Consider the following hypothetical conversation between a strike group commander (SGC) and his submarine element coordinator (SEC) during America's next major naval war:
SGC: Commander, we have to get some submarines closer to the ASW fight! We've already lost a couple guided-missile destroyers, and ballistic-missile attacks and bad weather have taken a lot of our maritime patrol aircraft out of the picture. The weather is getting too rough for the littoral combat ships to launch and recover their ASW vehicles. We can't launch F-18s if we have to keep reacting to all of these diesel sightings.
SEC: Yes sir, admiral. Conditions are still pretty good for acoustic search, and it is definitely becoming a target-rich ASW environment. I also think that the SSN heavyweight torpedoes will perform better against these diesel subs than what we've been seeing from air-dropped torps.
SGC: How long will it take to change submarine operating area assignments so we can get a couple SSNs in there
SEC: I think we can definitely get those subs moving out of their boxes in about 12 to 18 hours, especially if we cut a few corners, and the subs are at communication depth when the messages are uploaded to the satellites. Of course, it will take a few more hours after that while the SSN navigation teams are entering the new assignments and the command team reviews those inputs and the new nav plan. My team is already over there drawing some boxes on the nav charts.
SGC: You have to be sh$%*#@& me! Commander, the war may be over in 36 hours!
In the past decade command-and-control (C1 These significant advances have obviously been facilitated by improvements in the reliability and bandwidth of communication systems. Although far from perfect, these innovations in C have permitted tremendous increases in the tempo of U.S. combat operations while improving safety. During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the time from detecting to engaging time-critical targets was often well under 30 minutes.
) tools and processes have advanced significantly. The Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) now provides commanders with a comprehensive common operational picture from which to make decisions regarding force positioning and target engagement. The ongoing fielding of Composeable FORCEnet (CFn) on board "large decks" and key shore installations is pushing the common operational picture into the third dimension and allowing operators and commanders to drill down into CFn objects and pull associated information and intelligence via naval computer networks.Unfortunately, C
for the undersea volume has not made similar progress. The processes used to enhance navigation safety for underwater vehicles and to minimize inadvertent attacks against friendly submarines remain mired in cumbersome manual exercises that needlessly consume man-hours and also can engender costly errors. During peacetime, these deficiencies equate to large opportunity costs for warfighters all the way up to the command level. In war, the shortcomings in undersea C can result in lost or damaged friendly submarines and the squandering of attack opportunities against hostile submarines. These shortcomings are likely to be exacerbated by the fielding of a large number of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) as part of distributed netted sensor systems and anti-mine warfare.Command and control of the undersea volume has consequences well beyond those wearing the dolphin combat insignia. During the past few U.S. conflicts, American and allied forces have enjoyed almost undisputed sea control. Future hostilities against a peer naval competitor, especially in its own backyard, would require the United States to establish sea control before it could bring its power-projection capabilities to bear. By all estimates, achieving control of the undersea volume would be particularly challenging as the quantity and quality of submarines in enemy orders of battle expand.2 Without this element of sea control, the operations of aircraft carriers, missile shooters, and amphibious assault ships would be threatened. Or at least they would be greatly complicated as they are forced to focus resources on undersea warfare that are perhaps orders of magnitude greater than the conflicts in which America has been involved since World War II.
