The Navy is a physical symbol of our foreign policy. Foreign policy is considered “that formulation of principles upon which our state bases its attitude toward other states, and the administration of those principles by official organs of government.” History teaches that other nations accord respect to foreign policy in proportion to the moral force ready to demand its observance and enforcement.
The United States has not always been treated with due consideration by other powers. The defiance of our announced principle of the freedom of the seas brought on the early wars with the Barbary corsairs and the War of 1812. Fifty years after its promulgation, Bismarck called the Monroe Doctrine a piece of international impertinence. The open-door policy has needed a permanent and active naval force stationed in the Far East, to lend moral support and enforce observance of equal commercial privileges for American nationals. The Spanish-American War brought us general recognition as a world power. Yet in 1914-17, disregard of our notes of protest against unrestricted submarine warfare culminated in a declaration of war.
Sea power and the power of diplomacy are synonymous. When diplomatic relations are severed, the policy of defense is projected by pressure from the military forces. Referring to our statesmanship, the disrespectful term, “shirt sleeve” diplomacy, has no foundation in fact. The diplomacy of the United States, like its people, has been direct and frank, and its conduct compares favorably with that of older and more experienced countries. However, the catch slogan, “The pen is mightier than the sword,” also has no all-supporting foundation in fact. The history of the world to date shows that when the negotiations of diplomacy have broken down the machinery of war has been started.
The United States directly and indirectly controls the greatest economic empire the world has ever known. Our government has a positive moral and ethical duty towards its own citizens and those of interrelated countries to maintain, and, if possible, advance the present standards of living and of civilization. A chain is as strong as its weakest link. Therefore, the navy supporting foreign policy must be strong enough to insure protection adequate to this tremendous responsibility.
The question is raised immediately, “As the general pact for the renunciation of war of July 24, 1929, disavows war as an instrument of national policy, are not deductions from past naval history purely academic?” President Hoover gave an answer on November 11, 1929, “The machinery for pacific settlement of disputes among nations is, as yet, inadequate.” The general pact, or the Briand-Kellogg treaty as it is popularly referred to, recognizes national defense as a sovereign right.
The purpose of this paper is to review events in the history of the United States wherein the Navy supported and enforced foreign policy. Popular knowledge is acquainted with the naval function of providing protection against invasion from the sea, but not so well known is the necessity for protection of our increasing sea commerce. The United States, concerned with the internal development of its wealth of natural resources, has but recently taken a dominating place in external affairs. A nation like England, dependent on the sea for its existence through the supply of food and raw materials, has learned through centuries of bitter experience of the need of adequate naval forces for its very survival. Our overseas commerce, a fast growing institution, is accentuating our reliance on sea lanes. The following review of the past vicissitudes of our ocean trade will aid in shaping future protective measures for our foreign policy.
Freedom of the seas.—Today, freedom of the seas is a principle that calls for observance and enforcement only in the event of war. The seas are well policed, and piracy extirpated with occasional exceptions on the south China coast. Conditions, however, were not always so. In the early days of the republic claims of dominion over adjacent seas, the unaccepted rights of search, and the claims of legal piracy had to be disavowed. The American statesmen of the day initiated the time-honored doctrine that “a free ship makes free goods.”
After separation from Great Britain, the thirteen colonies found their seagoing commerce no longer under the protection of a powerful naval force. The arming of merchantmen was compulsory in England in the seventeenth century. The next century saw ships still constructed, if not actually equipped, as potential privateers and men- of-war. Pirates and marauders preyed on insufficiently protected shipping.
The Barbary states of Morocco, Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli demanded that all commerce sailing in the Mediterranean Sea, in waters adjacent to their countries, pay tribute.
When the new government under the Constitution was formed, Jefferson, as Secretary of State, declared the determination of the United States “To prefer war, in all cases, to tribute under any form,” but a Navy was wanting to make the declaration effective.
Treaties for the payment of tribute were made with each of the four states. As a result, much money was placed in the coffers of the pirates, when a much smaller sum spent on a navy would have destroyed the corsairs’ power and retained the national honor.
