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The attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31) raised issues that will be debated for years across wardroom tables, in the Pentagon, in Congress, and in the pages of Proceedings. There are many complex implications for the Navy, but two major issues emerge: the incident itself, and the proper place for ships like the Stark, today and in the future. The most pressing question is quo vadis frigates in the U. S. Navy. The frigate force, although relatively modern, is aging. The NATO Frigate Replacement Program (NFR-90) is on the horizon. Congressional language in the fiscal year 1988 appropriations act directed the Navy to examine what amounts to a service life extension program (SLEP) for the Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates. Other congressional programs are changing the mission of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class by upgrading the ships’ fire-control systems rather than their antisubmarine warfare (ASW) suites.
What is a frigate? This is not a trivial question. Size is not a determinant, though many people (including this writer) think of frigates as small ships. The 3,500-ton (going to 4,000) FFG-7-class ships are larger than World War II-era Fletcher (DD-445)-class destroyers. Like 18th- century sailing frigates, modern frigates are smaller than the “battle line’’ fleet ships, lightly gunned and armored, maneuverable, supposedly inexpensive to build and operate, and, by implication—expendable.
An important role for the sailing frigate and its spiritual descendant—the pre-World War II destroyer—was to serve as the fleet’s eyes and ears, and to be its messenger. In the U. S. Navy, the surface-ship surveillance function has largely been taken over by long-range sensors, and the delivery role has been assumed by the helicopter. (In many navies, these traditional functions are still carried out by ships classified as frigates.) Other lineage attributes still apply to modern frigates, principally small size (relatively) and economy of construction and operation. They are about 350-450 feet long and displace 3,000-4,200 tons. The crew, depending on class, numbers 200-300 officers and men.
The mission statement defining today’s U. S. Navy frigate describes a ship for open-ocean operations in the protection of shipping, specifically convoy and amphibious shipping. The frigate’s offensive capability is in the ASW mission area. The mission statement also requires an antiair warfare (AAW) capability for point defense and limited protection of the escorted ships. The frigate’s command, control, and communications suite is tailored to the escort and shipping protection mission. This singlepurpose mission highlights one important difference between sailing frigates and those in service today. The frigates built during Admiral Horatio Nelson’s and Admiral George Preble’s time were designed and employed as multipurpose warships. The sailing frigate could search for the ship of the line, but would run before it. Today’s frigate is expected to do battle with her quarry. Versatility for other tasks, particularly in peacetime, is derived from her defensive weapon suite, the gun and missile battery—not the main battery, the ASW weapon system.
Before we examine the place of a frigate in modern naval warfare, particularly in the U. S. Navy, surface warship survivability must be discussed. The debate about aircraft carrier vulnerability has raged for years. The sinking of the Sheffield during the Falklands Conflict expanded the debate to include all combatants. The Stark incident added volume to the debate. Cassandras and sedentary armchair experts (to paraphrase former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman) flatly state that “surface ships are obsolete,” being fatally vulnerable to the ordnance of modern war, particularly missiles. Even if this were true-" and it is not—the question should be: “What is the alternative?” Can a submarine maintain sea control, or specifically, defend maritime shipping from missiles and air attack? Land-based air would require a winged alumina111 cloud. From the perspective of warfighting (and economics for that matter), the question—“Are surface ships obsolete?”—is trivial unless the assumption is made that there is no need for sea control in a war with the Soviets'
The surface-ship question is not one of vulnerability’ but the ability of a surface ship to survive battle damage and continue to fight; the correct term is “survivability- In combat, the survivability of a warship depends on many factors. The design characteristics built into the ship ,0 enhance survivability—armor, speed, compartmentation- redundant equipment, etc.—are vital. The first principle in survivability is to put ordnance on the enemy before he can do the same to you. Critical to the success of this ride are: the skill of the captain in fighting his ship, damag^ control, training, and the ship’s material condition ana equipment readiness.