Key Elements of Undersea C2
Command and control of the underwater volume includes two major concepts: the prevention of mutual interference (PMI) and waterspace management (WSM). Once fairly distinct, the terms PMI and WSM have merged over the last decade. In the naval lexicon, WSM is now often used to encompass both efforts to ensure submarine navigation safety and to avoid fratricide of friendly submarines by friendly ASW forces. Although similar, these two concepts should be understood as fairly distinct challenges with different controlling authorities and controlled units. Prevention of mutual interference is intimately tied to navigation safety and involves keeping Blue (friendly) submarines from colliding with each other and other underwater objects. Important in both peace and war, failure to comply with PMI rules and assignments is considered a cardinal sin in the U.S. submarine force. Most submarine navigators and captains would be lucky to survive more than a few such violations. PMI is a three-dimensional (four dimensions, when one includes "time") challenge, since multiple submarines, towed objects, or UUVs can and routinely do share water columns. It is normally managed by the submarine operating authorities, to include negotiations and coordination with foreign submarine forces and U.S. surface ships and ASW aircraft.3
Submarine movement messages, or SUBNOTES, are usually employed to move submarines safely across large expanses of ocean while operations schedules (OPSKEDS) and operations orders (OPORDS) manage the operation of submarines, both independently and in exercises, in local operating areas. In many cases, submarines and other naval units must positively acknowledge receipt and concurrence with PMI schemes before they go into effect. It is not unusual for a local PMI scheme to change a half-dozen or more times during the week it is in effect.
For example, operating schedules that control underwater operations in local areas (for example, Southern California, Hawaii, or Puget Sound) are promulgated on a weekly basis. Unit PMI assignments will likely change several times during the week as units are moved around the underwater "chessboard" according to operational necessity and the rules of underwater navigation. However, these changes are anticipated and included in the weekly OPSKED so that crews can conduct navigation planning. Operational necessity, such as the need to bring a submarine in for emergent repairs, can require significant changes to the PMI scheme, especially in areas of dense underwater vehicle traffic.
Waterspace management mitigates the risk of inadvertent fratricidal attacks against Blue submarines and is a wartime consideration. Such management is not a trivial concern: at least two of the U.S. subs lost during World War II were fratricide victims.4 Traditionally, WSM was controlled by the strike group ASW commander (in tight coordination with embarked officers on the submarine assistance team). The overarching goal of WSM is to ensure that antisubmarine warfare weapons are dropped only in areas free of friendly submarines. Like PMI, the execution of waterspace management requires acknowledgements from applicable antisubmarine warfare units and often includes more direct coordination between units (for example, between submarines and maritime patrol aircraft). As one might imagine, WSM can be very dynamic, especially when ASW aircraft are employed to engage a hostile submarine, and a friendly submarine's "safe" operating area must be collapsed or otherwise modified to permit an ASW attack.
What Is the Problem
The three major deficiencies in the execution of both PMI and WSM are that these processes waste time, can lengthen the ASW "kill chain," and can engender errors. For example, to prepare for a submarine's weekly operations in Southern California operating areas, the enlisted navigation team must spend dozens of man-hours manually entering data, chart updates, and operating area boundaries on the Voyage Management System (VMS).5 The assistant navigator or navigator and the executive officer or commanding officer must then independently verify data transfer.
These checks are done independently and can burn up a lot of senior leadership time. These same leaders must then review the navigation plan for safety and operational effectiveness. When the operations schedule is changed, the process must be repeated. The opportunity costs are huge: when submarine executive and commanding officers are spending hours squinting into the VMS displays and pushing buttons, they are not spot-monitoring the execution of the navigation plan or training junior officers.
The theater ASW commander (TASWC)
a rank that has achieved prominence over the last few years and seems to be supplanting the strike group ASW commanders in America's most troubled maritime regions is also employing inefficient methods involving paper naval charts, acetate overlays, spreadsheets, and manual message writing to execute waterspace management responsibilities. A TASWC might be tempted to place submarines outside of strike group operating areas so that these areas can be "ASW-free" zones to facilitate and simplify weapons control. However, this does not provide the flexibility that will likely be needed in a major naval conflict with hostile submarines. The inefficient processes currently employed to conduct PMI and WSM can also result in lost attack opportunities. The ASW kill chain consists of finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging, and assessing hostile submarines. The chain can be lengthened when the "engaging" link must be extended to ensure that friendly submarines are clear of an antisubmarine warfare weapon drop area.The opportunity to attack can be lost while submarine safe areas are verified or, if necessary, modified. Some naval planners may be tempted to do away with this problem by establishing fixed submarine operating areas ahead of a major potential conflict far away from strike-group operating areas. Although this tactic might be satisfactory, it would be far better to improve what the current Chief of Naval Operations describes as the "soft" part of the ASW kill chain and establish systems and processes that give the shore and afloat commanders the flexibility to move submarines around quickly in case, for example, hostile submarines start leaving "flaming datum" between the operating areas of friendly submarines and high-value units.6
Most of the processes associated with PMI and WSM are also prone to error. These errors are likely to occur when data are being transferred. The probability for error entry obviously increases with stress, and mistakes are most likely to occur when they can least be tolerated, during times of conflict. Yes, the series of required independent checks is designed to detect and correct these errors. However, operational imperatives and fatigue can significantly reduce their effectiveness, even when they are performed by senior personnel. In time of war or other circumstances that are operationally challenging, it is even easy to imagine a captain invoking the "big ocean" theory and making the decision for the executive and commanding officer not to personally check changes to the PMI or WSM scheme.
