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Contents:
The Surface Navy is Not Ready
From Cockpit to Bridge
The Marine Corps Is Special Ops
No More Bandaids
“The Surface Navy is Not Ready”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 34-40, December 1987; R. R. Nebicker, pp. 16-20, January 1988; J. G. Stavridis, G. D. Pash, and R. O’Neill, pp. 2830, February 1988; J. M. Rodgers and D. W. Meadows, pp. 20-24, March 1988; M. B. Sturgis, C. Johnson, L. R. Brown, pp. 22-23, April 1988 Proceedings)
good reasons why, and apparently the Navy is content with the situation, since the reasons have been institutionalized.
The End of the Submarine’s Era?
Interview: Bruce DeMars
The Maritime Strategy—1988
Defeating Abuse in the Corps
Killing Torpedoes
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“From Cockpit to Bridge”
(See F. C. Seitz and T. F. Davis, pp. 52-56,
January 1988; W. M. McBride, pp. 26-28,
April 1988 Proceedings)
Captain W. G. Carson, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Nebicker’s letter and the article by Captains Seitz and Davis make for an interesting juxtaposition in a single issue. The latter helps to explain the former—that is, the necessity to teach aviation officers the basics of shiphandling in prospective commanding officer school helps to explain the lower quality of surface officers. Surface officers often cannot aspire to command the ships on which they serve (those AOEs, AORs, AFSs, LPHs, LHAs, LPDs, and LKAs mentioned in “From Cockpit to Bridge”). This is only one of the institutional inequities ingrained into Navy policy ensuring that, with some outstanding exceptions, of course, the brightest midshipmen will not become surface officers, and the inferiority of surface officers will be guaranteed. Here is my list of inequities:
►Ensigns who wash out of submarine school or flight school often go to surface school, but the reverse rarely, if ever, happens.
►Surface officers are paid less than other unrestricted line officers.
►Aviation officers command carriers and surface ships, squadrons and groups, but surface officers cannot command carriers or aircraft squadrons or wings.
►Submarine officers command surface ships, squadrons, and groups, but surface officers cannot command submarines, squadrons, or groups.
Yes, “surface warfare officers are cut from a different cloth, inferior to that of submariners and aviators,” to quote Captain Byron, with whom I agree. There are
“The Marine Corps Is Special Ops”
(See T. C. Linn, pp. 48-51, February 1988
Proceedings)
Captain F. G. Hoffman, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve—Major Linn’s use of Eliot Cohen, the Harvard scholar, to buttress his argument is curious. Mr. Cohen is a frequent critic of the defense establishment’s ability to conduct small wars and to deal with low-intensity conflicts (LICs). He finds that most shortfalls are the result of institutional resistance.
In an essay entitled “America’s Conduct of Small War,” published in Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy (Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 293), Cohen stated, “In order to wage small wars successfully, [the Department of Defense] must meet requirements in five respects; expectations, doctrine, manpower, equipment and organization- In all respects the American defense establishment is deficient.”
Mr. Cohen contends that the U. S. mil' itary is unprepared for handling LICs and that the reluctance of the military to comprehend the distinctions between LICs and conventional warfare is the biggest constraining factor. Major Linn provides further evidence of this reluctance to appreciate the need for appropriate changes-
I agree with Major Linn that the Corps represents the most likely tool for limited operations in support of foreign policy- However, unless we want to be criticized as being more interested in our self preservation (mission expansion, budgetary defense) than in fulfilling this obligation, we will have to look objectively at out current roles and missions. Our ne^ Commandant has started this necessary' evolution by redesignating our Marine air-ground task forces from amphibious oriented to expeditionary. This is another step toward refocusing internal and external attention on the real reasons for the Corps’ existence and the need for change- More needs to be done.
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“No More Bandaids”
(See A. M. Smith, pp. 69-74, February 1988
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Stephen Barchet, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Despite the complexity of his subject, Dr. Smith Performed an excellent historical and Physical examination and made a credible diagnosis. The remedied overhaul is long overdue! No more patches, please.
It is time for a complete overhaul or, Preferably, a redesign to correct the basic Problem. Absent clear entitlement to a defined, comprehensive medical benefit J°r all eligible military beneficiaries—to 'nclude predictable and reasonable costsharing—and absent clear management c°ntrol directly by the military services, n° amount of patchwork reform will re- ^rse the ailing military health benefit. National, prospective military health care Management is the logical solution.
‘The End of the Submarine’s Era?”
