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ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Requiem for the Sixth Fleet?
The Captain Infamy
AWACS for NATO
One Hornet, Two Stings
No Place for Women
FMF for the RDF
Not in My Navy
“Whiskey” on the Rocks
The Fleet Connection
Combat Readiness: Naval Air vs. Air Force
Ticonderoga: Another Hood?
The U. S. Navy: A New Destroyer Class Cuba: Moscow’s Marionette Coast Guarding the Caribbean
“Requiem for the Sixth Fleet?”
CSee P. T. Deutermann, pp. 46-49, September 1982 Proceedings)
Captain Barry L. Brown, U. S. Navy, Organization of the JCS—Commander Deutermann could not have planned a less propitious time to advocate the disestablishment of the U. S. Sixth Fleet. The fleet’s brilliantly executed evacuation of PLO members from Beirut is now a matter of historical record. It is difficult to envisage how this operation, and the many other crisis containment actions taken by the Sixth Fleet over the past 35 years, could have been executed by a contingency force operating from the Western Atlantic. To suggest such a thesis implies that we can predict the timing, location, and type of potential crises that might arise and have ready for sea all of the forces needed for an appropriate response.
Rather than fostering stability in the Atlantic Fleet as Commander Deutermann suggests, the opposite result would be the case. In terms of crisis deterrence, the value of a naval presence on the scene cannot be underestimated. There is considerable merit in arguing that had the Royal Navy been deployed to the South Atlantic prior to the Argentine incursion into the Falklands, the costly and politically damaging recapture operation could have been avoided because the Argentines would not have invaded. One also has to wonder whether events in Iran might have turned out differently if a U. S. Indian Ocean Fleet had been in existence prior to the Shah’s overthrow.
“The Captain”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 39-45, September 1982 Proceedings)
R. Kent TeVault—Commander John Byron’s article is superb!
Several of your other contributors could benefit from a writing course; I nominate “The Captain” to teach it.
“Infamy”
{See R. Love. pp. 97-99. September 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant DeLancey Nicoll III, U. S- Naval Reserve (Retired)—Dr. Love s review of Mr. Toland’s book is especially impressive, as it is the only one to tell it like it is. The book was reviewed recently in the Sunday Ne*>’ York Times, and the result was a Pol- lyannish overview. The other reviews I have read are much the same. This indicates to me that either the reviewers are afraid of the publisher, or they have no real knowledge of the subject. Fortunately, Dr. Love does not fall into either of these categories.
“AWACS for NATO”
(See A. G. Russell, pp. 109-112. August 1982
Proceedings)
Captain A. G. “Slim" Russell, U. S- Navy (Retired)—You dropped AFPR9 (Air Force Plant Representative Office) out of my job position as the NATO E-3A Program Manager. While the Air Force contributes in many ways to the program’s success, in no way can we take the credit which Boeing so richly deserves. Tom Manning, an outstanding individual, is Boeing’s NATO E-3A Program Manager.
“One Hornet, Two Stings”
(See R. E. Stumpf. pp. 115-119, September
1982 Proceedings)
Captain J. C. Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Retired)—It is obvious that the F/A-18 Hornet will be superior to both the F-4 and A-7 it is replacing. Further, there is no doubt that our pilots can become proficient in both the fighter and attack missions and will be able to exploit the versatility of this fine airplane.
However, to make the claim that the F/A-18 is the finest fighter in the world because it is superior to the
F- '4 in air combat maneuvering engagements (it won't be superior when and 1 the F-14 gets new engines) is a disservice to the Navy, and ignores the Primary air-missile threat to the Navy s carrier task forces. This becomes ^specially pertinent as the Defense Resources Board examines Navy tac- t,cal aircraft alternatives. The Hornet cannot replace the Tomcat in the fleet air defense role.
Since 1979, the Defense Department has acknowledged that the So- v’et bomber-launched antiship missile hreat has overtaken their submarine orce as the primary threat to our fleet and sea lines of communication. The Fiscal Year 1980 Annual Defense jJepartment Report” listed the main Navy objective as “countering Soviet
'iq31 *rom t*le a'r’" anc* ^sca* Vear 981 report listed the main objective ?? 'improving fleet air defense capacities." The main reason for this change in threat emphasis has been he advent of the supersonic “Back- hpe ’ bomber aircraft with its two to °ur long-range air-to-surface missiles 'ASMs) and its combat radius of 2,500- -000 nautical miles without in-flight refueling.