In 1793, England and Portugal opened the Atlantic to the Barbary pirates for preying on commerce, particularly American. England was not above fostering conditions that hindered the shipping of other nations. A year later, our government, receiving no just hearing, ordered the construction of six frigates, the real beginning of our permanent Navy.
A few years later, our former ally, France, also demonstrated that she had not yet learned to render proper immunity to our peaceful commerce. In 1798, French privateers and men-of-war plundered American ships on the high seas, and in a few cases, in our own territorial waters. Official protests to France brought many promises in reply, but no practical results. Congress then declared all treaties with the French null and void, and a virtual state of war ensued without any formal declaration to that effect. American privateers and men-of-war, especially in the West Indian area, soon taught France her error. After two and a half years of fighting, a treaty of peace was signed. Thereafter, American diplomacy was treated with more consideration upon the lodging of protests to that government.
Tripoli was next in line for a lesson. The Bey of Tripoli high-handedly made exorbitant and humiliating demands on the American nation. Imperiously, he repudiated the existing treaty with the United States. Our young Navy with the aid of the brilliant exploits of Stephen Decatur and the able leadership of Commodore Preble broke the Tripolitan power. From the treaty of peace in 1805 to the outbreak of the War of 1812, American commerce in the Mediterranean was treated with increased respect.
During this period, Great Britain, pressed by the Napoleonic Wars, gave but scant attention to our conception of the freedom of the seas. Needing man power, Britain stopped American vessels at sea, removed members of the crew, and declared them British subjects on the slightest pretext. At times, so many seamen would be impressed that vessels were left to proceed with undermanned crews. Objection was not made so much to the principle of British municipal law, known as the doctrine of indelible allegiance, as to the British claim that they were exercising a lawful “right of search.” The United States, admitting the belligerent right of search, granted its employment for enforcing blockades, seizing prize goods and members of the enemy military forces, but denied the exercise of impressment of seamen under this right. England answered our diplomatic protests with evasive counter contentions.
With England’s resources severely drained by the continuous wars, the encroachment of American shipping on her trade routes did not alleviate Britain’s uncompromising attitude. Jefferson, determined to make a peaceful reprisal, declared a commercial embargo against England. As a result, our growing merchant marine was dealt a severe setback, our export industries were stopped, and more than the lost sea trade was gained by England. In the end, the embargo collapsed, and the United States received the greater harm.
British orders in council further restricted our trade. Our own coasts were blockaded. The coasts of countries controlled by Napoleon were blockaded. Protests against the non-observance of our rights as neutrals were disregarded. The question of the impressment of American seaman turned out to be unnegotiable. Accordingly, war was declared in 1812.
Ship for ship, the American Navy astounded the world in its ability to cope with the world’s premier sea fighters. However, the sea power of our young and undeveloped nation was not adequate to prevent the burning of the Capitol at Washington and a major land operation against New Orleans. In the peace of 1814, Great Britain did not specifically abandon her claim of the right to impressment of seamen, nor did she repudiate the illegal seizures authorized by her orders in council, but she abandoned these practices in fact. The war stimulated the American people to a sense of national consciousness, and public opinion called for the removal of Algerian oppression of our commerce in the Mediterranean Sea.
The Dey of Algiers, probably under the impression that the American naval ships would be blown off the face of the globe by the British, made increased demands on American shipping, and then dismissed our diplomatic agent in the person of the American consul general. President Madison’s answer was the dispatch of a squadron under Commodore Decatur and another under Commodore Bainbridge. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were reduced to submission by forceful action. Instead of paying tribute, indemnities were secured for recently captured American ships and nationals. The Moslems, disregardful of diplomatic notes, were taught to understand the language spoken by the guns of the naval vessels. The Navy’s support of our foreign policy in the destruction of the Barbary corsairs resulted in initiating commercial stability for all nations in that section of the world.
Peaceful sea interests were now free from oppression for the long period of peace that followed. After the Crimean War, European powers drew up the first codification of sea law, as provided in the Declaration of Paris of 1856. The United States was about to ratify this declaration at the outbreak of the Civil War, when Great Britain stated that she would not regard its provisions applicable to the internal differences then existing in America. Privateers, fitted out in British ports, wrought havoc with Union commerce. In 1871, Great Britain agreed to arbitrate the claims against the Confederate raiders, the Alabama, the Florida, and the Shenandoah, but this late award did not aid the federal government in the black years of the war.
