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Suppose the Soviets decide to start a limited nuclear war. Suppose they expect this war to afford them more leverage over the opposition than any other type of conflict. What sort of conflict would they choose? Most likely, a war at sea to wrest control of oceanic trade from the West. For this reason, Western powers will rely on the U. S. Navy to ensure the survival of free nations.
So why is so little attention given to preparing the U. S. Navy to win a nuclear war at sea? Several standard answers are usually provided. One is the avoidance reply— nuclear war of any kind is unthinkable, and therefore defense against it does not need to be considered. But two nuclear bombs were employed in World War II, and human nature has not changed drastically since then. Another reply is the Armageddon one—if a single nuclear weapon is fired, all strategic forces will be launched, and the Navy’s problem will be insignificant in the context of the larger war. U. S. emphasis on mutual assured destruction may have promoted this thinking; it is, however, obsolete. Another reply is that no U. S. President would ever give nuclear release; therefore, we need not worry about nuclear war. But we will not be the ones to decide if the war will be nuclear. Soviet military writing repeatedly affirms that if a war cannot be won conventionally, a nuclear strike will be used to turn the tide of battle. The Soviets also speak of initial attacks to gain a decisive advantage.
A final reply is the Navy does not want to consider nuclear war at sea because its forces are simply too ill-designed for this brand of conflict, and discussion of their problems would be a technical embarrassment. Specifically, the carrier battle group, considered the center of U. S. naval strength, is vulnerable to a nuclear strike. But this does not necessarily have to be so.
One of three nuclear devices will destroy a carrier: (1) a reentry vehicle on a ballistic flight, (2) a cruise missile, or (3) a torpedo. The first of these is not considered a potent threat yet, as such devices have not been perfected for attack on a moving target. The last of the three, the submarine close-in threat, is somewhat controllable by antisubmarine forces. It is the long-range cruise missile which poses the most serious threat to the carrier battle group.
every hostile missile fired simply to survive is a more- than-formidable task.
To get that one missile in, a Soviet commander has several options. He can launch a massed attack and try to saturate the defensive rings of one sector by flying in more missiles than on-scene defensive forces can shoot down- He can attack from all quarters to try to find a defect in the barriers. He can attack the outer defensive rings to peel
It takes only one leaker, one missile that slips through the outer rings of U. S. combat air patrol aircraft and surface-to-air missile-equipped surface ships, then the inner missile ring, and finally the close-in gunfire systems to end the career of the battle group commander. Stopping
back the defensive layers one by one. He can attempt to Penetrate with a single hidden platform, a submarine. He can attempt to blind the sensors of the defense with an electromagnetic pulse burst over the fleet and to jam essential communication between defensive units. A broad smorgasbord for the offense means a nightmare for the defense.
In addition, there is a temporal aspect to the war. The next war may not begin with skirmishes between opposing fleets deployed far from each other. Rather, it may begin with a massive initial attack without warning, or with a rapid-fire launch from trailing submarines. This preemptive attack, reminiscent of the Pearl Harbor attack, means the battle group may have to maintain a high readiness evel for extended periods. As a result, systems begin to Weaken, and defensive holes form.
Why does it seem the Soviets hold almost all the advantages in this picture? This occurs because we adopt an unnatural limit to the combat capabilities of the battle group. The adversary of the battle group is not the ensem- . le of air-to-surface missiles that are launched to destroy jt- Nor is the adversary the fleet of “Backfires” that aunch them. The adversary is the air base that launches hese bombers. As long as the air base is not as targetable as the battle group, there will be a fatal asymmetry in the Navy’s war plans.
Two actions are necessary to prevent a massive air strike against the carriers. Both involve deterrence, not efense. First, we must put equivalent Soviet assets at nsk. Second, we must eliminate the payoff of the Soviets’ adventure. If the Soviets risk their Naval Aviation forces against the U. S. carrier battle groups, and both are eliminated, what happens? The U. S. fleet is destroyed, and the °viet fleet controls the seas. The Western economies languish, the Soviet economy does not. The Soviets have a °W-cost, high-payoff trade.
But the likelihood of such a Soviet attack diminishes if _ S. battle group assets destroy the air base or bases from 'vhich the land-based aircraft are launched. In this case, ere would be equivalent economic damage and an equal number of casualties among the military population.