. The primary reason, then, for buy- 'n8 F-14s instead of F/A-18s for the Pghter aircraft squadrons on carriers ,except the Midway [CV-41] and Coral e‘i [CV-43], which would require expensive modifications to handle F-I4s) ‘s the crucial requirement of providing al* naval carrier task groups with the CaPability to defend themselves against the ever-growing “Backfire” ASM iptreat. In contrast to the Hornet, the •°mcat can intercept both the “Back- hre ’ and its fired ASMs on a sustained b;isis. Its two-man crew markedly improves the aircraft’s operational capabilities in a complex and sophisticated electronic countermeasures environment. The F-14's Phoenix ^jssiles are highly resistant to jam- rning, as is the high-powered AWG-9 fissile control system. With the Fhoenix, six targets can be fired on x,niultaneously at altitudes ranging horn more than 80,000 feet to less than 100 feet.
hi most cases, aided by E-2C, AWACS, or shipboard radar acqui- S|hon and vectoring, the F-14 will be ahle to acquire and shoot down backfires” before they reach their 'P'ssile-launching point. Failing this, jne F-14s can shoot down ASMs with Phoenix missiles. Against all types of
targets, the F-14's Phoenix missile has several times the kill probability of the F-18’s Sparrow missile.
The single-place Hornet, on the other hand, which has a less powerful radar, must close to closer ranges before firing its Sparrow missiles, and can attack only one target at a time. Many experienced naval aviators give the F-18 no intercept capability against “Backfires” prior to their launching ASMs, nor against the hard-to-ac- quire ASMs once they have been launched.
In the strike group fighter escort role, the F-14 may also be required. The recent appearance of the Soviets' MiG- 255 with a very advanced look-down/ shoot-down radar using long-range, highly capable missiles has caused consternation among Navy planners that the single-place F-18—with its relatively low radar scan volume and limited detection ranges—may not be able to cope with this new Soviet threat when escorting naval aircraft strike groups. In contrast, the two-place F-14, with its high-powered, large- volume, long-range AWG-9 radar and Phoenix missiles, should be able to detect and shoot down any defending MiG-25s long before they can close the air strike group.
The F/A-18s have their place; they will provide improvements over the F-4s and A-7s they are replacing. But the requirement for two F-14 interceptor squadrons on all carriers is well established and any alternative suggestions should be rejected.
Commander C. F. Ward, U. S. Naval Reserve—While otherwise enjoying this article on the F/A-18, I stumbled on the mention of the use of tankers “as is currently done with the Phantoms.” I’m not sure about the eastern ocean, but out West it’s mainly F-I4s. The TF-30 is not my overall replacement for the J-79, but it is more stingy with fuel. A brief one-liner to continue filling the decks of a CV with nonfirepower carrying aircraft won’t do. At the very least. Lieutenant Stumpf should prepare for several hundred barbs from anyone who received fuel from said tankers while flying a thirsty F-4. We think turnabout is fun and fair play; the F-18 pilots and the air boss might not see the humor. There is much more to that "alternative" than meets the eye: money, deck loading, aircrew at risk, support troops for starters. Think again; buy tanks.
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arrent needs weren't (h, consider the future, f 5 can cope with each ne that appears without cos [es to the system.
EA-6B. It more than Pa^s ;lf.
