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. This is a fascinating and frustrat- lng little book told from an intensely British point of view. Fascinating because of the gaps it fills in our understanding of what occurred. Frustrates because it does not always identify the sources of the new information. We are told, for instance, that in February 1982, the Argentine embassy in London reported to Buenos Aires that ‘the British were militarily weak and that its navy was ‘virtually non-existent.’ ” How did Mr. Laffin get that? He doesn’t say. Again, he quotes directly from Argentine “intelligence documents” without further identification or explanation of how they came into his hands.
The book suffers from the speed with Which it was published. (It was circulating in Britain prior to the September 1982 U. S. publication date.) Yet many of the book’s limitations are balanced by Mr. Laffin’s background as a military historian and a World War II combat infantryman.
The best chapters are the first three, describing how the war came about, and Chapter 10, “The Propaganda War,” in which the author analyzes British information policies.
Britain’s inability to assess properly the forces driving the Argentine junta toward a military adventure and the Argentine inability to understand what that would do to British pride provide a striking example of how two governments with all of the information needed at their disposal could totally misperceive each other’s character and Psychology. Mr. Laffin makes a convincing argument that the role of w°men in Argentine and Latin society generally had a lot to do with the junta's profound misassessment of Margaret Thatcher.
Considering the amount and quality of information available, Chapter 2 is mislabeled “The Intelligence Failure.” As Mr. Laffin himself makes plain, there was no failure of “intelligence” in terms of reliable information. The failure was one of strategic assessment. The author does a service for future students of the conflict in identifying just who, in Britain at least, misjudged the ample intelligence.
The chapters dealing with the campaign itself offer much human interest and much in the way of detail about ground operations that will be new to American readers. Of special interest is the information provided about the remarkable 8,000-mile logistics “tail” that made the successful campaign possible. The speed with which it was set up, considering the paucity of means in British military hands at the start, is amazing.
“The Propaganda War” chapter is worth the price of the book. “Aha,” the British Ministry of Defence seemed to say, “we can control this from beginning to end by barring the foreign press from the fleet.” It didn’t work, and why it didn’t work is important to understanding the interaction between a democratic government and the press in any future conflict.
William V. Kennedy is a military journalist. He is a coauthor of The Chinese War Machine and The Balance of Military Power.
Whence the Threat to Peace
USSR Ministry of Defense. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1982. 78 pp. Illus. $4.50. (Available from Imported Publications, Inc., 320 West Ohio Street, Chicago, IL 60610.)
War or Peace
Rudiger Moniac, Editor. Munich:
Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1982. 96 pp. Illus. $5.10.
Reviewed by Norman Polmar
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s Soviet Military Power was one of the best-selling books in Washington last year. (It was reviewed in the February 1982 Proceedings.) Known as the “red book,” the lavishly illustrated U. S. paperback described the increasing capabilities of the Soviet armed forces and their threat to world peace.
The Soviet Ministry of Defense has fired an answering salvo with the publication of Whence the Threat to Peace. In the introduction, the Soviet book describes how the “relaxation of tensions” and the “restructuring of international relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence” that occurred in the 1970s suffered a “sharp about-turn” at the beginning of the 1980s. Blaming the change of leadership in the White House as well as the governments of other NATO countries, the Soviet report proceeds to describe the falsifications of the U. S. book and how the United States—not the Soviet Union—is the threat to world peace.
The Soviet volume marks an unprecedented effort to convince Europeans and Americans that President Reagan’s defense policies are threatening world peace. Whence the Threat to Peace begins with an attack that points out the bias of the authors of the U. S. document and then seeks to demonstrate with words, tables, and maps how the United States has developed and deployed the weapons that threaten world peace. For example, one chart graphically shows the initiative in developing new weapons. The United States is credited with developing four major systems before the Soviet Union: nuclear weapons, intercontinental strategic bombers, nuclear-powered submarines, and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. Two other U. S. initiatives are shown as not having Soviet counterparts: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and neutron weapons.