(See G. G. O’Rourke, pp. 64-68, February •988; W. J. Ruhe p. 139, April 1988 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John F. Meow an, U. S. Navy, Naval Air Systems otnmand’s technical representative to Corporation—Captain O’Rourke is Premature in sounding the death knell for he nuclear submarine. His article is acCUrate in its description of the capabilities and limitations of current antisubmarine ^arfare (ASW) platforms. The major . eficiency is his premise that a number of •mperfect sensors and platforms add up to an overwhelming strength. Perhaps if SaPtain O’Rourke’s background had een in ASW he would have experienced ■rsthand the frustration that those of us in Y® ASW communities experience daily ahout our inability to detect, localize, and jhtack these supposed anachronisms. As e author points out, the ASW forces ,ave been playing catch up to the capa- •hties of the submarine since they were lrst introduced. Except for a brief pe- .‘°d, from the end of World War II to the production of the nuclear submarine, e advantage has been and remains with e undersea forces.
The submarine forces have the inherent s- Vantage of setting the pace. When pas- Ve acoustic detection was improved, Passive prosecution was the keystone of ^ . prosecution, with active acoustics lng used only in a very noisy environment or for attack. Now that a new gener- (je°n of submarines is reaching ever- leasing levels of noise generation, we ay come full circle and be forced to rely
on shorter-ranged and power-limited active sensors. This will severely limit the airborne portion of our ASW forces since it will be dependent on the amount of power an aircraft can generate for its sensors, which is a factor of size. Active prosecution, even with the use of modem technology, is still much shorter ranged than passive. Thus, for active ASW operations, more sensors and platforms are needed to cover the same search area previously handled by passive systems. In addition, active prosecution alerts the submarine to the presence of ASW forces and provides the submarine valuable locating information on the hunters. In general, a submarine can detect the hunter at twice the range the hunter can detect the submarine. Tactical surprise is lost. We may be forced into this situation because our passive sensors have too low a probability of detecting the modem Soviet submarines.
Data processing is not a panacea either. It really involves two technical areas. The first is a correlation of data from two or more sensors that have contact. By using all the data available, incomplete information from one sensor can become a piece of the overall puzzle which, when combined with other pieces, gives us a solution. To use this form of “artificial intelligence” one must have information to feed it. With the new generation of quiet Soviet submarines, we are finding it increasingly difficult to find the pieces of the puzzle for our computers to solve.
Another area is signal processing. Modem computers use mathematical techniques to enable sensors to distinguish a valid signal from the very noisy ocean background noise. Once again, there is a limit to how small a signal-to- noise ratio the computer can handle. As submarines become quieter, we will be unable to separate their acoustic signatures from the background noise. This is already a limiting factor.
Captain O’Rourke refers to nonacoustic sensors, but there has been no technological breakthrough to make the oceans transparent. All the new sensors have great limitations. Laser techniques are often mentioned as the hope of the future, but once again, the laws of physics come into play. The ocean is a poor conductor of light frequencies. Most light that hits the ocean’s surface is reflected back. The incident angle with which the laser hits the ocean must be near vertical to minimize this reflective loss. Thus, the search area is limited to the area directly below the laser source. Lasers also require a great deal of power that is not easily accommodated on board an aircraft. The
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other limitation involves processing the reflection from the target. This requires very sophisticated signal-processing techniques that will give an acceptably low false alarm rate. All the other new technologies face similar problems that must be overcome before they can be usable detection systems. It is doubtful that any new long-range detection system will be developed in this century. Acoustics will remain the primary means of submarine detection for the forseeable future.
New developments in ASW are not keeping pace with the improvements in submarine manufacturing technology. In the future, an increasing percentage of our scarce national defense assets will be needed to counter the Soviet submarine threat, just to maintain the status quo. Technology gains are measured in inches rather than yards. The Soviet submarine threat remains the hardest threat for the battle group to counter and it will remain so in the near future. This will be compounded by improvements in submarine technology and submarine weaponry, such as wake-following torpedoes and cruise missiles.
As a crewman in the Navy’s newest ASW aircraft, the SH-60B, I have great respect for the capabilities of all submarines—Soviet and U. S., diesel and nuclear. They are not invincible, but they are very tough to defeat.
We are not at the end of the submarine era. It has just begun.
“Interview: Bruce DeMars”
(See Interview, pp. 45-55, October 1987; H. C.
Hemond, pp. 23-24, December 1987
Proceedings)
Midshipman First Class Douglas Murphy, U. S. Navy—By early 1990, I hope to be joining the submarine force of which Vice Admiral Bruce DeMars speaks so highly. Why does a midshipman first class choose to go into the submarine force? Admiral DeMars laid it all on the line for me, and showed me the many opportunities I will have as a future submariner.
Admiral DeMars’s emphasis on research and development is the most inspiring part of the interview. The technology of today and tomorrow is constantly being incorporated into submarines, and I want to be part of these developments. Entering the fleet today will put me right in the middle of this progress. The new Seawolf (SSN-21)- class subs have particular interest for me, because with hard work and dedication I hope, eventually, to command one.
