PROFESSIONAL NOTES
By Lieutenant Commander H. W. Underwood, U. S. Navy
FRANCE
French Naval Progress.—There are ample signs on all sides that France, abominably devastated, but victorious—after displaying a patience no other great nation would have shown in her place—means at last to assert her rights as recognized by the 1918 Versailles Treaty. Moreover— a fact overlooked in England—she has no choice; bankruptcy and revolution are at her doors if the long-overdue Boche reparations are not forthcoming. The national indignation at the contrast between France's unparalleled sacrifice and the negative results obtained up to the present is such that the least delay in enforcing redress from Bocheland will overthrow the Briand Cabinet or any other Ministry weak enough to trust to conferences and scraps of paper after the unedifying experience of the last two years.
Outside of a very small minority of Socialists that have been won over to the Boche cause by the Berlin subsidies, the great bulk of the French nation is genuinely Anglophile, and would welcome naval and military co-operation with Great Britain; but, if necessary, the Republic is preparing to act single-handed, both at sea and on land. It is understood that Admiral Sagot-Duvauroux (59), now Prefet Maritime at Toulon, an officer reputed for his sangfroid and firmness, would hoist his flag in the 24,000-ton Provence (22 knots, small tubes, ten 13.4-inch guns), and eventually take charge of the "escadre et flotilles de blocus," now being formed at Brest. Toulon, like Brest, is getting alive again, and officiers de vaisseau welcome the possibility of an opportunity to work anew on the water.
The rumored adoption of extreme displacements by the English Navy for her "improved Hoods" is having a disheartening effect on French partizans of Cuirasses. France was glad to go one better than the dreadnought (24,000 tons against 18,000), but when it is a question of exceeding 40,000 tons she cannot by any means follow suit, for financial and political reasons, and so, on the motion of Chairman Dupuy, the Commission de la Marine is giving serious consideration to "Dreadnoughts de 15,000 a 16,000 tonnes," designed not to rule the ocean but simply for defensive work in the Mediterranean and round the French coasts, thus with reduced radius of action, but with stout armor and the biggest practicable calibre, enabling them to have a say against the mightiest dreadnoughts. The 7,000-ton requins of 40 years since lacked freeboard and could not have fought in a seaway; their improved copies, the Bouvines (1892), were very unsteady; the Henri IV (1899, though remarkable, was too weakly armed. What is wanted to avoid these defects is a Patrie carrying three or four guns of 18-inch bore.
The French destroyer flotillas that have been decimated by the fearful wear and tear of the war, and also by the neglect and lack of sea practice of the last two years, are to be strengthened this year by the Normandbuilt Enseigne Gabolde, of 900 tons, 22,000 h.p., with oil furnaces and geared turbines, three 4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. This torpilleur d'escadre was commenced in November, 1913, and, significant enough, is the first French-built addition made to the flotillas for the last six years, Gallic yards having from the opening of the war given up new construction to devote their whole energy to ammunition and gun-making for the Allies. Consequently, she compares poorly with the many units of later designs built during the war by the British, American, and Italian navies. Yet she is an interesting craft in several respects. Her speed, nominally 30 knots, will probably exceed 35 knots on trials, the Norman firm, that 25 years since created the famed Forban torpilleur de haute mer type, being known to excel in the construction of motors. Previous boats of the same series, the Bouclier and Casque notably, exceeded 36 knots with 15,00c h.p. These records ought easily to be beaten by the Gabolde, that has had, besides, her armament modified by the addition of a third 100-mm. gun that has led to striking changes in her original silhouette. With her two super-imposed forward guns, she will resemble many British cruisers and destroyers.
If the 2,200-2,500-ton destroyers of the 1921 program can be pushed forward with as much speed as is officially expected by the several arsenals and private yards that are making ready for the contracts, the Marine Francaise may regain some of the ground lost, though, considering the extremely fine designs produced within the last few years by the British and Italian Admiralties, it will not be so easy to realize the superiority for all-round quality and for individual fighting strength and speed, which is avowedly the object the Rue Royale authorities have in view in adopting unusually high displacements for their projected contretorpilleurs. With the experience of the real thing in their minds, French officers insist on two main points, viz., reliable and high sea speed and superior calibres, with a view to securing the first hits and having the upper chance in the end-on actions that are the rule between destroyers.
Admiralissimo Dartige du Fournet complained bitterly of the fragility of his 800-ton destroyers, and could only find two or three really satisfactory in the whole lot. The successive "Commandants des Flotilles de l'Adriatique" remarked that their contretorpilleurs, though superior to the Austrian on paper, could never catch them at sea, and especially lacked sufficient calibre to stop the enemy. The disclosures made at the time of the Forget affaire were edifying on this point. Still, since the advent of the 6-inch gun as a destroyer weapon the 5.5-inch, even improved, will be none too strong for its eventual work.
The painstaking aerial experiments of the last two years in the Mediterranean have led to tangible results, as is shown by the appointment as "chef de l'aviation d'escadre" of Lieut. Teste (28), a gifted young aviator whom his comrades had surnamed "un brave parmi les braves" for the exceptional gallantry and resourcefulness which he displayed off Dunkirk in May, 1917, in an unequal fight between four French flying machines of obsolete type and ten larger and more up-to-date Boche seaplanes, when he was wounded and, after astounding "peripeties," made a prisoner, taken to a Boche reprisals camp, whence he escaped under exciting circumstances. To his ingenuity and daring is due the success of the comprehensive experiments (landing and flying off under the various conditions of weather and wind) carried out in the Beam and Bapaume under the supervision of the go-ahead Admiral Violette. Obviously he is he right man in the right place, and, as he combines practical competence with "feu sacre" and a genuine faith in the high destines of aviation, he may be expected to accomplish much and to substantially add to the fighting worth of la flotte de la Mediterannee, provided he is allowed sufficient freedom of action to fully display his qualities of initiative. Up to the present the development of the French aerial wing has been hampered by the ill-will and incurable dislike for innovations of antiquated admirals, and the fact speaks for itself that, whereas the French army counts scores of flying generals, and among the most eminent, the Marine Frangaise is still waiting for her first "amiral-aviateur," a rather bad sign at a time when maritime efficiency depends to so great an extent on aerial supremacy, especially in narrow Mediterranean waters.
The French "aviation navale,'' first in date in the naval arena but badly handicapped by incompetence at the head, is getting none too soon in shape when are considered the strides accomplished by the Italian and British naval flying squadrons. The lessons of the fiasco of the trans- Mediterranean group-flight organized by Admiral Ronarch have not been lost. Improvisation, impossible at sea, is, if anything, still more impossible in the air. Success to be attained requires robust and reliable machines together with a thoroughly-trained and numerous personnel, desiderata that can only be the result of constant practice and of careful fostering by the Rue Royale authorities. In addition to the Beam (to be ready next year) and to the 800-ton porte-avions of the Bapaume class, all battleships and cruisers are gradually to be fitted to carry small "avions de chasse, d'eclairage et d'observation du Air," very satisfactory installations having been worked out, whilst heavy "avions autonomes de bombardement," too large and cumbrous for transportation on board, would operate from basis now being prepared in Corsica and on the North African sea border. —The Naval and Military Record, May 18, 1921.
The Merchant Fleet.—The Ligne Maritime has issued a manifesto which reflects the general feeling of uneasiness regarding the future of the merchant fleet. While the French were fighting for their full share of the surrendered German shipping the condition of the mercantile fleet was painted in very sombre colours, and it was declared that in the absence of a fleet of her own France was absolutely dependent upon foreign freights. Now that most of the surrendered enemy ships have been delivered, and the vessels ordered from British and American yards are in French hands, it is found that there are far too many for present needs, and the harbors are encumbered with ships that are laid up through want of freights. While the tonnage before the war was only 2,500,000 tons, it will before long exceed 4,000,000 tons. The Ligne Maritime therefore feels that if some vitality is to be imparted to the merchant fleet it can only be done by a national effort, and it therefore appeals to manufacturers and traders throughout the country to give a preference to French boats wherever possible, for it is' argued that if French ships were assured of full cargoes it would be possible to bring down freights, which are at present high on account of the operation of the eight hours' day and other charges with which foreign ships are not burdened.—Engineering, May 13, 1921.
GREAT BRITAIN
Warship Design and Torpedo Attack.—The problems associated with warship design, and especially those relating to protecting against torpedo attack, are again exercising the minds of all interested in the subject, in view of the fact that four new capital ships are about to be laid down to take the place of obsolescent ships in the British navy. Under these circumstances it is of interest to review the question in the light of recent experience and controversy. It will be remembered that Sir Philip Watts has in two successive years, at the Institution of Naval Architects, raised the question of the protection of battleships against torpedoes. He stated that all the dreadnoughts, battleships and cruisers up to and including the Queen Elizabeth, were designed to be safe against the explosion of two torpedoes in any position,, and sufficient stability was provided in each case to ensure the vessel not capsizing from loss of stability due to the flooding of compartments. Two battleships, the Audacious and Marlborough, and one cruiser, the Inflexible, were seriously damaged by torpedoes or mines; the Marlborough was able to fight on and arrived in the Humber 27 hours after she had been torpedoed. The repairs necessary were subsequently speedily effected.
Sir Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt, the present Director of Naval Construction, stated that the Marlborough was the only battleship of the past dreadnoughts that was torpedoed during the war, and the value of the longitudinal bulkheads and the subdivision and' arrangements adopted was clearly shown, as the ship was able to remain in the line, no vital damage being done. Sir Eustace also mentioned that vessels of the "Royal Sovereign" class were provided with good under-water protection, which in certain of the ships was reinforced by adding outside bulges. These bulges were originally fitted in the "Edgar'' Class, after considerable experiments had been made. He further stated that results had proved the efficiency of the bulges.
Sir Philip Watts, in the discussion on this paper, whilst approving of the addition of bulges for ships actually built, submitted that there was no advantage in providing such bulges in the design for the new ships, but asked the question: "What is the shape and construction which provided most protection against torpedo attack?" He pointed out that a torpedo may run at the surface or at any depth below the surface; if it could be compelled to run so as to hit near the ridge of the bulge, the bulge would be justified, whereas if it hits below this ridge the forces of the explosion would be directed inwards by the upper plating of the bulge against the vitals of the ship instead of being allowed to escape upwards. The internal protection seems to be about the same in the two cases. As to form alone he concluded that there was no advantage in the bulge-shaped side over the ordinary side. He pointed out that in the bulge-sided ship it was very difficult to adopt any means to prevent a torpedo from exploding before it reached the side of the ship. Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt, in reply, stated that the bulges had proved successful in resisting the attack of torpedoes. In the old ships the bulge formed a complete protection, and when the bulges were hit by torpedoes some of the hits were near the top and some near the bottom, and some at the centre of the bulge. In all cases adequate protection was given. The bulge, too, keeps the protective structure external to the ship proper; gases due to the explosion are vented in the air immediately above the bulge.
Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt, in his paper in 1920, read at the meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects, on H. M. S. Hood, stated that the torpedo protection consists of the bulge arrangement with an outer compartment of air and an inner one especially strengthened with the bulkheads, which renders the ship as safe from attack against torpedoes under the water as she is against gun attack above water, and that the bulge fitted to the Hood was different to that fitted to the earlier ships, as proved by a series of experiments by Professor Hopkinson. He also stated that trials have shown that the Hood can receive the blows of several torpedoes and still remain in the line without serious loss of speed. Sir Philip Watts, in discussing this paper, said that the Hopkinson device was proposed by Lord Kelvin in the Warship Design Committee of 1905, but Lord Fisher considered the weight prohibitive. Two longitudinal bulkheads between the outer side and the bulkheads were effective, provided air spaces were fitted between them to be filled with water to take up the forces of the explosion, the bulkhead adjoining the machinery spaces having protective plating for stopping the fragments driven in by the explosion. The Hood was made of sufficient beam to have the wing spaces wide enough for sufficient protection.
Sir Philip Watts thought that the structural arrangements of the wing spaces in the dreadnoughts were practically the same as in the Hood, though not so wide. Between the outside plating of the bulge and the side plating of the machinery compartments there are two longitudinal bulkheads, the space between them being as in the dreadnoughts. The only structural difference was the longitudinal hollow along the Hood's side near the water line, on account of which the part below is called a bulge, and the two longitudinal bulkheads are not quite vertical. He further stated that the bulge is not an additional structure. It is a part of the whole as existing in all other dreadnoughts; the bulge does not take the place of a torpedo net. He suggested the use of plate shields outside the hull, which would destroy the torpedo before it reached the ship; these shields could be instantly got rid of if desired, but could only be conveniently stowed and carried on a ship without bulges. Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt replied that the explosion on a ship with a bulge takes place outside and does not destroy the stringer and sheer strake, which is a distinct point gained. The bulge is free from the disadvantage of a shield, which seriously reduces the speed and is difficult to handle. Sir Philip again returned to the question at this year's meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects, in discussing Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt's paper on German battleships.
It will be seen, therefore, that there is a distinct issue between the present and the earlier Director of Naval Construction as to the value of bulges. The actual amount of material used for protection against torpedo attack seems to be very little different in the case of the Hood and the Queen Elizabeth; the former having a bulge and the latter vertical sides. There is no doubt that the outside of the bulge is farther away from the vitals of the ship in the case of the Hood than in the Queen Elizabeth, but in order to obtain this the ship has to be made much broader. This advantage of the Hood over the Queen Elizabeth is not due to the bulge, but to the extreme beam of the ship. A recent correspondent to The Times has pointed out that the Baden, the German battleship which Sir Eustace was comparing to the Royal Sovereign, was 10 feet wider, so that it would seem as if the Germans had appreciated the benefit of greater beam, but had availed themselves of it without adopting a bulge form of construction. There is no doubt that the German ships withstood a great deal of damage without sinking, and that they were attacked by both guns and torpedoes very severely.
Sir Philip Watts and Sir Westcott Abell have recently contributed to this discussion in The Times, and both have called attention to the necessity for the provision of sufficient beam to ensure adequate stability should the side protection be defeated, and both are of opinion that the best way to ensure this stability as well as to obtain the protection by the best available construction of the side is a matter which deserves the most careful consideration. Sir John Biles has also contributed to The Times discussion without entering into the relative merits of the bulge or vertical side. He has followed up the views expressed by him at the Institution of Naval Architects, and has reminded the authorities "That a policy of secrecy adopted deliberately to avoid criticism is likely to be harmful to the country and to the science of naval design as well as those who practice it," and he urges that the design of the new British capital ships may well be referred to a suitable committee for consideration, to the satisfaction of all concerned.
From the summary we have given above of the views of the present and late Directors of Naval Construction it will be seen that nearly all that can be said for and against the bulges in public discussion has been said and it is not easy without more detailed information, such as could be placed before a competent committee, to reach any reliable conclusion. The bulges undoubtedly were a satisfactory way of adding to the stability of existing ships, whose stability was deficient. The bulges also keep the point at which the torpedo exploded further away from the vitals of the ship. Whether this is the best way to give the ship the necessary stability and protection seems to us to be sufficiently in dispute to necessitate a thorough investigation of the question by a competent and independent committee. The protection of our battleships from torpedo attack is of vital importance so long as we rely on these battleships for our naval defense. Sir Philip Watts thinks that we should go farther than we have done and that portable shields should be carried. Undoubtedly, if they can be successfully carried they will afford another and a powerful line of defense. The matter is bristling with intricate technicalities, but no harm can be done by, and good is likely to follow, a thorough investigation. Without doubt such an investigation can only be made by considering the whole designs of our recent battleships, and a committee which could do this would have to be similar in character to Lord Dufferin's Committee of 1870 and Lord Fisher's of 1905 on Warship Design. —Engineering, May 20, 1921.
The New Shipbuilding Program.—The strategical principles underlying the Admiralty's post-war shipbuilding policy have not been disclosed, nor, according to information which is current in Parliamentary circles, is any statement on this subject likely to be made till after the Imperial Conference. It may, however, be assumed that in drafting their new program the professional heads of the navy have taken fully into consideration the complete change brought about in the strategical outlook by the collapse of German naval power. Seven years ago the problem of naval defense was a comparatively simple one. Its solution lay in preserving an ample margin of strength in the North Sea, for, as was clearly foreseen, it was there that the only real challenge would have to be met. The strength and composition of our foreign squadrons were a matter of secondary importance. Once the German High Sea Fleet had been accounted for, either by destroying it in battle or hermetically sealing it up in its ports, the safety of British trade and oversea territories would be practically assured, for without coaling stations or base facilities abroad the German cruisers at large could only reckon on a very brief career. On the other hand, a failure to destroy or contain the German battle fleet in the North Sea would inevitably have the most disastrous effects on the sea campaign as a whole. Such was the idea that dictated our general policy before the war, and experience proved it to have been thoroughly sound. Later on the development of the submarine menace necessitated a considerable readjustment of our dispositions, but, broadly speaking, it had no effect on our strategy in the main area. To the very end of the war the Grand Fleet's command of the North Sea remained the dominant factor in the naval situation.
The influence formerly exerted by Germany on British naval policy was not confined to the distribution of the fleet. It had a very marked effect on the design of our warships. While there was never any radical departure from the traditional rule that British men-of-war should be built to go everywhere and do anything, it is certain that the dimensions, armament, and other characteristics of the vessels we built from 1905 onward were largely governed by the trend of contemporary German design. Our aim then was always to go one better in what were believed to be the vital elements of tactical efficiency, and as a consequence we gave our ships heavier guns and greater speed than the German ships possessed. If less attention was paid to defensive qualities it was because the importance of this feature was not realized. On the whole, however, the purpose in view was achieved. The problem that now confronts the Admiralty is infinitely more perplexing. No one can foretell the future battle ground of the British Navy, and the subject is scarcely one that lends itself to public discussion. Nevertheless, there is a widely-held belief that if the navy is called upon to fight in the next ten years or so it will be in waters many thousands of miles distant from the shores of England. This conviction is apparently shared by the Admiralty, who are well aware that our present fleet is quite strong enough in ships of every type to ensure its indisputable predominance in European waters for many years ahead. If therefore, they have recommended the building of four capital ships to replace obsolete material, it is manifestly with a view to contingencies other than those -of a conflict in Europe.