No Place for Women”
(See D. Evans, pp. 53-56, November 1981;
C Mollison, F. R. Hamlett, and T. C. Nichols, pp. 10-17. February 1982; M. A. Brewer, pp. 18-21, March 1982; L. J. Korb. PP- 87-90, April 1982; J. H. Brother, p. 208, May 1982; J. E. Shea, pp. 20-21, June 1982;
■ Hoffman, p. 74, August 1982 Proceedings)
^‘/tenant Colonel G. D. Batcheller, • $■ Marine Corps—I am remiss for B°t sooner voicing a supportive amen” to Colonel Evans’s “No Place °r Women.” The article so closely JBatched the voiced opinions of vir- ually every Marine officer I know that
1 did
not attribute much significance
'*i VfL’ -v '- A, ' r-v
BR
■j? Il- But comments such as those by r- Korb and Commander Hoffman Serve to illustrate how close to the mark . was, and how much accurate criti- Clsm hurts when it strikes politically sensitive or emotional subjects. It’s a sname that neither Dr. Korb nor Com- niander Hoffman will have to cope with e Problem in a more immediate, responsible setting. The issue of women jn the military cannot be defended in ,erms of military merit. If our military js to retain (regain?) its warrior ethic, . re can be no serious talk of women In its operating forces. The warrior i'c, itself, may be “unscientific dri- .> ’ but then we get so damn few scientists in either our base of fire or °Ur enveloping force.
1 Would like to register a more ‘niely “amen” for Commander By- r°n s comments in the August issue 0n “FMF for the RDF.”
cies. In 1983, the RDJTF will become the Commander in Chief (CinC) for SWA. Rapid deployments to other parts of the world will be directed by the CinC assigned to that area. For unassigned areas, CinC, U. S. Readiness Command, is responsible.
There are no plans to carry large numbers of troops to a deployment in military lift aircraft. Current deployment plans project commercial passenger aircraft to carry troops and their immediate baggage in order to save military airlift assets to carry equipment. Getting people to the war is not a significant problem; getting warfighting material to the troops is. The material must not only reach the theater, it must get from the port of entry to the battle area. In Europe, there is a vast transportation infrastructure that can take on this job. In Korea, we have extensive forces and roads already in place. In almost any other place to which a rapid deployment force is likely to be deployed, there will be very little local logistic support. In such a case, the intertheater lift has two burdens: It must not only get the tanks, the helicopters, the ammunition, and
the petroleum to the theater, it must also deliver trucks to carry the warfighting material to the battle, the engineering equipment to build and maintain the roads on which the trucks will travel, and the support equipment to handle the cargoes. In one unclassified scenario in the “1980 Congressional Mandated Mobility Study,”
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“FMF for the RDF”
(See M. L. Cover, pp. 51-55, June 1982;
J- G. Miller, pp. 16-18, July 1982; J. L.
Byron, pp. 79-81, August 1982, J. M. Saur S. G. Kalemaris, pp. 31-33, October 982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Ralph E.
Latham, U. S. Navy, Military As- 'Ostant to the Defense Science Board— ne Rapid Deployment Joint Task orce (RDJTF) is not intended for rapid . ePloyment throughout the world. It ls a headquarters with responsibility °nly for Southwest Asia (SWA) and Parts of Northeast Africa. It com- ntands no troops except for exercises °r for an actual deployment. In such a ease, it will be given some combination of forces previously specified 0r the mission. Although these units know they may be called upon for an RDJTF mission, they also have other Potential missions in other contingen-
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more than 70% of the weight of Army unit equipment taken to a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) war was composed of trucks and engineer equipment. The direct combat equipment made up only 15% of the weight. This is a strategic lift problem that needs to be solved by a combination of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning; it is not a troop transport problem.
It is this need for intertheater logistics that makes the unassisted Marine Corps unsuited for a large portion of potential RDF missions. The Marine Corps can project troops across the beach, which the Army cannot. The Marine Corps carries a substantial amount of consumables with it upon entry, which the Army does not. But the Marine Corps cannot project its forces much more than 50 miles inland because of the lack of a corps logistic capability, which the Army does have and provides to both the Marines and the Air Force in RDJTF scenarios. To change the U. S. Marine Corps into a self-contained RDF force, as Commander Cover suggests, would take more than converting it into a “mobile, mechanized ground force.” It would take a tremendous restructuring of the logistics tail for the Corps.
I am not saying that this may not be the direction for the Corps in the future. I am saying that “the professional worries about logistics,” and the change proposed by Commander Cover would require a drastic alteration in the Marine Corps’ structure.