1 thank Admiral DeMars for convincing me that my selection to go submarines was the correct decision. Also, thanks to Proceedings for giving me a chance to express my enthusiasm as I prepare to enter the fleet.
“The Maritime Strategy—1988”
(See W. S. Lind and C. Gray, pp. 52-61, February 1988 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas A. Fitzgerald, U. S. Navy, SFIAPE, Belgium—Mr. Lind’s part of the article—“Bad Strategy”— exemplifies the short-sightedness of critics of the maritime strategy, who tend to confuse possible theater campaigns with the overall concept of the maritime strategy. The maritime strategy is a broad description of how the use of maritime force can support national policy. The maritime strategy is formulated within the framework of our geographic position and seeks to attain the ultimate goal of the United States and its allies. Those who attack the strategy as Mr. Lind has done, by plucking out bits and pieces of possible campaigns, miss the overall idea of the strategy. Forward deployment, seizing the initiative, and offense rather than defense are the strategy's major tenets. They suggest possible courses of action— forward deployment to the Kola peninsula, Norway, the North Pacific, the Arctic, and the Baltic, and support for the Central Front. They recognize the major strength of the Soviets—the submarine— and propose many ways to deal with this threat.
Furthermore, those like Mr. Lind, who describe our maritime strategy as continental because its ultimate goal is to bring global pressure on the Soviets, truly misinterpret the overriding goal of all military strategy—forcing the enemy to our will. The United States and its allies can thus subdue the enemy only by combining the efforts of all components of warfare—land, air, and sea. The Navy’s role is to gain command of the sea and bring pressure to bear on the flanks, the vulnerable points of the Soviet Union’s vast land mass. Our military and political leadership will decide, based on the existing situation, when, where, and how this will be done.
Although the maritime strategy proposes a number of ways to gain command of the sea, it does not give priorities, timeliness, or excessive detail. It is a grand strategy that makes three major contributions. First, it tells us how we must train and think: forward, offensive, and global. Second, it prescribes the forces needed to accomplish our mission.
And finally, by its very nature, it makes a major contribution to deterrence; the proposed and practiced theater campaigns force the Soviets to think very carefully about invading Europe’s Central Front.
Mr. Lind talks at great length about nuclear escalation—on both sides. It is clear that neither the Soviets nor NATO wish to venture into this potentially horrible and yet unknown arena. But if we accomplish our maritime goals, the Soviets will be forced to consider such escalation. Faced with U. S. bastions in Norway and Jutland, on the southern flank, and in the Western Pacific, the Soviets would be so unlikely to win an extended land battle on the Central Front that the risk of such a battle would be untenable.
The Soviets are opportunists, but they are not gamblers. They can plan the correlation of forces in the Central Front to foresee a favorable outcome, but when faced with the probability of global maritime pressure exerted at times and places dictated by NATO, they will have to rethink their plans. The Soviets are not dependent on the sea, but they are vulnerable to attack from the sea.
Chaplain-Major G. Caufriez, Belgian Army—The excellent articles prompted me to comment on a dimension to which Dr. Gray—“Global Strategy”—only alludes, and which Mr. Lind—“Bad Strategy”—almost completely disregards—namely, the peacetime political impact of the choice of a strategy.
A strategy is not discarded overnight, so one chosen in peacetime necessarily would be used in the first phase of a conflict, at least. Thus, allied nations, in judging the reliability of U. S. protection, look more to the strategy the United States chooses than to the political pronouncements it makes. Sending the Navy forward to defend Norway and Turkey - for example, would be quite risky, but planning to do so is the clearest demonstration of U. S. commitment to the defense of Europe.
What might be the political consequence of the opposite option, if the United States, as Mr. Lind argues, held back the Navy as a kind of “strategic reserve?” Although it smacks of fiction, this could well result in the progressive unraveling of NATO.
Most Europeans believe—and, I think, rightly so—that the United States would not risk its own territory and population in an all-out nuclear exchange for the sake of Europe. Dr. Gray, who speaks of “counterdeterrent,” recognizes this fad- After the INF treaty, the only tangible signs of U. S. determination are the U. S-
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•roops stationed in Europe—in the Central Region. But for Northern and Southern regions, it is the presence—in peace and war—of the U. S. Navy that proves U. S. support.
Withdraw the Navy, and you will have, as Dr. Gray argues, “NATO’s northern flank behind the Soviet strategic border” (true for the southern flank, too). Fearing that they would be inadequately defended, these countries would probably he driven to look for some alternative for their security—that is, a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, even if this implied economic and political concessions. And thus NATO would begin to unravel. The result might be the break-up of NATO, and the Soviets would have been offered a victory on a silver plate!