By this chain of reasoning we arrive at the conclusion that our new capital ships have probably been designed for a very extended radius of action. It is said that the proposal to station a powerful fleet in the Pacific has been rejected for a variety of reasons, among them being the dearth of local resources for docking and otherwise maintaining a numerous force of ships of the largest dimensions. If this is the case, and our future battle fleet is to be based on home ports, the importance of endowing the new ships with high speed is evident, for they must be capable of proceeding with the utmost expedition to any part of the world where our interests are threatened. Great cruising endurance and high speed may therefore be accepted as two probable elements in the plans of the "improved Hoods." Their armament and protection have doubtless been designed to embody the lessons of the war. As we have said before, the magnitude of the sum at stake entitles the public to an explanation—not necessarily technical or detailed—of the grounds on which the sub-committee presided over by Mr. Bonar Law decided in favor of perpetuating capital ships of the largest dimensions. —The Naval and Military Record, May 4, 1921.
The Functions of Naval Aircraft.—A rooted conviction as to the present supremacy of the capital ship affords no reason for neglecting to study the development, present and prospective, of other agencies of sea warfare whose past achievements have been such as to entitle them to rank as effective and formidable weapons. It is a highly-significant circumstance that many students who were until lately ardent advocates of the submarine should now be transferring their allegiance to aircraft. This is not surprising in view of the rapid evolution of the heavier-than-air machine, whose progress in the past few years has been incomparably greater than that of the submarine. We know that British naval officers, as a body, are far more anxious about our future in the air than about the menace of the submarine. In the case of the latter familiarity has bred not contempt, but knowledge of its limitations, which, being inherent and ineradicable, disqualify it for the position of arbiter of future naval combats. The submarine will always be dangerous, especially to a nation which is largely dependent on seaborne commerce; but it is a danger that experience has shown us how to counter. With air power the case is different. The boldest imagination cannot discern any limit to its military possibilities. It remains for the time being an auxiliary arm to navies and armies alike, but an auxiliary which has already made itself indispensable; and should its development continue at the pace which has been maintained since 1914, it will undoubtedly supersede at no remote period more than one of the instruments of land and sea warfare which now rank above it in point of supposed importance. Whether air power will ever transcend sea power is a question which time alone can answer. What is already apparent is that sea power and air power are rapidly becoming complementary and interdependent and may soon be unable to exist apart. That is why a farsighted and vigorous air policy is so essential to a great maritime community like the British Empire.
The public mind is somewhat hazy as to the precise functions of aircraft in the naval organization, and, indeed, it is not easy to define them off-hand. One of the clearest exposes we have seen is that given by a naval aviator in "Flying" (an American periodical.) He enumerates in the following order the principal duties that fall to aircraft working with the fleet in war-time, (1) Bombing enemy battleships and bases, and attack with torpedo-plane; (2) protection of our own fleet from hostile aircraft; (3) scouting; (4) reporting on movements of enemy over smoke screens, in low visibility, and over the horizon; (5) detecting minefields, torpedoes, and submarines; (6) spotting; (7) escort. As regards the first, he holds that all offensive actions must be undertaken by heavier-than-air craft until a practical non-inflammable gas -is in use for airships. In the late war offensive action against surface craft was of negligible value, owing to lack of opportunity, small size of bombs, indifferent bomb sights, untrained bombs, insufficient numbers of planes and material, and backward state of aerial strategy and tactics. Nevertheless, good work was done. Two German destroyers were sunk by 2301b. bombs, and towards the end Zeebrugge was attacked with 16501b. bombs, loaded with 1100lb. of T. N. T. He considers that all daylight bombing should be formation work and guided by the principle of concentration. As with projectiles, bombs must be suited to their objectives, and the 3,300-pounders that were being experimented with when the armistice was signed would be particularly effective against capital ships and concrete defenses. Smaller varieties could be used with advantage against light cruisers, destroyers, etc., while light bombs with good fragmentation would be most deadly against personnel. "With the accuracy of our new sights and the application of proper tactics and material, the importance of the future of bombing cannot be overestimated."
After explaining in some detail the use of aircraft as protectors of their own fleet, as scouts, and as detectors of submerged perils, he goes on to deal with their value as an aid to accurate long-range gunnery. Towards the close of the war the Grand Fleet, practicing long-range shooting by means of aerial spotters, obtained by this means a standard of efficiency at least 300 per cent higher than from masthead spotting. It is not believed, he says, that spotting from the ship can be accurate at over 18,000 yards, whereas aircraft spotting is efficient up to the maximum range of the gun, and is not affected by smoke screens. Airships are best for this work, but their utility is circumscribed by dependence on weather conditions. As for the future of the torpedo-plane, the capabilities of this weapon have been set forth by Mr. R. Blackburn, the well-known British designer, who has specialized in the production of such craft. In his judgment surprise can rarely enter into a torpedo attack by surface vessels, for the approach of a destroyer would be observed in clear weather at least ten minutes before it came within torpedo range; whereas "torpedo-planes flying at upwards of 10,000 ft. can begin to glide with engine shut off, and therefore silently, some ten miles away, remaining invisible until within three or four miles, and probably undetected until much closer. Gliding at, say, 120 knots, it is unlikely they would be seen more than a minute before launching a torpedo at close range." The foregoing extracts, which do little more than touch the fringe of the subject, yet suffice to indicate the vast field of activity that will lie open to naval aircraft in a future war, and also to create misgiving as to the wisdom of entrusting the development of airpower to a department in which army influence is paramount.—The Naval and Military Record, April 6, 1921.
A Super-Dreadnought as Target.—The Latest German Battleship "Baden" Sunk by Gunfire and Torpedo.—Early in February the ex-German battleship Baden, which was among the former enemy ships allocated to Great Britain, was towed from Portsmouth to Spithead and there subjected to attack by gunfire and torpedoes. According to a semiofficial statement issued on February 9, "the Baden was subjected to short-range firing in the presence of gunnery experts, and also to aerial torpedo attacks. The object was to test the construction of German battleships and to throw light on the value of capital ships. The ship will be solved for further tests." The photograph reproduced herewith was taken soon after the conclusion of the experiments. As the first occasion on which a really modern war vessel of the largest dimensions has figured as a target ship, this experiment has created great interest in naval circles. The Baden, which was laid down in December, 1913, at the yard of F. Schichau, Danzig, and commenced her trials in November, 1916, embodies the latest German ideas on battleship design. The Baden is 590 feet long over all, has an extreme beam of 98 ½ feet, and her displacement at 27 feet 8 inches, 28,074 tons. She represents the latest German ideas in battleship construction.
As regards armor and protective plating, the Baden has a main belt 13 3/4 inches thick, which tapers to 6 3/4 inches at the lower edge. This is surmounted by a strake of 97/8 inches armor extending to the upper deck and the citadel is enclosed by transverse bulkheads. Beyond the main belt there is plating of 6 inches up to the bow and stern. The secondary battery is armored with 6 3/4-inch plating, the deck above the battery being about 1 1/2 inches thick. Deck protection is less substantial than might have been supposed. The protective deck proper is only 1 3/16 inches on the slope, but abaft the citadel this deck increases in strength till it reaches its maximum thickness of 4 3/4 inches over the steering gear. Forward of the main belt the protective deck is 2 3/8 inches thick. The barbettes have a maximum thickness of 13 3/4 inches, the turrets being 13 3/4 inches thick at the front, 9 7/8 inches at the sides, and from 4 inches to 4 3/4 inches on the roof. The forward conning-tower is built up of 13 3/4-inch armor, with a 5 7/8-inch roof. The coal bunkers are so arranged that they extend all the way above the protective deck from the foremost to the aftermost barbette, and when filled with coal add considerably to the sum, total of protection. Armor gratings of the usual pattern are fitted to all openings in the forecastle and protective decks. So much for the defense against gunfire.
In the Baden, as in every other German warship of modern construction, great pains have been taken to minimize the effect of submerged explosions, an object facilitated by the generous beam of the ship. The principal defense against torpedoes consists of a longitudinal bulkhead which runs throughout the major length of the ship. It has a uniform thickness of 2 inches, and is closed at each end by 1 3/16-inch athwartship bulkheads. There is, in addition, a very elaborate system of pumping and flooding, which war experience showed to be more effective than mere passive resistance by means of subdivision. When the ship went into action the commander was posted at a station below deck, where his sole duty was to keep the ship on an even keel. From his central station he could communicate by voice-pipe and telephone with the pumps, sea-cocks, and auxiliary leak-control stations. A pendulum showed him at a glance the exact trim of the ship, while a diagram board indicated the quantity of water which could be admitted to each compartment and the effect which flooding would have on draught, heel, and general trim. The whole ship's company had been thoroughly trained in this work, partly by periodical drill and partly by means of an instructional model, which produced in miniature the subdivision of the hull. Thanks to these careful precautions German ships which received in action injuries of the gravest description were brought safely into port, the Derfflinger and Seydlitz after the Jutland battle being cases in point.
The Baden was armed with eight 15-inch, 45-caliber rifles in four center-line turrets; sixteen 5.9-inch 45 caliber rapid fire guns; eight 3.5-inch 45-caliber anti-aircraft guns, and three 23.6-inch submerged torpedo tubes. An interesting feature of the main armament is the extraordinarily light weight of the 15-inch gun, which weighs only 76.2 tons. On the other hand, the projectile is much lighter than that of the British is-inch gun, weighing only 1,652 pounds as against 1,930 pounds. Its muzzle velocity is 2,625 feet-seconds, and at 16 degrees (the maximum elevation of which the Baden's guns are capable) the extreme range is 22,200 yards. Of the three torpedo-tubes fitted, the bow tube is horizontal and located 19 feet below the load waterline, while the broadside tubes are depressed two degrees and set at an angle of 20 degrees before the beam, the centers of the tubes intersecting the ship's side at points 13 feet below the load waterline. The torpedoes used in this ship are believed to be the largest extant. Their diameter is 23.6 inches, the length 23 feet, and the total weight 2.16 tons, of which 551 pounds is represented by the bursting charge. Set at a speed of 28 knots these formidable engines have a range exceeding 14,000 yards.
Before being fired at, certain modifications are understood to have been made in the Baden, and the foremost turret was removed. Few authentic details of the bombardment are available, but it is known that the vessel succumbed far more quickly than had been expected. According to statements published in the press, the firing ship was the old monitor Lord Clive, which during the war carried a pair of ancient 12-inch guns and, subsequently, a single 18-inch gun, with which she shelled the German positions at Zeebrugge. For the Baden experiment the Lord Clive was fitted with a triple 15-inch gun mount, the first mount of this kind to be used in the British Navy. It is reported to be in contemplation for the four new battleships of the current shipbuilding program, which may therefore mount ten 15-inch guns in two triple and two double turrets, arranged as in the U.S.S. Oklahoma; or, possibly, twelve 15-inch guns in four triple turrets, corresponding to the arrangement of the U.S.S. Indiana. On this point, however, there is no definite information, and it is by no means certain that the designs of the new type have been finally approved. Nevertheless, the fact that a triple mount for heavy guns has been made and experimented with marks, a distinct epoch in the development of British naval ordnance and indicates the belated adoption of a system which has long been in vogue in the navies of the United States, Italy, Austria and Russia.
Although the Baden was shelled at short range, the velocity of the projectiles is believed to have corresponded to a range of about 10,000 yards. The effect was surprising in view of all that has been heard about the super-excellence of Krupp cemented armor plate made at Essen. Round after round cleanly perforated the 13 3/4-inch belt, and in some cases projectiles impinging at an oblique angle punched their way right through the thickest armor. Under this heavy punishment the great battleship soon displayed signs of distress. Water entering through the numerous shell holes 'twixt wind and water gave her a heavy list to starboard, and long before the specified number of rounds had been fired she heeled gently over and sank, coming to rest on the shallow bottom with most of her hull above water. It is not quite certain whether the torpedo-planes which had been detailed to administer the coup de grace made their attack before or after the bombardment, but in any case one or more torpedoes were dropped from the air and are said to have found the target. Sir E. T. d'Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction, has stated that the Baden's armor showed a degree of resistance considerably inferior to that of British armor of the same dimensions. A further point demonstrated by the test was the great improvement which has been made in the quality of British armor-piercing shell since the Battle of Jutland. In that action, according to Lord Jellicoe, many shells broke up on striking the thick German armor, though there is photographic evidence that a large percentage got through and exploded with terrific effect inside the ships. Views have been published showing clean perforations of the 12-inch belt and barbette armor of the Seydlit, Derfflingcr, etc., and Commander von Hase, gunnery officer of the Derfflinger at Jutland, has admitted in his book, "The Two White Nations," that the two after turrets of his ship were totally wrecked in succession by direct penetrations from British 15-inch projectiles which exploded after passing through the barbette armor.
Interesting as these Baden experiments have doubtless been, they will be surpassed in educational value by the test which is to be made this summer with the British battleship Agamemnon. This old ship, of a type intermediate between the pre-dreadnought and the dreadnought, is now being equipped as a movable target under wireless control, and will be attacked by the guns of the Atlantic fleet. The speed and course of the target will be unknown to the firing ships, and as the practice is to be at considerable range the experiment should result in valuable evidence as to the present efficiency of the British fleet at long distance firing. — The Scientific American, May 21, 1921.
JAPAN
America and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.—No greater menace to the British Empire could be imagined than that England should find America arrayed against her with the British Dominions at America's back, and yet this peril is "implied in possibilities" of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Such is the somber- presentiment of some British observers, and it is in no way brightened by various official and unofficial utterances in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to the effect that the chance of the dominions ever fighting against America, should America become embroiled with Japan, is "so remote as to be scarcely conceivable." The whole question of the alliance is to be threshed out at the coming Imperial Conference in London, we are told, when the dominions are expected to "speak out in meeting," with a voice that was trained in the World War, on other questions besides the alliance. But on the latter subject there is intense concern in some quarters, as may be gathered from the avowal of the conservative London Spectator that "an alliance between England and, Japan was never meant and never could be used against America," but until now "we have left the most important argument on our side unstated," and this weekly continues:
"Even the most widely imperialistic and aggressive of Britons do not contemplate with pleasure the blowing of the British Empire into smithereens in a single instant. We all know perfectly well this would be the result if we went to war against America, not to support some rights of our own, but in order to help the Japanese. The moment such a war was declared the bonds that united us with our dominions would be severed.
"If the people of Australia and New Zealand were asked on which side they were going to be in a war between America and Japan they would not hesitate a second. They would not waste time in reading diplomatic papers or considering legal points. They would say
"’With our own flesh and blood! If the poor old mother country has gone mad we can not help it. We are deeply sorry, but if things have come to this pass we must reluctantly take the leadership of her elder daughter rather than herself. Help the Japanese to take San Francisco by assault! Good heavens! What are you talking about?'
"The same dreadful message of disintegration would run from one end of Canada to the other with similar vehemence. There could be only one place for Canada in a finish fight between Japan and America—by the side of America.
"White South-Africans would have the same answer. Nor would that be all. The moment they realized what had happened 99 per cent of the population here would be stoning their own government for the criminal lunacy of backing Japan against their own flesh and blood."
The Spectator goes on to say that one of the reasons for continuing the alliance with Japan has been to keep peace and to be able to calm Japan's population should it become excited on "a point of honor." Also, it suggests two possible British proposals to the United States, although it admits they would be "furiously denounced by thousands of so-called naval experts in America and in England," and explains:
"The first of these would be to make our position absolutely clear to the whole American people and also to the people of our own empire, declaring we would not renew the Japanese alliance, although, of course, we would remain in perfect amity with Japan. Next, we should propose a naval convention with the United States. We should say to America: 'You shall take over command of the sea throughout the Pacific and carry on the policing of it. Just as you will be answerable for the Pacific, so we will have command of the sea in the Atlantic, which means not only all the northern waters of Europe and the Mediterranean, but also the waters encompassing the western and southern coasts of Africa.'"
But this view is founded on misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the alliance, declares the Auckland Weekly News, which cites as a piece of misrepresentation the arguments of American Anglophobes that "if the United States became involved in war with Japan on a Far-Eastern question Britain would be bound to enter the struggle." This is not so, flatly declares this weekly, which explains that—
"British statesmen have been careful to exclude a possibility which would do so much violence to British sentiment and instincts. In 1911 the following new clause was introduced into the treaty: 'Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, nothing in the agreement shall entail upon such contracting party any obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.'"
Melbourne dispatches report the Australian Premier, Mr. William M. Hughes, as saying in concluding a debate in the House of Representatives on the coming Imperial Conference, that "the chief problem before Great Britain is to draw up a treaty which will not involve us or Britain in a struggle with the people of the United States." 'What is more, the Premier averred that—
"The hope of the world depends upon some sort of an understanding between America and the empire, and it is to find a way of realizing that hope that the minds of those attending the Imperial Conference should be directed.
"It is unthinkable and not within the bounds of possibility that we should ever take part in a struggle against America. We can not be bound by any treaty which we do not ourselves ratify, although the practical consequences of war between Britain and America, whether Japan was or was not her ally, would of course have to be faced by us. But even if this treaty be renewed it will not bind Australia to go to war with any country in the world."
