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how
much authority and expertise
TyCi
tion
°m. All maintenance and inspec- actions, especially in aviation, are
sPonse times, and a clearer statement °f their responsibilities. Similar opportunities for streamlining abound throughout the Navy structure.
Authoritative Action: Too often those attached to major staffs fail to realize exist within their commands. TyCom staffs have within their purview naval Personnel who have the ability to alter utunning priorities to eliminate short- a§es, to expedite material requisitions to those in need, ferret out technical expertise from contractors and the Navy activities to resolve equipment utlures, and communicate service requirements to support staff. Even if ueir only contribution is to pass information through proper channels, the act of their involvement shows interest aud assists in expediting matters ■trough the bureaucracy.
It is demoralizing for subordinates to Petition TyCom for assistance, help §enuinely needed, only to have staffs resPond with inaction or denial of any
responsibility.
Proper definition of TyCom support responsibilities—administrative and utaterial—and dissemination of such nroughout the command structure are Mandatory. Only then will subordinates aPproach TyComs with reasonable exPectations of assistance.
One-Man Show: A good indicator of °w little operational control naval Units have is the high volume of report- !n§ requirements mandated by the
f lull J 111 Cl V 1C11IV71I , ell V
ed daily into an extensive data base, taking periodic reporting requirements j^edlessly redundant. The only plausi- e reason for establishing parallel rePorting systems within the TyCom is a Psychological need to exercise complete c°ntroI over subordinates’ daily operations. Reporting such things as each aircraft launched, the lighting of individual boilers, the transfer of department heads, and the number of components on supply’s shelves serves only to stifle initiative by making administration more important than innovation. By limiting the issue of reports to emergencies or to items not covered by the maintenance and material management and supply systems reporting formats, on-scene leaders would be able to concentrate more effectively on planning or more immediate priorities. This would lessen the administrative burden at all levels and increase operational efficiency.
Muddled Communications: Quite often, the quality of communications is a function of the quality of directions issued by seniors. Asking for reports consisting of crude numbers, not explaining what the numbers mean, yields reports of crude numbers. Asking for reports without supporting statistics produces incomplete reports that raise additional questions, often generating additional paperwork. Too often reporting requirements are added to satisfy the uneasiness of seniors, to correct staffers’ inabilities to use available and numerous data products, or to supplant existing data systems.
Once a genuine reporting need is established, then clear, concise, accurate directions to subordinates are mandatory. If the report is to stand for prolonged periods, then publish a brief notice written in simple terms. As one former commanding officer said,
“Write it so any ensign can easily understand it. That way any flag officer or staffer who sees it won’t be confused either.” Only in this way will messages moving up and down the chain of command be meaningful to all concerned.
The Challenge: Assignment of quality personnel, officer and enlisted, is a key to ensure TyCom and functional commander staffs operate effectively. If detailers are to attract this talent, the Navy must ensure TyCom representation on promotion boards, eliminate meaningless administrative requirements, allocate sufficient manpower and funding resources for tasks assigned, space road trips to visit subordinate commands, and establish effective public relations.
Staffs must be seen as opportunities to excel, not places to be exiled to. Talented individuals from operational environments will, given proper support and encouragment, rapidly make the transition to superior staffers. When searching for men and women to fill these crucial billets, detailers should be guided by one additional admonition, “no yes-men need apply.” They should look for aggressiveness, creativity, professional expertise, and individual courage. Given the visibility of staffs, nothing less should be accepted.
The Solution: Tired of non-answers, extraneous reporting requirements, lack of staff operational familiarity, and insufficient logistics support? Think you are at the top of your professional specialty? Willing to present innovative, controversial solutions to seniors? Do you possess the intellectual honesty and personal courage to dispassionately evaluate peers? Are you willing to sacrifice self and time to ensure that others receive quality support and direction necessary for safe operations?
Then you can be part of the solution.
Take time when filling out that next duty preference card, giving consideration to major staff requirements and your qualifications. If you meet the standards, then lobby your detailer for a chance to make your mark on the Navy.
Nobody asked me either, but . . .
^ Captain Carl H. Amme, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)
Should We Invade Nicaragua?
^hen the revolution in Nicaragua ta^S. °ut the dictator, President Anas- q 10 Somoza Debayle, the Sandinista tj°Vernment promised democratic elec- °ns. liberty for the people, land re-
°ceMtings / September 1984
form, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.
The United States Government provided $150 million in direct aid, and $200 million in indirect aid to the San- dinistas. Since then, the Marxist-Lenin- ist leaders have seized control of the
government and ousted the genuinely democratic Sandinista members, who are now revolting against the government in order to gain the liberty that was promised. The motto of the Sandinista Government, “A revolution without boundaries,” exemplifies its
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intent to spread the communist ideology throughout Central America.