At the beginning of the World War in 1914, Great Britain and Germany adjusted their conceptions of maritime law to fit their individual needs. The combatants based their interpretations of the rights of neutrals on expediency and not on established principle. The United States suggested without success that the combatants observe the unratified Declaration of London of 1909. This country further proposed that the belligerents agree to limit the use of mines, to restrict the employment of submarines against unarmed merchant vessels except under the previously acknowledged rights of visit and search, and to observe our old conception of contraband. Both sides claimed to be in accord with our wishes, but made reservations and modifications that nullified their expressions of cooperation. Upon the sinking of the Lusitania with the loss of American lives, an attempt was made to define the status of armed merchantmen and of submarines. The answers of both Great Britain and Germany were indefinite and unsatisfactory for our purposes.
The government was given scant respect in attempting to secure recognition for us under the principle of freedom of the seas. A secretary of state resigned. What was to be done? There must be some agency to support our foreign policy. The answer was given in approving the naval program of 1916, which would have given us naval supremacy after the war. Fire insurance should be taken out before, not after, one’s house has burned down. The people came to realize that the neglect of our Navy results in the contempt of our rights by other nations. Germany’s campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, declared in the early part of 1917, disregarded point-blank our announced diplomatic policies. The employment of the military forces was the only resource left, and accordingly war was declared.
In the final analysis, only an adequate Navy can assure our ocean commerce and merchant marine of the freedom of the sea. President Wilson, convinced that arguments and notes exchanged with belligerents were useless without support by strong moral force, recommended in his St. Louis speech of February 3, 1916, “incomparably, the most adequate Navy in the World.”
The Monroe Doctrine.—The Monroe Doctrine is generally considered our major foreign policy. Our early statesmen maintained a policy of self-determination, isolation, and non-intervention, steering clear of the interrelated European wars that extended to the Americas. Self-preservation and protection warned the young government to check European expansion in the new world. From the expression of a weak nation against aggrandizement of old world nations, this doctrine advanced to international recognition in the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
In the early part of the nineteenth century, Russia, Prussia, and Austria formed a league, commonly referred to as the Holy Alliance. After restoring Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, the allies turned to America. These monarchies, apprehensive of the growth of representative republican governments, intended to recover Spain’s lost colonies of the new world. In 1815, the United States had already recognized as belligerent states, the majority of the colonies which had revolted against Spanish rule. Should the powerful Holy Alliance, with expressed plans for suppressing republican government, cross the seas, our national safety would be endangered. Great Britain, too, preferred to preserve the status quo. A large and profitable trade had been built with the revolted South American states. Should Spain regain these colonies, this lucrative trade would be taken from British hands and monopolized by Spanish merchants and Spanish ships.
Canning, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, calling attention to our common interests, suggested a joint declaration with the United States against intervention by the alliance for the recovery of Spain’s lost colonies. This suggestion for joint action was rejected, and President Monroe delivered his famous declaration to Congress on December 2, 1823.
Simply, the Monroe Doctrine is a statement of our policy that the Americas are for the Americans. The President announced objection to the further acquisition of political possessions by European nations in the Western Hemisphere, and to further colonization by European nations of this continent. Great Britain had made known already her disapproval of the alliance’s proposed operations. The Monroe Doctrine, ready to be backed up by Great Britain, the world’s most powerful sea power, had the desired effect, and the Holy Alliance abandoned the idea of invading the new world.
In 1860, Spain, France, and Great Britain took under consideration armed intervention in Mexico to protect the interests of their nationals in the then bankrupt and anarchistic country. The three countries combined and landed military forces in Mexico. Unfortunately, our Civil War had broken out, and Secretary Seward could protest with little vigor. In 1862, the Spanish and British forces withdrew. On the other hand, France, under Napoleon III, seized the government and established a new French colonial empire under Archduke Maximilian of Austria. The United States Army and Navy were occupied with troubles at home, and so we could do little more than voice our disapproval.