As an indication of Canadian sentiment we have the unreserved declaration of the Kingston Standard that—
"It is unthinkable that, in the event of war between Japan and the United States, Canada would ever be found ranged on the side of Japan, even though the proposed renewal of the treaty between Japan and Great Britain should be consummated. Canada has nothing whatever in common with Japan; she has, on the other hand, much in common with the Unite States, since in effect we are one and the same people, speaking the same language, living side by side at peace for over a hundred years, and with like ideals, aspirations, and high resolves."
But the Montreal Daily Star derides "those Americans who hope that Canada and Australia can be split away from the British Empire on the Japanese issue," because the Anglo-Japanese alliance is "a larger question than our own irremovable feeling against Asiatic immigration," and it adds:
"The men in Great Britain who have guarded the confines of the empire successfully through the centuries have other things to consider, and they may feel that an alliance with the strongest Power to-day in Asia—if not in the entire Old World—is an asset in these unsettled times which is not to be tossed light-heartedly over the shoulder because the American people can misunderstand it if they insist upon doing so. For they can only regard the Anglo-Japanese alliance as anti-American by deliberately reading all the documents in the case in the contrary sense.
"Suppose Britain refused to renew the Japanese alliance? It would be almost impossible to prevent that action from falling upon the sensitive Japanese cheek like a blow. Japan would be roughly hustled out of the circle of British friends. Where would she go? Does she look to you like a Power which would stand alone and patiently accept the bitter wages of isolation? Or do you not imagine that she might turn up as the protector of Soviet Russia, possibly the champion and beneficiary of the effort of the Soviets to rouse China and India, the spear-head of an Asiatic Monroe ' movement, and ultimately, perhaps, the nurse and emancipator of Germany."
In sharp contrast is the attitude of the Toronto Mail and Empire, which wonders whether the alliance "has not served its turn and had its day." The Far-Eastern question has been changed by the war, according to this daily, which proceeds
"Japan's alliance has not proved serviceable to Britain in preventing the spread of Soviet Russia's power in Asia Minor, in Persia, and in Afghanistan. For dealing with the new world questions that are looming up the Great Powers should study to avoid unnecessary commitments and entangling alliances. It is recognized more than in previous times that much that formerly fell to what were called coalitions, concerts, and holy alliances can now be left to a permanent grand international agency such as the League of Nations is meant to be."
Among the Japanese press the Tokyo Nichi-nichi is aware that the public opinion of Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand is inclined to oppose the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and it bids Japan take due note of this tendency. Moreover, American opinion "takes the line that as a practical issue it is unthinkable that the American Navy should be restricted while the Anglo-Japanese alliance continue to exist," and the Nichi-nichi remarks:
"It is general knowledge that the alliance was concluded with the object of maintaining peace in the Orient and consequently of preserving the peace of the world. Yet we find the opinion expressed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance is an obstacle in the way of disarmament, an arrangement designed to promote the peace and prosperity of the world. It is open to doubt whether the existence of the alliance is an obstacle to disarmament, but it is very clear that it is not desirable that such misgivings should be entertained by America, a country with which we are on friendly terms. This is especially the case as the influences which were considered subversive of the peace of the Orient at the time the alliance was concluded have now collapsed."
Those Americans who oppose the renewal of the alliance, says the Tokyo Yorodzu, fail to perceive that it is "necessary for the maintenance of peace in the Orient, and makes the functions of the League of Nations more effective locally," hence, "it is impossible for us to see what are the real intentions of the opponents of the alliance."
The Australian Premier's pronouncement, which is quoted above, was submitted to Baron Hayashi, Japan's Ambassador at London, by a representative of the London Times, who records the Ambassador's impressions as follows:
"Such a dear expression of opinion could not fail, he thought, to have good results. He had no doubt that it would be welcomed in Japan, where there was a desire to meet the wishes of Australia, Canada, and the United States. Co-operation was the aim of all parties, and he felt sure that in any renewal of the alliance between Japan and Great Britain there would be nothing to which the United States could take exception. It was absolutely necessary for Japan that she should possess the friendship of the United States. The Ambassador went on to say that he was convinced that in good time Australians would come to realize that Japan entertained no aggressive or mischievous designs. Her one idea was to cultivate friendly relations.
"Turning to the question of naval armaments, Baron Hayashi said that Japan had no desire to possess a fleet which was larger than she deemed necessary to maintain her interests and defend her possessions. So long as the Anglo-Japanese alliance lasted Japan was bound to remain on friendly terms with all the dominions, and it was not the wish of the Japanese that any other situation should arise."—The Literary Digest, May 21, 1921.
Recent Notes on Japan.—The outstanding feature of prevailing conditions in Japan at the present time is the protracted struggle for power between the militarists and the liberals.
While this struggle is an inevitable concomitant of all monarchial forms of government, it naturally reaches an extreme whenever there is a demand on the part of the people for some evidence of reform leading to self-government. Japan represents the survival of the old ideals of a monarchy wherein the ruling house governs by "divine right," and where the proprietary aristocracy is almost if not quite representative of the traditional superiority of the military class. There still exists among the masses an almost superstitious reverence for the samurai.
There are in Japan far-seeing and experienced political leaders who with the commercial and industrial circles of the country, are engaged in an effort to institute needed reforms consistent with a growing tendency to world democracy, and to develop the industrial resources of the country by peaceful methods. In these efforts they are constantly balked by the intercession of the militarist leaders, who have their own ideas as to what sort of reforms are desirable.
The power of the military party being deeply rooted in the ideals of the Japanese people, the more progressive leaders of public opinion make little progress.
The Minister of War and Minister of the Navy are ex officio members of the Ministry—members of the legislative chambers having no influence over them. This fact constitutes the bulwark of the power of the military party, which power was greatly increased by allied intervention in Russian affairs because it forced the necessity of maintaining Japanese troops in Siberia and gave the reins of government into the hands of the militarists.
National pride compelled the payment to these expeditionary forces of a wage nearly equivalent to that paid by the Allies to their troops.
The rank and file of the people of Japan proverbially are trained to habits of extreme frugality, to the strictest self-sacrifice and restraint, and thus the men of these troops were enabled to send back to their relatives at home the greater part of their wages to be invested in small business—characteristic of Japanese industrial ideas and representing a degree of affluence from the Japanese point of view.
An almost unprecedented period of prosperity self-evidently brought about by a reign of militarism resulted in a wave of popular support of the military party, the masses being led to hope that their success would continue if the military party were kept in power.
Thus the leaders of the military party were faced with the necessity of supplying some excuse for maintaining the troops in Siberia—an excuse which only the continued intervention of the Allies could warrant.
In this way the question of intervention in Siberia has become for Japan a question of home politics rather than of foreign policy.
The absence of any power in the Far East comparable with Japan forced the leaders of the military party to seek afar for something that might justify increased appropriation for military and naval purposes without which the life of the military party would be at an end. The act of the California legislature has given a plausible excuse to raise a hue and cry about Japan having her hands free in Far East questions. The results of the Vanderlip concession have had a similar effect, notwithstanding the fact that Japan has identically the same concession in the name of Mr. Nasamura, well-known industrial magnate of Yokohama and member of the Diet.
"Competition with America in the Far East" is the slogan of the military party, while co-operation with America is not only the dream of all far-seeing financial and industrial leaders of Japan, but also the solution of the internal strife—the struggle between the two parties. With such cooperation assured, all danger from other conflicting interests in the Far East would be at an end. It is for America to decide the future.
The Japanese Navy may be estimated as follows:
Effective Force:
Old Type: Cruisers 4; battleships of pre-dreadnought type 7; light cruisers 7; destroyers 70; submarines 20.
New Type: Dreadnoughts 4; cruisers—dreadnoughts 8; light cruisers 34 ; destroyers yy ; submarines 80.
In construction: Dreadnoughts 11; cruiser-dreadnoughts 8; light cruisers 41; destroyers 147; submarines 100.
The first condition of naval strength is fuel; oil as fuel increases naval efficiency in battle because it permits of a longer period of action without refueling. It also increases speed because of homogeneous and modern conditions of firing.
Therefore, the fuel question is the most formidable of the problems now facing the Japanese Navy. Japan has no sufficient source of oil supply outside of America. Recently two limited companies were created with the assistance of the government for the purpose of acquiring the necessary quantities of oil and to build tanks for its safe storage in different parts of the country.
In accordance with the lessons learned during the late war, reorganization of the army on a new basis is proceeding.
Brigades are to be abolished. The plan is to create divisions consisting each of three regiments. In accordance with the reorganization project, Japan will have in the near future 32 army divisions and i guard division.
On the 1st of January, 1921, the gold reserve was 2,183,000,000 yen. From this stock 884,000,000 yen were at the disposal of the government and 1,294,000,000 yen were in the Japan State Bank.
Export trade for the year 1920 amounted to the sum of 1,928,864 yen; import to 2,320,712,000 yen. In 1919 the export trade amounted to 2,098, 872,617 yen and the import to 2,173,459,880 yen.
The decrease in exports is partly explained by the interference of the government in the domain of commerce; so the government has vetoed the falling down of prices for some export articles, as for instance, raw silk.
It is interesting to note that the amount of exports from the port of Yokohama for 1920 fell to 25 per cent below that of 1918.
The total expense amounted to 1,562,542,797 yen. Of this sum, 183,290,831 yen is designated as "ordinary military expense," and 144,811,078 yen as naval expense.
For extraordinary military expense a sum of 79,853,871 yen is provided, and for that of the navy a sum of 358,826,000 yen. These expenses are in excess of those of the previous year by 227, 187, 480 yen.
The government is planning the construction of new railways and the building of central stores for rice, as a means of decreasing unemployment.
As we go to press, reports are current in the daily papers that the Japanese Government has requested from the Diet an additional appropriation for defenses, amounting to 50,000,000 yen, 40,000,000 yen of this sum being required for the navy "to meet the increased cost of construction of warships."—National Service, April, 1921.
Japan's Naval Effort.—Since Japan does not unduly advertise her armaments, the extraordinary efforts she is now making to strengthen her position as a naval and military power are not fully appreciated abroad. It is certainly not common knowledge that Japan, in the current year, is devoting no less than 48.7 per cent of her total revenue to the navy and army. Naval armaments alone represent an expenditure equal to 32 per cent of the entire Budget. An analysis of this expenditure reveals the interesting fact that 55 per cent of the money voted for the navy goes toward new construction. The Philadelphia Public Ledger prints a table showing the proportion of national income which the three leading naval powers are at present spending on new naval construction, as distinct from other branches of the naval service
Japan 17.5 per cent.
United States 1.6 " "
Great Britain 1.1 " "
According to the Public Ledger, this shows that Japan is putting forth ten times as much effort in naval expansion, in proportion to her national budget, as the United States, and about fifteen times as much as Great Britain. It further shows that since Germany in 1914 set aside 221,000,000 marks, or only 6.2 per cent of her income, for the benefit of her navy, while Japan in 1921-22 proposes to use 32 per cent of her income for the like object, Japan is making a five-fold greater effort in naval expansion than Germany made in the last year before the war. Reducing the German naval estimates of 1914-15 to yen, at the rate of two marks to the yen, the following comparison is obtained
German naval budget, 1914-15 Yen 110,500,000
Japanese naval budget,1921-22 Yen 490,000,000
Making allowance for the depreciation in money values since 1914, and assuming five yen in 192 1 to be equal in purchasing power to two yen in 1914, Japan, it appears, is still spending about twice as much on her navy as Germany proposed to spend in 1914-15. These figures undoubtedly offer food for thought. The Ledger, however, goes on to argue that when Japan has completed the present program her navy will be approximately equal in strength to that of the United States. This assertion is open to dispute. Reckoning dreadnought capital ships only, America has completed 19, and is building 16—a total of 35; Japan has completed 12 (including two "semi-dreadnoughts"), and is building, or about to built, 15—a total of 27. The Japanese total, moreover, will not be attained before 1928, and it is not improbable that long before that date America will have laid down additional ships. The really significant fact is the tremendous proportion of her revenue which Japan deems it necessary to set aside for naval armaments. Her statesmen assure the world that the fleet in process of creation at such appalling cost exists solely for defense, but they do not tell us from what quarter aggression is feared.—The Naval and Military Record, May 4, 1921.
Iron Manufacture and Shipbuilding in Japan.—The Japanese Special Economic and Financial Investigation Committee adopted at its meeting, held on February 14, under the chairmanship of the Premier, Mr. Hara, the national policy regarding the iron and shipbuilding industries of the country previously decided on and recommended by the sectional committees. The following is a brief resume of the policy in question:
It is considered most important to combine the existing ironworkers, while the iron industry should be protected by the imposition of an import duty of 10 per cent on pig iron and 15 per cent on other iron and steel, except that intended for shipbuilding, which may be exempted. Japanese manufacturers should be subsidised for the duration of the conventions to the extent of the difference between the above enhanced duties and the conventional tariff, while those employing Japanese steel for shipbuilding might be subsidised to the extent of a sum equivalent to the import duty on the same kind of steel.
Iron manufacturers should be exempt from payment of business and income taxes for a period of ten years, provided their equipment fulfils the requirements of the Iron Industry Encouragement Law, which should be revived. The electro-iron industry should be similarly protected.-
Iron and steel of Japanese make might be employed in most government building works. Due protection should be given for the marine and land transportation of iron ores and iron manufactures. Japanese iron manufactures might be granted special financial facilities, while an ample supply of iron should be insured by the procuring of foreign products, the improvement of transportation methods, their economical employment and the encouragement of domestic production. The technical side of iron manufacturing might be advanced by encouraging the study of the manufacture, the linking up of the laboratories, the training of experts and the standardization of manufactures.
The existing Shipbuilding Encouragement Law is held to be inadequate for the protection of the industry, and it is considered important to exempt from import duties the steel and wood necessary for building and repairing vessels—including warships—in order to place the Japanese shipbuilders on an equal footing with foreign manufacturers; also to exempt from import duties, fittings, engines and other parts, including half-finished vessels, which cannot be manufactured in Japan or may not be manufactured on account of patents.—The Engineer, May 6, 1921.
Flying Instructors.—Questioned on 23rd March about the reported despatch of a mission of British airmen to join the Japanese Navy, the Secretary of State for Air said it was understood that a certain number of civilians had been engaged by the Japanese as flying instructors, but no mission had been sent by the Royal Air Force, nor had the civilians in question been sent for courses to R. A. F. stations in England. The British Government have neither sold nor sent to Japan any aeroplanes or aero engines, but it is possible that the Aircraft Disposal Company, in which the government have retained an interest, may have sold certain obsolete or surplus engines to that country.
Naval Strength.—Sir James Craig, on 16th March, gave the following information about the Japanese Navy: Twelve battleships, excluding one attached to the Gunnery School, are at present maintained in full commission, and six battlecruisers, excluding one attached to the Torpedo School. The numbers borne on 19th January, 1921, were 76,600, made up of approximately 7000 officers and 69,600 men, all of whom were available for manning. The corresponding figure in 1914 was 55,712.—The Journal of The Royal United Service Institution, May, 1921.
Ships and Sailors of Japan.—By courtesy of the Japanese Naval Attaché and the officers of the ship, I spent a very interesting afternoon last week on board the battleship Kashima at Portsmouth. This vessel and her sister, the Katori (to which I paid a briefer visit), do not, of course, represent the modern material of the Imperial Japanese Navy; they have already completed three-fourths of the span of "life" allotted to big warships, and irrespective of age, they lost a great deal of their fighting value soon after they were completed, owing to the advent of the dreadnought. But "men fight, not ships," and the visit was well worth while for the insight it gave into the character of the personnel and general service conditions in the Japanese Navy. On the naval side there has been an entire absence of ostentation in connection with the visit of the Crown Prince. The voyage was made not in one of the latest and mightiest fighting ships of the Imperial fleet, but in an obsolescent vessel already relegated to the second line, and escort was furnished by a sister ship. Nor in other respects has any attempt been made to create an artificial impression.
I asked a lieutenant of the Kashinia whether the men had been picked for the voyage, and he replied "No," the ordinary complement already on board had been retained, and this was true of the officers also, excepting certain members of the staff. In the Katori a suite of apartments, quite simply furnished, and a special cabin on the shelter-deck were provided for the Crown Prince, but beyond this no alteration of any kind was made in either ship. Having gone practically all through the Katori, I came to the conclusion that the Prince's staff must have been rather cramped for room. A pre-dreadnought battleship makes at best an indifferent Royal yacht, but it was, I am assured, the Emperor's particular wish that the entire arrangements for his son's voyage should be characterized by simplicity and lack of display.
The admiral's cabin in the Kashinia is comfortable, furnished with the exquisite taste that one naturally expects from the Japanese, but by no means luxurious, and the captain's quarters are severely plain. The wardroom is small and somewhat cheerless from our point of view. It is very evident that creature comforts do not enter largely into the Japanese scheme of man-of-war organization. In these two ships space that otherwise would have been available for berthing accommodation has been sacrificed to military efficiency. The 6-inch battery takes up an enormous amount of room, as each gun is in its own large casemate, perfectly isolated, and giving the crew plenty of elbow play. In fact, with the exception of the Baden, I know of no ship in which the broadside battery guns are so well protected as in the Kashima. On the other hand, the four single lo-inch gun turrets do not seem to be well placed, and probably interfere with the 12- inch main armament. The lo-inch guns are worked hydraulically and the turrets are fairly large, but when the full crew of 19 are inside there cannot be much room to spare. In both ships the officers spoke very highly of the workmanship in the vessels themselves and in their machinery, armament, and general equipment. Said one: "These British-built ships have never given any trouble, and they are as sound to-day as when they were delivered to us. The only change we have made in them was to modify the boilers. But for the new tactical standards set up by the dreadnought these two ships would still be in our first battle fleet. They are, and always have been, very popular ships with us."
