The United States military has been forced to learn the lessons that were only formerly known by its special operations units throughout the current contingency operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. A more capable military has emerged from this series of transitions and growing pains. These lessons have been disseminated to military colleges and universities for others to reflect on and gain understanding from. The U.S. Naval Academy is such a place where officer candidates are exposed to this theory and understanding of warfare and its new reality.
Surface warfare officers entering the Fleet today are programmed by the same feedback that has recently shaped the Army and Marine Corps' tactics in fighting asymmetrical, unconventional battles. The Navy and its sister branches face the same kind of enemy. Two examples of the kind of threats our Navy faces every day are East African pirates and Colombian drug-smuggling cartels. Asymmetrical warfare teaches us that many small, quick-moving, highly trained units are much more effective than large conventional forces when facing other small asymmetrical units. This is a concept seldom applied to maritime conflict as it occurs today.
The Patrol-Craft Legacy
The Navy goes back and forth on the idea of having junior officers command small boats in close combat. The PT boats of World War II, the PCF boats of Vietnam, and the PC boats deployed currently in Iraq are all examples. The junior officers in the Fleet are quickly adapting to the new demands of asymmetrical warfare. The patrol craft has been called the unsung hero of the surface Navy and firm contributor to five of the six strategic naval imperatives outlined in The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.1 The Navy currently only operates ten PCs and has no plans to build more. The need for small, capable ships is urgent and apparent.
This new understanding of warfare has defined some of our surface-combatant developments in the last five years. In 2006 the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was created with the district role of missions in coastal and near-shore operations. The littoral combat ship (LCS) project was recently given a significant push and has produced two prototypes. These seeming successes do not reflect full readiness on the Navy's part. The NECC has not been given ample resources to develop itself separate from our large blue-water fleet.2 Many argue that the LCS, a bloated $730-million project, is neither suitable for real combat nor will ever see the littorals. In short, the LCS's aluminum superstructure and production costs make it unsuitable for going in harm's way.3
Our military has learned repeatedly that we cannot fight asymmetrical battles from over the horizon, at 35,000 feet, or any other distance that technology gives us the advantage. The Navy, like the other branches, will need to find the balance between preparing for a potential conventional war and engaging the threat before our eyes. The need for the large blue-water Fleet will always be necessary. The question becomes: why commit these large valuable national assets to do the work a slightly modified commercial vessel for a tenth the cost can do
A Targeted Approach
The Navy can build cheap, simple boats in American shipyards, using already existing plans and taking advantage of off-the-shelf technology. This approach to force structure, in combination with ample training, would supplant the need for sending billions of dollars in assets to chase pirates who command glorified fishing vessels. Deck guns, albeit their occasional use, and vertical launchers are unnecessary to fight our foes on the water today. We need a better posture to deploy assets and keep them on station. We need helicopter pads and immediate small-craft launch capability to fight the highly mobile and elusive threats on the water. Companies such as Shadow Marine can do this in commercial shipyards for an extremely reduced price.
During World War II, the U.S. Navy chartered civilian vessels, painted them gray, and sent them to patrol the coastline. Many had previously been used as civilian pleasure yachts, but when given Navy crews served honorably and with legitimate contribution throughout the war. We are not in dire need of ships, nor do we need civilian pleasure yachts to join our ranks, but the Navy is naíve to think that the commercial sector does not have something to offer its force structure. The Navy must approach its own construction-cost issues realistically. The USS Freedom (LCS-1) is an incredible machine, but it is not a reasonable solution to the maritime threats it seeks to challenge. It has proven to be a capable platform in its first deployment in the Caribbean Sea, but it is still extremely vulnerable. Thirty-five years ago the USS Belknap's (CG-26) aluminum superstructure was burned flush to the deck. It was built of aluminum to save weight, much like the Freedom. Despite the successful capture of large shipments of illicit drugs and smugglers, the LCS has its limitations in the Navy. Furthermore, its hefty price will burden the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan during the inevitable budgetary cutbacks our military faces.
The junior officers in the fleet today have been educated in a different atmosphere and with a different approach to warfare than their predecessors. It is with this knowledge that a new, distinctly different shipbuilding endeavor should begin, striving to outfit the Navy with craft specialized in fighting new maritime threats. As outlined above, the Navy can spend a significantly less amount outfitting smaller commercial boats with helicopter pads and fast-launch rigid-hull inflatable boats to combat the modern threats. Though not as dynamic and multi-roled as an Arleigh Burke destroyer, this force will satisfy the current demands of our country's national security and budgetary needs.
1. Stephen J. Coughlin, "Good Things Come in Small Packages," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 42 47.
2. Brian Hamlett, "Command Decisions: Can the Navy Do Right by NECC
" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 4 (April 2010), pp. 77 79.3. "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs." United States Government Accountability Office, March 2010. John Patch, "A Thoroughbred Ship-Killer," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 4 (April 2010), pp. 48
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