I disagree that the Marine Corps should deactivate its aviation units except for close air support if it is assigned to the RDF role. Although interdiction is not particularly profitable in a NATO war because of the many ways for the enemy to get material to the front, it will, perhaps, be the most important single warfighting tactic in an RDF scenario. For the same reason that we would need to import intertheater logistics assets to the RDF war, an enemy would be confined to the few roads and transportation routes in a lesser developed country. An enemy’s invading and logistic forces would present a perfect target set for interdiction assets. The RDF concept is not based upon having time to pick the conditions and place of combat; we will not get there “fustest with the mostest.” If, as envisioned, we would deploy in response to a request from a host country to deter external aggression, we may, at least initially, be the inferior force. Deep interdiction will be a vital component of the tactics in such a situation.
Furthermore, the Marine Corps should not expect the Navy to be understanding of or sympathetic to its air support needs. In many RDF scenarios, the carriers will be protecting the sea lines of communication and themselves. Little extra naval air may be available for deep support. Interservice coordination is one of the best features of the Marine Corps air-ground team. If the Corps is to become an RDF force only, it will have all the more reason to keep and strengthen its air arm.
I agree with Commander Cover s recommendation that the forces for rapid deployment missions be desig' nated specifically and uniquely structured for that mission, rather than double-hatted with NATO or other responsibilities. RDF issues are not a simple subset of NATO issues. The need for unplanned rapid response, the lack of logistic infrastructure, the lack of cultural understanding of the area by our troops, the very different nature and intensity of the conflict, the long lines of supply, and the lack of time spent on analysis of the problem add up to a different kind of fighting than that for which we have planned in the past and for which we have structured our forces and our defense management. As a result, the cracks between the services are much wider for RDF matters than anywhere else. Had we the luxury of sufficient resources, RDF forces should clearly be made up of dedicated units.
Still, it is not true that the RDJTF “is not capable of conducting successful military operations.” We should not sell the current RDJTF short; neither should we sell it out. It is a competent and capable organization, but this nation places demands upon it that it cannot meet.
When the policy that created the RDJTF was articulated, an effective but somewhat disjointed contingency force was patched together. We now have a significant military capability that we did not have less than three years ago. Its formation in such a short time is a remarkable achievement, but competent though the force is, it bears the marks of its hasty formation. Perhaps we should now take our time and create a worldwide contingency force from the ground up that would not suffer from interservice rivalry.
Not in My Navy”
^ee S. A. Paolantonio, pp. 38-43, August L. B. Brennan, p. 23, October 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James A. McNitt, U. S. Navy—My collateral duty as legal officer on board a Spruance-class destroyer proved to be a time-consuming one. To the administrative officer and fi16, the problem with increased command pressure on identifying and processing drug users was a time lag: the cognizant section of the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) had to catch up with the Chief of Naval Operations. Policies on the type of mscharge applicable in specific cases .d not seem consistent with the ad- ',,ce that defense counsels at the Navy Legal Services Office (NLSO) were giving to our crew members. After listening to the senior naval district court judge address the subject, and after Several talks with an NLSO representative, I acquired the impression that, although NMPC had established pol- 'cies supportive of the drug abuse pro- 8ram, the military justice system was 'agging behind.
Military judges are forced to test the legality of probable cause urinalysis testing in the military courts. Although the system protects the rights °f the accused, the reality of the situation—to the shipboard legal offi- Cer—is one of resistance by military c°urts to rapidly set policy of the CNO and NMPC.
Recently, a sailor with four positive Urinalysis screenings for marijuana use was being processed for a misconduct discharge on the basis of drug abuse, which could lead to an other than honorable (OTH) discharge. The commanding officer could recommend an OTH, general, or honorable discharge; NMPC would make the final determination. When a service member is given an OTH, he can have his case reviewed by an administrative discharge board composed of officers from his ship. In this particular instance, the sailor was counselled by a Navy Judge Advocate’s General defense counsel, who recommended that he request a discharge board on the grounds that the command should have been processing the service member under a discharge reserved for drug abusers—which could not lead to a discharge more severe than general.
My command, like all others, is concerned with identifying and prosecuting drug abusers. The commanding officer dealt severely with crew members convicted of drug abuse at captain’s mast, as did the appointed summary courts. When I detached from the ship, approximately 10% of the crew was involved in the weekly urinalysis screen program; at least a dozen administrative discharges were in various stages of processing. As the command’s recommendations are processed by NMPC, the ship gains insight as to what type of discharge to give. Currently, many initial cases are being resolved by NMPC, and the feedback to the ship has reduced timeconsuming procedural errors.