The voyage on the whole was favored by fine weather, but heavy seas were encountered near Malta and again in the Bay of Biscay and on the latter occasion the battleships rolled rather badly, as well they might considering the weight they carry topsides. Few changes have been made in rig or general appearance since the ships left England fifteen years ago, though both underwent big refits during the war. The torpedo nets have been removed, though perhaps only temporarily, as the shelf and the boom fittings remain, and two small Q.F. are now mounted on the crown of each 12-inch turret. Neither ship is fitted for director fire, and the largest rangefinders at present on board are of the 10-feet base type. Very possibly, however, the ordnance equipment in these two ships does not represent the latest Japanese practice, even in the pre-dreadnought squadron.
The mess decks are, if anything, roomier and more comfortable than those in contemporary British battleships. Although the Kashima was coaling at the time of my visit, by some miracle the dirt and noise were localized and did not penetrate unduly to the after part of the ship. The men were putting an extraordinary amount of energy into their work, and if coaling ship is always conducted on the same lines, I shall say that the Japanese Navy easily holds the world's record. Hard work seemed to conduce to cheerfulness, for there were smiling faces everywhere, and all appeared to look upon coaling as a rich joke. Outwardly there was no trace of the iron discipline with which some writers have credited the Japanese Navy. The men, I noticed, were far more self-reliant and far less servile in their bearings towards superiors than was the case in the old German Navy Orders were given quietly and obeyed with cheerful alacrity. The saluting was most punctilious, not only between officers and ratings, but between the officers themselves. My impression is that the Japanese conception of discipline differs very radically from the Western conception, but that it is wonderfully good, and doubtless well suited to the Japanese temperament. The officers are manifestly absorbed in their profession and exceedingly well-informed on the world's naval affairs. The plain, almost sombre uniform, with the "stripes" in black braid instead of gold, consorts well with their quiet, earnest demeanour, but they soon become vivacious when the talk turns on "shop." They have few relaxations, but one lieutenant confessed to me that his "hobby" was "reading naval war literature," of which he certainly had an imposing stock. A certain British admiral would have liked to hear this officer's quaint but flattering tribute to his book.
Among the men the average of physique was excellent. They are well fed, and the story in one London paper of their "wholesome but rather monotonous diet of rice and beans" is moonshine. They have a generous meat ration at dinner every day, and, as a rule, fish for supper. For recreation they play shuffle-board, quoits, and other deck games, but I was told that wrestling is their favourite pastime. The men's library contained nearly a dozen books in English—including certain popular novels, and several quite passable English scholars were pointed out to me. If these men of the Kashima are typical there is nothing wrong with the Japanese lower-deck personnel. Indeed, one might say of the Katori and Kashima, their officers and their men, that if the rest of the Japanese Navy is "up to sample" the honor of Japan is safe in the keeping of her seamen.—The Naval and Military Record, May 25, 1921.
UNITED STATES
Launch of Submarine "S-48."—The U. S. submarine S-48, launched on February 26 at the works of the Lake Torpedo Co., Bridgeport, Conn., is the first of the ten vessels of the S-42 to S-51 group to be launched, and is about 75 per cent completed. The displacement is about 993 tons, and the vessels are 240 feet in length overall; beam, 21 feet 6 inches; draft, about 13 feet 6 inches in normal surface condition.
The vessel is of the double hull type for about one-half the length amidships, the forward and after portions of the hull being of the single-hull type. The hull must withstand with safety a submergence test to 200 feet. Particular attention has been given to providing ample strength to ensure against rupture from explosion of depth charges. Strong bulkheads divide internal spaces into six watertight compartments, so proportioned that the vessel will still float if any one compartment is damaged and flooded.
The vessels are propelled on the surface by two Diesel engines, each driving a screw propeller, rated at 950 brake horsepower each. Submerged, the vessel is driven by two electric motors taking their power from a lead-acid storage battery. These motors also act as electric generators for charging the storage battery, being driven by the Diesel engines when operated on the surface or when at rest with propeller shafts uncoupled. The fuel oil system is of the "floating" type, oil used being automatically replaced by salt water.
Navy Department—Bureau of Construction and Repair
Vessels Under Construction, United States Navy—Degree of Completion, and Probable Dates of Completion, As Reported May 31, 1921
Type, number and name | Contractor | Per cent of completion | |||
June 1, 1921 | May 1, 1921 | ||||
Total | On ship | Total | On ship | ||
Battleships (BB) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
44 California | Mare Island Navy Yard | 97 | 97 | 96.5 | 96.3 |
45 Colorado | New York S.B. Cpn. | 73.1 | 71.3 | 71.3 | 69.4 |
46 Maryland | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 99.2 | 98.9 | 98.3 | 97.8 |
47 Washington | New York S.B. Cpn. | 65 | 58.5 | 63.1 | 56.3 |
48 West Virginia | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 54.1 | 44.4 | 52.1 | 42.4 |
49 South Dakota | New York Navy Yard | 30.5 | 22.3 | 29.1 | 21.1 |
50 Indiana | New York Navy Yard | 28 | 20.7 | 25.8 | 17.8 |
51 Montana | Mare Island Navy Yard | 24.4 | 15.2 | 22.1 | 13.2 |
52 North Carolina | Norfolk Navy Yard | 32.3 | 23.1 | 29.4 | 21 |
53 Iowa | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 23 | 19 | 19.3 | 15.4 |
54 Massachusetts | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 6.4 | .9 | 3 | .5 |
Battle Cruisers (CC) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
1 Lexington | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 18.7 | 9.2 | 16.6 | 6.5 |
2 Constellation | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 10.5 | 7.7 | 9.3 | 6.3 |
3 Sarasota | New York S.B. Cpn. | 22.4 | 13.4 | 20.4 | 11.8 |
4 Ranger | Newport News S.B. & D.D. Co. | 1.8 | .7 | 1.6 | .9 |
5 Constitution | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 7.7 | 4 | 6 | 2.9 |
6 United States | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 7.7 | 4 | 6 | 2.9 |
Scout Cruisers (Light Cruisers CL) | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
4 Omaha | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 92.1 | 83.4 | 91.4 | 82.7 |
5 Milwaukee | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 89.2 | 80.9 | 88.3 | 79.7 |
6 Cincinnati | Todd D.D. & Const. Cpn. | 81.7 | 74.1 | 80.6 | 68.9 |
7 Raleigh | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 56.7 | 38.8 | 53.8 | 35.2 |
8 Detroit | Beth. S.B. Cpn. (Fore River) | 56.6 | 38.7 | 53.6 | 35 |
9 Richmond | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 66 | 40 | 64 | 38 |
10 Concord | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 63 | 37 | 62 | 36 |
11 Trenton | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 45 | 25 | 44 | 22 |
12 Marblehead | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 43 | 22 | 42 | 20 |
13 Memphis | Wm. Cramp & Sons Co. | 37 | 19 | 35 | 14 |
Auxiliaries | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Fuel Ship No. 18, Pecos | Boston Navy Yard (Oiler AO6) | 88 | 87.5 | 82.5 | 81.6 |
Repair Ship No. 1, Medusa (AR1) | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 62.4 | 47.7 | 60.6 | 44.5 |
Dest. Tender No. 3, Dobbin (AD3) | Philadelphia Navy Yard | 62.3 | 62 | 57.3 | 57 |
Dest. Tender No. 4, Whitney (AD4) | Boston Navy Yard | 25 | 16.5 | 21 | 12.5 |
Sub. Tender No. 3, Holland | Puget Sound Navy Yard | 17.8 | 2.5 | 16.8 | 1.4 |
Aircraft Tender, Wright (AZ1) | Tietjen & Lang | 76 | ? | 70 | ? |
Patrol Vessels | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Gunboat No. 22, Tulsa (PG22) | Charleston Navy Yard | 67.7 | 48 | 64.6 | 44.7 |
In addition to the above there are under construction 4 destroyers, 37 submarines, and 4 fleet submarines. Authorized but not under construction or contract 12 destroyers, 7 submarines, and 1 transport.
There were delivered to the Navy Department during May, 1921, 4 destroyers.
The armament consists of four 21-inch torpedo tubes in the bow and one in the stern. A 4-inch 50-caliber gun is installed on the deck forward of the conning tower. Ammunition is served by means of an inclined ammunition hoist with spring actuated cover. Three periscopes are installed, one of which has its eye-piece in the conning tower, but arranged with a platform and trunk to permit the operator to ride up or down with the periscope and take observations at any height. The eye-pieces of the other two are in the control room. The variable ballast tanks are of sufficient capacity to provide for adjustment of weight under all probable conditions. The flooding and venting arrangements are ample, and are designed to permit the vessel to be submerged in approximately one minute. The S-48 is equipped with radio apparatus, both for surface and submerged work, and with submarine coils for receiving radio messages submerged. Submarine oscillator signaling sets are also provided. Particular attention has been given to providing comfortable quarters for the crew and the inner surfaces of the hull in way of the living spaces have been sheathed with cork. Stowage for a 14-foot boat is provided in the superstructure. (Army and Navy Journal, Mar. 5, 1921.)—The Technical Review, May 17, 1921.
Merchant Marine
Government's Armada of Inactive Steel Ships Crowds James River.—In the James River opposite Camp Eustis, Va., there are approximately 160 steel Shipping Board vessels tied up in groups of eight, in some places three groups abreast. Most of the ships are of the "Lake" type and have proven unprofitable for operation in the coastwise and West Indian trade in normal times. The groups of ships, which are designated as "units," clutter the river for miles up and down on each side of the pier —quietly floating, orderly islands with sheer black and red steel sides and each with a forest of masts and stacks atop.
The dreamy and peaceful appearance of the scene is belied by the life on the "mother-ships" of the units. The men work hard aboard the vessels. In the morning they turn to at eight and begin chipping or painting or continuing whatever job is under way until five o'clock, with an hour free at noon. Many evidences of neglect, poor workmanship and graft on the part of the builders are coming to light. Usually they are defects which would be unimportant except in time of extreme danger. Then, however, they are liable to cause loss of life. Whenever it is possible, the crew put things to rights, or report the trouble if they are unable to remedy it. A defect common to many of the ships was the fact that the shackle pins in the anchor chains were "frozen" and could not be moved with a sledge hammer, making it necessary to saw the pin in half to part the chain.
Suppose that a vessel so handicapped is anchored on a lee shore during a gale and another vessel drags down on her. No time to heave up the anchor—the chain must be slipped. The crew set to work to knock the pin out of the shackle, in order to release the chain. They have only a few minutes—no time for sawing. The pin won't move! The other ship is drifting down surely and steadily! They pound it frantically but without success! Too late! The ships collide and both are swept into the surf, to be pounded to pieces. But "dead men tell no tales." On several of the ships, round pins were found forced into oval holes.
The most important and most difficult work falls to the lot of the engineers, and thanks to their activities the vessels in a number of the units will go out in a better condition than that in which they arrived. On one unit, the engineers constructed an electric welding machine and made repairs which, in a shipyard would have cost the Shipping Board many thousands of dollars. The chief concern of the deck force is to see that all the ships are securely fastened together. The vessels lie side by side, with their bows pointed in opposite directions, so that one vessel points up stream and its neighbor down stream. Each vessel has both bow anchors out nearly to the ends of their chains, so that the average unit has sixteen anchors out, eight on each side. Even that number sometimes fails to hold. One unit dragged a hundred and fifty yards during a squall in March.
The danger of fire is the chief concern of the officers of the units. Inspections of all ships are conducted hourly, both day and night. Lines of fire-hose are stretched across the unit, and spare hose is always ready. Smoking and the use of oil lamps are not allowed on any but the motherships. Everything is ready so that if any ship catches fire it can be taken out of the unit in short order. The crew are drilled thoroughly in their fire duties and everyone is ready for any emergency. So far there have been no serious fires.
There has been much talk of the ship's rotting to pieces and opinions have been expressed that they will be worthless when the time comes to put them in operation again. The general belief of the officers aboard the ships, however, is just the opposite. There is naturally a large depreciation in any laid-up ship, but it is being offset to a considerable extent by the work of the caretaking crews. The captains and engineers are doing their utmost to put the ships in the best condition, although they are somewhat handicapped by lack of men and equipment. In February, all the engineers in the fleet sent a letter to the Shipping Board asking for more skilled engineers and assistants. In support of their request, they declared that the ships would gain in efficiency and that the Shipping Board would save money by enabling these men to make many necessary repairs which otherwise would be done in a shipyard by men whose only interest in the work would be the amount of money they could get out of it. Nothing came of the appeal, however.—The Nautical Gazette, May 21, 1921.
Words of Wisdom on the Shipping Problem.—There is probably no subject, unless it be that of reparations, upon which so much has been said and written and such diverse solutions offered as in respect to the problems of our Shipping Board policy. To our thinking, the best summing up of the situation is that which was made by James A. Farrell at the recent National Foreign Trade Council Convention in Cleveland, Ohio.
Looking at the matter broadly, Mr. Farrell laid his finger at once on one root of the trouble when he said that the present conditions are the outcome of haphazard efforts to deal with a problem which from the very first called for a settled policy and a well-defined purpose. To begin with, for a period extending from the Armistice well into the year 1919, there was an opportunity to dispose of a large portion of the fleet at prices bearing a fair relation to a moderately depreciated cost. That was the time, our readers will remember, when a bona fide offer was made to purchase the Leviathan, a deal which would have gone through except for the spiteful opposition of the Hearst papers and certain other influences of a strongly anti-European favor. Through not taking advantage of this opportunity, the government, says Mr. Farrell, "missed its market," and, it is estimated, lost a chance to realize at least 800 million dollars, this sum representing the difference in the market value of the tonnage which could have been sold at that time and the value of the same ships to-day. The Shipping Board fleet cost over three billion dollars, and the question of getting rid of these ships by sale is hampered by our perfectly impossible navigation laws. We are told, moreover, that even a temporary improvement in ocean freights would fail to absorb the world's idle tonnage in less than three years. Approximately seven million tons of the world's carrying capacity is laid up out of a total of 60 million tons, of which five million tons is not yet completed.
In Mr. Farrell's opinion, we have to recognize that the policy of the Shipping Board of endeavoring to build up trade routes from every Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific port to practically every port in the world is expensive, and, under present conditions, impracticable. He believes that a partial solution of Shipping Board difficulties would be to lay up a considerable portion of its tonnage and withdraw from all but supervisory activity by chartering the steamers to reputable and experienced operators. With this policy we have always been in hearty agreement. The operation of shipping, with all its multiplied and varied activities and problems, is one of the most highly specialized branches of commerce and industry. It should be left to the genius of the men who have had long experience. The Shipping Board scheme of laying out trade routes and supporting the unprofitable lines by active and very generous financial help is attractive on paper, but, as the event has proved impossible of fulfillment, at least under the present disturbed world conditions.
But after all is said and done, Mr. Farrell lays his hand upon the most serious handicap of all when he says that the main factor in determining whether we can compete successfully with foreign tonnage is our shipping laws. From the very day on which the La Follette bill was passed the Scientific American has realized that this bill would be the undoing of our Merchant Marine; and everything that has happened since then has proved the fear to be well founded. Not only do our navigation laws strangle our ocean-going ships, but they are affecting even the carriers on the Great Lakes, where we have no local foreign competition. As compared with competing foreign ships on the high seas, American vessels must maintain larger crews, 65 per cent of whom must be licensed men and they must carry in the engine room crew 30 per cent more men. The solution of the shipping problem lies in chartering the boats to competent people of long experience in the shipping business, coupled with a drastic revision of our navigation laws.—The Scientific American, May 21, 1921.
Policy of Discriminations Fraught With Danger to Our Shipping.—The advocates of discriminatory tonnage dues and preferential tariff duties on goods imported in American bottoms are not idle, however. They are even proposing the enactment of new legislation calling for the imposition of a ten per cent ad valorem tax on all commodities brought into this country in foreign ships. Not even articles on the free list are to be exempt from this tax. As we have pointed out before, such unequal treatment of foreign shipping would be almost certain to evoke retaliatory measures on the part of other nations and lead to our vessels being, discriminated against. The British colonies have had for some time a system of preferential duties in favor of Great Britain and would probably be glad of a pretext to impose discriminatory tonnage dues against American ships.
It is argued that any such retaliatory legislation could be offset by the simple expedient of our again raising our discriminatory charges and keeping them on a higher level than those established by foreign countries. In other words, still higher discriminations are to be imposed against nations which may rebel against the enforcement of the discriminatory clauses of the Jones Act. We should then be in the illogical position of deeming it a cause for reprisals should foreign nations venture to discriminate against our tonnage, while claiming for ourselves the right to levy any dues we saw fit on the ships of these same nations when they visited our harbors. Such an unfair attitude would be almost certain to cause commercial warfare to the resultant detriment of our shipping and of our trade. Furthermore, in the event of any such war of discriminating tonnage dues, the United States would be a heavy loser by reason of the fact that its exports are far greater than its imports. As American ships arriving in foreign ports would have to pay heavier tonnage dues than foreign vessels it would be cheaper to ship our products abroad in the latter. All that our discriminator tonnage dues could effect would be the deflecting of our less numerous and less valuable import cargoes to American ships, while our far more precious export cargoes would move out in foreign bottoms. This would be a losing proceeding for us. Instead of furthering our shipping as alleged, discriminatory tonnage legislation would be certain to imperil seriously its position.—The Nautical Gazette, June 4, 1921.