But still the United States will only have extracted an eHual cost for the loss of its carriers. The payoff to each SuPerpower must also be equalized. The loss of the car- r'ers w*ll deprive the West of its resource base for a certain ^ber of years if the remaining Soviet fleet controls 'Pping. Therefore, Soviet naval forces must be hunted nd destroyed to allow trade to resume. Finally, the Sovi- s transportation links to its resources must be destroyed t?r a similar number of years as the West’s will be. To do 's> its resource recovery assets, such as mines, smelters, e tneries, and power sources, must be nullified, cli e*‘m*nate Bte Soviet Navy after their Naval Aviation |'Ws katt*e grouPs> we must have adequate air and buiarine assets of our own. If, for example, we were to cUl d submarines of sufficient quantity and quality to keep J-rtain shipping lanes clear of Soviet forces, this would be Equate.
Q destroying the Soviets’ resource connections requires Ue ot two actions by the United States. Either a nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine or guided missile submarine must accompany the carrier forces and be controlled by the carrier group flag officer. Or long-range missile surface platforms, which can complete their counterattack launches in the brief interval between the detonation of the first wave of incoming weapons and the platforms’ own destruction, must accompany the carrier forces. II the battle group does not control these forces for counterattack, the Soviets will believe they can uncouple the sea battle for our resource links from a battle for their own. This uncoupling must be prevented by not allowing either a psychological or technical barrier to interfere with our counterattack.
To facilitate the U. S. battle group’s reply to a massive air strike, command, control, and communications must
be made secure. Rather than having the battle group commander colocated with the biggest target, he should be defended by putting him in a specially hardened surface platform, underwater in a submarine, or mobile between a number of surface vessels with equivalent control capabilities. Communication from any one of these command centers must be transmitted to all units, because in a nuclear engagement, there is no knowledge beforehand as to which platform will survive. For example, a submarine command post must communicate with strike aircraft heading out to launch air-to-surface missiles at the air base area targeted for counterstrike. This command post must have the authority to launch all types of strikes; otherwise, the Soviet leaders could limit their own damage by pressuring U. S. national authorities into uncoupling land and sea battles, therefore providing a leverage to Soviet forces which is not available to U. S. forces.
In addition, the counterstrike forces’ target must be the Soviets’ main base for land-based forces, not some hastily prepared desert air base used for staging the final leg of the air raid. Therefore, the cruise missiles or ballistic missiles employed for this theater deterrent need a range sufficient to travel from the battle group’s location, across oceans and continents, to the Soviet heartland. For example, if a battle group is attacked off Diego Garcia, the missiles need a range of 5,000 nautical miles.
The next most worrisome Soviet threat to a U. S. battle group is the preemptive launch of nuclear cruise missiles from platforms sited around the battle group. The Soviets may plan to launch a phalanx of missiles from one or more vessels when the battle group least expects it—during the night, rough seas, bad weather, or refueling. Again, the design of Soviet forces has put the U. S. battle group at high risk with low cost to the Soviets. This is especially true for nuclear-powered guided missile submarines, such as a “Charlie”-class submarine idling 50 nautical miles from the carrier, trailing her movements. The “Charlie” is capable of submerged launch without warning by surfacing or communicating.
To counteract this threat, two capabilities must be built into the U. S. Navy. First, U. S. on-station trailing forces must have similar attack capability against each of the four Soviet fleets. Second, we must have antitrail units on station above each Soviet trailer. These units should be armed both with missiles that can intercept the first shot and with missiles that can kill the platform before the second launch occurs. Because of the need to maintain a constant antitrail, airplanes will not fulfill this mission. Nor will submarines because of the need to have antimissile capability. A dedicated surface ship, which can keep pace with a Soviet submarine and destroy her immediately, is needed. Use of a small, cheap surface platform reverses the high leverage the Soviets have achieved with a single submarine and replaces it with a high leverage for our own fleet. The surface ship must be able to hear approaching torpedoes and to counterattack before their detonation- This ship does not need to avoid or deflect the torpedo, as her purpose is to exact a high cost from the Soviets for
trailing operations. Such a ship is ideal for deterrence.
By deterring against massive air strike and preemptive strikes from trailing submarines, U. S. forces are made equal to the Soviet forces as far as types of attack are concerned. With a relatively small investment in ships and missiles, the United States can turn a difficult defense task ■nto one in which the Navy is well suited: fighting at sea in fleet versus fleet or submarines versus fleet battles.
