FROM JANUARY 1 TO FEBRUARY 1
PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
Opening of Conference.—The evident purpose of the United States Government in preparing for the Sixth Pan-American Conference at Havana was to make every effort to avoid friction or domination and to secure the good will of the Latin American States. A strong delegation was sent, including former Secretary of State Hughes as chairman, Mr. James Brown Scott, Judge Morgan J. O’Brien, Ambassador Morrow, former Ambassador Fletcher and Mr. Noble B. Judah, our new Ambassador to Cuba. Mr. Leo Rowe, Director General of the Pan-American Union, was included in the delegation in order that he might have an official place in the Conference. President Coolidge attended the opening of the Conference, arriving January 15 on the U.S.S. Texas and delivering an address at the formal opening next day. Mr. Hughes was made Chairman of the Governing Committee of the Conference, but declined the chairmanship of the important Committee on the Reorganization of the Pan-American Union in favor of Dr. Pueyrredon, head of the Argentine delegation. Dr. Guerrero of Salvador was chosen head of the Committee on Codification of International Law. It was voted that committee sessions should be open, though in accordance with previous practice they could be closed by a two- thirds vote of the members.
Hughes Defends American Policy.— The speech of Mr. Hughes at the dinner of the American colony on January 21 was a vigorous defense of our recent policy in the Caribbean, though, like President Coolidge’s address, it covered familiar ground. Mr. Hughes said that Pan-Americanism rested on four pillars. The first, he said, was independence. “It is the firm policy of the United States to respect the territorial integrity of the American republics. We have no policy of aggression. We wish for all of them, not simply those great in area and population and wealth, but for everyone, to the very smallest, strength and not weakness.
“What a fatuous idea it would be to think that the United States desired any of these states should be weak, or the prey of disorder. There is no promise for the United States in that. We do not wish their territory. We have troubles enough at home and without seeking responsibilities abroad. The rights we assert for ourselves we accord to yours.
“Nothing could be happier for the United States than that all the countries in the region of the Caribbean should be strong, self sufficient, fulfilling their destiny, settling their problems, with peace at home and the fulfilment of their obligations abroad. It is in the strength of these powers, as equal and responsible states, and not in the weakness of any, that lies our confidence for future tranquility and the mutual benefits of intercourse.”
The second pillar he declared, was stability. In connection with this, Mr. Hughes pointed out that after aiding Santo Domingo to establish a firm government the United States withdrew, and that “we would leave Haiti at any time that we had reasonable expectations of stability.” He continued:
“We are, at this moment, in Nicaragua, but what we are doing there and the commitments we have made are at the request of both parties and in the interest of peace and order and a fair election. We have no desire to stay. We wish Nicaragua to be strong, prosperous and independent. We entered to meet an imperative but temporary exigency, and we shall retire as soon as it is possible.”
The third and fourth pillars were mutual good will and cooperation, the latter meaning not domination by one state or group, but “cooperation of equals for common advantage.”
Reorganization of the Union.—The Committee on the Reorganization of the Union engaged in an effort to incorporate into a treaty the various proposals made for changing the make-up of the Union. Among the most interesting amendments suggested were those of the Mexican delegation proposing that the chairmanship of the governing board should be held, not as at present by the U. S. Secretary of State continuously, but by delegates of each nation in alphabetical succession; that the director-general should change similarly; and that the members of the board should not be diplomatic representatives in Washington. All this was aimed to weaken American influence in the board. The only action taken was to permit nations to send special delegates if they preferred. Speaking on the subject, Mr. Hughes declared that the chairman had little special influence, that the delegates always consulted their governments before important decisions, that the director-general really did all the work, and that there was an advantage of continuity in having a permanent director-general and a governing board always on hand.
Another suggestion made by the chairman of the committee, Dr. Pueyrredon of Argentina, was that something should be said in the proposed treaty about reduction of tariff barriers between the American states, and he intimated that Argentina would not approve a reorganization of the Union that did not contain such a clause. He said the United States’ high tariff caused more ill feeling in some parts of South America than our policy in Nicaragua.
On the whole, it appeared unlikely that any progress would be made toward giving the Union a political status, especially in the field of mediation and conciliation, making it a kind of American League. This would require solving the problem of the place to be given to large and small states; and the United States, as well as some of the larger South American countries, were opposed to the whole idea, preferring to let the Union remain an innocuous society for conferences, publication of reports, and cooperation in non-political spheres.