AERONAUTICS
Calendar of Bombing Tests.—June 21—Tuesday: Bombing of ex- German sub-U-117 by army and navy air forces jointly.
June 22—Wednesday: Destruction U-140, U-111, UB-48 by destroyers.
June 28—Tuesday: Search for and bombing or radio controlled battleship Iowa by navy and army air forces using naval aircraft only. Iowa to be between latitude of Capes Hatteras and Henlopen 50 to 100 miles off shore at zero hour.
July 13—Wednesday: Bombing of ex-German destroyers about 60 miles off Cape Charles light ship in 60 fathoms of water. Army and navy aircraft jointly. If not sunk by bombs to be sunk by destroyer fire.
July 15—Friday: Destruction remaining destroyers by gunfire.
July 18—Monday: Bombing of ex-German cruiser Frankfurt under same conditions as above. If not sunk by bombs to be sunk by big guns of fleet.
July 20—Wednesday: Destruction of ex-German battleship Ostfriesland. Flyers must register at least two hits with largest bombs. If vessel still afloat to be sunk by big guns of battle fleet.
Notes: Naval air forces under command of Capt. A. W. Johnson, commanding Atlantic fleet air forces, flag on U. S. S. Shawmut. Army air force under command of Brigadier General W. Mitchell, director of training and operations army aviation. Shore base operations under command of Capt. S. H. R. Doyle, base commander, Hampton Roads, Va. General supervision of bombing experiments in charge of Admiral H. B. Wilson, commander-in-chief, U. S. Atlantic fleet. U. S. S. Shawmut take station center of scouting area for Iowa experiment and a target in other tests.—The Aerial Age Weekly, June 6, 1921.
Bombing the Radio-Controlled "Iowa."—Among the bombing tests to be conducted jointly by the army and navy air forces the latter part of June and the first part of July, the most spectacular and interesting from the public viewpoint will be the search problem and accuracy of bombing test on the radio controlled Iowa, scheduled for June 28.
In one respect war conditions will be accurately simulated in this problem, for the old Iowa, under the control of a distant ship, will maneuver as an enemy ship, just as though she had a crew aboard, except that her speed will be somewhat reduced. Starting at a point somewhere between 50 and 100 miles at sea off the Virginia Capes, the Iowa will steam toward shore, while the planes from shore, starting at the same hour, will fly out to locate her. When this is accomplished, the bombing with dummy bombs will begin.
For this operation the army will use only the seven seaplanes it obtained from the navy and four airships, all of its land planes having been withdrawn from this test. The navy will have four of the NC type of flying boats and 12 P-5-Ls in the search problem and four Martin bombers, land planes, aiding in the accuracy of bombing tests. The navy dirigible probably will take part in the search problem.
In order to use the larva for a moving target, she has been fitted out with special apparatus that will enable her to be controlled by wireless from a ship at a distance. Some extensive changes in the Iowa's power plant were necessary, as the propelling machinery must be capable of running for a considerable time without attention. The boilers were changed to burn fuel oil instead of coal and automatic devices for feeding the fuel to the burners and supplying water to the boiler were provided.
The apparatus for controlling the ship consists of a standard radio transmitter aboard the controlling ship, a receiving aerial on the Iowa with special radio receivers, amplifiers, relays, etc., for converting the radio signals into a form such that they will operate the electrical devices which control the steering gear and the throttle of the main engines.
The officers in charge of sending out the radio signals from the control ship has absolute control of the starting of the Iowa, steering her in any direction and stopping her when desired. The various operations which take place are as follows:
When everything on board the Iowa is ready, the main engines are started up and are left running very slowly. The ship is then abandoned and the officer aboard the controlling ship has control of the Iowa. The first radio signal sent out is intercepted by the aerial on the Iowa and is received by the radio receiver located well below deck.
This signal is then amplified by means of special vacuum tube amplifiers and is made to operate a very sensitive relay or switch, which in turn operates a larger relay. This large relay closes an electrical circuit which operates an electrically controlled pneumatic valve. When this valve opens, it admits compressed air to the throttle control of the main engines, which causes the throttle to open and bring the ship up to full speed.
The above mentioned relay also operates a device called a commutator, which is a special switch having control of the steering mechanism.
The steering gear consists of a standard steam engine driven rudder gear, the throttle valve of the engine being geared to a small electric motor. The commutator is connected to the control panel of this motor and is thus able to operate the electric motor, which in turn causes the steam engine to drive the rudder to either starboard or port as desired.
A very novel feature of this installation is the automatic steering, which is made possible with the aid of a gyro-compass. The compass is electrically connected to the control panel of the electric motor on the steering gear, so that the ship can be made to hold any course, the gyro-compass immediately operates the steering gear to return the ship to her course. The officer sending the control signals can steer the Iowa to either starboard or port or may put the gyro-compass in control and hold a steady course.
The commutator might be considered the mechanical brains of the Iowa, it receives the radio signals and interprets them, passing them on directly to the electric motor controlling the steering engine, if the order is either starboard or port, or giving the gyro-compass control, if that is the order.
If the officer in control desires to stop the Iowa, he sends a long signal of about ten seconds duration. This operates a special relay which opens the circuit on an electrically controlled pneumatic valve, which shuts off the various fuel oil and feed water pumps, thus shutting down the power plant and stopping the ship.
A special safety device is provided in the form of a time clock, which automatically shuts everything down in case the radio receiving apparatus should become inoperative, or in case no control signals were received after a certain lapse of time.
The radio receiving instruments and amplifiers are navy type instruments. The special relays for converting the radio signal to a form which can be made to control the electrical devices were furnished by John Hays Hammond, Jr. The electrically operated pneumatic valves and their controlling relays for controlling the throttle valves of the main engines, the automatic time clock, the commutator, and the electrical control for the steering gear (with the exception of the gyro-compass itself) were furnished by the General Electric Company.—The Aerial Age Weekly, June 6, 1921.
AERIAL CO-OPERATION WITH THE NAVY
BY SQUADRON LEADER C. H. K. EDMONDS, D. S. C, 0. B. E., ROYAL AIR FORCE
Contents
Introduction
Chapter I.—"Co-operation with the Fleet in the North Sea."—Evolution of the Aeroplane Carrier.—Grand Fleet's Aircraft.—German Aircraft in the North Sea.—Narrative of events in the North Sea: Some Observations and Criticisms.
Chapter II.—"Commerce Protection and Prevention of Enemy s Commerce."—The Blockade.—Anti-submarine Warfare: General Description.—First Phase: October, 1914, to December, 1916.—Second Phase: December, 1916, to March, 1917.—Third Phase: March, 1917, to Midsummer, 1917.—Airships for Convoy Work.—Large Flying-boats for Convoy Work.—Seaplanes, Aeroplanes and Kite Balloons for Convoy Work- Fourth Phase: Midsummer, 1917, to Autumn, 1918.—Last Phase, and General Considerations.
Chapter III.—"Support of Military Expeditions Overseas."—Dunkirk, Dardanelles, etc.—Value of the Fast Seaplane Carrier.—Future Combined Operations by Navy, Army and Air Force.
Chapter IV.—"The Possible Future of the Various Types of Aircraft." Limitations of Machines Heavier-than-air and Lighter-than-air.—Probable Requirements in a Future War Against a First-class Naval Power.—Aircraft in Fighting Ships.—Aircraft in Carriers.—Aircraft from Shore Bases.—Conclusion.
Charts.—North Sea.
Introduction
The object of a nation at war is to stop the enemy's national life, and the strategic plan which either belligerent follows to achieve this end may be divided into three classes, viz., naval strategy, military strategy, and independent air strategy.
When aircraft are employed for reconnaissance over the sea and in co-operation with the navy the objectives must be the same as those which are the aims of the naval strategy, hence the use of aircraft against any other objectives comes under the heading of independent air strategy, or possibly military strategy, and is outside the scope of this paper.
Now the object of naval strategy is the control of maritime communications, and the destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet is the principal means to this end. The subject may be conveniently considered under the three following headings:
- The Battle Fleet.
- Commerce protection and prevention of the enemy's commerce.
- Support of military expeditions overseas.
In Chapters I, II, and III the use of aircraft in the late war in cooperation with the navy under the above three headings will be examined and some criticisms offered. In Chapter IV the limiting factors of various types of aircraft will be considered in conjunction with the probable requirements of future naval warfare. From this a forecast will be made of "the possible future of the various types of aircraft in a war against a first-class naval power."
Whenever "The War" is mentioned the late world conflict is meant. And the phrase "the future," unless specially stated, refers to the next ten years, for the author considers that the progress of aeronautics may be so rapid as to render impracticable conjectures beyond that period. No attempt has been made to discuss the work of aeroplanes and kite balloons in any detail, as they are not included in the "Definition of Subject" given in A. M. W. O. 915 of the 14th August, 1919.
Chapter I
CO-OPERATION WITH THE FLEET IN THE NORTH SEA
Evolution of the Aeroplane Carrier.—On the outbreak of war very little was known of working aircraft from ships, therefore the solution of the problem of how to provide aircraft for the fleet at sea was at once energetically sought.
Two classes of seaplane carrier were tried: a large ship with considerable stowage space for machines and considerable radius of action, and smaller ships with correspondingly less radius and stowage. In the former class was the old Cunarder, the Campania, for use with the Grand Fleet; and in the latter class were the Engadine, Riviera and Empress, all three cross-Channel packets.
By December the three last-named ships had joined the Harwich Force, and on Christmas Day 1914, a successful air raid on Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven was made by the seaplanes from them. This popularized such operations. The three existing carriers were fitted with improved accommodation for seaplanes, and others of a similar class were taken up.
When the refitted ships rejoined the Harwich Force, however, attempts to make similar raids led to repeated failures and disappointments. It was found that the North Sea in average weather was too rough to permit of seaplanes being hoisted out and in. Also surprise was practically impossible because the flotilla on passage to the German coast was almost invariably observed by Zeppelins, which the low performance seaplanes were quite incapable of bringing down. The seaplane carriers, too, had only a speed of about 19 knots, consequently it was very risky to keep them near the enemy's coast once they had been observed. Therefore, the policy of raiding the enemy's naval bases continuously was abandoned, and no more than sporadic attacks were afterwards attempted.
H. M. S. Campania joined the Grand Fleet in the summer of 1915. Experience with her, confirming that gained with the Harwich Force, was that the use of aeroplanes from ships at sea was impracticable, that an aircraft carrier must have a speed at least equal to that of the ships with which she works, and that there was a need for both the large and the small class of carrier. Further, this experience enabled the commander-in-chief to lay down his- aerial requirements for the fleet at sea as follows:—
- To prevent reconnaissance by Zeppelins.
- To reconnoitre the enemy's fleet.
- To spot for gunfire after the battle was joined.
Accordingly the pre-war experiments in flying seaplanes with wheels, or aeroplanes, off the deck of a ship steaming at high speed into the wind were pressed on, and the results were good. In the meantime the possibility of an aeroplane alighting on the deck of a ship under way became recognized, which obviated the necessity of stopping to hoist-in after a flight, with the consequent risk from submarines. The construction of H.M.S. Argus, with a special alighting deck, began in 1916. In the autumn of 1917 successful trials of landing an aeroplane on H. M. S. Furious were carried out, also the practicability of flying an aeroplane off a turret had been proved; and from this date onwards aeroplanes were carried on ships in lieu of seaplanes.
Grand Fleet’s Aircraft.—At the time of the Armistice a comprehensive programme for Grand fleet aircraft was nearly completed. There were two large aeroplane carriers (Furious and Argus) and one small one (Vindictive), whilst two more large ones were under construction. Argus had torpedo machines, the other carriers reconnaissance machines.
In each light cruiser, except when prevented by questions of stability, a single-seater fighter was carried, whose primary role was the attack of Zeppelins.
Each battleship, or battle-cruiser, carried two aeroplanes. These were either single-seater fighters or two-seaters, so distributed that each squadron of ships had its own planes for spotting or reconnaissance, and fighters to protect them.
This use of aeroplanes for overseas flying was necessary, because no seaplane existed which had the necessary performance to permit of flying off platforms, or of landing on a deck, or to bring down a Zeppelin. Nevertheless, there were certain unavoidable drawbacks. Even with airbags and hydro-vanes on the chassis, the strain on the pilots and observers and the wastage of machines was greater than if seaplanes could be used. Also, to keep the personnel in practice, there must be aerodromes, lighters for landing and embarking machines, etc., at each fleet base In the war these drawbacks were not prohibitive, because as the oversea flying was only occasional the strain on the personnel was never very great, neither was the wastage excessive, as the aerodromes and shore organization could be easily provided. In peace, however, or in a war where the fleet was more at sea, the same methods might not work. This matter will be dealt with further in Chapter IV.
Kite balloons were carried in a proportion of the cruisers, T.B.D.'s and battleships, being used respectively for reconnaissance, anti-submarine work, and control of gunfire. Considering that a great division of opinion existed as to the value or otherwise of the balloons, and that shortage of either men or material, or both, was always a difficulty throughout the war, the author considers that once the aeroplane programme was accepted the kite balloons should have been given up, except in a few destroyers for anti-submarine work. Airships of sufficient performance to meet the fleet's requirements were not available during the war.
German Aircraft in the North Sea.—Having reviewed the development of aircraft with the Grand Fleet, it is appropriate to consider the enemy's naval aerial resources, before passing on to a more detailed examination of their employment. Unlike ourselves, the Germans started the war with an efficient service of large rigid airships, whose primary role was the patrol of the south-east corner of the North Sea. They were based on Tondern, Altona and Cuxhaven, and it is no exaggeration to say that in the region of their patrols they held the supremacy of the air. Hence, the German fleet when at sea in good weather always enjoyed aerial cooperation, the movements of any ships were ready always screened by airships, whose great radius of action, speed range, and long endurance rendered them capable of this work.
The airship patrols were supplemented by seaplanes from Sylt, Heligoland, a station near Cuxhaven, and Borkum. Flying-boats were not used, but the German float-seaplanes were much superior to our own. They had no aircraft carriers, neither were aircraft carried aboard warships. Presumably the enemy relied on his large airships to fulfill the requirements of the fleet at sea.
Narrative of Events in the North Sea, with some observations and criticisms.—A brief review will now be made of the work of the Grand Fleet and Harwich Force, in order that the work of aircraft co-operating with them may be examined. Generally speaking, the guiding policy for our fleet was to keep the majority of ships in harbor, and to carry out continual sweeps of varying strength with the remainder. Early in the war, as already mentioned, there were no aircraft to co-operate in these sweeps, which extended far beyond the range of our aircraft working from shore bases. The direct result was that the enemy's Zeppelins, being entirely unopposed, were in a position to warn their outlying small craft; if the sweeping force was small it ran the risk of interception by a superior force suitably guided by information from the air; if the sweeping force was strong this fact was reported, and the enemy was not to be enticed out. In any case the sweeps were far less effective and much more risky than if aircraft had been available.
The only offensive operations made by the enemy's ships were three similar sweeps, during which towns on our East coast were bombarded. On only one of these occasions were we able to intercept the raiders by our surface ships and submarines. Had there existed on our side a more extensive system of air patrols, airships at long range, and seaplanes and aeroplanes closer inshore it seems that our fleet would certainly have had a much better chance.
It was in January, 1915, that our battle cruisers intercepted the enemy's, who were probably embarking on one of these sweeps. The running fight of the Dogger Bank took place, in which two enemy battle cruisers were sunk and one seriously damaged before they could escape behind their minefields. This gives an excellent example of an opportunity for torpedo-carrying aircraft, had they been available. One hit on each ship with even a 14-inch torpedo would probably have so reduced the squadron's speed that all would have been overtaken and sunk.
In May, 1916, the Battle of Jutland took place. As is well known, before a superiority could be brought to bear, the German fleet turned away under cover of a smoke screen and a failing light, and escaped a decisive defeat. On neither side were aircraft available in any numbers, yet the action is of interest by reason of the work which the few aircraft did, and more especially by reason of the proof it provides of the imperative necessity for air work in a fleet action.
The seaplanes in H. M. S. Engadine were the only aircraft available for the British. One of these sent by wireless an accurate report of part of the German fleet before the action commenced—information which light cruisers could only have obtained after considerable fighting. The author believes, but does not know definitely, that during the battle the German airships patrolled to the southward of the High Sea fleet, watching its line of retreat. On the morning following the battle they did valuable work in reporting our fleet's position.
Two points are made strikingly evident by the official despatches and Lord Jellicoe's book, "The Grand Fleet." The first point is the uncertainty in the C.-in-C.'s mind as to the position of the enemy, after receiving a few reports from the battle cruisers; in other words, insufficient reconnaissance. The second point is that until about twenty minutes after the enemy had turned away, the C.-in-C. was unaware that they had done so, and to this their escape seems largely due. Again, insufficient reconnaissance. Any aircraft flying above the mist and the smoke might well have reported the turn immediately it was made.
After the Battle of Jutland the enemy abandoned any idea of an active policy for his Hight Sea Fleet, and concentrated on the submarine campaign. Accordingly, we greatly extended the Heligoland Bight minefields, and in connection with the mining, long reconnaissance flights from Killingholme, Yarmouth, and Felixstowe were made as often as possible by flying-boats. The chief object of these flights was to ascertain if and where the Germans were sweeping. At the end of the war the F.2A.'s were capable of patrols measuring 400 miles on the chart, but this only took the reconnaissance about half-way across the Bight, and the need for longer range aircraft became increasingly evident. This was emphasized during the last few weeks when a final sortie by the High Sea Fleet was confidently expected.