What Needs to Be Done
PMI and WSM must be automated to improve operational effectiveness in peace and war. The figure below depicts a notional end-state for automated PMI/WSM processes.
The submarine operating authorities or antisubmarine warfare commander generate the PMI/WSM scheme based on operational necessities, units operating in the area, and bathymetry. This may require coordination between VMS and the Nav C
system unless the latter has accurate and comprehensive bathymetry data. These assignments are sketched out using 3-D drawing tools. Once developed, the PMI/WSM scheme is checked by navigation-safety algorithms and approved by appropriate personnel. Once routed (it is hoped without paper) and approved, the assignments are then translated into formatted messages and transmitted. Submarines and other units ingest the messages from radio into their navigation C system. The assignments (essentially overlays with a "start" and "stop" time) are then sent to electronic navigation, command-and-control (e.g., GCCS-M), and relevant fire-control systems.Because the data are transferred reliably, the members of the senior navigation team (the navigator, executive officer, and commanding officer) only check the assignments to ensure that they meet operational needs (for example, no gap in submerged water assignment that would require the submarine to surface, time-distance requirements can be met, torpedo firing ranges assigned during TORPEXs, etc.). As always, it would be the commander's responsibility to communicate with the controlling authority if the PMI/WSM scheme is flawed and does not meet the submarine's operational requirements. Such an automated process would save crews thousands of man-hours per year and also make it much simpler for commanders to propose changes to waterspace assignments.
Once PMI/WSM is automated for submarines, similar tools should be fielded on maritime patrol aircraft, large decks that can host strike-group staffs, and ASW-capable surface ships to give them the situational awareness necessary to ensure they are not using ASW weapons where friendly submarines may be operating.
Several challenges must be met to achieve the notional end-states for PMI and WSM that this article proposes, including the following.
Build a better navigation C7 The Navigation C System must also be compliant with service-oriented (open) architectures.
system. Automated PMI/WSM requires vigorous processing for planning and running complex navigation-safety checks. Although the GCCS-M WSM segment is set to meet many of the Fleet's requirements for PMI planning, it is not designed for WSM, has limited ability to parse PMI/WSM messages, and has a sub-optimal human-machine-interface, with no 3-D display.Install interfaces between the nav C
system, electronic navigation systems such as VMS, and fire-control systems. There currently is a gap between radio, naval command-and-control systems, and electronic navigation systems. This gap is what necessitates the tedious and error-prone manual transfer of data into electronic navigation systems. Interfaces must be built to transfer data efficiently and reliably between electronic navigation systems and navigation C systems and to support geographic displays on fire-control systems.Develop 3-D visualization and drawing tools. 3-D displays are becoming an expectation, if not a requirement, for Fleet C
applications. To support navigation safety, PMI C systems need to include 3-D displays both for planning at the submarine operating authorities and for afloat navigation teams. It may often make sense to disable the third dimension, but the capability should be available on demand.Establish highly formatted (standard) PMI and WSM messages. SUBNOTES, operations schedules, operations orders, and WSM messages vary in their degree of formatting. The Navy should establish standardized message formats that will support machine-reading and machine-message generation. The Navy has almost achieved this with SUBNOTES, but has some work to do with OPSKEDS and OPORDS.