Air Routes Regulation.—In the Committee on Communication Problems difficulty arose over an amendment proposed by the United States to the treaty for the regulation of commercial aircraft and communications. The amendment proposed that any two governments might arrange between themselves for designation of air routes over their territory, and was designed to permit arrangements with Panama and with Cuba to prevent commercial aircraft from flying over portions of Panama and Cuba adjacent to the Isthmian Canal and Guantanamo. The objections of Mexico and Colombia were later obviated by explanation that there was no intention to exclude commercial aircraft from all parts of Panama. Mexico suggested amendments to the effect that in time of peace no nation could lay an embargo on the sale of aircraft to another nation, and that any nation could exclude commercial aircraft of another country from parts of her territory.
Codification of International Law. —Work in the Committee on Codification of International Law made some progress, though the tendency was often shown to suggest new principles rather than formulate those already established. Thus one chapter of the proposed code contained the clause that “no state may intervene in the internal affairs of another,” to which the United States objected on the ground that as phrased it ran counter to established practice and constituted a new rule. At the suggestion of Dr. Ferrera of Cuba, the whole chapter in which this clause appeared was sent back to the sub-committee for elimination of clauses too vague or too sweeping to secure acceptance.
Among the matters to come before the committee later were draft proposals regarding the conduct of neutral states as regards revolutionary movements or rebellions in another state, and draft proposals prepared by the jurists’ conference in Rio de Janeiro last April covering maritime neutrality. These latter contained sweeping changes, having slight chance of adoption.
Maritime Neutrality Proposals.—The provisions in the draft treaty recommended for maritime neutrality are sweeping and designed to alter profoundly conditions on the high seas during war time, besides being aimed at rendering the prosecution of hostilities as difficult as possible.
The first article says that other States in case of hostilities “shall consider it a duty to remain neutral,” although ready to offer good offices.
While the right of search on high seas is sanctioned, the provision is included that ships cannot be attacked except if, after being stopped, they fail to observe instructions given. Submarines are specifically mentioned as included in this article.
The draft says that only State acts of assistance to belligerents shall be a violation of neutrality, leaving to private individuals freedom in their commercial activities.
It specifies, however, that neutral States are obliged to refuse to belligerents credits or loans and are forbidden to deliver to the belligerents directly or indirectly, war materials. Despite this last provision, a further article specifies that a neutral State is “not bound .... to prevent in its ports or waters the export or transit” of war material.
Numerous provisions are included in the draft concerning the activities allowed to belligerent ships in neutral waters. They may not use these as bases of naval operations, nor remain in a neutral harbor more than twenty-four hours. Not more than three belligerent warships may crowd into one neutral harbor at one time, nor may one man-of-war weigh anchor from a non-belligerent port less than twenty-four hours after an enemy one has left it.
The Pan-American Union in Washington would be charged under the draft convention with the appointment “in agreement with the Governments interested .... of commissions to observe how the belligerents conform to the laws and usages of war.”
In addition, among the myriads of other provisions in the draft, the Governing Board of the Union would have to meet immediately upon the declaration of war to suggest fitting measures to the American republics “to insure respect for the rest of the neutrals and particularly the freedom of commerce and navigation which exists in time of peace.”
Our Caribbean Policy (From an editorial in the Baltimore Sun, January 22). —Although the time may not yet be here to say so flatly, our delegation to Havana knows very well that we have a Caribbean policy distinct from that directed toward the ten republics of continental South America. Nearly five years ago, while Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes stated that “so far as the region of the Caribbean Sea is concerned it may be said that if we had no Monroe Doctrine we should have to create one. The inference of special interests, rights and obligations in this territory is plain. And President Coolidge said in New York last April that “toward the governments of countries which we have recognized this side of the Panama Canal we feel a moral responsibility that does not attach to other nations.”
For most of the Caribbean countries much of the formal program of the Havana conference is superfluous. The United States already dominates their trade, directs their finance, and to an increasing extent determines their cultural development. With or without Pan-American conferences these bonds will grow increasingly closer. Willingly or unwillingly, subject or independent, these little countries are our satellites.
But South America is outside our orbit and, judging by the development of several of her units during the post-war years, will so remain. So also should Mexico, with whom we are now happily making earnest effort for good relationships upon a basis of mutual toleration and respect.
Desirable in any case, the good will of South America becomes essential as the obvious lines of our national expansion bring us to a position of domination in the Caribbean basin. Our hegemony there will be peacefully accepted or fiercely resented, according to whether or not it is established with the tacit approval of South America and Mexico, whose cultural and sentimental interests in the territory go far to balance our greater material concern.