The anti-drug abuse program is working, despite the frustrations and problems inherent within an administrative program which must protect both the individual’s rights and the government’s interest. I am convinced that the troops know we are serious: Ask a recently discharged sailor who submitted a urine specimen prior to departing on terminal leave. He was called back to duty when the results were positive—and before leaving the Navy, lost his third class crow.
As I move on to my next tour of duty, I am confident that the recent changes I have seen in my men, their increased morale, will continue to build as the “dirtbags” are weeded out for good. The Navy-wide battle against drug abuse is a major reason for this positive attitude and proof that we can solve our own problems through teamwork.
Disbursing Clerk Third Class Richard Hartmann, U. S. Naval Reserve—I am pleased that the Navy is taking steps to control drug abuse, and it should continue unabated.
My main purpose is not to praise Lieutenant Paolantonio’s interesting and informative article, but to address another sensitive issue: my deceased shipmates, and the slurs their memories must endure. I was on board (and still am) the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) the night the EA-6B Prowler crashed into the flight deck. The 11 men who died were in no way responsible for the crash, and I cannot believe that marijuana was a “contributing factor.” Those who had marijuana traces in their systems were victims—plain and simple; most of them died in the initial crash and blast. Would it have mattered any if there were no traces of the drug in their systems? No. They were performing their duties and happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.
The blame should be placed on two factors: the long hours of flight operations that can cause fatigue and the pilot of the EA-6B. A recent Navy report has stated that the pilot had “excessive amounts of antihista-
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m!ne ’ in his system. I hope this fact |V|II be kept in mind by those who write utUrc articles on the Nimitz flight deck crash.
‘Whiskey’ on the Rocks”
nc^ Given and W. Cashman, pp. 112- 'l5- April 1982; R. Suggs, p. 84, July 1982 Proceedings)
A" Hanley—Generally, it has been j*ccepted that the nuclear traces detected outside the hull of the “W-137” came from nuclear-tipped torpedoes.
csterners are quite willing to believe hat the Soviets would have such Weapons on board. However, there is a flaw in this logic. A submerged Whiskey' ’-class submarine, on a good ay, can average 13.5 knots. This speed S|mply isn'{ fast enough to escape the shock wave that would result from the donation of a nuclear torpedo.
The Soviets have a sufficient num- pr of advanced submarines which ■scharge the need for an old “Whis- eY ' to engage in a suicidal mission, ttrthermore, when penetrating a for- e,gn nation’s territorial waters, such torpedoes would probably be offloaded; as the Swedes have few aircraft carriers—the only targets that ^ould justify a “Whiskey’s” suicide, herefore, it seems that the “Whis- ey was in those waters to either lay 0r. service previously laid nuclear mines.
Certain German sources have postdated the existence of Soviet nuclear m,r>es that can remain dormant for years and can be armed and even detonated by a coded radio or sonic signal. Tremendous benefits could accrue for the Soviets if such mines were strategically placed near neutral facil- ntes. In wartime, no neutral nation w°uld dare let any NATO force use 'ts facilities under the threat that the Soviets would detonate. NATO na- f'ons could be denied their own ports ln the same manner. Without firing a shot, the Soviets could, in effect, “destroy” NATO’s harbors. In addition, n Would not be practical to attempt to msarm such devices. With conven- bonal devices, only the demolition crew ls risked; with nuclear mines the entire surrounding population is.
Suppose such a mine were found? Assuming the finding nation “went Public,” the Soviets would simply deny " Was theirs. Farfetched? Remember, 'he U. S. Government was unable to convince Congress of Soviet use of chemical and biological weapons in Afghanistan, and NATO nations are having a hard time convincing their citizens that emplaced Soviet SS-20s aimed at them are a bigger threat than undeployed U. S. cruise missiles aimed eastward.
Laying mines is relatively easy and would be an ideal mission for an older, relatively small sub. The spying theory (there are easier ways) doesn't fit, nor do nuclear-tipped torpedoes. Until the announcement that U-238 had been detected outside the hull, the Swedish authorities seemed quite willing to hold the sub for a long time. Then suddenly these same officials decided to release her. What secret communications passed between the Swedish and Soviet governments to generate such an action?