With the Civil War settled, the United States was able to take a firmer stand. Napoleon III was informed that the presence of French troops in Mexico was a matter of vital concern, and Austria notified that if troops requested by Maximilian were furnished, this country would no longer remain neutral. Soon thereafter the French troops were recalled to native soil to meet Prussia’s threats, and no soldiers were forthcoming from Austria. The expedition ended with Maximilian’s execution. This serious attempt against the Monroe Doctrine was quelled by militaristic developments on the European continent, and by the regained ability of the United States to make vigorous diplomatic representations.
In 1894, Venezuela complained to the United States, asking intervention in compliance with the Monroe Doctrine. The boundary line between British Guiana and Venezuela had never been definitely settled. The British, with certain gold fields in view, refused to arbitrate, and pushed their claims further into the disputed territory. The United States accepted the invitation and commenced negotiations with Great Britain. Unconcerned, the British further expanded their mining operations. President Cleveland, through Secretary Olney, addressed a sharp note to the British government: “Today the United States is practically sovereign upon this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” Great Britain did not treat our advances seriously, and showed no disposition to arbitrate. Diplomatic means were coming to an end. President Cleveland presented the matter to Congress, practically threatening war if England persisted in her refusal to negotiate. Startled, Great Britain became more tractable.1 Upon a threat of force, she seemed to realize the advantages of arbitration. Thereafter, Great Britain gave a mixed commission every opportunity for studying the situation, and the dispute was amicably settled.
Venezuela again claimed our attention in 1901. England and Germany placed the South American country under a “pacific blockade” because of nonpayment of debts. When the two European nations contemplated military occupation, Secretary Hay notified them that the matter should be subjected to arbitration. England demonstrated her sincerity by stating that she was ready to welcome any aid in the collection of these debts. Not so Germany. The latter country practically ignored our diplomatic correspondence, and proceeded with her plans for military intervention.
Germany’s refusal to arbitrate could mean but one thing: acquisition of a foothold on the Venezuelan coast. But two years before, the Germans had seized Kiachow (Tsingtau), China, on a slight pretext, and quickly established a military and naval base there. President Roosevelt did not intend having a naval base of a European power within striking distance of a possible Panama canal and our own seacoasts. Forcibly, he informed the German ambassador that unless arbitration was consented to, the American fleet, then holding exercises in Caribbean waters, would proceed to Venezuela and prevent the landing of German military forces. Germany, unimpressed, refused to open negotiations. President Roosevelt informed the German envoy that, unless an answer agreeing to arbitrate was received within forty-eight hours, Admiral Dewey and the fleet would leave a day sooner than originally planned. Within thirty-six hours, the Kaiser consented to arbitration.2
The incident of Germany and Venezuela showed the world that the armed forces of the United States were ready to demand observance of the Monroe Doctrine. No longer was it necessary to have Great Britain’s interests coincide with ours, and thereby have the assurance that the Monroe Doctrine would be backed up by the guns of the British Navy.
The Monroe Doctrine has gone through the evolution from von Bulow’s “a theory launched venturesomely upon the blue waves of conjectural politics” to incorporation in art. XXI, League of Nations Covenant. The modern interpretation, given by Secretary Hughes in 1923:
It is opposed to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non- American power.
This policy is essentially defensive. It has been, and continues to be, an important factor for our peace. It strengthens the security of the Panama Canal, and prevents non-American nations from getting closer to our coasts.
The doctrine’s influence for peace is illustrated in the two cases of Venezuela. However, our diplomatic notes must be supported by other agencies than reference to precedent and international law. That far- seeing and practical statesman, President Roosevelt, observed: “If we possess a formidable Navy, small is the chance indeed that we shall ever be dragged into war to uphold the Monroe Doctrine.”
The open-door policy.—The American peace commissioners in Paris, in 1898, stated that the policy in the Philippines would be “to maintain an open door to the world’s commerce.” This statement was in contradistinction to the actions of other nations in establishing spheres of influence in the Orient. Japan was in Korea, Russia in Manchuria, the British in various treaty ports and concessions, and the French in Indo-China. After Germany’s seizure of Kiachow, Secretary Hay, in 1900, sent a circular telegram to all nations concerned, stating the desire of the United States “To seek a solution—safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.” This note, advocating “the principle of equal and impartial trade,” is popularly referred to as Hay’s open-door policy.