Of course, such comparisons have very limited value. When were these weapons started? What was the rationale for the systems? Were they in response to other Soviet developments, as MIRV being a response to expected Soviet ballistic missile defenses? What of other systems, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles
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If imitation is the since rest form of flattery, the U. S. publishers of Soviet Military Power should be pleased to see that the Soviet publishers of Whence the Threat to Peace have borrowed a U. S. illustration, left, to reinforce the Soviet claim that we, not they, really threaten world peace.
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and orbiting systems, which the Soviets had operational before the United States?
In another section of the Soviet publication, there is considerable discussion of the Ohio (SSBN-726)-class strategic missile submarines, but there is no mention of the larger Soviet “Typhoon” SSBNs. Then, although the Soviet document points out the increased size and firepower over the previous Polaris-Poseidon submarines, it takes no notice of the Soviet superiority in numbers of modern SSBNs (currently 63 vs. 32), or numbers of submarine missiles (currently some 950 vs. 520), or the relative age of the SSBN forces (all 63 Soviet boats completed since 1967 compared with two for the United States).
The list continues. The problem is not entirely one of Soviet prejudice (nor were the problems with comparisons in the U. S. document entirely U. S. prejudice). Part of the problem is the difficulty in addressing exceedingly complex defense issues for the lay public in a “Madison Avenue” style. Regardless, the Soviet document will be widely read and cited, especially by critics of the United States, of President Reagan’s policies, and of defense programs.
Indeed, the Soviet book is one of the best written and most attractive documents to emerge from the Military Publishing House in Moscow. It is heavily illustrated with color photographs and maps, the former mostly from Western magazines. Whence the Threat to Peace has been published in six languages in addition to English and seems to be more widely distributed than its U. S. counterpart.
Responses to the Soviet document by the United States and the Western Alliance should attempt to be balanced, understandable, and credible. These criteria seem to be better met in War or Peace than they were in either the Soviet or earlier U. S. publications. War or Peace is an official NATO document, published commercially by the book division of Monch Publishing in West Germany.
Like the earlier U. S. book, War or Peace shows the Soviets having superiority in most key areas. Some of the material is directly from Soviet Military Power. But in the NATO publication, Alliance and Soviet (Warsaw Pact) relative trends are highlighted, making the story more credible. Also, the language seems less inflammable than in Soviet Military Power.
There is increasing public interest in defense issues, at least in the West.
This is evidenced in part by the protest movement against nuclear weapons development. This movement, coupled with the confusion and contradictions over new weapons, like the land-based MX ICBM missile, demand that Western governments better explain defense issues. The Soviet book Whence the Threat to Peace will raise even more questions. The NATO book War or Peace will help to answer some of them. Both books should be read by Western naval professionals and others interested in contemporary defense issues.
Mr. Polmar is an analyst and author in the defense and naval fields. He is the coauthor of the recently published biography Riclcover and editor of the Naval Institute’s Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet and Guide to the Soviet Navy.
P.O.W.
Richard Garrett. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982. 240 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $22.50 ($20.25).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel W. Hays Parks, II. S. Marine Corps Reserve
War, however undesirable, is an inevitable by-product of nation-state relationships, and prisoners of war (POWs) unfortunately, are inevitable by-products of war. The author, a former British officer and a POW during World War II, provides a survey of the prisoner of war experience.
The treatment of POWs is one of the few bright points in the history of modern warfare, though it is not without its tarnish. While the level of destruction gradually has increased, the concept of nations assuming responsibility for combatants found hors de combat on the battlefield slowly but surely has found acceptance by most nations. As the author notes, the POWs’ fate has improved substantially since the days of Henry V, when most of the French prisoners at Agincourt were Put to the sword. Some survivors were sold for ransom, while others remained prisoners for as long as a quarter of a century.
During the American Revolution, the forces of King George III were confronted with the difficulty of finding accommodations for their prisoners. Rather than exchange or parole them, many were incarcerated on board prison ships, with devastating results. Their lot was improved only when the British were advised of the likelihood of reprisal against British Prisoners in American hands. There is a lesson in this history: No matter how great the emphasis on humanitarian- ism over the past century, humane treatment often depends on reciprocity and an adequate enforcement mechanism.