It is the knowledge of developing American policy, of which events in Nicaragua are but a symptom, that has led to all the feeling of skepticism and mistrust which Latin America has voiced toward the Havana conference. Such apprehensions would be increased by sedulously clinging to the letter of an innocuous agenda. Only in the degree that we welcome as from equals and as of right, inquiry into and criticism of our actions in the Caribbean, will the success of Havana prove more enduring than the garlands hung for President Coolidge’s visit.
Proposed Latin-American Policy.—In a special supplement (No. 4) of the Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Dr. R. L. Buell, Research Director of the Association, proposes certain changes in United States policy in the Caribbean. In a review of our past relations in this region, he finds that our “anti-revolution policy”—of refusing to recognize governments set up by force —has involved us in constant difficulties, and even led to intervention, as at present in Nicaragua. Furthermore, our policy of interference for protection of American and foreign property or to force settlement of claims has aroused resentment in Latin America. To remedy these difficulties he makes three proposals:
- A change in recognition policy so as to recognize de facto governments.
- The establishment of permanent claims tribunals by the United States and each of the Latin American countries, having annual or biennial sessions.
- A Coolidge doctrine stating that the United States will not intervene in any country without consulting the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union.
The tribunals he suggests would be composed of two judges appointed by the two countries concerned, and a third, preferably non-American, to be selected by lot from a standing panel of names chosen at each Pan-American Conference. There would be about twenty of these tribunals, one for each of the countries of Latin America. Such tribunals would be less “packed” against the United States than would a court, such as recently suggested by the American Institute of International Law,
composed of judges appointed by each of the New World countries.
As regards consultation with the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union before intervention, this would be putting the Union into politics with a vengeance. However, the writer points out that the United States could disregard the judgment of the Union if it desired. Otherwise there would be no intervention.
NICARAGUA
Sandino Forces Scattered.—At the close of January the forces of the rebel leader Sandino, who since last May has been making trouble for the Marines in Nicaragua, were reported to have abandoned their mountain stronghold of El Chipote and to have fled either southward or across the Honduras frontier.
On December 30 a force of 200 United States Marines and an equal number of the Nicaragua National Guard, advancing to occupy the town of Quilali, Sandino’s so- called capital in northern Nicaragua about twenty miles southwest of Chipote, were ambushed in a narrow pass. Five marines were killed and three wounded, and one was killed and two wounded of the National Guard. The fighting lasted nearly two hours, after which the marines pushed ahead and occupied Quilali. A reinforcement sent three days later lost one killed and five wounded. Upon news of these casualties additional marine forces were ordered to Nicaragua to the number of about 1,400, bringing the total in the country to 2,800, with General Logan Feland again in command. An aircraft attack on Chipote by a squadron under Major Rowell on January 14 was reported to have killed at least forty; and this, with the shortage of food owing to the occupation of towns by the marines, seems to have led to the dispersion of the band.
According to figures issued by the U. S. State Department, there were twelve marines killed and six wounded in Nicaragua in the fighting between May 15 and the attack near Quilali.
Supervision of Elections.—Difficulties have arisen at Managua over the action to be taken by the Nicaraguan Congress on the bill which would put into effect United States supervision of the presidential election in autumn of this year. The necessity for its passage lies in the fact that control of elections rests with the Congress rather than the President. At the close of January the bill had passed the Liberal Senate, but had been held up and modified in the Conservative lower house, for while the Conservatives have all along favored American intervention they apparently fear a Liberal victory for General Moncada if the elections are supervised. President Coolidge has already appointed General Frank R. McCoy, U.S.A., to take charge of the elections as President of the Central Electoral Board, and if the bill passes the Nicaraguan Congress there will be an American member on each local board.
American supervision of the elections arises out of the agreements made at the time of the settlement arranged by Colonel Stimson last May. Before laying down his arms at the time, General Moncada called for a written statement to the effect that there would be American supervision of the elections, and further that United States forces would remain in Nicaragua to disarm forcibly all Nicaraguan troops refusing to surrender of their own accord. Hence the continued presence of marines in the country, and the operations against Sandino.
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE
Anti-War Treaty Shelved.—The French note published in the press on January 23, and pointing out the obligations of France to the League of Nations as an obstacle to the anti-war treaty proposals of the American State Department, apparently ended, at least for the present, the prospects of further consideration of such a treaty.