An interesting point in connection with these long reconnaissances was the difficulty of accurate navigation over the sea, and the need for developments in this direction. Obviously the more accurate the position of minesweepers reported, the more valuable the report.
Whenever the flying-boats were near Borkum, considerable fighting occurred with the German seaplanes. This led to development in flying the boats in strong formation, and of defensive armament and control of fire in the boats, which eventually enabled them to hold their own.
But to send a strong formation for each reconnaissance was most uneconomical, thus showing the need of a moderately maneuverable seaplane of high performance, which, though not intended for offensive fighting, could look after itself if attacked (a). These machines would have undertaken the work near Borkum, and the flying-boats would have undertaken the longer range work, the latter of necessity avoiding areas where opposition was likely to be very heavy. Such a machine, Fairey with a Rolls-Royce engine, was produced just before the armistice. There was much controversy on this subject, one school of opinion declaring that aeroplanes could do the work. It is, however, significant that those actually employed on continuous long-distance overseas flights (frequently over minefields) were emphatic that seaplanes or flying-boats, providing, as they do, more chance of safety in case of engine failure, are essential. Where the flights were less frequent and the strain consequently less, as in the Grand Fleet, the use of aeroplanes was satisfactory.
Whilst the large flying-boats, sometimes extending their radius by the use of lighters, confined their activities to the southern part of the "prohibitive area," a number of reconnaissances over the northern part, and a raid against Tondern, were made by aeroplanes from the Furious. The aeroplanes in light cruisers also, from, time to time, had chances of attacking Zeppelins. In these operations it became evident that although the large airship falls an easy prey to an aeroplane that brings it to action, yet the action is often most difficult to bring about, because the airship can generally make a reconnaissance without coming very close, and if pursued can often escape in clouds of fog. Critics of the airship are much too prone to make capital out of the number of German airships destroyed over, the North Sea (actually only six!), whilst forgetting the countless occasions on which they did valuable work without molestation.
The reconnaissances made latterly by machines from the Furious had an excellent effect on the morale of the Fleet's flying personnel, and in the Tondern raid gave a fine return in material damage done, but unfortunately the extent to which the minefields had now increased, put most objectives out of range. It is interesting to examine the good results which would probably have followed if more aeroplane carriers had been sanctioned along with the Argus in 1916, whereas actually it was nearly a year later that Furious, Vindictive, etc., were sanctioned, and at a time when there was very little more data than in 1916 regarding the capabilities of aeroplane flying off and on to ships, and when the pressure on the shipyards had increased. Had more carriers been available earlier, before the great expansion of the minefields in 1917, continuous air raids on a small scale could have been made. Their object would have been to keep the enemy occupied, to collect information, and to keep up an offensive. If the development of the torpedo aeroplane, whose possibilities were proved at the Dardanelles in 1915, had received the attention it deserved, these machines would have played an important part in such raids, which might have been developed into the landing of raiding parties on the Frisian Islands, etc. Actually, however, the enemy enjoyed complete immunity from attack on his seaboard, he was thus able to decrease his defensive measures to a minimum, and concentrate on the offensive submarine campaign. Perhaps also the earlier provision of more fast carriers would have enabled the enemy's air patrol to have been neutralized. Efforts were made in this direction with the Vindex and Manxman in the Harwich Force, but their low speed and inferior carrying capacity prevented success.
The author considers that our inability to raid the German seaboard with ships and aircraft, and the fact that until the end of the war we lacked efficient aircraft with the Fleet, handicapped us and helped the enemy (whose airships provided the aerial co-operation which we lacked) to an extent not fully realized at the time. Had our fleet not been so handicapped the war might have been considerably shortened.
Chapter II
COMMERCE PROTECTION AND THE PREVENTION OF THE ENEMY'S COMMERCE
The Blockade.—To the stoppage of the seaboard commerce of the central powers, their collapse and our ultimate victory were largely due; Their stoppage was accomplished by means of the blockade, based on the right of search, which necessitated the examination of all ships entering or leaving the North Sea by the Dover Straits or round the North of Scotland.
A minefield across the Straits of Dover compelled merchantmen to enter the Downs, where examination took place, and rendered this part of the blockade comparatively simple. But the Northern Patrol was a much more difficult proposition, involving as it did the watching of a line of some six hundred miles, from Scotland to Iceland, and thence to Greenland, where the weather was of the worst and submarines were a constant menace to the patrolling ships. In June, 1918, the laying of a mine barrage from Scotland to the Norwegian coast was commenced. Primarily this was an anti-submarine measure, but it would also have helped the Northern patrol, by forcing merchantmen to use certain swept passages.
In conjunction with the plan for this barrage a considerable aircraft program was contemplated, which comprised the expansion of the existing seaplane stations in the Orkneys and Shetlands, the use of airships, and the allocation of aircraft carriers and kite balloons to the patrol. Actually the program was never undertaken, for it was realized that the long nights, the bad weather, and the great distances required to be flown rendered the work beyond the capabilities of contemporary aircraft. Had the conditions been easier there can be no doubt but that the effect of aircraft would have been great. For instance, they would have provided a most economical method of locating merchant ships and directing them to rendezvous where the searching craft would be. Again, they would have provided valuable protection for the patrol ships against submarines. In short, the great possibilities of the m.ore efficient aircraft of the future in connection with a maritime blockade were clearly shown.
The activities of the German cruisers, such as the Emden, and their raiders such as the Wolf, merely emphasize the difficulty from which surface ships suffer in searching and patrolling, by reason of their limited speed and vision, as compared to aircraft. This amplifies the remarks made above concerning the use of aircraft in a maritime blockade. It is interesting to note that the Wolf used a seaplane, which is believed to have materially helped her.
Anti-Sub marine Warfare—General Description.—The German submarine campaign, and our anti-submarine war, can conveniently be considered in five phases. In October, 1914, the first submarine attack on an allied merchant ship was made; later the enemy announced that all shipping in a prescribed zone round the United Kingdom was liable to attack, and in January, 1915, the first merchant ship was sunk without warning. Meanwhile, our policy had been one of attacking submarines wherever they were reported, in so far as the very limited means available would allow. By December, 1916, however, the situation had become so serious that a special organization was established in the Admiralty to deal with it, and with its establishment the first phase ended.
The main feature of the second phase was that increased efforts were made to harass each submarine from the moment of leaving the base until her return. During this phase Germany declared her policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, which virtually brought the United States into the war.
The third phase commenced with the inauguration of the convoy system in the spring of 1917, previously to which the trade had been directed by "routeing" or by "suspended sailings." It was the convoy system which, above all other methods, did most to prevent the success of the German submarine campaign, and it was in connection with the convoy system, above all other anti-submarine operations, that aircraft proved of the greatest value.
In the summer of 1917 the policy of intensively mining the Heligoland Bight began to take effect, and the fourth phase may be said to have begun. Its characteristic was the great extension of mining in the North Sea and Dover Straits. The final phase was inaugurated by the enemy abandoning his attack on merchant ships, recalling his submarines, mine-laying off our Northern fleet bases, and apparently making all preparations for a large naval engagement.
The five phases referred to apply mainly to the waters round the United Kingdom. In the Mediterranean we followed the same methods, so far as resources allowed. The work of aircraft during these phases will now be examined.
First Phase: October, 19 14, to December, 1916.—During this period air stations grew up near every naval base at home and in the Mediterranean. Also a wing was sent to Flanders during the first weeks of the war, which later became based on Dunkirk. It is doubtful if aircraft contributed much towards such anti-submarine measures as were taken during this period, but experience was gained which helped greatly towards the aircraft being usefully employed when the inception of the anti-submarine division of the Admiralty led to the more vigorous measures of the later phases.
By the end of 1916 the force at Dunkirk had grown to a strength of about four wings, composed of fighters, bombers, reconnaissance and photographic machines, and seaplanes. These were used continuously over Zeebrugge and Ostend, and it was proved conclusively that seaplanes are so handicapped by the weight and head resistance of their floats, that they cannot be used where the opposition from anti-aircraft guns and hostile aircraft is very strong.
Second Phase: December, 1916, to March, 1917.—Immediately on the inception of the anti-submarine division there followed a great increase in all anti-submarine measures, and co-ordination of the methods of their employment.
At Dunkirk the R. N. A. S. was continually augmented, until at the time of transfer to the R. A. F. it consisted of a brigade. Up to the closing months of the war constant reconnaissance and bombing of the Flanders naval bases was done. This reconnaissance, which provided accurate data of the extent to which submarines used the Flanders ports, was of great value.
As regards the bombing in April, 1918, 17.5 tons of bombs were dropped, while in August this had been increased to 98.8 tons. From the evidence available it seems that the material damage done was slight, probably one submarine was destroyed in Zeebrugge docks, and in July, 1918, the lock gates at that place were probably burst. On the other hand, the enemy was forced to construct the most elaborate protection for the submarines, the constant alarms of raids must have retarded the refitting of the boats, and the effect on the crews necessitated their being sent into Germany for their leave. In addition to this, the enemy's very elaborate anti-aircraft organization must have absorbed great numbers of men and many aeroplanes, searchlights, etc., on purely defensive work.
The distinguished air officer who is best qualified to judge has estimated the relative value of the moral damage to the material damage done by the independent bombing force as twenty to one. It is probable that the effects of the Dunkirk bombers and the bombing of Cattaro were similar. Certain it is, however, that aircraft provided the only means of attacking submarines in their bases.
All this bombing was done by aeroplanes, and therefore falls outside the strict scope of this paper. Mention has been made of it, however, because it shows where the legitimate work of seaplanes ends and that of aeroplanes begins.
Third Phase: March, 1917, to Midsummer, 1917.—The feature of this phase was the substitution of the "convoy" system for the previous system of "routeing." In the latter, merchant ships had been instructed, as far as possible, to keep clear of dangerous areas. Also trade was ordered to pass through one of the four "cones of dispersion," of which the apexes were Falmouth, Innistrahull, and Kirkwall. It was thought that the submarines would operate in these areas where the trade converged, and that it would be possible to patrol them adequately with every means available, including aircraft. However, this proved to be bad policy, for the increasing range of the submarines so magnified the cones that the controlling craft were insufficient. This led to the introduction of convoys, by which system merchantmen were collected at certain ports, and then escorted to their destination. It will readily be seen that the new system presented great advantages over the old, especially for aircraft. Patrolling a large "cone of dispersion" for a periscope was indeed searching for a needle in a haystack, but convoying ensured that the flying was done where the submarine was most likely to be, and most likely to take risks.
To co-operate in the convoy system, air-stations were built up first of all in the Channel and on the East coast, and later were extended to the Mediterranean, Irish Channel and French coast. The U. S. A. took over the convoy work in Ireland, and the Canadians made stations in Newfoundland and at the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
The general organization was as follows: An air group was formed for each operational area. The headquarters of the group was in immediate touch with the S. N. O. and the local base intelligence office, and also in telephonic and wireless connection with the air stations or substations of the group. This provided the rapid means of communication which experience had shown as essential. As regards the equipment of such a group, this came to comprise airships, flying-boats, seaplanes, aeroplanes, and kite balloons. The functions of each of these in convoy work will now be examined.
Airships for Convoy Work.—The S.S. Airship, virtually a B.E. aeroplane stripped of its wings and suspended under a small envelope, was the first type to be used. Early in 1918 it was superseded by S. S. Z., which had greater speed, duration, bomb-carrying capacity, and facilities for observation.
The S. S. Z. was in turn being superseded by the twin S. S. This type, whilst giving an all-round increase in efficiency, had the great advantage of twin engines, and consequent greater safety in the case of engine failure or adverse winds. Further, to meet the demand for increased performance, larger non-rigids of the coastal and North Sea classes were produced but never in great numbers.
Except for the R-29, which helped in sinking the U-115, no rigids were completed in time to play much part in the anti-submarine war, but had the war gone on they would probably have done important work in escorting convoys far into the Atlantic, for which purpose large airship sheds were in course of erection in Ireland. As the submarines were gradually driven to work farther and farther from the coast, the problem of how to provide an escort when the convoy was out of range of the smaller types of surface craft and aircraft began to arise. The difficulties of flying aeroplanes from and back to a ship are so great that at present there is little chance of each convoy carrying its own aerial escort (except kite balloons), and for the future it seems that convoy work at a great distance from the coast will be the rigid airship's role.
The airship's greatest difficulty was that of providing adequate sheds. Finally, mooring out sites were selected for the smaller non-rigids, and this proved most satisfactory, the ships riding out gales of over 60 m.p.h. without damage.
Much criticism was leveled at the policy of employing airships. The great expenditure on the sheds was one argument, but this was largely met by mooring out. Another argument was based on the airships' inability to fly in strong winds, and although this was true in fact it was counteracted by the facility with which they flew by night or in foggy weather.
When escorting a convoy and a submarine is sighted, the airship on account of its low speed usually fails. to get over the submarine with bombs before the enemy dives. Hence it is clear that the principal value of the airstrip is that it locates the submarine and frightens it into diving, whereupon the submarine's speed is so reduced that probably it cannot get into position to attack.
The great variation of speed facilities for observation, signaling, and accurate bombing make airships excellent for convoy work, though on account of their vulnerability this must be confined to areas which hostile aircraft do not frequent.
Very careful statistics were kept at the Admiralty of man power, etc., used up by the various anti-submarine arms in relation to the results achieved. By these the employment of airships was fully justified. In the author's opinion the only criticism that can justly be leveled is against the pre-war policy which so neglected airships.
Large Flying-Boats for Convoy Work.—The large flying-boats very early proved their value, for they had the essential qualities lacking in smaller seaplanes, viz., excellent view, good bomb-carrying capacity, big radius of action, and reliable engines.
Compared to airships the boats could fly in much stronger winds provided they had calm water for the take off. With the convoy station-keeping was more difficult, but the high speed gave a better chance of bombing a submarine before it dived. They were also capable of escort work where hostile aircraft were met; for instance, the Dutch traffic from Felixstowe.
As regards disadvantages, the F-2A suffered from extreme heaviness on controls, which was, however, largely rectified in later types. The chief disadvantage was the great requirements in sheds and slipways; but as in the case of airships this was met by the expedient of mooring out. Although this was satisfactory in modern weather, the machines were always exposed to the risk of a gale when they would almost certainly "fly" at their moorings and stave in the hulls. To render the large flying-boats really reliable when they are away from main bases where extensive slipways and sheds exist, some means of enabling them to ride-out gales in a sheltered anchorage must be found. Possibly an adjustable trailing edge by which the plans could be set to give no lift would meet the case. The author considers that this question of mooring is of great importance, and demands immediate attention (d). Some improvement was effected by keeping machines moored on lighters, but this did not entirely meet the case in really heavy weather.
Seaplanes, Aeroplanes, and Kite Balloons for Convoy Work.—Several types of seaplanes, the Short, the Wright, the Sopwith Baby, etc., were used, and all suffered from the bad view ahead, inevitable in a single-engined tractor, and insufficient bomb capacity. These disabilities, together with the fact that the seaplanes were often prevented from rising by a choppy sea, and also the necessity for reducing the number of types in production, led to the gradual elimination of the seaplane, whose inshore work was taken over by aeroplanes.
In turn these aeroplanes suffered from the same disadvantages as the seaplanes, except in the case of the Blackburn Kangaroos, and in addition flying over the water, even with air-bags, imposed an extra strain on the personnel, and caused extra casualties.
This leads one to the logical conclusion that the type of heavier-than-air machine required for inshore anti-submarine work, say, up to about 30 miles to seaward, is a medium-sized amphibian with floats and detachable wheels, carrying at least one 500-lb. bomb and either a pusher or twin tractor (c). Normally the machine would work from an aerodrome, but, if necessary, the wheels could be dropped, and she could alight on the sea and be capable of taxiing or rising again.
Kite balloons were extensively used with convoys, for they provided the only possible aerial escort when out of flying range of the shore stations. As in the Grand Fleet there was much difference of opinion over their value, and finally the majority held the opinion that they did more harm in giving away the position of the convoy than they did good as look-outs or as "scarecrows."
Fourth Phase: Midsummer, 1917, to Autumn, 1918.—The feature of this phase was the great extension of mining and barrage work in the North Sea, the Dover Patrol, and the Straits of Otranto—the work of aircraft in this connection in the North Sea has already been described. At Dunkirk seaplanes were originally employed for this. Their value lay in their ability to observe any change in the positions of buoys or surface nets, to act as "scarecrows" and force the submarines to dive into minefields, and to help hunting flotillas. Later the use of seaplanes had to be abandoned because they were no match for the German fighter aeroplanes, and the overseas anti-submarine work was taken over by a squadron of D.H4's with Rolls-Royce engines.
At the Otranto barrage most of the flying consisted of hunting in cooperation with the surface craft. Kite-balloons unquestionably proved their value, for, used at the extremities of the barrage area, they forced the submarine to dive before entering the area. Generally speaking, experience on this barrage led to the same conclusions as at home.
Seaplanes were found preferable on account of the reduced risk from engine trouble, but a certain number of aeroplanes were essential for weather when seaplanes could not get off, and to provide machine to get away quickly in response to urgent calls. That aircraft are a necessary part of a mobile barrage is proved. However, it was also proved that a mobile barrage is an extravagant method of using aerial and other resources, for after the Armistice it was found that the Otranto barrage had accounted for only one submarine.
Last Phase: Autumn, 1918.—General Considerations.—Of this period little need be said. The enemy abandoned the attack on merchant ships, and concentrated on submarine mine-laying off our Scottish fleet bases. To meet this all available aircraft were moved to the East Coast of Scotland and England, and employed with hunting flotillas and on patrols.