Willing or not, NATO’s cohesion rests uPon the concept of forward defense, and this is as true for the Navy as it is for the Army and Air Force.
Brought to their logical conclusions, Mf- Lind’s proposals lead straight to the concept of “Fortress America,” with the Navy being the first and most powerful hne of defense.
The feasibility of “Fortress America” can be argued endlessly, but I note that Lind says “[in] a true maritime strategy, effective land action in the theater would depend heavily on making alliances with local land powers; our own pound forces would not be sufficient.” Be says that such a strategy “assumes a °ng war in which initial defeats in Eu- r°Pe might have to be accepted.”
Allies don’t like to be considered mere Pnwns on a chessboard, ready for a necessary sacrifice. Europeans can understand that the United States would not risk its very existence for their sake, but it should be just as clear that Europeans are n°t prepared to be the victims of “such temporary continental losses.”
The kind of maritime strategy Mr. T*nd advocates would probably leave the United States with some client states, but surely not with proper allies. That it ^t'ght be profitable in the short run is Possible, but it is highly doubtful that sUch a policy would be advantageous in he long run.
It never should be forgotten that the h°ice of a strategy cannot be a purely tulitary matter. It must also, and maybe essentially, be a geopolitical option.
defeating Abuse in the Corps”
®ee J. w. Rider, pp.70-73, January 1988 r°ceedings)
Midshipman First Class Joseph P. Bren- J’un, U. S. Navy— While reading Lieu- enant Colonel Rider’s article, l found myself thinking that I have not been exposed to any form of child abuse. Since I have not been married, I have considered myself excused from this topic. Then, I remembered certain instances of abuse that affected those around me.
During my freshman year in high school, a fellow student was being abused by her father. No one considered this possible since her father was a highly respected police detective. The young lady—for this discussion I will use the name Jane—talked to a teacher at the school and was given professional help.
Jane was sent to live in a house with other abused children while the family had to deal with the shame of losing their daughter. Prior to hearing of the torment that Jane had to endure, I never considered anything so horrendous would be happening to a friend. She was being beaten on a regular basis but was able to conceal her injuries.
After the episode was exposed, I began to ask myself questions. Should I have noticed anything? Could or should 1 have been able to help this friend in need? If 1 had known, what course of action would
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I have taken? I reviewed the year we’d spent together in class and I began to discover that there were clues. Although mood swings are quite common in adolescents, Jane suffered severe periods of depression. Even after this incident, 1 was quite naive. I still felt that this was a rare and isolated case.
As the author also pointed out, children are raised in a perpetual state of
change. The paddle, for example, is outdated. I observed this firsthand while working at a day care center for one semester. On my first day, the instructors laid down the ground rules: no physical punishment would be levied by us. I was not allowed to roughhouse or use any force.
Next, I learned about detection. The obvious signs of abuse include excessive
bruises and abrasions, and a child’s fear of going home with a parent. Another telltale sign is when a child appears overly withdrawn or introverted. The most important rule is that suspicion warrants action. Not taking the proper steps to prevent abuse ultimately hurts the abuser as well as the child.
The military profession entails stress and serious responsibilities experienced by few other professions as vividly. It is important for junior officers, whether married or not, to be on the lookout for abuse among their subordinates and their families. Education on this subject is vital to the continued existence of the family- The subject of abuse has been taboo long enough. Positive action must be taken-
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“Killing Torpedoes”
(See B. F. McConoughey, pp. 102-103,
February 1988 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Steve Swierczek, U. S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Mc- Conoughey’s article really is dedicated to a discussion of how to detect torpedoes, not how to effectively counter or even destroy them. In order for a tactical action officer (TAO) to decide how to evade a torpedo and protect the high valued unit (HVU), he must be given the tools necessary to deal with the threat-
The most dangerous torpedo is the “wake-rider” type. Its high speed and long range make it a very deadly weapon against any surface target. But what if the torpedo couldn’t find the wake of its intended victim?
The obsolete depth charges that Lieutenant McConoughey refers to would be suited ideally for the purpose of rolling off the fantail and detonating at a preset depth, designed to thoroughly disrupt the wake of the ship as it maneuvers to escape the homing torpedo. Even the HVU could be configured to carry depth charges for this purpose. With any luck at all the torpedo would be damaged or even destroyed outright as a result of the depth charge’s detonation.
In addition, the optimum use of ASW weapons mandates that the TAO have the vital pieces of information on the undersea picture on hand. The use of sonobuoy patterns in the latter stages of a submarine attack would be a matter of “too little, too late.” If an attack is detected and the torpedo is on the way, then the TAO must react to protect the HVU and his own ship, if possible. The time for laying sonobuoy patterns is then past.
Let’s really kill torpedoes. Then go get the skunk that let them loose!