The most critical factor affecting ship vulnerability's the operational mission and associated threat. All ships"' surface or subsurface, large or small—are vulnerable when sent in harm’s way. A ship is vulnerable the momeflt she casts off all lines—whether to cruise to a local training area or to protect U. S. interests in a foreign sea. Tbe measure of vulnerability is the threat or risk, which may be rocks and shoals or Exocet missiles. Borrowing formef Ohio State football coach Woody Hayes’s words (referring to use of the forward pass), “Many things can happe(1’ only one of which is good.” This is particularly true when
Mission involves “peacekeeping” or putting ordnance n target.
1>s important to understand what the modern frigate U«>1 do. First and foremost, the frigate is not a battle ^reeP~caPable warship, though many frigate sailors disa- Oliver Hazard Perry- and A"/!ox-class frigates were f Ula to meet the threats a battle force is expected to t0ee' anV more than a sailing frigate was expected to stand the [0 toe anc^ slug it out with a two-deck, 100-gun ship of a h-lne fr*gate makes only a marginal contribution to the h 6 ^rouP s mission and cannot protect herself from batti reats. 1° short, a frigate is a liability to the wartime e_group commander.
ti Cvertheless, there are those who think otherwise, par- fav ar*^.0^ lhe FFG-7 class. This wishful thinking finds and°r Pr'marily *nstde the Washington, D. C., beltway, the tf ^ase<^ on economics—not on an understanding of b, lareat. If it were possible to build a battle group-capa- beSa'P for the price of an FFG-7, the U. S. Navy would ers pCUring frigates and not Aegis cruisers and destroy- com roP°nents of a small-ship navy can argue that fleet e]e Zanders have deployed frigates for years as integral •ho^ts of the battle group, and in high-threat areas. Al- nia i ^'s 's true’ h ’s done reluctantly by fleet com- tim CrS’ W*10 must balance the threat against the peace- Peuc ni*ss*on °f a particular battle group. The Navy’s etime use of frigates is based on the premise that numbers are important (witness NATO obligations), and that the frigate helps satisfy the presence role of deployed battle forces. The use of frigates with the battle group in peacetime reflects the fact that the Navy does not have sufficient battle group-capable surface warships to meet the requirement. Benefits and requirements are weighed against risks.
The use of the Stark in the Persian Gulf was a classic example of peacetime balancing of need against risk and threat. The U. S. Navy has been operating in the region for 40 years. The threat in the Persian Gulf— surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles, particularly the Exocet—was understood in May 1987. Unfortunately, the reasonable assumption that “friends” would not use the Exocet against the U. S. Navy was incorrect. The Stark as deployed was capable, with an acceptable risk, of defeating the known threats, including the Exocet. There have been times in the Gulf when the risk to patrolling
ships from missiles was greater than at the time of the Stark incident. For years, the Navy routinely deployed A'no.r-class frigates to the Persian Gulf. This class had little chance of defeating the Exocet until the Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS) was installed, and would have been ineffective against the missile-launching platform. But at the time they were deployed to the Gulf, the need was balanced with the risk. It is no accident that an FFG-7 was on guard in the Gulf on 17 May and not an
battle-force operations.
Can the frigate force carry out its mission against current and future threats? The answer is yes for convoy escort operations and for meeting the first- and second- generation Soviet submarine threat. Because the Soviet submarine force will include a large number of these boats well into the next decade, it appears that the current U. S- Navy frigate force should be effective for another ten years. But the third-generation submarine threat will be
|
Table 1 |
Current U. S. Navy Frigate Force |
|
|
Type |
Class/Ship |
Commissioned |
Active |
NRF |
FFG-7 |
Oliver Hazard Perry |
1977-88 |
38* |
12 |
FFG-1 |
Brooke |
1966-68 |
6 |
|
FF-1088 |
Glover |
1965 |
1 |
|
FF-1052 |
Knox |
1969-74 |
41 |
7 |
FF-1040 |
Garcia |
1964-68 |
10 |
|
FF-1037 |
Bronstein |
1963 |
2 |
|
|
|
Total |
98 |
19 |
♦The Ingraham (FFG-61) the last ship of the class, is scheduled for commissioning on 25 June 1988. Source: Norman Polmar. Ships and Aircraft of the V. S. Fleet, 14th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 160. |
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FF-1052. In this era of “violent peace,” employing military force is a difficult issue for planners and operators. The American people, at least according to the media, trial lawyers, and politicians, would like to think that it is possible to live in a world without risk.
