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munications problem. I did not se^ level of understanding when 1 peterrn'
‘Blue” submarine—doing s0
Another example of the too
mentality is what happened to a Pj
i . .• i ........................ ,^/iiitrt tne ^ ..
the • subrna'
posed tactical memorandum Lance submitted to improve
to 1 _
tween too hard and too vulnerao need to reevaluate our training P
Better ASW on fleet time—without new gadgets . . .
Antisubmarine warfare is a difficult problem that grows more difficult as Soviet submarines get quieter and harder to detect. But tough as it is, we in the fleet should be better at ASW than we are. We can go a long way toward solving the ASW problem without buying any fancy new equipment; we must simply fight smarter with what we have. The most important effort has to go into training our people.
Specifically, we need to communicate what we have learned about combined-arms ASW. In spite of all the symposia, simulations, and exercises paying lip service to the combined- arms concept, it is not widely applied in fleet ASW operations.
In February 1987, for instance, I attended a Naval Institute seminar on ASW in my home port of Charleston, South Carolina. The participants discussed new approaches and solutions to ASW, but ignored the larger problem of coordinating the naval warfare specialties to solve the ASW challenge together. Maybe that august group neglected to mention the problem because it is obvious—we have tried to solve it for so long that we have given up. Again, following my participation in NATO’s Display Determination ’86 exercise, I briefed naval personnel on lessons learned from the exercise. One experienced officer in my audience said, “It’s always been that way. That will never change.” We need to eliminate that attitude, as well as the one that says, “if it’s not invented here, we won’t try it.” We also need to focus on improvements that we can implement with present assets, on “fleet time,” rather than counting on acquiring “near-term” improvements on “Washington time.”
What can we do now, with the equipment already in the fleet, to improve our ASW effort? There are two kinds of ASW: under ice and not under ice. We must fight ASW under ice with nuclear submarines alone. Solving the problem in the open ocean requires coordination of naval aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.
The first thing we can do to sharpen the ASW effort in open water is to account for environmental anomalies in our ASW planning, both offensively and defensively. The Soviets are using the environment well, and this has reduced our effectiveness. We need to place our valuable assets in areas where we can better protect them from Soviet submarines. Equally important, all levels of personnel involved in ASW need to become more sensitive to the environment. Junior officers on ships should routinely consider local conditions in their ASW planning. We need to learn the new, but ensure we relearn the old, including nonacoustic ASW.
Second, now that our technological advantage over the Soviets is shrinking, we must tighten our ASW procedures. Because playing war is artificial and defending against submarines is less than glamorous, junior officers on carriers give the ASW mission lower priority than more exciting strike warfare. We can solve this problem only by having disinterested policemen provide on-the-spot correction in the carriers’ combat information centers. This immediate feedback will raise the standards for ASW.
Third, we need to ensure that we fully implement in our operations the improvements that we learn from exercises. Many realistic exercises have taught us some excellent lessons. But poor implementation has limited our drive for greater realism. In Display
the
Determination ’86, for instance,
USS Sand Lance (SSN-660) di ^ significantly participate in the A because communications lessons learned previously were not incorp rated into the exercise. 'rnple'
I suspect that the obstacles to ^ ^ menting what we learn are sinu a those that have blocked the impr ments in combined-arms warfare ^ sired by Congress (and resulte 1 ^ joint duty requirement for flag 0 selectees). |gS-
Fourth, we need to ensure tna ^ sons learned in ASW trickle do ^ junior officers. Senior officers a Naval Institute’s symposium, stance, demonstrated clear un |COm-
ing of the command-and-contro ^ ^
Lance participated in Display D J nation a few months earlier. 1 a(1d Lance was the “Blue” submatin , was left to fend for herself, al ^ only in the areas where no actio ^ expected. I think the planners a^ng had time to develop plans f°r in^,oUl(l
_______ ___ _ qQ
have been too hard. Submarine* contribute to combined-arms A there has to be some planning-^ part of the problem was that t staffs in the exercise did not kn enough about combined arms. ^ arrns from our discussions on combin ^ere at Submarine Squadron Four t ^nir
are better ways to incorporate s
rines into the combined-arms r-
. . . ..... “tnO nJ*1'
rine
ASW search tactics. It was apP^^ed by the type commander, and 'or to the responsible command *or0)isi' mulgation. For two years the wf ^ ble tactical development author! ^ layed promulgating the memora ^ because it is “too hard for the implement.” If the choice lS
126
Proceedings
Octob«r
t]gS U/
essarv tn mUSt conduct the lining nec- y to improve.