Garrett traces his narrative through the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War and the tragedies of Ander- sonville, the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. He notes the emergence of the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Although early treaties contained provisions relating to the treatment of POWs, their protection by separate Geneva Convention did not occur until 1929. Based °n the experience of World War II, the 1929 treaty was replaced by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (GPW), the present treaty on the subject. One hundred fifty-one nations of 168 are parties to the GPW, making it one of the most universal of mternational agreements.
The author correctly notes that violations of the GPW have occurred, but distinguishes between harsh accommodations being the normal lot of POWs and their intentional abuse. Few can be expected to receive the favorable treatment recently given the Argentine commander of South Georgia Island, who reportedly was dined (and Presumably wined) by the Royal Navy after his capture earlier in the day in the Falkland Islands conflict. Certainly the plight of many would have been worse but for the GPW.
Garrett notes the turn of events in recent conflicts with communist foes, and particularly the experience of U. S. POWs in Vietnam. History appears to have come full circle with the communists using POWs as hostages to exact a favorable political settlement. The question the author fails to address is whether this tactic has been adopted because the atheism of communism cannot be reconciled with the Judeo-Christian principles upon which the Geneva Conventions are based, or whether the communists simply have identified a chink in the armor of democratic nations (i.e., the high value placed on the return of one’s POWs) and exploited it to the maximum.
This is an interesting, well-illustrated general history. The selected bibliography’s brevity suggests the research was not as great as it might have been, particularly given the wealth of available material. Although somewhat overpriced, the book is a highly readable treatment of a complex subject.
Colonel Parks, a frequent contributor to the Proceedings. is Chief of International Law for the U. S. Army.
No Hiding Place: The New York Times Inside Report on the Hostage Crisis
Robert D. McFadden, Joseph B. Treaster, and Maurice Carroll.
New York: Times Books, 1981, 314 pp. $14.90 ($13.41).
Reviewed by Captain
Patrick A. Putignano, U. S. Army
No Hiding Place is the collective effort of more than two dozen staff writers from The New York Times. Their purpose was to answer some fundamental questions about the hostage crisis. Their questions help fill a conspicuous void, since there was no thorough public inquiry into the crisis. Their answers are the fruit of extensive research, including detailed interviews with the hostages and other participants.
The book is divided into three parts: “Inside”—the detailed story of the hostages’ captivity; “Outside”—accounts of key decisions made by the Carter Administration; “The People”—profiles of the hostages.
The hostages’ ordeal is a moving story of extreme physical discomfort, occasional mental torture, and interminable uncertainty.
“ ‘On the second day,’ Duane Gillette, the Navy petty officer, said, ‘they moved me from one room to another. They blindfolded me for it. One of the others was moved before me. When he went, I heard a shotgun blast. Then they came for me.’ ” The hostages adapted to this intense environment in disparate ways. Four hostages—Jerry Plotkin, Marine Sergeant Kevin J. Hermining, Steven Lauterbach, and Army Sergeant Joseph Subic, Jr.—collaborated with their captors. They criticized the American Government for admitting the Shah into the United States, and they variously supported the Iranians. As Lauterbach said after his release: “we had been told at that time that they were seriously considering letting some of the hostages go and that if we cooperated in this respect it might expedite their release.”
Not all of the hostages cooperated, however. As Colonel Charles Scott said, either you cooperate with your enemies, or you do not, "The Code of Conduct says it all.” (The Code of Conduct states: “I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.”) The book inevitably forces one to ask: How would 1 have held up under similar circumstances?
The captors treated the hostages despicably. However, it might have been worse. One hostage, a foreign service officer, said that it was clear that Khomeini wanted no harm to come to the hostages. The hostages were his “stock in trade”; thus, the captors ensured the hostages’ safety. Also, the captors were terribly inefficient terrorists. For example, the captors interrogated the hostages for long periods to break their will but permitted them to rest between questioners.