Institute PMI and WSM relational data bases. As the Navy moves toward submarine operating authorities, it makes increasing sense to establish relational data bases for both PMI and WSM for U.S. submarines. These would allow a variety of afloat and ashore units to subscribe to undersea C
data and information which are currently largely sequestered.Change the submerged navigation culture. As always, cultural change may be the biggest obstacle to bringing PMI and WSM into the 21st century. It may take time to break the "no pain, no gain" mentality associated with underwater navigation and for senior members of the navigation team to trust that PMI and WSM assignments are accurately sent from controlling authorities and displayed on electronic navigation systems.
While PMI and WSM remain obscure notions to many naval warriors, command and control of the undersea volume will be crucial to achieving sea control against a peer naval competitor. Without such sea control, U.S. power projection will be slowed or even stymied altogether. The likely pace of operations in a major naval conflict mandate that the U.S. Navy should no longer accept the current processes, which are cumbersome and inefficient. In the next major maritime conflict, the battle rhythm simply will not allow for a half-day's delay when a commander needs to reposition submarines in support of strike, special operations, or antisubmarine warfare operations. The challenge of controlling the undersea water volume isn't likely to get any easier as UUVs become as ubiquitous as unmanned aerial vehicles. It is time to automate undersea C
and drag PMI and WSM into the present century to achieve the effectiveness and efficiency that are now present in strike planning and execution and air tasking orders. If the Navy chooses to maintain its inefficient and marginally effective PMI and WSM command-and-control processes, fleeting attack opportunities against diesel submarines (perhaps the ultimate "time-critical target") will be missed, and the probability that friendly submarines will be inadvertently attacked or suffer navigation accidents will increase. Given what is now possible with C systems, this would be criminal.
1. CFn has significantly advanced C displays toward a "God's-eye view" of the battlefield. It can display the battle space in three dimensions, soon to include the bathymetry associated with the undersea volume. Because of CFn's connectivity to naval networks, it can be used as a collaborative tool for operational planning, a means of briefing senior leaders, and also provide training and watch-to-watch continuity through its record and play-back capabilities. It has been, or will be, installed in CVN-65, CVNs 68-71, CVN-74, CVN-75, CTF-34, CTF-69, and CTF-84.
2. Over the next two decades, the number of submarines in the world's navies is expected to increase by 50 percent. Geoff Fein, "Navy needs to invest in ISR, maintain ASW advantage, CNO says," Defense Daily, 18 March 2008, p. 3.
3. The submarine operating authorities include CTF-14, CTF-69, CTF-74, and CTF-82. Submarine Squadron 11 and the Submarine Operating Center in Northwood, United Kingdom also have some responsibilities for controlling the undersea volume. All six of these shore sites are scheduled to receive the GCCS-M WSM Segment for PMI.
4. See "Lost U.S. Submarines and Crews" (http://www.pigboats.com/ww2/lost.html).
5. VMS is the electronic navigation system used by submarines. The process of certifying submarines to employ paperless navigation is ongoing in the Fleet.
6. Geoff Fein, Defense Daily, 18 March 2008, p. 1.
7. The GCCS-M WSM segment was developed closely with the Fleet over the past few years and will significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of PMI planning. This segment is scheduled to be modified for afloat users and installed as part of GCCS-M Version 4.1. PEO C4I (PMW 150) is developing a WSM tool for the TASWC and will be demoed at CTF-74.
Commander Dobbs is a senior analyst for SOLUTE Consulting, San Diego, California. He supports PEO-C4I (PMW-150) as an ASW and submarine expert. His career in the submarine force spanned 22 years and included command. He completed several tours in Washington, D.C. on both the Joint and Navy Staffs.
Mr. Wong is the software engineering lead for SOLUTE Consulting. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he has been a submarine navigator and submarine operations officer on a strike group staff and was a key member of a PMW-150 science and technology project, developing a waterspace management software tool to be employed by ASW commanders.