The open-door policy is an application of the most favored nation principle whereby all trading rights granted to other nations are also granted to merchants of the United States. It is an insistence that citizens of the United States shall have an opportunity to trade with the Chinese on equal terms with other nations. The apportioning of concessions in China was similar to the parceling of African territory by European nations. Countries established trade monopolies in their own spheres of influence to the exclusion of legitimate American business. The vast potential markets of the Orient appealed to our commercial instinct for future development. It was and is incompatible with our foreign policy to establish exclusive economic privileges in weaker countries through military and political pressure.
When the clipper ships of New England carried merchandise to the Orient in exchange for tea, spices, and silks, Great Britain was the most influential naval, commercial, and political power in the Far East. The rather humiliating phrase “American commerce crawling behind British guns” had some basis in fact. However, the initiative and success of officers of the United States Navy in opening new ports for commerce compensated for our early lack of sufficient naval protection.
Great Britain’s dissatisfaction with certain trading privileges resulted in the so- called Opium War of 1840. China acknowledged British claims in a treaty signed on the decks of the old line-of-battle ship H.M.S. Cornwallis at Nanking, actually 250 miles inland in a foreign country. Captain Lawrence Kearny, U. S. Navy, perceiving the advantages ceded to British trade with the subsequent disadvantages to American commerce, immediately forwarded the facts to Washington. As an answer would not be received for months, he made advances to the Chinese government, and secured for the United States the extension of all trading rights and privileges that had been granted to the British. The timely information at Washington brought an American mission to China under Caleb Cushing, who, in 1844, concluded our first treaty with that country. By his alert grasp of the situation, Captain Kearny’s action resulted in giving us the “most favored nation” treatment and in stabilizing our growing trade with that country.
In the meantime Japan had carried the exclusion of foreigners to the point of actual isolation. All nations except the Dutch had been barred from entering her ports or territory for the previous 200 years. Stimulated by the Mexican War, the Oregon Treaty, and the discovery of gold in California, shipping increased between our Pacific coast and China. It became imperative to have entry into the harbors of Japan for overhauling, refueling, and obtaining supplies. Accordingly, the government ordered some naval ships to Japan to ascertain the Japanese attitude, and to start negotiations for opening the latter’s ports and harbors.
Commodore M. C. Perry, commanding four ships, anchored in the Bay of Yedo in July, 1853.
When he was directed to go to Nagasaki, he refused; when ordered to leave the bay, he moved farther up; and he found the nearer he approached the imperial city, “the more polite and friendly they became.”
He made preliminary overtures, studied the reactions of the Japanese, and departed. On his return, the following February, a preliminary treaty was made. Perry, by his tact, firmness, and insight into oriental character, opened certain ports to commerce, and paved the way for the Harris Treaties of 1857-8. France, Great Britain, and, later, other countries followed in procuring entry to these new markets for their trade. Thus, Commodore Perry opened the door of the world to Japan, and in keeping with the “most favored nation” principle, the door of Japan was opened to the world. In Japan today, Perry’s name is fittingly a household word.
Korea, too, pursued the policy of isolation. Japan had succeeded in opening commercial relations, but the United States had no success in attempting to do likewise in 1878. Four years later, Commodore R. W. Shufeldt, U. S. Navy, was given orders to treat with the hermit kingdom. He succeeded in concluding a treaty wherein Korea agreed to further commercial relations and diplomatic negotiations. Commodore Shufeldt’s treaty was the first one made by a western power with Korea, and like the opening of Japan, cleared the way for the commerce of other maritime states.
The open-door policy, although signalized in its announcement in connection with Chinese affairs, is part of our foreign policy in all sections of the globe, and has recently been exercised in mandated territories. This policy is a corollary of the principle of the freedom of the seas. A merchant marine with a protecting navy to assure safe and open sea routes is not enough. Our merchants must be assured of fair and equable treatment in foreign ports with no discrimination in fees or privileges. If American interests, previously established under reasonable conditions in another country, cannot be adequately safeguarded by that country, the naval vessels are called upon to protect American lives and property.