Assuming the mine theory is correct, what if this isn’t the first time the Soviets have done this, but merely the first time they have been caught?
“The Fleet Connection”
(See R. Boyle, pp. 58-61, September 1982
Proceedings)
Carl Weikel, Lockheed Field Service—Mr. Boyle states that, “ Tech Reps’ visit ships in port more and more these days because of the complexity of modern hardware. They seldom go to sea.” Having served Lockheed Aircraft for the past seven years as a tech rep—five of those years on sea duty with the carrier force—I feel safe in saying that Mr. Boyle is not aware of how things are with the naval air arm.
During the predeployment period, my company will assign three to five men to the carrier to assist in her preparations for deployment. During the deployment, these same people stay on the ship and assist the ship and embarked squadrons. Other compa- niessuchasGrumman, Litton, Vought, and Harris also will have their contractor teams on board for the same periods. However, it should be noted that I have seen only two civil service personnel deploy with the carrier for an entire cruise.
The company tech rep is there to provide assistance and the fieet/fac- tory interface that Mr. Boyle claims is missing. Granted, while at sea. direct communications with the company are limited to “class easy” messages. But, the moment that the ship hits port, the tech reps call the factory to resolve problems that have come up during that at-sea period, ln many cases, the affected maintenance officer from the squadron will be invited to be present during the telephone call. He is able to listen in and make comments and recommendations for improvements in the product.
If this does not provide the "meaningful dialogue" that Mr. Boyle refers to as missing, I do not know what other steps that he would want the tech rep to take.
(Continued on page 90)
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 33)
“Combat Readiness: Naval Air
vs. Air Force”
(See S. W. Smith, pp. 41-45. February 1982;
D. J. Kiely. pp. 200-203. May 1982. W. A.
Weronko. p. 87. July 1982 Proceedings)
First Lieutenant John F. Reardon Jr., U. S. Marine Corps—As a Marine Corps intelligence officer with Fleet Marine Force experience in both ground and aviation units, 1 am astonished at Colonel Kiely’s proclivity for shooting himself in the foot, so to speak, with his statements in the penultimate paragraph of his article concerning the current threat.
The colonel states, “I didn't know that much of what we developed in Vietnam was now outdated”—a classic, concrete example of the observation that the U. S. military trains for the last war it fought. I respect the colonel’s combat time and years of experience. but I strongly suspect that the next conflict we find ourselves in will include an enemy with a great deal more technological sophistication and related weapon systems than the Vietnamese fielded. Lieutenant Smith correctly observes that the only ground threats to aircraft in Vietnam were antiaircraft artillery and SA-2 missiles (in addition to SA-7s and small arms), but the colonel expresses doubt that he'll face anything more than this in future conflicts: “When it comes to surface-to-air threats, that's all there will be the next time, too.” What happened to SA-3s, -4s, -6s?; improved -7s, -8s, and -9s?; and more recently, the numerous and vastly improved follow-on systems to those named above? And the ZSU-23-4? I assume from the colonel's statements that all surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery have the exact same capabilities. Following that line of reasoning, the F-4B is the same animal as the slatted F-4! Colonel Kiely would be well advised (nay, is implored by this writer) to revisit this issue with the help of the nearest intelligence officer from any service. It certainly bears more accurate analysis than the “high- side pass” it received in his letter.
“Ticonderoga: Another Hoodf"
(See S. Morss, pp. 116-117, August 1982:
E. L. Beach, p. 134. October 1982 Proceedings)
“The U. S. Navy: A New Destroyer Class”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 122-124, August 1982 Proceedings)
Thomas S. Hoback—Unfortunately, these articles convey an essentially depressing view of our two future battle group combatants. One is allegedly overweight, and the other is supposedly hobbled by deletions and lightweight variants of equipment. Both concepts are misleading.
Commander Morss made one assumption that scuttled his major assertion. He believes that the Spruance has normal-to-generous growth margins. She does not; her margins are massive. In fact, they were an object of criticism by detractors of the design. The structural limit of this basic design is 10.200 tons. The Ticonderoga reportedly displaces 9,600 tons. While Commander Morss’s criticism is erroneous, it is obviously well-intentioned and offers a positive suggestion.
