Get Serious About Naval Gunfire Support
(See K. P. Green, pp. 48
52, May 2010 Proceedings)Captain Michael R. Tollefson U.S. Navy (Retired)
Admiral Green's scan of the waterfront for an acceptable vessel to take the electromagnetic launcher to sea missed the obvious. The Navy already has on the ways an all-electric drive ship that delivers by 2014. Powered by a 78-megawatt integrated power system, with 54 megawatts of power margin at 20 knots, the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) is that obvious choice.The 78-megawatt main and auxiliary turbine generators power a 34.6-megawatt advanced induction motor for propulsion. Beyond hotel services and mission systems, the delta is available for rail guns, ballistic missile defense radars, and other loads not yet imagined, without requiring any added generation capacity. The generators and the advanced induction motor have completed their factory testing. At 20 knots, the Arleigh Burke class has only 1.7 megawatts of power margin.
Though its genesis is the land-attack destroyer, the Zumwalt is also an 80-missile blue-water ship with a radar suite that will become the envy of the Navy. Just because it can be inshore is not a requirement that it must be. Admiral Green's comment that "DDG-1000 was designed to operate in coastal waters" is only half the story.
The Unbearable Being of Jointness
(See B. McGrath, pp. 40
43, May 2010 Proceedings)Captain Chuck Nygaard, U.S. Navy
This well written article by a lead drafter of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower provides some good insight and some fresh ideas. The strategy was a clever move by the Navy to reinvigorate awareness of the impact that maritime forces have at a time when our country's ground forces were dominating media attention and national support. It reintroduced "soft power," embraced by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, highlighting the strong diplomatic roots of the Navy.The strategy did come off as "isolationism" from the other services, which could have been better curbed if the Navy targeted the joint audience as it did the business community to at least bring them aboard. The "sea power political action committee" is an excellent idea for the "coming age of fiscal austerity," as well as revitalizing the strategic communications campaign to our fellow countrymen (an effort that dropped off dramatically after the strategy was published).
Commander McGrath's article suggests a tone of "anti-jointness" in Navy leadership then and even now, but it is important realize that, with the lean fiscal times we face in our immediate future, doctrinal solutions will be required to repair the seams between the services. Which brings us to the operational aspect of this "unbearable jointness" that needs to be addressed and adjudicated in time for the train wreck that is fiscal austerity and its impact.
The impending encroachment of the Air Force into the Navy's traditional realm will require progressive leadership with the support of a smart and operational-experienced group of thinkers. The classic Navy response has been avoidance; to hold current ground for fear of losing any maritime domain is weak and contradicts the spirit of these new times. The Navy is staring directly at opportunities to lead the joint community in multiple areas where the fiscal down-turn will require coupled resources and united efforts to accomplish the mission. The sea-air interface is a frontier of new cooperation, and the Navy will be expected to lead the planning and execution of the next major maritime campaign, which will be a joint venture.
The Navy's poor representation in the Combined Force Air Component Commander's Combined Air Operations Center adds risk to the mission and personnel. The Navy's anti-joint doctrinal positions on ballistic-missile defense asset management are short on imagination and foresight, also adding risk to the mission, and staff processes prevent swift solutions. The theater maritime operations centers must be better coupled to theater air operations centers, and planning and execution cycles need to be shortened.
The decision for a larger commitment to jointness is upon us, and the more-than-respectable showing of naval officers as combatant commanders suggests that the decision is all but made.