When the democratic government of Grenada was overthrown by leftists and it became apparent that the island was being fortified as a bastion for the spread of Soviet/Cuban subversion in the Western Hemisphere, the United States sent diplomats to talk with then- Prime Minister Maurice Bishop about improving relations. But Bishop s fainthearted attempt to improve relations, by excluding the Cuban ambassador from cabinet meetings, resulted in his house arrest and later assassination.
Considering the United States’ experience with Castro and the history of Soviet expansionism, the developments in Nicaragua and Grenada pose a growing threat to the national interests of the United States.
Many, however, do not see the events in Central America in terms of national interests, but rather in terms of moral issues. Our failure to ensure human rights in the nations south of the border is claimed to be the basic cause of these developments in Central America and the Caribbean. Our allies in Europe criticize us on moral grounds of disregard for the principle of selfdetermination. The church, epitomized by Archbishop John Quinn of San Francisco, charged in a pastoral letter that the policy of the United States toward the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua is “profoundly misdirected.” The Sandinista Government’s recent restrictions on the church on holding mass makes one wonder whether the church can distinguish between peace and liberty.
Under the phony philosophy of peace at any price, no distinctions between democratic and communist regimes are possible. Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni- han (D-NY) asked how one can bring in democracy at the point of a bayonet. He asked the wrong question. The question he should have asked is: “Can we fail to defend democracy in our own back yard?”
Despite the moral concerns of the press, clergy, and liberals in Congress, policies affecting national security can seldom be moral choices. National security policies should not be based upon benign intentions or moral precepts, but upon the probable consequences of inaction, which, in the case of Grenada, would have resulted in a well-fortified Soviet outpost astride the tanker routes from Venezuela.
Columnist George Will pointed out that “liberal democracies have only one goal: a peaceful commodious living.” This goal is subject to two conditions: anything is negotiable, and force should be avoided if at all possible. As long as national interests are not involved, it is affordable to disapprove of the way neighbors apply human rights measures. Economic pressure can be applied to obtain needed reform. But there is a limit to how much pressure can be exerted over another sovereign state.
At times, the United States has neglected its moral choices. In fact,
U. S. blessings were given to the rebels in Cuba who overthrew Batista, and to those in Nicaragua who overthrew Somoza. But when Castro converted the democratic revolution into a communist totalitarian state, and when the Sandinistas destroyed all semblance of democracy in Nicaragua, and when the Cubans and Soviets began to establish a strategic base on Grenada, our concern for moral rights was superseded by concern for the amoral long-term probable consequences to our national interests.
The problem is that we have difficulty in reconciling moral choices, amoral national interests, and government actions in situations such as Grenada. Congress gave its approval after the fact to the Grenada invasion because the medical students felt threatened. But what if there were no Americans on the island . . . would the invasion be justified? Maintaining democratic regimes among our neighboring states is an important national interest. Yet, this was explained at the time as a secondary consideration to the safety of American citizens on Grenada. That the eastern Caribbean democracies felt threatened and requested U.S. help should have been sufficient justification for the intervention. Furthermore, if the grounds of national interest justified our taking action against Grenada, wouldn’t we be justified on the same grounds to seek to overthrow the current communist-controlled government of Nicaragua?
There is a difference, after all, between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian one. An authoritarian regime has an element of pluralism in permitting the existence of some institutions that do not directly threaten the ruler’s power (e.g., the church and trade unions). A totalitarian regime seeks direct control over all institutions and uses repression to ensure the survival of the communist system. Note that Argentina’s long line of authoritarian regimes has ended and that country has chosen a democratic government.
Such evolution is impossible under totalitarian communism.
The question then, is whether Nicaragua is an evolving authoritarian regime that may lean toward democracy or is the administration already in the communist totalitarian camp. If the latter is the case, then the question becomes, will the regime do something that would justify a U. S. invasion into Nicaragua—such as allowing Soviet missiles to be installed on its soil? Currently, everything points to the fact that the Nicaraguan junta is still authoritarian, and that some sort of modus vivendi might still be arranged with the United States. Eden Pastora, the Nicaraguan rebel who is fighting the current regime in the south, claims that the revolution is still alive and that democracy is still possible. Pastora advises against U. S. interference.
There is, nevertheless, a moral dimension to the interpretation of our national interests. This affects our relations with communist China, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Argentina. The moral legitimacy Americans recognize is that the government enjoys the consent of the people and is respectful of life, liberty, and property. The U. S. Government encourages these goals. However, it would not go to war over these moral issues unless they were coupled with palpable threats to our national interests. Despite the slogan of World War I: “make the world safe far democracy,” we fought the war because of concrete threats to our national security.
We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. It nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our "Nobody asked me, but . . column.
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $60.00. It it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest.
To ignore the Soviet Union’s implaC' able confrontation to our purposes of establishing and maintaining democracy and liberty is to court disaster in Central America and to our reputation as a staunch ally.
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Proceedings / September
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