Throughout all the anti-submarine operations there was a constant demand for increased size of bombs, more accurate bombing, and better fusing. The fusing question was the most difficult, and remained unsolved at the time of the Armistice. What was required was a variable fuse, which the observer could adjust to whatever depth he required.
Intercommunication between aircraft and ships was another vitally important question. Visual signaling by Aldis lamps was proved the best, wireless only being used for long ranges. Especially abroad, however, many patrol craft carried only indifferent signalers, and in these cases dropped messages in watertight containers proved a good expedient.
Frequently aircraft failed in their attacks because a submarine heard their approach without seeing them and dived. Experiments were made to try and find a means of silencing both engine and propeller, but they met with little success, and it is hoped that the research will be continued on this most important question.
The destruction of a submarine by aircraft alone proved most difficult. Officially aircraft are credited with only twelve, submarines, though the instances when they helped surface craft in successful hunts are numerous.
Undoubtedly the most effective role of aircraft in anti-submarine warfare was convoy work. This was proved by statistics in 1918, when of 7,000 convoys escorted by aircraft only six were attacked.
Chapter III
SUPPORT OF MILITARY EXPEDITIONS OVERSEAS
Dunkirk, Dardanelles, etc.—A considerable proportion of the anti-submarine work already described was in support of our numerous military expeditionary forces. However, in addition to this, certain other air work falls within the scope of this chapter, of which some of the flying on the Dover Patrol and that at the Dardanelles form the most important part.
The principal duty of aircraft, in this connection, on the Dover Patrol was to keep so close a watch on Zeebrugge, Ostend, and the eastern approaches to the Straits as to prevent the enemy's naval craft bringing off a raid in force against the cross-channel communications of the army in France. During the passage of the expeditionary force a seaplane patrol was maintained from Westgate to Ostend, and a mixed force of aeroplanes and seaplanes was sent to Belgium.
After the German occupation, however, the aircraft for the Dover Patrol were based on Dunkirk and Dover. It has already been stated that the great opposition necessitated the anti-submarine patrols and bombing being done by a squadron of D.H.4's with R.R. engines. Exactly the same conclusion was reached in the work of spotting for monitors, and reconnoitering (chiefly by photography) the enemy bases.
At the Dardanelles conditions were different. Enemy opposition was much less, calm water was nearly always available for the get-off, and hence throughout the operations seaplanes played an important part.
When the operations began in February, 1915, the only aircraft available on either side were seaplanes on H. M. S. Ark Royal, which were employed chiefly in locating the forts and entrenchments on the peninsula. Later, both sides were reinforced by aeroplanes, and in May H. M. S. Ben-my-Chree, a small seaplane-carrier of high speed arrived.
From this time onwards the presence of submarines necessitated Ark Royal (a ship of only eight knots) remaining in harbor. Her machines were chiefly employed in spotting for the monitors and blister ships against positions on the peninsula. This work they did most satisfactorily, their performance being quite sufficient against the limited numbers of enemy aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. Spotting for ships was gradually developed, and together with the experience gained at Dunkirk led to the following definite conclusions:
- The best intercommunication between plane and firing ship is by W. T. (but the wireless telephone gives great promise for the future).
- The clock system gives the best results.
- With these aids a ship at anchor can fire sufficiently accurately to take on counter-battery work.
- It is, however, risky to take on targets very close to our own troops ashore.
Value of the Fast Seaplane-Carrier.—The work of Ben-my-Chree exemplified the great value of a fast seaplane-carrier, used as a self-contained highly-mobile unit. Wherever aircraft were suddenly required, this ship was sent. In July, 1919, her machines were spotting for the monitor Roberts against the Asia batteries. During the second landing in August they assisted in a dummy landing, as a diversion, near Smyrna and later, in the same month, effectively used torpedo seaplanes in the Marmora and Dardanelles. When Bulgaria entered the war, Ben-my-Chree's machines reconnoitered most of the Bulgarian coast, and were used from the Island of Milo in demonstrations against Greece. Finally, when aerial reconnaissance of the approach to Egypt through Syria and Palestine (which were out of range of aeroplanes in Egypt) were urgently required in January, 1916, this ship was detached to the Egypt and East Indies stations. In each of these various operations it was found possible for seaplanes, judiciously employed, to compete with such moderate opposition as was found at first. The opposition invariably grew too strong later, but by this time the less mobile aeroplane units had had time to select their aerodromes, etc., and get to work. The simplicity of working seaplanes from a carrier, granted always the sine qua non of sheltered water, is very marked in comparison with the use of aeroplanes from an aeroplane-carrier, which must be both under way and head to wind.
Similar work was done by seaplanes in the operations on the coast of German East Africa, and also in the Red Sea, when in the spring of 1916 the Allied diplomatists were beginning to cast their flies over Mecca, and during the evacuation of North Russia in 1919. All of which proves not only the great value of the fast seaplane-carrier under certain circumstances, but also the value of the type of "fighter reconnaissance" seaplane already mentioned (see a, page 242).
Future "Combined Operations," by Navy, Army and Air Force.—Now an opposed landing on the enemy's territory (which may be termed a "combined operation'') or the defence of our own possessions against such expeditions, has been a very frequent employment for the fighting forces of the Empire throughout history, and would seem to be a probable task for them in the future. Moreover, it seems that the effect of aircraft on such operations will be great. Therefore, the subject may now be considered briefly in the light of war experience and of probable developments.
Let us examine the effect of aircraft on such an expedition in its various stages. The first point is that the selection of the base or advanced base will be largely governed by the range and characteristics of the defender's aircraft. Even if his aircraft were not very strong the base could hardly be as close to the actual point of landing as were Imbros and Mudros, or all secrecy would be lost.
If, however, the defender's air force was strong, and included large airships, to ensure secrecy during the preparations and embarkation of troops the base would need to be about 1000 miles from the point of landing.
The next point is the air work during the voyage from the base to the landing. This will comprise aerial escorts against hostile aircraft, surface craft, and submarines. The relative distance between the base or advanced base and point of landing must largely decide what types of aircraft are used for these duties, and whether they work from aircraft carriers for shore bases.
The effect of the defender's air patrols might be considerable. For instance, if it was intended for the expedition to approach the coast after dark, and land by night, a machine patrolling to seaward in the previous afternoon might discover the whole expedition, and to retain any chance of surprise the attacker's air force must shoot down that machine, not merely drive it off. Probably, too, the defenders would have coastal aeroplane patrols in the evening, which would prevent the expedition approaching to very near the coast before dark, and might be a considerable handicap at a season when nights were short.
The provision of the necessary flying for covering the landing, and immediately after, presents considerable difficulties for various reasons. First because the number of aircraft carriers would probably be limited, and there might be difficulties against keeping them under way or even anchored head to wind. Again, landing grounds ashore might be bad or even non-existent. These considerations might necessitate the use of seaplanes, providing another example of the value of seaplanes and their carrying-ship under certain circumstances. Further difficulties are imposed by the great variety of work required, such as spotting for naval or military guns, fighting, contact work, and naval or military reconnaissance.
The great vulnerability of the beaches to low-flying aircraft, and of the large numbers of anchored transports to attack by torpedo aeroplanes, must not be overlooked.
Generally speaking, the introduction of aircraft into "combined operations'' appears to favor the defender more than the attacker, as the latter's machines will probably have to work from ships, or extemporized bases, and whilst suffering from the inevitable disadvantages which such conditions impose, will have to carry out complicated, varied and difficult flying.
Chapter IV
THE POSSIBLE FUTURE OF THE VAKIOUS TYPES OF AIRCRAFT
A forecast of the future of the various types of aircraft can only be attempted after duly weighing the various governing factors of the problem. There appear to be three factors: First, the limitations of the various types; second, the probable requirements in another war against a first-class naval power; and finally, the teachings of the late war, many of which have already been dealt with in previous chapters. On the above lines the problem will now be considered.
Limitations of Machines Heavier-than-Air and Lighter-than-Air.—The way in which machines are likely to develop in the future appears to be determined by certain mechanical facts. If heavier-than-air be considered first, the farthest that an aeroplane or seaplane can fly in still air, taking a reasonable load of bombs, guns, etc., is, to-day, about 400 miles. Now this is not improved by increasing the size of the aeroplane, because in practice the bigger the aeroplane the greater is the structural weight compared to the useful load carried; and also because the spreading of weights over the structure, which seems necessary with increase of size, causes heavy stresses when alighting. Hence, in the future aeroplanes and seaplanes appear to be limited to flights of about 400 to 800 miles, and the average speed at which they fly is at present about no miles per hour. (Attention is drawn to the fact that, as explained in the Introduction, "the future," unless specially stated, refers to the next ten years.)
Improvements in the motor, in constructional methods, in propellers, will doubtless cause greater efficiency, but as these are likely to be gradual improvements and not fundamental changes, the limit suggested above seems reasonable.
With the airships the conditions are different. If the ship is increased in all its dimensions in the same proportion, the volume increases as the cube, and the surface as the square, therefore to drive it at the same speed requires relatively less power. This advantage is not all lost through the fact that the stresses on each circular sector increase with the diameter. Generally speaking, then, the bigger the airship the more efficient it is, and the limits which are met first are the size of the shed, or the difficulty of mooring out a really large ship. Notwithstanding these limits, the present-day airship is capable of carrying a reasonable fighting load a distance of about 1500 miles in still air at a speed of about 60 miles per hour. In the future then, the use of the airship is for flights beyond the limits of heavier-than-air machines, accomplished at a more moderate speed and with a bigger load.
The extreme vulnerability of the airship to attack by a high performance aeroplane is another limit. At present it precludes the use of airships from localities where enemy fighters are strong, and the writer considers that probably this will remain the case in the future. The question of defensively arming the big airships demands very careful investigation, also the question of airships fighting each other.
Probable Requirements in a Future War against a First-Class Naval Power.—Having defined the fundamental limits of the two main classes of aircraft it is appropriate next to consider whether the requirements of a future war against a first-class naval power are likely to differ from the late war.
A little reflection leads to the conclusion that we are most unlikely to find ourselves placed in so favorable a strategic position as in the late war, with the British Isles situated across the arteries of the sea communications of our enemy.
Again, in the late war the main bases of the opposing fleets were separated only by some 500 or 6co miles. Is this likely to occur again? On the contrary, it is far more probable that this distance will be greatly extended, and the key of the naval situation instead of being the control of the North Sea may be the control of a great ocean. Or it is possible that the enemy's fleet may be so distant that before naval operations on a large scale can begin, our fleet will have to move to bases situated nearer the enemy, whilst our trade and possessions within striking distance of the enemy's fleet are protected as much as possible in the meantime by local resources.
Another consideration is that the increasing use of aircraft in naval warfare will have the effect of forcing fleets to move at night or under water if they are to be unobserved, in the same manner as troop movements are nowadays made in darkness, or with great attention paid to concealment and camouflage.
What, then, are the inferences to be drawn from the difference between the probable requirements of the future and those of the late war? Obviously we cannot be content with ranges and performances which would have suited the North Sea. There must be no slackening of effort to produce aircraft with greater radius of action, greater speed, and greater all-round efficiency. Night flying and anti-submarine work must continue to be developed. Also the possibility of the Admiralty calling upon the independent air force to endeavor to secure aerial supremacy over a specified part of the ocean during any big fleet movement should be recognized. The possibility referred to above of distant possessions and maritime trade being protected by local resources pending the arrival of our fleet (which would probably take several months) opens up great possibilities for aircraft. Aircraft would be invaluable as part of these local resources—their use in defence against invasion has been emphasized in Chapter III.
The rapidity with which aeroplanes can get to Australia forms a striking contrast to the time it would take our fleet to reach the Pacific should its presence there be necessary. When once the Empire's air routes are developed, a powerful air force from some central position, such as Egypt, could be sent to any threatened possession long before the fleet could arrive.
If imagination is allowed to take us somewhat beyond the ten years by which the writer defines "the future" for the purpose of this paper, it is not difficult to visualize the Air Force undertaking some of the present functions of the fleet, transporting expeditions to enemy countries by air, arriving rapidly to reinforce beleaguered garrisons, or fighting a campaign against merchant shipping with large numbers of torpedo-carrying aircraft. Indeed, the imagination leads us into a veritable Abdullah's Cave of strategical possibilities. We are led, perhaps, out of the scope of this paper—co-operation with the navy—into the sphere of independent air strategy. But in an age when the rapidity of communications and transportation continues to increase, a contemporary speeding up of warfare is inevitable, and such possibilities for the more distant future must be recognized. By recognizing them we can ensure that aerial development in the immediate future, and the development of imperial strategy, progress along lines which will eventually enable air power to be a safeguard to the Empire.
To return, however, to the question under consideration. Another point which should be borne in mind before trying to predict the future uses of aircraft, is that in the late war machines designed for work with the army were produced in much greater numbers than those for the navy. Therefore, it was often good policy to adapt a primarily military machine to naval use, because only by reducing the number of types could sufficient production be maintained. But in the next war the opposite might be the case, and therefore in peace time the provision of makeshift machines for naval purposes should be avoided.
Subject to the various considerations enumerated in this Chapter, some prediction of the future of the various types of aircraft for sea reconnaissance and co-operation with the navy will now be attempted, and aircraft from ships at sea will be dealt with first.
Aircraft in Fighting Ships.—In a modern fleet the writer considers there should be special aircraft-carriers and also aircraft in certain fighting ships.
Each light cruiser should carry a machine, either a single-seater fighter or a two-seater reconnaissance machine, so allotted that there was one of each type in each pair of light cruisers. The role of the fighters would, of course, be keeping down all enemy machines. The reconnaissance machine was not part of our Grand Fleet program during the war, but as so much of a light cruiser's work is reconnaissance there can be little question that they would be most valuable, and it should be possible in the future to produce a suitable two-seater for this work. Wireless telephony will probably prove a most useful means of communicating with reconnaissance machines, and also with spotters.
As regards the battleships and battle cruisers. Each, it is thought, should carry at least one two-seater for spotting and at least one fighter. This would ensure that each squadron of ships had its own quota of spotting planes and fighters to protect them. Also it would avoid the complications and the anxiety to the flag officer commanding the squadron which there would be, if machines from a special aircraft carrier accompanying the squadron carried out these duties. In future it may be possible to produce a three-seater for spotting; if so, it would be a great advantage to have a gunner in addition to the pilot and observer. The author considers that spotting, and reporting enemy movements in a naval action is too difficult for the pilot alone to do, and this necessitates the passenger (if only one is carried) being primarily an observer.
Aircraft in Carriers.—Now as regards the aircraft carriers. It is impossible to lay down any definite proportion of these to the other classes of ships, since this must depend on the composition of the adversary's fleet and the nature of the battle it is expected to fight. But it is possible to predict the types of machines to be used from the carriers. These ships should work directly under the commander-in-chief (except, perhaps, one or two under the flag officer commanding the most advanced light cruisers or battle cruisers), and should be stationed within visual signaling distance of him, if possible. They should carry fighters to enable aerial supremacy to be obtained at any given time and over any particular area should the commander-in-chief wish it; also torpedo machines, bombers and reconnaissance machines, all working directly under the commander-in-chief. It is quite clear that this will necessitate there being a considerable number of aircraft carriers in a modern fleet, and that the number of carriers should be greater in proportion to the surface craft than was the case in the Grand Fleet in the late war.
Another use for the fighters will be low-flying attacks on ships, particularly destroyers whose personnel is so exposed. A determined low-flying attack on a flotilla by a squadron of fighters might easily prevent a destroyer attack being pressed home.
The carriers generally should be large ships, but a certain number of small ones (probably without landing-on decks) will be necessary for operations with light forces, like the Harwich force in the war. Apart from the value of carriers in a fleet action, they will be useful for minor offensive operations against objectives which are beyond the reach of aircraft from shore bases.
Then there is the question of whether the machines carried in fighting ships and in carriers should be aeroplanes, or seaplanes with wheels for flying-off and capable of being dropped. The author considers that if seaplanes can be produced to fulfill the necessary flying-off conditions from the fighting ships, and in addition the necessary alighting conditions in the carriers, and also have the required performance in the air, they should be used. Obviously the fighters must be aeroplanes, but in the future the spotting machines and perhaps those for reconnaissance might be seaplanes. With the seaplanes the strain on the personnel and the wastage would be much reduced. Also, wherever the fleet went in peace time the machines could make daily practice flights, weather permitting, irrespective of whether there was an aerodrome near by or not, and of whether the fleet was at sea or in harbor. There will also be special uses for seaplanes from seaplane-carriers, in combined operations and minor operations, as explained in Chapter III.
Aircraft from Shore Bases.—From shore bases the future of the airship is to work beyond the range of heavier-than-air machines, or in localities where hostile fighters are weak or neutralized. Fleet reconnaissance, patrols, anti-submarine work, bombing and reconnaissance of enemy ports, and perhaps mine-laying will all be part of the airship's duties under these conditions.
The same duties will be carried out at shorter ranges by heavier-than-air machines. Here, again, the question of seaplane or aeroplane arises, and the answer, the writer considers, is the same, viz., where the performance which is required permits, use a large flying-boat if a big machine is wanted, or a seaplane (fitted with wheels and flown off an aerodrome if sheltered water is not available) if a smaller machine is wanted. The writer considers that small flying-boats have no future, as experience has proved that they are so easily swamped.
But if the employment necessitates a very high performance an aeroplane must be used; for instance, the amphibian suggested (see c, page 248) would be suitable for anti-submarine work if there was little opposition, although for similar work or reconnaissance on a strongly-defended hostile coast, everything else should be sacrificed to performance, and an aeroplane used.