U. S. carrier battle groups are beautifully designed instruments of naval battle, but they were not meant to be Put at risk cheaply. Breaking the connection between land and sea nuclear escalation provides Soviet land-based Naval Aviation a free ride to our battle groups. By refus- lng to build countertrail platforms, we give their subma- nnes a similar free ride. Instead, we should accept a maximum of one shot launched at any U. S. vessel before it receives a nuclear hit in return.
In addition, we must not allow the Soviet Navy to use lhe psychological weapon of fear of nuclear risk to achieve a major leverage position. By putting a trail counter above their submarines, we risk starting a war by accidentally stacking their submarine after the counterstriker mishears a torpedo approach. If we back off from this risk and inhibit the trailing ship commander from firing on attack w*thout approval from higher authority, we allow the Soviets’ high-leverage position to persist. We should put the nsk in the Soviets’ court. If they do not wish to risk the Iqss of a submarine, they can withdraw it from attack range.
Even if the U. S. Navy builds and deploys weapons to deter attacks from air bases and trailing submarines and thieves equality or superiority in attack capability between at-sea forces, the Navy still needs to counteract the
Soviets’ advantage in shipyards. If a nuclear war at sea continued for an extended period, until only submarine forces remained on each side, the Soviet capability to build four to five times as many submarines as the United States can per year will allow them to achieve control of the sea unless the U. S. submarines are very superior. This is unlikely considering that Soviet research and development in military areas exceeds our own, and that they currently have the fastest and deepest diving submarine, the largest one, and the longest range missiles. If we are to compete in a long, drawn out war, our submarines must have a surgical strike capability to take out Soviet shipyards, by nuclear means if it cannot be done by conventional ones.
Hence, we need to add certain components to our fleet to balance Soviet advantages. These include (1) a hardened or mobile command post at sea, (2) robust communications from each post to all ships, submarines, and aircraft, (3) very long-range missiles for air base vicinity attacks, (4) small surface antitrail ships, (5) enough submarines to maintain sea-lane control for vital supplies, and (6) a surgical strike capability for submarines against shipyards. The cost of all of these is minimal compared to the expense of building more carrier battle groups to make up for the probable losses we will incur if we do not use a proper configuration.
Dr. Erickson received a doctorate degree in applied mathematics from MIT. He has worked as an operations research analyst attached to Headquarters, Naval Underwater Systems Center, and he is currently the head of the Naval Tactical Applications Unit of the Evaluation and Planning Program at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
------------------------------------------------------- The Unsafe Safe----------- -----------------------------------------
The disbursing officer’s safe was bolted to a steel bulkhead of the destroyer to keep it from rolling in a rough sea. The bolts holding the safe to the bulkhead protruded into the disbursing officer’s space.
Entering this adjacent room, the engineer unscrewed one of these bolts, exposing a small opening into the safe. The engineer dropped a dried pea through the hole and replaced the bolt.
The next morning the disbursing officer opened the safe, saw the pea, and brushed it out.
That night the engineer dropped in a second pea.
The next morning the disbursing officer saw the pea and brushed it out as he done before.
There was another pea the next day.
His suspicions aroused, the disbursing officer securely locked the safe the next night. But he couldn’t see the engineer remove the bolt and drop in a fourth pea.
When the disbursing officer found this pea in the morning, he carefully inventoried the safe’s contents. Everything seemed to be in order.
But he decided to make sure that nobody could put in another pea. Sleeping on a cot in front of the safe, he was satisfied that no one could have opened the safe that night. But when he himself opened it, there was another dried pea!
This time he put the pea in his pocket and made sure there were no other peas in the safe. He stayed up all night, watching the safe. He was now positive that no one had opened it. Yet there was another pea that morning! He almost shook as he closed the safe and went to see the captain.
“Sir,” he said, “I think I’m getting to be a psycho. I think I'm going nuts!”
The officer told the whole story. The captain looked at him as though maybe he was going crazy. That night the captain was there when the disbursing officer closed the safe. The captain was on hand when the safe was opened in the morning. And there was a dried pea!
The captain assembled the ship’s officers and demanded that the individual who knew the secret speak. The engineer confessed that he had engineered the whole thing and, accepting his reprimand, helped make the safe safe from future practical jokers.
Harry Edward Neal
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
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