More Henderson, Less Bonds
(See H. Hendrix, pp. 60
65, April 2010; and J. Cataldi, p. 12, May 2010 Proceedings)Captain Stephen J. Coughlin, U.S. Navy
Commander Hendrix has done a terrific job equating two of the most appreciated activities known to mankind, naval service and major league baseball. As a former patrol coastal squadron commander, I think his analogy presents the concept of an "influence squadron" with great merit. It makes sense for near-shore operations and for the requirements of our Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.I particularly like the notion of a small surface combatant within the influence-squadron construct to cover the green-water zone of a particular region. As Commander Hendrix points out, such a ship, perhaps a corvette, could be built at an affordable price and in the numbers we need to achieve the necessary presence, sea control, and engagement that is directed by our maritime strategy. As a point of reference, in 1997 a Cyclone-class ship was built for just under $24 million and in 1993 the American-built Israeli Sa'ar 5 cost $260 million. Even at today's prices, that's a drop in the bucket compared to current shipbuilding costs.
The great value of capable yet affordable ships is the volume and speed with which they can be produced, thus resulting in a more continuous global presence for the Navy in the near term. The importance of the resulting sea control cannot be overemphasized. I would argue that sea control can only be achieved with surface ships that have long on-station times, not a dwell time subjected to crew endurance or on-board fuel capacity. These vessels should be virtually linked, electronically connected, and must be there all the time. Any significant period of absence simply reduces the influence we are trying to achieve. It all can be done with ship designs that currently exist; only then will true sea control be realized.
In addition, if we are going to engage our global maritime partners in a way that will empower them to participate as stakeholders in the maintenance of secure commercial shipping lanes and crime-free maritime economic zones, the influence squadron as described has many tools to do that, with vessels of the appropriate sophistication that will not overwhelm partner nations.
Finally, using Lewis and Clark
class ships in logistics support for an influence squadron is a great idea. A similar concept has been considered for Cyclone-class ships to be partnered with Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates for Fourth Fleet irregular-warfare missions. It seems to follow that mothership support would have a huge multiplying effect on the sustainability of the influence squadron.There are so many great reasons to pursue this concept of operations. I appreciate the intellectual creativity combined with operational know-how that produced this writing.
So, in terms of ships, the U.S. Navy should consider signing a few more base runners and a few less sluggers before we get into extra innings with any future adversary.
Get off the Fainting Couch'
(See C. Hooper and C. Albon, pp. 42
47, April 2010; and A. Erickson, pp. 8 12, May 2010 Proceedings)Eyes in the Sky
(See A. Erickson, pp. 36
41, April 2010 Proceedings)Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired), consultant on East Asia Security Affairs
Dr. Erickson reveals the shortcomings of the article by Dr. Hooper and Mr. Albon while valuing its furtherance of discussion of the Chinese antiship ballistic-missile (ASBM) program. Dr. Erickson wrote an article in that same issue on targeting this ASBM. There are important additional concerns.Dr. Hooper and Mr. Albon alluded to a space system for targeting the ASBM and warheads that would strip the targeted ship of defenses, yet deemed the "hue and cry" unnecessary because experts have known this for years. They described as "poor manners" analysis that ignores as primary targets the smaller aviation ships of Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Russia. Far more pejorative terms are warranted for analysis that suggests the sophisticated ASBM is designed to fight against these small ships "because they are the ideal platforms to prevent regional aggression"
implying that China intends to attack ThailandAfter dumping prompt global strike into the mix, the authors' convoluted conclusion was that "ASBM fear-mongering" and the danger of unwarranted nuclear response to a conventionally armed ballistic missile could lead to a "regional effort to slow the proliferation of conventional missiles in the Pacific." Such a complex sequence, they assert, would make all the embarrassing "hand-wringing" worthwhile. Their conclusion, like other mental gymnastics revealed by Dr. Erickson's comments in the May issue, is quite a leap. The appropriate conclusion is that China's ASBM program is an abiding concern.