Foreign Minister Briand’s reply was an interesting document, worked out after consultation with Premier Poincare and the rest of the French Cabinet and also after conversations, on January 9, with the British Ambassador, Lord Crewe. It was in answer to previous communications from Secretary Kellogg which had proposed: (^Separation of the general “anti-war” agreement from the Franco-American Arbitration Treaty; (2) extension of the anti-war pact into a multilateral agreement which should be worked out together by the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Premier Briand stated that the question whether the treaty should be signed first by France and the United States and left open to the others, or whether it should be negotiated and signed by all together, was a matter merely of procedure. But the great difficulty in the way of such an agreement, and the reason why France must limit it to “aggressive” war as between themselves, was that France and the other nations mentioned were bound by the League Covenant, as well as the Locarno and other treaties, to “wars of assistance” under certain conditions, and that no agreement could be made with the United States which disregarded those obligations. The gist of M. Briand’s reply was in the last paragraph of his note, as follows:
“It cannot have been overlooked by the United States that the great majority of world powers are making, for the organization and strengthening of peace, common efforts which they are following out within the bonds of the League of Nations. They are already bound one to the other by a compact creating for each other reciprocal obligations, both by accords such as those concluded at Locarno in October, 1925, and by international conventions relating to guarantees of neutrality—and all of them are engagements which impose upon them duties they cannot break.”
Renewal of Arbitration Treaty.—In spite of the dubious outcome of the negotiations over Foreign Minister Briand’s proposal to abolish war between France and the United States, there appeared no obstacle to the renewal of the Root Arbitration Treaty of 1908, with changes extending its scope. French experts, however, called attention to the fact that the Bryan Treaty of Arbitration, negotiated with France in September, 1914, is also still in full force, since after running five years it was to continue indefinitely unless denounced after a year’s notice, and that this agreement is in some ways more far-reaching than the other. It provides that all questions, “whatever they be,” shall be submitted to an international commission for study and report, prior to which the contracting parties pledge themselves not to resort to force.
EUROPE
President Cosgrave in America.—On January 21, William T. Cosgrave, President of the Irish Free State, arrived in New York for a brief American tour. After a call on Mayor Walker, President Cosgrave went directly to Chicago where he spent several days. He was then in Washington, where he was given a dinner by the Canadian Minister, Vincent Massey, and before sailing on February 3 he also paid a brief visit to Ottawa.
Soviet Opposition Exiled.—As a result of their attacks on the Stalin control in Russia, the whole group of opposition leaders in the Communist Party were banished in the middle of January to remote districts of Russia, the distance from Moscow depending on the degree of their offenses. Trotsky was banished to the Chinese-Turkestan frontier. Reports of military disturbances at the time were unfounded, but the Soviets appear to be facing a genuine economic crisis, due to lack of foreign credits, and inability to increase production and distribution of manufactured goods to meet the demands of the peasants resulting from three successive good harvests. Politically the government is not threatened, and general conditions are better than a year ago.
Italian Arms for Hungary.—Early in January five freight cars loaded with machine guns, shipped from an Italian factory as “agricultural instruments” for Poland but apparently destined for Hungary, were found at a railway station on the Austro- Hungarian frontier. Since the shipment was in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Trianon, all the Little Entente powers were much disturbed, and France appeared eager to have the matter made a subject for League investigation.
FAR EAST
Japanese Elections.—On January 21 Premier Tanaka dissolved the Japanese parliament, after a vigorous speech in which he defended the policy of his ministry. The new elections, scheduled for February 20, will be under the recent universal manhood suffrage laws which increase the number of voters from 3,000,000 to 9,600,000. The opposition planned during the campaign to base their attacks chiefly on the government’s foreign policy, on the ground that the Shantung expedition and other military measures are mainly responsible for the growing anti-Japanese sentiment in China.
Lull in Chinese War.—The winter season in China was marked by a let-up in hostilities between Nationalists and Northerners, during which both factions occupied themselves with conferences and government reorganization. At Peking there was an important New Year’s Conference during the fourth week of January attended by Chang Tso-lin, the Peking Cabinet, and the Northern generals, at which, according to reports, an effort was made to wrest civil authority from the war lords of Shantung and Chili. If this effort for separation of civil and military rule had any real success it would mean perhaps merely a change of masters, for Chang Tso-lin would control the civil ministers at Peking.
From Peking came the news also that A. S. F. Edwards, the English Inspector General of Chinese Customs, had obtained permission from Chang Tso-lin to confer with Southern officials at Shantung over customs reform, the plan being apparently to grant the Southern authorities a share of the customs receipts and other concessions while retaining the seat of administration at Peking.
From Nanking, however, came the announcement that T. V. Soong, the new Finance Minister would not only demand 70 per cent of the customs revenue, but would also refuse to recognize the right of other authorities to control customs in the sixteen out of twenty-one provinces under nationalist rule. Among other steps taken by Soong to bolster Nationalist finances was a new tax of $1 Mexican on every ten gallons of gasolene or kerosene imported. The oil companies compromised on a payment of sixty cents.