President Jimmy Carter was as surprised by the Shah's cancer as our government was by the extent of the social unrest in Iran. Carter’s decision to admit the Shah into the United States for treatment sparked the embassy’s seizure: two articles address this key turning point. Initially, Carter opposed admitting the Shah, because Carter sought to improve relations with the Bazargan Government in Iran. However, Carter was persuaded by David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger of the surprising and apocryphal
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
naval affairs
Battleship North Carolina (BB-55)
Capt. Ben W. Blee, USN (Ret.). Wilmington. NC.: USS North Carolina Battleship Memorial. 1982. 98 pp. Illus. $14.95 ($13.95) (hardcover), $8.95 ($8.05) (paper).
This handsome, well-illustrated history of the USS North Carolina (BB-55) includes a full-color foldout and cross-sectional diagram of the ship. The book emphasizes the North Carolina's operational history during World War II, including operations around Guadalcanal, the Central Pacific Drive, the typhoon of December 1944, Iwo •lima, and her role in protecting the beachheads at Okinawa. Photographs, paintings, line drawings, and tactical diagrams accompany the text.
E Introduction to Naval Architecture
Thomas C. Gillmer and Bruce Johnson. Annapolis, MD.; Naval Institute Press, 1982. 324 pp. Ulus. Append. Gloss. Ind. $23.95 ($19.16).
This is a textbook designed for use in the Department of Naval Systems Engineering at the U. S. Naval Academy and updates Professor Gillmer's Modern Ship Design (Naval Institute Press, 1975). It includes a brief summary of engineering statics and covers subjects like materials strength and fluid mechanics as well as concepts more directly related to naval architecture such as hydrostatics, stability, and propulsion systems.
SECOND EDITION
A MARINER S GUIDE
to the Rules of the Road
® A Mariner’s Guide to the Rules of the Road (2nd edition)
William H. Tate. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 159 pp. Illus. $12.95 ($10.36).
This second edition employs a new format in order to include changes to the rules of
the road resulting from the amendments adopted in November 1981. Fewer differences remain between the International Rules (COLREGS) and the Inland Rules. Where differences do remain, mostly for vessels under power, the author has carefully defined situations that might otherwise lead to confusion.
Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980
Bruce W. Watson. Boulder. CO.: Westview Press, 1982. 245 pp. Illus. Tables. Bib. Ind. $27.50 ($24.75).
This introductory survey by a faculty member at the Defense Intelligence School in Washington, D.C., offers a detailed chronology of modern Soviet naval operations. The book is organized geographically with sections on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans as well as on the Mediterranean; it includes extensive tables indicating ship days spent in various ports of call. The author concludes with a somber warning that as the Soviets gain in their development of sea power they are sure to become more aggressive.
Sunk! How the Great Battleships Were Lost
David Woodward. London, England: George Allen & Unwin, 1982. 153 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
The author, a British journalist and naval historian, has compiled accounts of the demise of a score of the world's great battleships from the Re d'Italia sunk by ramming at the Battle of Lissa in 1866 to the destruction of the Japanese superbattleship Yamato by more than 300 U. S. war planes in 1945. Other chapters concern the sinking of the Maine, the Bismarck, British and German vessels at Jutland, and American battlewagons at Pearl Harbor, as well as lesser known battleships. There is no new information offered in this collection, but it is an interesting survey for the general reader.
MARINE CORPS AFFAIRS
S3 Guadalcanal Remembered
Herbert Christian Merillat. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1982. 332 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $17.95 ($14.36).
A combination memoir and history, this first-person account of the battle for Guadalcanal was written by the man who was the public relations officer and historian of the First Marine Division in 1942-43. Verbatim entries from the author's diary are interspersed with a historical narrative in which Merillat offers conclusions about the conduct of the campaign as well as its longterm significance. The battle is examined from both a macrocosmic and a microcosmic perspective.
Marines at War
Ian Dear. London. England: Ian Allan. Ltd., 1982. 128 pp. Ulus. Maps. £9.95 (Approx. $17.50).
This heavily illustrated tribute to the skill and toughness of the Marine forces of both the United States and the United Kingdom focuses on nine campaigns in World War II. Those that concern the U. S. Marine Corps are the Pacific campaigns of Wake Island, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. Less familiar to American readers are the campaigns that highlight the British Royal Marines in Europe and Southwest Asia. There is also a chapter on the Normandy landings which involved both British and U. S. Marines. This is a serious history, though the greatest strength of the book may be its liberal use of contemporary action photographs.