In his own April article, Dr. Erickson provided a comprehensive description of the various means by which China could now or in the future detect, identify, and target U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs). There is another crucial point. China may presently fall short of systems that reliably and consistently track U.S. naval forces. But in a crisis occurring before China has attained such a full tracking-and-targeting capability, Beijing would necessarily rely on whatever capability it had at the time to subject CSGs to attack by submarines with lethal cruise missiles and the ASBM
when that system is an option, even if not optimally operational.In short, China's ducks need not all be in a row to threaten U.S. carrier forces, as well as regional bases. This complicates the decision on CSG intervention
precisely what China seeks to accomplish. Along with curbing cross-strait tension, honing antisubmarine capabilities and ballistic-missile defense are called for but unlikely to be enough, soon enough. Consequently, to deter conflict, it must remain clear that China could face some dramatic surprises, does not stand to win even if it produces short-term complications and that it may end up without Taiwan. What China may end up with instead is a badly defeated navy and air force, and economic and infrastructure damages that reverse the country's unprecedented economic growth of the past three decades. The future unquestionably should include U.S.-China cooperation, even partnership, but for the present, hedging militarily is necessary as confidence and trust are built and the Taiwan issue is resolved.
Through a Chinese Lens
(See P.A. Dutton, pp. 24
29, April 2010; and E. A. McVadon, p. 8, May 2010 Proceedings)Thomas Wyman
China's U-shaped "sea grab" in the South China Sea as described by Commander Dutton should not be viewed as solely a U.S.-China issue. Other nations with coasts bordering that sea include Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. They each have vital interests in being able to access waters beyond their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for the reason that those deeper waters could well produce oil, gas, and other resources. Technology is evolving to the point where drilling and production of petroleum in waters over a mile deep is becoming increasingly common. In fact, however, much of the South China Sea, especially to the south, is comparatively shallow, making it attractive for oil and gas exploration well beyond national EEZs. Coastal nations on the South China Sea should not be deprived of their right to access such offshore resources just as surely as China has the right to control the development of such resources off its shores.The United States should focus on assisting these smaller South China Sea nations to assert their rights beyond their respective EEZs. Without the muscle of a major world power these nations may ultimately be forced to acquiesce to the Chinese "grab." The South China Sea is not the exclusive domain of any one nation. Given their economic potential, access to those waters must be equitably shared with other littoral states in the region.
The United States faces an analogous situation itself in the Arctic Ocean where the ice pack is gradually disappearing, opening the potential for marine navigation and also for far-offshore drilling. No one nation has the right to claim this ocean as its private domain, and any attempt to do so must be vigorously resisted. Freedom of marine navigation is well established, for example, in the English Channel and Persian/Arabian Gulf, where national oil and gas development rights are also clearly defined.
Returning to the South China Sea, it is essential that coastal states in the area not be prevented from accessing waters beyond their shores. Might must not trump right. The United States should stoutly defend the rights of coastal states in the area, recognizing that we face similar challenges and possible infringement of our rights elsewhere. Once national rights have been established to access offshore waters for economic exploration, the issue of unfettered marine navigation and over-flights becomes less intractable.
New Modes of Failure
(See N. Friedman, pp. 90
91, April 2010 Proceedings)Thomas J. Vaughan Jr., P.E.; President, GSC Engineering Inc.
Norman Friedman's excellent article is correct about a cultural difference in developers of computer-based systems.Over the past 20 to 25 years, a culture has developed that assumes software is different from anything built previously and therefore the laws of physics are somewhat optional.
Many of my colleagues
smart, qualified, capable people who have only been trained in software development, not engineering, do not understand the physical behavior of what they are trying to control. They also seem to feel there is no need to worry about "that stuff." If we just list the right "requirements" a perfect system will result.This thinking is reminiscent of the ancient practice of alchemy
if we can just get the right "sacred ritual" (the "methodology" in vogue), the right "magic spell" (the mystical "software" vocabulary), and the right "magic charm" (the proper diagram in the proper colors), then we don't need science or engineering.In the movie 2012 everyone nearly dies because the computer won't let them start the ship's engines until all the hatches are closed. Only a software person would conceive of tying a mission-critical system to the status of a gangplank. A computer hardware designer would at least put in a bypass jumper.
