tool in the political gamesmanship process by virtue of its position in society, is not in a position to take an active role in politics itself. This is left to a select few at the highest levels who have the confidence of the army. The remainder of the officer corps are professionals in the truest Western sense of the word. The line of command is obviously not the type a Western advisor would like to see, for it appears inefficient and seems to encourage increasing military participation in nonmilitary activities. The fact is that the system works quite efficiently and is well-adjusted to the realities of Thai culture. The highest officers concurrently hold both civil and military positions, but the mass of the officer corps remains engaged in purely military activities.
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Against this unusual background, Thai cultural mechanisms can be quite baffling to an uninformed observer. On one occasion, for example, the Minister of Interior ^recommended that an army officer serving in the Ministry of Interior be promoted from Special Colonel (equivalent to U. S. Brigadier General) to Major General. The same man, who made the recommendation, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, disapproved the recommendation. Such an exercise might appear pointless and unprofessional, yet it served to satisfy many of the requirements of the Thai mind.
Buddhist doctrine is tolerant of but not supportive
of striving, for this is interpreted as placing an emphasis upon material things and hence not in keeping with the character of a good Buddhist. In the promotion refusal example, the man recommended was honored and flattered personally without being given a public reward which could be interpreted wrongly and arouse antipathy among fellow officers.
U. S. advisory efforts to get the Thais to reform their mixed political-military framework have been futile; for, as long as the officer corps and the army occupy the dominant position in Thai society which they do, they cannot consent to any move which would attempt to create an artificial dominance of some other group. One such move was the Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACThai) attempt at decentralizing ammunition control within the army. Under the present system, all ammunition is distributed from Bangkok for specific purposes and must be strictly accounted for. This is, of course, to dissuade any local commander from considering an independent coup of his own. While control of ammunition by local commanders may appear an essential element of preparedness to U. S. advisors, it obviously is not so to the Thais.
The present system could be seen in one light as a hindrance to military effectiveness caused by military political involvement and therefore as a nonprofessional quality; but, in another light, centralized control is simply centralized control, regardless of the reason. The action remains the same, regardless of motivation, and does not of itself mean there is more or less professionalism in the organization. Thai units still receive ammunition when it is necessary for their military functions, but they are prevented from using it for any other purpose. Any attempt to change this system will not be tolerated, for it would ignore the realities of power on the Thai scene.
Several times in this discussion, the effects of Buddhist doctrines have been mentioned, and the teachings of this religion and their accompanying societal behavior patterns should not be underestimated in a consideration of the problems inherent in Thai professional development. Buddhism is a gentle religion, preaching nonviolence and placing an emphasis upon the spiritual things in life. Superiors are to be respected and not criticized. Objective solutions are difficult to obtain in an atmosphere where such solutions will in all likelihood be seen as criticism of one individual by another. An officer is reluctant even to change the methods of a predecessor, for this would appear to be a criticism of him. The emphasis upon the spiritual makes suspect any professional actions which enhance an officer’s career and such actions may become the cause of a possible social ostracism by one’s fellow officers.
As an illustration, many Thai officers do not volun-
Professionalism in the Royal Thai Army 53
teer for duty in the Black Leopard Division, Thailand’s 12,000-man force sent to Vietnam in July 1968, despite a desire to do so, for fear of offending their colleagues. This fear comes from the fact that volunteering for Vietnam is not just an act of patriotism, but a move which brings considerable material benefits for the individual concerned. Monetary rewards for such duty are substantial, because the United States supplements the pay of all ranks. For example, a major, who receives a normal salary of $98 per month, has his income nearly tripled by the addition of another $180 per month in overseas allowances paid by the United States. Career- wise, a return to Thailand after the completion of a Vietnam tour brings a promotion. Looking at these benefits, officers are afraid that volunteering for Vietnam will be construed by their comrades as an attempt to get ahead of them. In many cases, the fear of social ostracism as a penalty for apparent striving has outweighed other considerations.
Of special interest is the effect the precept that a Buddhist refrain from taking another’s life may have on professionalism. Obviously, an officer who shies away from combat when it is necessary is failing in his mission as a soldier. To date, research in the field of how Buddhist values effect military performance has been limited, but some work has been done. Using Thomas C. Wyatt’s unpublished manuscript "Impact of Certain Social Psychological Factors on Royal Thai Army Counterinsurgency Operations” as a source, Commander Robert L. Mole, U. S. Navy, has noted:
"The Thai is not emasculated by his religious beliefs to the degree that he will not fight, but due to pressure of belief and societal forces, he goes about his combat in a manner quite different than do Americans. He avoids conflict situations as much as possible and tends to engage in battle only when other alternatives are denied. In theory, only defensive operations can be tolerated.”
Such judgments are perhaps a bit superficial, but there is not enough research or data available to state clearly whether military training and socialization of the officer will offset the traditional Thai dislike of confrontation and conflict situations. A number of classified sources have corroborated Wyatt’s observations; but, in other situations, officers have performed creditably as expected. The quote above, however, as well as the earlier reference to the hesitancy of officers to volunteer for Vietnam duty because of a fear of social ostracism, points out the necessity for viewing officers’ actions in the context of their own society rather than ours. Certain actions which may be viewed as nonprofessional are often manifestations of the indi-
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vidual’s cultural and societal background, not of his professional ability as an officer.
The Thai Army officer corps, while it is certainly involved in politics and economic affairs, has not by any means lost its proficiency as the leadership element of a fighting force. It is bound together by its feeling of being an elite group and the defender of the nation, and sees itself as having a responsibility to that nation. Its level of expertise is high and will remain so. Less clear are the effects that religious and societal beliefs will have on this expertise when it must be used in action. The army’s structure and nonmilitary activities are reflections of the realities of Thai society, and attempting to remake the officer corps and the army in the U. S. image will not change these realities.
Professionalism does exist in the Royal Thai Army officer corps, but it is distinctly Thai. It can never become professionalism in the Huntington sense, for Huntington’s thesis, as Samuel Finer observes in The Man on Horseback,
". . . is made to hang upon a very special definition of professionalism, and by pure deduction from this, of a so-called 'military mind.’ The argument then becomes 'essentialist.’ If soldiers are observed to act in ways inconsistent with these concepts of 'professionalism’ and the 'military mind,’ so much the worse for the soldiers; they are not completely 'professional,’ not purely 'military.’”
Second Lieutenant Thomas A. Marks graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in June 1972 and was commissioned in the Infantry. Following completion of courses at Airborne, Ranger, and IOBC schools at Fort Benning, Georgia, his first assignment will be with the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. He has traveled to the Far East three times, with his primary interest in the area being the study of Thailand.