cess°ber.SUre’ there have been suc- ing I i -.j, ne.examP'e is the recent train- r0n p 0n between Submarine Squadding n’ °Ut °f Charleston, and Patrol ^PDenp i'k'1 ^Jacksonville, Florida. It ers from h fraUSe SqUadron eommand- Sether tferent communities got to- niore such made 't happen. We need npgraHo £rass-roots coordination to Final! °U[ cornbined-arms ASW. al1 comm' bftter ASW wil1 come when lesSons i and levels communicate the ture the med in exercises. To struc-
"ceds ovCemTUniCati°n’ the Navy and imni coordination to develop
tactics s'1' c°mbined-arms ASW coord,n,PeClflcal|y- we need an ASW
c°mman °r who works for the fleet the Den 7rS'ln:chief but has access to for A<j\y y Chief of Naval Operations SUre corn' ■ coor(tinator would en- that—__to ‘"Ul‘y among exercises, so are leam extent possible—lessons iish an once- He would estab-
cluding P'an for each exercise (in-
n’Unicatio°m,mand’ contr°h and com- Plan, on th'’ dr'e^ Participants on the Earned fr6 Frob'ems and lessons W tdeHm Previous exercises, and on that infr,i^eSentP*an will incorporate atton. The briefing team
must include members from each naval community to ensure that it is credible to the fleet.
There are other ways we can improve our combined-arms ASW without expensive new hardware. We can:
- Base our exercises on the assumptions and assets detailed in our war plans. The exercises must also be properly umpired, so we know our analyses of the events are valid.
- Promptly feed lessons from exercises into future exercises and back to the fleet. The system for sending information to the fleet must include the chain of command, or at many commands it may go unnoticed.
- Find a method of promulgating proposed tactics that obviates endless “chop chains.” To develop innovative tactics, we need a free flow of ideas. The “chop” can come later, when command authorities are approving a tactical doctrine.
- Use training commands—the fastest way to circulate new information—to promulgate ASW information picked up in exercises
- Provide ASW lesson plans to the Naval War College, prospective commanding officer schools, and department head schools
- Have a training task force working
for the Chief of Naval Operations or the commanders-in-chief teaching the ASW courses at these commands. The task force should include representatives from each naval community.
- Incorporate the lessons we leam about combined-arms ASW into our war plans
- Do a sharper job of identifying expert tacticians. We should continue to emphasize tactical ability on fitness reports, and single it out in the Navy’s promotion system.
- Ensure that joint-duty designator and admiral-selection requirements include experience in ASW
- Share what we leam in Proceedings—the forum that includes all the sea services and warfare communities.
We can do much to upgrade our ASW readiness immediately, without new hardware. The improvements can be significant, but achieving them will not be easy, or it would have occurred by now. It will take strong leadership, a charter from high command, the support of the strike forces, and the free flow of communications. Much more could be done if people were not so concerned with who gets the credit.
The magnitude of today’s ASW problem demands that kind of patriotism— up and down the chain of command.
„ 26th ANNUAL
Naval & maritime
photo contest
Systems-. Naval Institute and the Government to co-SDlv,sion. Eastman Kodak Company are proud qohtest°nSOr'he 26th Annual Naval & Maritime Photo
Proceecj ^ ^0,os W'H he published in a 1988 issue of 7®s' Cash prizes will be awarded as follows: 2nHn2e $500
3rHdDPrKe $350
HoPflZe $250
n°table Mention (15) $100 each
Naval
Us kT & Maritime PHOTO CONTEST Anna^al lns«Me
(30l)a?RoS’ MarVland 21402 I 268-6110
DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 1987
^VRuies:
time si. Photograph must pertain to a naval or mari- year lfct' Hhe photo is not limited to the calendar 5. °',he contest.)
3 entries per person.
- Entries must be either black and white prints, color prints, or color transparencies.
- Minimum print size is 5” x 7.”
- Minimum transparency size is 35mm.
(No glass mounted transparencies, please.)
- Full captions and the photographer's name and address must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print, or printed on the transparency mount. (No staples, please.)
- Entries must arrive at the U.S. Naval Institute no later than December 31, 1987.
Photographs not awarded prizes may possibly be purchased by the U.S. Naval Institute. Those photographs not purchased will be returned to the owner if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.
WIN $500
Sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute and the Eastman Kodak Company. Kodsk
lRS 1 October 1987