The real problem for the Ticonderoga has been a bitter but misleading campaign waged by congressional staff members, allegedly over displacement but actually over cost. What these people really want is to deny this class its LAMPS III and SQR-19 tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS); they also question the need for the SPS-49 long-range air search radar. In a similar campaign, the General Accounting Office has questioned the need for the DDG-51 to have the SQR-19 towed array.
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Accepting these recommendations could prove catastrophic. Congress has been furious with the Navy over the rising costs of the LAMPS III program, and TACTAS has been delayed by additional bureaucratic nonsense. Concurrent production of new LAMPS I helicopters and an effective earlier type of towed array has complicated congressional understanding of these programs. The differences between the LAMPS I and LAMPS III are fun-
damental but difficult to explain to laymen who notice the differences in Price very quickly. The same holds true for two types of towed arrays. The earlier SQR-18 has performed admirably, but its performance cannot match the later SQR-19. The SQR-19’s much increased and needed performance, however, has resulted in a commensurate rise in price. Soviet submarine performance is showing marked improvements, and these two systems are to be our major means of countering the Soviet submarine threat.
Another factor to be considered is the serious decrease in numbers of both systems caused by such cancellations. There are only 35 other battle group escorts which can carry the larger LAMPS III and improved TACTAS: the 31 Spruance and four Kidd destroyers. It appears that these destroyers will now carry one LAMPS Hi helicopter and not the two they were designed to haul. None of our Previous cruisers, including the nuclear-powered ones, can handle Lamps hi, and none are scheduled to receive either towed array. The Navy may not be able to use FFG-7s m battle groups as some have proposed, despite the large numbers in the class. Twenty-four ships of this class have not received LAMPS III and TACTAS, and there is some doubt whether they ever will because of the cost of conversion to accommodate them. The Navy’s official position is that frigates do not belong in battle §roups and will be eliminated from them as soon as sufficient numbers of Proper combatants are available.
The CG-47 and DDG-51 are the Proper types of battle group combatants. Later, the CG-47 will have Sl8nificant improvements such as vertical launchers and the improved but hghter SPY -1B radar as well as LAMPS Hi and TACTAS. This program should he kept on track because it is produc- lng our best and most versatile surface combatant. The DDG-51 will be an even better antisubmarine warfare •ASW) ship than the CG-47 currently ,s- This is because her hull sonar, the SQS-53C, is not only lighter but has S|gnificant performance improve- rr|ents over earlier versions, including 'he SQS-53B. In addition, the DDG- will have the “Superset” ASW control system which is even more ad- yanced than that scheduled for the CG- 47 class. Besides having the SQR-19 towed array, the DDG-51 also has a complete set of LAMPS III electronics and has a fully equipped flight deck, including inflight refueling capabilities. The improved DDG-51 systems will probably be fitted into later CG- 47s as preplanned product improvements.
A way to provide increased ASW protection for battle groups is to build additional DDG-51 s modified for ASW, leaving the missile launchers and radars intact. What would be deleted is the aft module with the Mk-45 gun- mount, which would be replaced by a twin hangar assembly similar to that on FFG-7. The small Mk-75 76-mm. gunmount could be fitted in front of the forward missile launcher. Because of her larger beam compared with the frigate’s and because of her large growth margins, the DDG-51 could provide an ideal helicopter facility, including an enlarged magazine to handle more torpedoes and other weapons such as guided missiles which hopefully will appear on LAMPS III eventually. The lack of a hangar is the only detraction to the DDG-51 as an ASW ship.
“Cuba: Moscow’s Marionette”
(See J. E. Hopkins, pp. 58-64, July 1982:
J. Stavridis, pp. 18-23, October 1982 Proceedings)
“Coast Guarding the Caribbean”
(See M. R. Adams, pp. 61-65, August 1982 Proceedings)
David J. Kenney—America’s diminished capacity to influence its friends and to stymie its foes has provoked a wide range of responses. Some authors like David Calleo in his Imperial Economy amassed a body of fact and presented finely wrought economic arguments to get to the bottom of America’s frustrations. Others like General Joseph Hopkins see the world's happenings rooted entirely in Marxist imperialism aided by American ineptness. Such pundits resemble their simplistic communist adversaries in their refusal to see the complexity of the late 20th century.