On account of unsettled conditions, an Asiatic fleet is permanently stationed in the Far East. An illustration of the need of naval ships in those waters was given in the shelling of Nanking in March, 1927, when the U.S.S. Noa and Wm. B. Preston assisted in the evacuation of American nationals and the American consul. In the summer of 1928, the Nationalist flag and the five-barred North Chinese emblem were shifted three times in Chefoo. Each shifting of allegiance was accompanied by fighting and disorder. Only the presence of our destroyers in the harbor assured safety for the American consulate, the American missionary schools and hospitals, and commercial interests.
From Shanghai’s bund, you can generally see American, British, French, Japanese, Portuguese, and Italian men-of-war. Each nation represented is prepared to carry out its national policies and protect the lives and property of its citizens. An editorial writer and keen political observer of the Orient recently made the following comment:
Were it not for the American Navy, the open- door doctrine would be a mockery and China would long since have been carved into foreign protectorates.
The Caribbean policy.—The Caribbean policy is definite and distinct from the Monroe Doctrine. The former gives the United States the role of international policeman in the Caribbean area, while the Monroe Doctrine is a policy against the extension of European power in the Western Hemisphere. It is an economic and administrative policy to preserve order and stability in these Latin American countries that are vitally situated for the security of the Panama Canal and for the preservation of our national safety.
The Caribbean policy, or the doctrine of paramount interest in the Caribbean, received official announcement in the Platt Amendment of 1901, later incorporated in a treaty with Cuba. This amendment states first, that Cuba shall never enter into any treaty with any foreign power which will impair her independence; second, that the United States shall have the right to maintain order in Cuba; and, third, that Cuba shall not contract debts which are beyond her financial resources. The West Indian and Central American countries need capital to develop their natural raw materials and soil and thereby build up a citizenry capable of conducting a civilized and responsible state. However, some of these countries disclose an anarchical record of revolutions and financial unstability. Unsettled conditions have made it necessary for a stronger nation to bring order out of chaos. Rather than leave such tasks to a foreign power, offering temptation for infringement on the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has accepted the duty, with the correlated responsibilities, of maintaining order in this area.
Although some have objected to the abruptness that marked certain of the negotiations, the acquisition of the rights to build, operate, and fortify a canal on the Isthmus of Panama stands as one of the greatest diplomatic strokes of our foreign policy. The canal, opened to shipping in 1914, has passed increased tonnage each year, reaching 30,553,006 tons in 1929. It has cut about 7,800 miles from the New York-San Francisco water route with a consequent reduction in freight charges and time of transit. The decreased cost of merchandise has raised immeasurably the standard of civilization in practically all countries of the world. A former secretary of state has voiced our attitude towards this unparalleled engineering feat:
We deem it to be essential to our national safety to hold the control of the canal and we could not yield to any foreign power the maintaining of any position which would interfere with our right adequately to protect the canal or would menace its approaches or the freedom of our communications.
Conditions in West Indian republics have tested our Caribbean policy. In 1904, France threatened to seize the customhouses in Santo Domingo City because custom receipts were being flagrantly diverted to private purposes. The Dominican Republic, on the verge of bankruptcy, was not meeting obligations on a government loan, mostly held by the French. Intervention by a stronger nation was imperative. Rather than have a European nation attend to this task in a region so close and vital to this country, the United States assumed fiscal control. After a period of insurrections and disorder in 1916, Admiral Knapp declared the Dominican Republic under the military administration of the United States. Marines were landed and remained there until 1924. The American military forces were withdrawn as soon as the organization of a permanent and stable government was indicated.
In the early part of 1914, Great Britain asked Haiti for the payment of an indemnity while France and Germany demanded control of the customs. These countries were weary of the neglect of governmental and other debts under a rule inclining to anarchy. The next year, Admiral Caperton ordered a landing force ashore upon the assassination of the President and the public mutilation of his corpse. With no marked improvement in conditions, he placed the country under a military protectorate. A responsible government is being developed under the guidance of the United States. The gendarmerie, officered by members of the U. S. Marine Corps, has established order, and marine and naval officers have aided in the restoration of finances, the promotion of education, the improvement in hygienic and health conditions, and the furthering of other measures for creating an effective citizenry.