In addition to the duties enumerated, heavier-than-air machines would be most valuable for attacks against an attempted landing, as already explained. In such operations, and for attacks on ships in harbor the torpedo machine has a great future. These machines should be developed on two lines, the small handy machines (particularly suitable for work from ships) to attack at close range, and large machines for attack at longer ranges, requiring less maneuverability. For the latter work the flying-boat is believed to have already been found suitable. With the advent of the improved mooring-out capabilities suggested (see D, page 248), it is easy to visualize a squadron of torpedo-carrying flying-boats working like a destroyer flotilla of to-day.
In all aspects of overseas flying the difficulty and importance of accurate navigation is very great. Too much attention cannot be given to this question. At present directional wireless seems the most promising method.
Conclusion.—Finally, it is only necessary to add that whereas in the late war aircraft gradually became valuable in nearly every branch of naval warfare, study leads to the conclusion that in the next war against a first-class naval power the use of aircraft will be very greatly extended. Consequently, to a naval power which now develops aerial co-operation with the fleet, largely and on sound lines, aircraft are a vast accession of strength. But to a nation which fails to do this they are a most serious danger.—The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, May, 1921.
The Actual State of the Helicopter Problem.—The helicopter problem has again been brought to the general attention by a few attempts made in different countries to realize such flying apparatus. For this reason a few competent remarks on the actual state of this problem would be at present not without interest.
The helicopter is understood to be a flying apparatus where the lift is derived from rotating blade-screws.
A helicopter, in order to actually fly, must not only be able to lift itself but must also be fully stable and maneuverable, and in addition, must be able to safely reach the ground in case of the stoppage of the motor. A clear idea of how the helicopter will behave when free to move in space must first be gotten before the requirements of design can be met. I will give a short survey of these different sides of the question.
I. The Lifting Problem.—The present state of the blade-screw theory is such that it is not difficult to design and build helicopter screws that can secure a very high lift, and the difficulty in the realization of helicopters is not at all in this problem. In Fig. C is given a general picture of the thrusts per horsepower than can be secured by helicopter screws. This figure has been established for a first checking and must be considered as giving rather an underestimate of what can be really realized; which means that the data here furnished shows only the minimum of what can be expected from a helicopter-screw and by a careful design these performances can be easily exceeded. As abscissae, are plotted the helicopter screw diameters and as ordinate, the thrust per horsepower. The two systems of curves give the corresponding total horsepower and numbers of revolutions per second. For example, a helicopter-screw absorbing 10 h. p. and having 6 meters in diameter will be able to furnish 10 klg. Thrust per horsepower when turning 2 revolutions per second. This means that the total thrust would be 100 klg. for the 10 h.p. If for the same power the diameter of the helicopter-screw would be reduced to 4 ½ meters then at around 3 revolutions per second, such blade-screw would give us only 8 klg. per horsepower, that is, 80 klg. for the whole power. One can see how easily any power or size relation concerning helicopter-screws can be answered by this diagram and that helicopter-screws when properly designed can with ease furnish the thrust necessary to lift a helicopter with its power plant and pilot. The data used in the establishing of this diagram are of such reliability that they illustrate the relations which hold in the present case with great accuracy. I will mention here that several blade screws built and tested by the author have more than' justified the data here furnished.
A point of interest is, that it is easier to get a high lift per horsepower from a smaller power blade-screw than from a higher power one. The helicopter-screw must only make a number of revolutions appropriate to power and diameter selected in order to work in efficient conditions. The study and discussion of all such subjects as helicopter-screw efficiency and general method of the design will be found in the author's Blade-Screw Theory above mentioned. The general conclusion to be drawn is: With the knowledge actually available helicopter-screws securing the necessary lift can be built with ease. The foregoing diagram is here given to justify this opinion. It is only ignorant inventors who think the whole helicopter problem consists in the building of the lifting screws, although they usually do not even reach so far. It is necessary to bring attention to this state of this question. It must be remembered that the blade-screw problem is one of the most difficult problems of modern aerodynamics and no one can hope to familiarize himself with it in a few days. But those at the level of the present state of knowledge and experience on this subject know well that there is nothing to invent in order to build a helicopter-screw giving a high lift.
II. The Problem of the Descent When Motor is Stopped.—Insofar as is known to him, the author was the first to investigate the blade-screw problem in such generality as to discuss all the possible states of work of a blade-screw and among which the brake state is to be found. The situation stands thus: Different brake states are possible for a blade screw. Two of these brake states which I call the first and second brake state require that power is applied to the blade-screw in order to get the braking action. These brake states can thus not be used in the helicopter case. The third brake state is, exactly speaking, the turbine or wind mill case. Usually a wind mill is used as a generator. But, as well known, the wind mill when working produces an axis thrust which is usually balanced by proper bearings. But in the helicopter case, when the motor stops and the helicopter is obliged to descend it is possible to make its blade-screws work as wind mills and simply use the axial thrust thus produced to brake the descent of the helicopter. In order to reach this result it is only necessary to design the helicopter screws so as to secure a high braking action of the kind above explained and that a proper resistance be provided to be overcome by the helicopter screw when rotating as a wind mill. Under such conditions the same helicopter screws which secure the lift of the apparatus when the motor power is furnished to them, will secure the descent, when motor is stopped, working as wind mills, the power being absorbed by a special device. Thus one must not think that the helicopter will simply drop down if its motor stops, but its blade-screws are able to secure the descent if properly designed. For all qualitative relations referring to the braking action of blade-screws, the reader is referred to the author's "Blade-screw Theory," especially its Chapter II. The figures A and B of this chapter give a general picture of all the states of work possible for a blade-screw and the relation of the lifting state of work (marked 1 in figure B) to the wind mill braking state can easily be seen (marked 4 in figure B). In the question of slowing down of the descent of the helicopter, there is in principle nothing to invent but only to use properly the knowledge available.
I apologize for having to refer so much to my own investigations on the subject but I do not know of any other investigations which have treated especially this braking action of the blade-screws, with the necessary generality.
III. The Behavior of a Helicopter When Free to Move in Air.—I think it will not be without interest if I will explain a little in detail as to what will be the general behavior of a helicopter, when it has hopped off and is left free to move in the atmosphere.
I will first mention that it is quite a naive idea to imagine that the helicopter will rise and fall exactly vertically through the point of its start. The trouble is that most usually we have winds in the atmosphere and once a helicopter has hopped off, it will be immediately carried away by the wind in the same manner as a spherical balloon. If we would like to have the helicopter remaining nearly over the place of start, we must equip our apparatus with the means .of propulsion able to communicate to the helicopter a translational speed equal and opposite to the wind speed. It is only if the helicopter will be able to move against the wind with the speed of the wind that we will be able to keep an apparatus over the place from which we have started. We thus see that if we do not want the helicopter to be carried away by the wind we must secure its propulsion at the speed of the wind. The magnitude of the wind speed fixes the lower limit of the horizontal velocity that a helicopter must be able to develop. If we want the helicopter to be able to travel, as we certainly do, we must even secure for the apparatus the possibility of developing horizontal velocities greater than the usual wind velocities. This means that the helicopter in order to be really useful must be able to develop horizontal velocities of the same range as the actual aeroplanes. It is just on account of this fact that the following must be well understood. Lifting screws and propulsive screws are of a totally different nature. A screw giving a high efficiency as a lifting screw is of no good as a propulsor. On the contrary, a good propulsive screw is a very poor lifting screw. This brings us to the very important conclusion that a helicopter reasonably conceived must have for its propulsion a special separate propeller, and that the lifting screws must not be used for the propulsion. An additional fact in favor of the last is that if a lifting screw (whose axis is vertical) is moved in a horizontal plane, and thus will have to work in a relative horizontal wind sweeping the plane off its rotation, the lifting ability of a helicopter-screw is not decreased but, on the contrary, some experiments have even shown that there is a tendency to the increase of the thrust. Thus the propulsion of the helicopter will not unfavorably effect the work of the lifting screws. But the helicopter screws as such are unable to secure an efficient propulsion. It is thus clear that a helicopter must have a special propulsive-screw or propeller in order to secure its propulsion with a good efficiency. This question of an efficient propulsion is even of first importance because the power demanded by a helicopter will be—for the first helicopter at least—somewhat bigger than the power absorbed by an aeroplane of the same carrying capacity and same speed of travel and thus no waste of power can be tolerated. We have thus reached the fundamental conclusion that a helicopter rationally conceived must, in addition to its lifting-screws with vertical axis, have also at least one special propulsive-screw or propeller with a horizontal axis. Concerning the lifting screws there must be at least two of them in order to balance the two reactive torques. All proposed types of fins for the balance of the reactive torque of a helicopter-screw are rather unhappy propositions which complicate the question without satisfactorily resolving the problem. Thus only the propulsed helicopter will really be able to hover over its starting point and be able to land, in the usual case of winds, with a small ground speed.
Let us imagine now that on a perfect, still, windless day a helicopter has just hopped off and its propulsive screw is at a standstill. What will be its general behavior? It is easy to realize that it is impossible to expect that the lifting-screw will give a thrust directed exactly along the vertical. Ideal conditions exist only in the imaginations of men. In addition, the slightest disturbance, a slight wind gust, etc., will incline the helicopter. If the thrust furnished by helicopter-screws will be admitted as not perfectly vertical, this thrust with the helicopter weight, which is always exactly vertical, will give rise to a resultant side force, which will produce a side slipping of the helicopter. The idea to have well in mind is that a helicopter as soon as it has hopped off will show a tendency to side slipping and this side slipping will be quite a natural phenomenon. Thus the first quality a helicopter must have is to be built in such a way that the pilot may have control of this side slipping, that is to be able to check it when it starts and to be able to provoke it when necessary. The fact is that by the aid of this side slipping a certain translational motion of the helicopter may be secured. The pilot may rise to a certain height, then side slip, then rise again, then side slip again and so on, because during the side slipping a loss of altitude will usually occur.
We can now see the kinds of evolutions that the helicopter may perform. The helicopter may rise vertically or descend, during which rising and descending, side slipping can occur. The helicopter can also have a translational motion produced by its propulsive screw when working simultaneously to the lifting screws. It is during all these evolutions that the complete stability and maneuverability of the helicopter has to be secured. And it is just this stability and maneuverability of the helicopter that has to be the more thoroughly thought through. It is clear that this stability and maneuverability cannot be secured by rudders such as in the case of the aeroplane, because during the lifting or descending the relative winds will be very weak, if any, and the rudders will not act. Thus, for the stability and maneuverability of the helicopter special devices must be provided. A detailed investigation of this question has brought the author of this note to the conclusion that such stability and maneuverability of the helicopter can be fully secured by very simple means based on the knowledge of the properties of blade-screws. In principle the stability of the helicopter is the more closely connected with the aeroplane stability and a good knowledge of the last is the first step for the understanding of the helicopter stability. The author's investigation of the aeroplane stability, published in Paris in 1911, can be with much profit consulted on this last subject. Aeroplane and helicopter stability have this in common, both are vehicles free to move in space, which is not the case for ships and automobiles that move in one plane. Aeroplane and helicopter stability are especially similar when the helicopter has a translational velocity.
IV. Practical Importance of the Helicopter.—It must not be thought that the helicopter presents an interest only as a pure and simple scientific curiosity. On the contrary, the helicopters will find many very important applications.
First of all, the helicopters will, with great advantage, replace observation balloons because they will be a much less visible target and, in addition, the great trouble of carrying the balloons filling gas is wholly avoided.
Afterwards, in many instances, the helicopter will, with great advantage, replace aeroplanes. A properly propulsed helicopter being able to fly quickly in the same manner as an aeroplane can in addition perform other very important evolutions. Thus the helicopter will have a speed range from zero up to its maximum which is out of reach for the aeroplane. From this last fact there follows for the helicopter such a big set of applications which the aeroplane is unable to fulfill, that it is rather impossible to enumerate them all. The reader will with ease be able to find such applications.
The realization of the helicopter must thus be considered a very important step in the progress of aeronautics.
I hope this short survey will give a general idea as to how the helicopter problem stands. Actually we have all the necessary knowledge on hand in order to build a helicopter, and such an apparatus can be built, even with small expense, in a rather short time. Even no preliminary tests are necessary so clear are all the relations that hold in this case. If the helicopter has not been realized until the present, it is only because those who have the facilities and possibilities to do it are usually ignorant on the subject. The usual helicopter inventor thinks that the entire problem is in securing the necessary lift. He concentrates all his attention on the last and because he is totally ignorant about blade-screws, is unable to even reach so far. If the building of helicopters would have been left to men of knowledge on the subject, it would have been long since realized.—The Aerial Age Weekly, May 23, 1921.
MISCELLANEOUS
Dutch Oil, Lubricant and Irritant.—Oil has a persistent way of "seeping into political discussion, as witness the cases of Mexico, Colombia, and Mesopotamia," remarks the Rochester Times-Union, as it views the international fight for control of the world's oil resources. Far-off Sumatra is now brought into diplomatic discussion through the State Department's protest to the Dutch Government against the exclusion of American oil interests from Sumatra and other Dutch East Indian islands. The note, says the Washington correspondent of the New York Times, "is merely another step in the vigorous prosecution of a very definite and fixed policy of the Harding Administration in opposition to the monopolization of the oil resources of the world by any foreign interests in any manner that involves discrimination against American capital or peril to valid American interests." The keen international rivalry which now exists, points out the Rochester Post-Express, "is not a struggle merely for the money profits in oil production, but a battle for world trade, commercial supremacy, naval dominance, and the control of the air, for control of a great part of the world's supply of oil could bring these things." Besides, as the Chicago Tribune points out, "the owners of some seven and a half million motor-vehicles in the United States are keenly interested in the future supply of oil and gasoline."
Secretary of State Hughes reminds the Dutch Government that "Dutch capital has had free access to American oil deposits," and a similar privilege for American interests in the Djambi fields of the Dutch East Indies is demanded. His note, which the American Minister handed to the Dutch Government, says in part:
"I have pointed out that the United States has for years carried a burden of supplying a large part of the petroleum consumed by other countries, and that the petroleum resources of no other country have been so heavily drawn upon to meet foreign needs as the petroleum resources of the United States. I have pointed out that in the future ample supplies of petroleum have become indispensable to the life and prosperity of my country as a whole, because of the fact that the United States is an industrial nation in which distance renders transportation difficult, and agriculture depends largely on labor-saving devices using petroleum products.
"In these circumstances, my government finds no alternative other than the adoption of the principle of equally good opportunity, with the proviso that no foreign capital may operate in public lands unless its government accords similar or like privileges to American citizens; and, furthermore, I have submitted that in the light of the future needs of the United States such very limited and purely defensive provisions as the above might become inadequate should the principle of equality of opportunity not be recognized in foreign countries."
Thus the note makes it clear that "if American capital does not receive equality of opportunity with other foreign capital in the development of the oil resources in various parts of the world, there will be vigorous reprisals on the part of the United States," is the way another writer puts it. "It is not the function of the government to become the partner of any interests searching for oil concessions, but it is the government's proper function to insist on the 'open door' in lands controlled by foreign governments," maintains the Brooklyn Eagle, and the Columbia (S. C.) Record agrees that "it is hight time that the United States Government put its weight and influence behind American oil companies, for oil is rapidly replacing coal as a fuel for ships."
It was the Netherlands lower house that denied to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey the right to obtain concessions; the upper house has yet to act. The vote, in the opinion of the Washington Herald, "represents a victory for the Anglo-Dutch concerns…in which a number of ex-ministers and former members of the (Dutch) Chamber are interested." Not only are principal Dutch oil companies "partly British, but they are British-government-owned, which makes the matter all the more serious from the political as well as the economic standpoint," asserts the Denver Rocky Mountain News. "British political interests find it convenient now and again to put forward a Dutch organization instead of a purely British one," significantly adds this paper, and it goes on:
"The British Government is in the oil business directly and indirectly. The government is shareholder in several of the giant oil-producing corporations. Besides, the government is spending many millions securing and policing oil territories in the ear East. Indian and British armies are employed for the purpose."
"The Dutch Government apparently has played fast and loose with our Minister, and it should now clear up its ambiguous attitude toward the admission of American capital and also refute, if possible, the charge of admitting British capital secretly to the development," declares the Mobile Register. "The note makes it clear that the United States demands nothing which it is not willing to grant to any other country," we are reminded by the Chicago Daily News; but "Holland and Great Britain appear to have arranged an oil alliance, and it is against this discrimination that the Hughes note protests," explains the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. As we read in the New York Herald:
"What the Dutch and English governments have neglected to say, but what is really at the bottom of the oil controversy, is that England has, in the words of one of her own financial authorities, 'got her claws on the future oil supply of the world and she intends to keep them there.' It is not the present supply or distribution of petroleum about which England is concerned, but a monopoly of the future supply and distribution after the oil resources of the United States, so heavily drawn upon to-day, shall have been exhausted. Then American companies will be out of the running and American industries, automobiles, airplanes, and merchant and naval ships will obtain their supplies of oil at a price and in a quantity to suit the convenience of foreign producers in a virtual monopoly."
In reply to the charges of discrimination, which it denies, the Dutch Government tells us that when competition for the oilfields in the East Indies was free to all companies several years ago, American oil concerns displayed no interest whatever.
Moreover, we are reminded in the New York Journal of Commerce of some of our own sins:
"Our shipping policy is discriminating, and our immigration limitations as well as various less familiar elements in the Federal policy all run counter to the ideals of internationalism which seem to lie at the root of the note to Holland. We can not be international where American foreign trade is concerned and national where the foreign trade of other countries is at stake. It will require the exercise of very great diplomatic ingenuity to present our case in such a way as to offset this outstanding fact in the situation."—The Literary Digest, May 21, 1921.