Hopkins fails to recognize ambiguity, limitation, or chance in the affairs of nations and instead resorts to a bully pulpit militarism that sounds cheap and hollow beside the foreign policy goals of any American administration within memory. Predictably, his analysis and solutions end up pre-
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tentious, illogical, and unconvincing.
Consider a few examples:
Hopkins writes ‘‘The Soviet Union as master geopolitician is pulling the strings and calling the plays.” He needs to be reminded, inter alia, that the Soviet Union has lost Egypt: that Marxism as a viable European political movement is dead: that the Soviet Union’s client-state Syria has been humiliated and its countless MiGs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and tank battalions destroyed; that the Soviet Union botched the Afghan invasion at great cost in blood and treasure: that the Soviet Union failed to quash the rebellious Polish labor movement. Some strings! Some plays!
‘‘These multiple fronts . . . when complimented by directed terrorist acts . . . .” Hopkins tilts at windmills that are already destroyed. The U. S. intelligence community, as quoted in the public press, failed after exhaustive examination to document a direct causal link between the Kremlin and world terrorism.
“The communists theorize that Free World citizens assailed by doubt, confusion and fear will lose confidence in their leaders . . . .” Which communist theorizers? Which leaders? Where is the necessary footnote? How many Free World citizens? All? A small minority? Of course, if Hopkins wants a sample of genuine fear and confusion, he need only watch TV for the faces of Polish workers as they risk their lives in repudiating the system that Hopkins posits is bound to capture the world.
“We must apply whatever measures are necessary to ensure that African and Southeast Asian nations may determine their own destiny ....'” This replication of 1950s cold war cant typifies the political immaturity that permeates Hopkins's essay. Does he seriously conclude that any American administration would invade Vietnam again?
Hopkins gives full play to bizarre and incomplete logic. The reader never does learn what new weapons and stratagems the Cubans will use to humble America. Stylistic infelicities abound. The expression “panregion" is not available in either Webster's Collegiate Dictionary or the Oxford English Dictionary. What does it mean? Pretentious expressions like "geopolitical pragmatism” proliferate but are never defined. Truisms grow like weeds: e.g., "Some Third World countries are dissatisfied with their current borders” (page 61). Indeed! Major theses are asserted but never proven: e.g.; “As World War II neared its end, Eurafrica and Pan-Asia literally became panregions in search of power bases” (page 58).
By contrast, Commander Adams s
article in the August Proceedings
wisely focuses on discernible problems in a discrete area, the Caribbean basin. Implicitly, he recognizes that blatant military solutions will not stabilize new and fragile governments. His proposal—small beer compared with Hopkins’s cosmic schemes—encompasses small groups teaching low technology skills to end users where the ultimate goals are social and humanitarian rather than purely military. Adams's method and goal are commendable: his suggestions could well be implemented.
Yet, he omits much that is crucial to an understanding of the area. For example, each Caribbean country is unique and needs its own solutions for its own problems. Most Caribbean peoples will be politicized soon—even a wacky Marxist clone like Grenada’s newjewel movement was voted in because it promised to enfranchise the people. Caribbean nations desire no new absentee landlords—conse
quently any assistance tainted by perceived American military presence will probably fail. Most Caribbean nations are insolvent—they need better internal security to induce foreign investment; the Caribbean’s problems would have occurred without Castro or Marx—it is not productive to view them through a cold war lens.
The Hopkins’s article has cloaked complexity in a specious simplicity and shunned ambiguity for a quirky clarity. His solutions are those of an ivory tower staff college theoretician uninformed about costs, human diversity- or the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy. His determinism outdoes Marx in its rigidity and sense of pervasive catastrophe. He attributes great moves in history to superficial causes when in fact such episodes stem from the deep reaches of culture and tradition and are only scantily influenced by human reason.
A former CNO stated that, over the next few years, the U. S. Navy would be involved in perhaps a dozen quasimilitary episodes that he was powerless to foretell—so unpredictable is the flow of world events. General Hopkins needs similar humility in the face of history.