The geographical location of Nicaragua is of particular importance in the security of the Panama Canal. In 1916, the United States obtained by treaty the exclusive right to build a Nicaraguan canal. Whether the latter canal is constructed or another set of locks is added at Panama, Nicaragua remains an invaluable strategic key to our safety.
As on previous occasions, a naval landing force was sent ashore in 1912 to protect American lives and property. At that time, the Nicaraguan government requested a permanent guard to aid in stabilizing the government, and consequently a detachment of 100 marines was permanently stationed at our legation in Managua. The marine guard was withdrawn on August 5, 1925, and the strong moral force for peace went with it. Three weeks later, the Chamorro faction seized the cabinet officers and overthrew the constitutional government. Disorder followed. In 1927, Great Britain and Italy requested the United States, in accordance with our paramount interest policy, to protect the lives and property of their nationals. Additional cruisers were ordered to these waters to augment the marine and naval landing forces which had been placed ashore the previous year. Admiral Latimer established neutral zones, and took other measures to protect the legitimate interests of the foreigners. The Navy prepared the way for the investigation and negotiations by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, President Coolidge’s representative, and the subsequent restoration of peace and order.
Our neighbor, Mexico, has also called for the presence of our Navy. General Huerta in a coup d’état during which Madero, the constitutional president, was killed, seized the wheel of the government. At that time, the value of American interests in that country exceeded the total wealth of the Mexicans themselves. Huerta favored the British and German interests in detriment to our own. Incidents occurred where the treatment of American property was just short of illegal confiscation. On April 21, 1914, the American naval forces took Vera Cruz after some sharp fighting. The American fleet established a pacific blockade of Mexican ports until the subsequent flight of Huerta and the return of a constitutional government.
The Caribbean policy calls for the preservation of order and stability in the West Indian and Central American countries washed by the Caribbean Sea. This is an area whose waters not only separate us from the Panama Canal, but also actually touch our shores. Admiral Mahan’s dictum is more authoritative than ever: “One thing is sure. In the Caribbean Sea is the strategic key to the two great oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, our own chief maritime frontiers.”
Aircraft and larger and faster surface ships are bringing this area closer to the inland districts of our country as well. Unsettled conditions in these waters throw the balance against the equilibrium of our national safety.
Foreign trade.—The principles of the freedom of the seas and of the open door apply directly to our foreign commerce, while the Monroe Doctrine and the Caribbean policy are concerned politically with our national safety and economic protection. Foreign policy, as emanating from the Department of State, treats with the diplomatic protection of our foreign trade and investments from discriminations contrary to our announced principles and doctrines. On the other hand, the Department of Commerce develops new markets for American business, and publishes valuable trade information in its commerce reports, “Yearbooks,” “Monthly Summaries of Foreign Commerce,” and other publications.
Today, the United States controls a vast economic empire with the only close rival in Great Britain. In 1914, we were placed in the fortunate commercial position comparable to England’s at the close of the Napoleonic Wars a century earlier. With all their energies taxed by the gigantic struggles of the World War, European countries came to American commodity and money markets. Home industries were stimulated in the demand for articles for export, and foreign trade pyramided. Bankers making loans to foreign governments and enterprises have seen much of this money return in trade to America. The New York Times of June 12, 1930, carried an advertisement for a German government bond issue of $98,250,000. American business is penetrating far-flung lands among strange peoples. American capital is revolutionizing the production of nitrates in Chile; a domestic company has leased 1,000,000 acres of land in Liberia for rubber growing; oil companies market their surplus kerosene in China, carried to inaccessible provinces by native carriers; old California newspapers are shipped to Siam for use as wrapping paper. No undertaking is too large or too small.
The Department of Commerce has trade commissioners and commercial attaches, separate from consular representatives, stationed so as to cover all parts of the world. A subdepartment, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, receives more than a thousand inquiries daily for new markets for absorbing surplus goods. The surplus production has to be sold to keep up industrial activity. Eight years ago, Secretary Mellon wrote in his annual report, “Business in this country cannot increase indefinitely without its foreign markets.” The value of our foreign trade was doubled from 1913 to 1927. Still, many of our people are not sea-minded, and do not associate national prosperity with over-seas commerce. The present depression emphasizes the need for this foreign trade.