The ship or aircraft or car doesn't care whether it is controlled by a computer, or discrete digital logic, or analog electronics, or mechanical controls, or the "little man behind the curtain." The ship or aircraft or car responds to the forces applied to it. If those forces are incorrect, it capsizes, or spins, or fails to stop, regardless of how clever the controller who made the mistake.
Some change is fundamental: switching from sail to steam revolutionized shiphandling (because the fundamental forces driving the ship changed). Some change is not fundamental: the principles of stability and trim did not disappear with the change from coal to oil (although the weight distribution might have changed). The principles of control systems don't disappear when we change part of the control system to software.
Dr. Friedman says "automotive engineers do not normally evaluate computer systems." This may be part of the problem. If the programmers can't explain the physical principles of their design to the automotive engineers, then that computer system has no business being in the car.
This magical, alchemistic view of software has created an "Emperor's new clothes" problem. People are afraid to scientifically question software designs. Software is frequently viewed as magic (and nobody would ask for a scientific explanation of Harry Potter's magic wand). In my experience, if engineers can't understand a software module, the problem is usually in the software, not with the engineers.
We should reverse this cultural difference and have engineers, not programmers, design control systems. Otherwise, I am afraid there is something to fear about computer-controlled systems.
New Naval Concerns for India
(See P. Das, pp. 60
65, March 2010; and B. Boland, p. 12, May 2010 Proceedings)Commander David L. Teska, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve
The admiral's article highlights yet again an area of homeland security that should concern us all the potential for land attacks from the sea. His observations on the 26 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, need to serve as the proverbial wake-up call.With all due respect to Admiral Das, however, the Coast Guard is an independent armed service of the United States, not one under the command and control of the Department of Defense but rather the Department of Homeland Security. As such, it has law enforcement authority granted under Title 14 USC 89, and deftly straddles the worlds of Title 10 and Title 14 to enforce various laws and treaties of the United States. Thus, it is inaccurate to state that the U.S. Navy, because of legal limits posed by the Posse Comitatus Act embarks "its Coast Guard units" to bring law-enforcement powers to the maritime domain. True, the Coast Guard does embark on U.S. Navy platforms, but the service is not "its Coast Guard." What it does bring is the law enforcement authority and skills (as applicable in an internal maritime setting in terms of a ship's flag state and the water it is operating in) to the fight.
Be Fit, But Be Fair: Eliminate the Body Composition Assessment
(See M. McCulloch, p. 10, March 2010 Proceedings)
Commander H. B. Le, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Lassen (DDG-82)
I disagree with Commander McCulloch's assertion that the body composition assessment (BCA) should be eliminated. He contends that "the BCA adds little value while distracting Sailors from a focus on actual fitness and potentially increasing their health risk." Quite the contrary, while not perfect (the BCA methodology could be improved to more accurately assess body fat percentage), it is a valuable and necessary tool in keeping Sailors more disciplined in their eating and exercise habits than they might otherwise be. The BCA is fair; all Sailors have to go through the assessment. Ultimately, the requirement to pass a BCA helps keep our Sailors healthier.A case in point: Last fall, one officer in my wardroom failed the BCA, measuring in at 24 percent body fat. This officer was carrying excessive weight, and it definitely showed in uniform. While he could pass the physical readiness test (PRT), he admitted that he had allowed his fitness level to slide and was not feeling very healthy. This first-ever BCA failure served as a wake-up call for him to start taking better care of himself. Since then, he has lost 27 pounds by balancing a good diet with regular exercise. During the spring physical fitness assessment this March, he was measured at 17 percent body fat and scored better on the PRT than he had during the previous two cycles.
The BCA has nothing to do with attractiveness as the author alludes
it has everything to do with wellness and maintaining standards. It takes a level of discipline to eat in moderation, to exercise to stay fit, and to maintain a professional appearance as a service member. The BCA encourages this discipline. Clearly, the BCA does not increase a Sailor's health risk being overweight does.