Semper FI, Mac: Living Memories of the U. S. Marines in World War II
Henry Berry. New York: Arbor House. 1982. 375 pp. Illus. Ind. $15.95 ($14.35).
A former marine, the author of this entertaining collection attended Marine unit reunions and also interviewed marine veterans for their reminiscences of life in the Corps. They rememberduty stations, colorful commanders, and tell old-fashioned sea stories. The result is a mosaic portrait of the Marine Corps of the 1920s-40s in salty language sprinkled with marine lingo.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Federal Records of World War II
General Services Administration. Detroit: Gale Research Company. 1982. 2 vols. 1.073 pp. and 1.061 pp., respectively. Ind. $75.00 per set ($67.50).
This guide was originally completed in 1950 under the editorship of Philip M. Hamer. It contains more than 3,000 entries; each cites a federal agency, its wartime mission, the scope of its records, and the location and comprehensiveness of those records. It is a useful starting point for researchers.
but should be supplemented by more recent and specialized guides.
The History of Dive Bombing
Peter C. Smith. Annapolis, MD.: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co., 1981. 253 pp. lllus. Bib. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
According to this history’s author, the first Pilot to execute a dive-bombing mission— t0 put his plane into a dive of more than 60° before releasing his bombs—was Lieutenant William Henry Brown of the Royal Air Force, who sank an enemy barge in France in 1918. This book surveys divebombing from its World War 1 beginning to the Korean War. One of the text's highlights is the quotations from pilots who flew dive-bombers in combat.
Jane’s Military Communications, 1982
R. J. Raggett. Editor. London and Boston.
MA.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1982. 723 PP- Ulus. Ind. $140.00 ($126.00).
The foreword to this third edition of Jane’s survey of military electronic communications criticizes the Reagan Administration for failing to realize that “we have moved from the age where muscle means power." Rather than rely on an expanded arsenal °f weapons, the editor argues, the West should adopt more subtle methods, especially an effort to disrupt Soviet commu- uications, rendering its weapons useless. The range of electronic gimmickry available for such a strategy is catalogued—each Piece of hardware is identified by a short descriptive paragraph and the usual wealth of statistical detail one has come to expect from Jane's publications.
Silence was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages
Stuart A. Herrington. Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1982. 222 pp. lllus. $15.95 ($14.35).
The author of this account of the Vietnam War in the Due Hue District of Hau Nghia Province was assigned the job of winning over to the government men who had formerly served the enemy. Though this book includes accounts of some particularly satisfying victories in that regard, Herrington observes at the outset that the United States failed to win "the hearts and minds" of the people during the war. He then examines the group dynamics and personal interactions within the small villages where he worked to help explain why success in that effort proved so elusive.
FICTION Pacific Interlude
Sloan Wilson. New York: Arbor House. 1982. 317 pp. $14.95 ($13.45).
This novel is a semiautobiographical sequel to Wilson’s Ice Brothers (Arbor House, 1979) and traces the experiences of Lieutenant Syl Grant, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve, as a gas tanker captain in the Pacific in 1944. Only 24, Grant must establish his authority with the crew and with a wardroom that includes a pedantic exec nearly twice his age, and an ensign who is a Louisiana good ol’ boy on the lookout for a shortcut and a fast buck. Grant manages the problems inherent in such a situation— and his loneliness—while servicing the fleet from Brisbane to Leyte Gulf to Manila.
Submarine
John Wingate. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 212 pp. $11.95 ($10.75).
This is the final volume of Wingate’s trilogy about a future NATO-Soviet war at sea. As in the first two volumes (Frigate and Carrier), the conflict takes place within the context of a half war, half game-of-bluff. Can the submarine force of NATO's Northern Command convince the Soviets to back down from their occupation of Norway and their hard-line stance by sinking a “Typhoon” submarine in the Barents Sea? Wingate’s knowledge of the machinery and the jargon of naval combat lend authenticity to his narrative, though it helps to have read the two previous novels.
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