The majority of goods and freight should be carried in American bottoms to be independent of the restrictions of other nations. Dependence on ships of registry other than our own opens American business to freight charge discriminations, shipping delays, and other hindrances fatal to close competition. Great Britain’s Stevenson Act, quadrupling the price of rubber, was a practical warning of the arbitrary action of a foreign monopoly. Yet, American ships carry only one-third of our foreign trade. To avoid the dictation of foreign monopolies, the expansion of the merchant marine should be further encouraged.
As our interior is more thoroughly developed and as immigration is restricted, we look more to the sea and can appreciate the attitude and spirit of an English pamphleteer of 1681.
As concerning ships, it is that which everyone knoweth and can say: they are our weapons, they are our ornaments, they are our strength, they are our pleasures, they are our defense, they are our profit. The subject by them is made rich; the Kingdom through them, strong.
The United States controls a great economic empire, second to none, with its outposts scattered in the farthermost reaches of the globe. From time to time, the State Department has enunciated policies to protect American nationals in their foreign dealings from discrimination and illtreatment. Notes of protest without moral force are not enough. Therefore, the navy, with the weapons at hand, physically supports foreign policy, and protects commercial antipodes, colonial possessions, and the lines of sea communications.
Adequate national defense.—In his message to Congress, December 6, 1927, President Coolidge stated:
Our Navy is likewise a weapon of defense. We have a foreign commerce and ocean lines of trade unsurpassed by any other country. . . . We are charged with an international duty of defending the Panama Canal. To meet these responsibilities we need a very substantial sea armament. . .. This country can never be relieved of the responsibility of adequate national defense.
This country must be able to resist any foreign aggression or infringement of our rights. Let us consider one of the problems involved. Theoretically, the League of Nations is the most powerful military alliance ever formulated in history. The league’s covenant, art. XVI, recognizing no higher authority, requires all signatories upon call from the council to undertake “the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, whether a member of the league or not.” Note well the last eight words, whether a member of the league or not. The United States is not a member of the league.
Therefore, if a member is a party to a dispute that is being settled by arms, the United States might forcibly be denied the rights of neutrals. Those time-honored principles, for which many American patriots have shed their life’s blood, the freedom of the seas and the open door, would suffer alien degradation.
Again, in a dispute unsettled by arbitration between a league member and this country, a non-member, all signatories have pledged themselves to unite against the offending nation, the United States in this case. Thus, our navy might have to face the combined navies of the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy, and other member states.
Conclusion.—History repeats itself. Styles of statesmanship and the external signs of formulation of policy may change with each administration and each decade. Our most marked advances in the Caribbean Sea were made under the standards of the brusque “big stick” of Roosevelt and the subtle moralizations of Wilson. However, the basic lessons deduced from history remain the same. This nation has had dire need of her military forces to solve vicissitudes in the past, and likewise will need similar aid in the future.
Let us not be misled by false prophets. A few years ago, the great advance in the stock market produced a new school of economists who recognized no shoaling waters for the bull movement, and who foresaw no normal tidal reactions to this country’s uninterrupted prosperity. Since then, many a financier and business man has struck the proverbial rocks and shoals. Are the former advisers keeping constant vigil, ever alert to effect rescue? No. The discredited seers have been enveloped by the haze, and their exploded theories are now unclassified films of mist.
On the other hand, unimpeachable agencies have laid a safe and true course for us to follow. The Briand-Kellogg treaty recognizes national defense as a sovereign right. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States provides for the common defense and the maintenance of a Navy. The Navy’s size has been determined by the London Naval Conference of 1930. Parity in principle and a paper Navy second to none is not enough. The Navy should be brought up to allowed strength with parity attained in fact.
Therefore, let us not forget our reliance and need of a navy for the support of our foreign policy. No peace pacts, no arbitration councils, and no mere expressions of good will have relieved us of the responsibility of such adequate naval defense.
Hesitation and half-measures are nowhere so fatal as in war. True wisdom for the general lies in an energetic determination.—Napoleon.
1. Editor’s Note: Possibly Great Britain’s South African troubles at this time, as well as the rising German menace may have influenced the change of position.
2. Editor’s Note: All authors do not agree with this version.