The Frigate in War: Table 1 lists the U. S. Navy’s current frigate force. The 16 FF-1040- and FFG-1-class ships, with five-inch/38-caliber guns and pressure-fired boilers, were scheduled to retire within the next decade, but because of budget constraints they may be retired earlier. This leaves a 101-ship frigate force to serve well into the next century. Twenty-eight will eventually be assigned to the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). All of the ships in this force are capable of operating a helicopter. The active ships of the FFG-7 class can operate the SH-60B LAMPS- III (light airborne multipurpose system) helo. The FF- 1052s and the NRF frigates operate the SH-2 LAMPS-I. The FFG-7’s active sonar is of low power and of marginal capability against the new generation of Soviet submarines, and the high-powered, active sonars of the FF-1052 class are satisfactory in an escort role, but need improvements. The two most important developments in surface- ship ASW are the LAMPS-III helo and the SQR-19 acoustic towed-array sonar. When these two weapons are integrated into the SQQ-89 ASW weapon system, it will be, arguably, the best ASW system above or below the water. In keeping with its mission statement, the frigate force has a limited hard-kill capability against the current threat, particularly air-to-surface missiles. This includes the Stark and her sister FFG-7s. The limited magazine capacity, Mk-92 fire-control system, and SM-1 Standard missile provide sufficient point defense for the ship and a limited force-protection capability, but it is unsuitable for wartime difficult for older active systems and ships without a helicopter and acoustic tail. Because of recent Soviet successes in submarine quieting, only ships with the SQQ-89 system can match the latest generation Soviet nuclear- powered attack submarine (SSN) threat at an acceptable level of risk. Soviet quieting technology will likely continue to improve, thus the U. S. Navy will have to change its emphasis on passive systems to active sonar; all AS^ systems will be affected—aircraft, surface, and subsurface. Generally, then, the frigate force’s mission capability is marginal, particularly in light of Soviet submarine quieting developments.
Does the U. S. Navy have enough frigates? The answer is yes, based on the most recent Navy force-level studies! considering only numbers, and not capability or an in' crease in the threat, the Navy should have enough frigate* through the year 2005. In fact, again only in terms numbers, the frigate force is the only adequate surface warfare ship category. This becomes obvious when frigate force numbers are compared to the required numbers of battle force-capable ships. The most serious U. S. Navy force-level deficiencies are in battle-force AAW. Currenj Navy force-level requirements represent a “prudent risk force, supporting a 600-ship Navy with 15 carrier and faur battleship battle groups, and an amphibious force to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).
But let us return to the real world. The discussion about a “prudent risk” force, Navy force-level studies, wartime mission statements, and the like is the language of tbe programmer and his lair—the Pentagon. Granted, tNs perspective is key to the warship acquisition process, but11 is only part of the equation. The Navy receives an enof'
J\
mous amount of help from pundits, Congress, and others ln setting requirements, and designing, building, and operating the ships of the Navy. This is particularly true of e FFG-7 class. As a class, frigates are relatively inexpensive. In a weapon system context, they are not inordinately complex. They could be built in several shipyards around the country—at least until the recent demise of a "umber of shipyards. In peacetime, each of the four main asses of frigates perform superbly and make excellent F ships. They are popular with Congress, ship build- Crs’ and even fleet commanders when numbers are re- 4U|red. (In fact, they may be the new home of the “true” ^estroyer sailor, who likes a lively ship under his sea ots.) Therefore, we can expect proposals that involve §ate numbers, modernization, and weapon systems.
he main frigate issues facing the Navy in the near term are:
^ 'T
0 what extent should the existing frigate force be mod- mzed, and what are the modernization priorities? Does ls include a service life extension program (SLEP) for the FF-1052 class?
Hovv should the U. S. Navy support the NFR-90?
Frigate Modernization: Any proposal to modernize the Jigate force, and particularly to SLEP the FF-1052 class, ^ °uld be addressed in the context of the total frigate rce, not just one class. On this basis, are there sufficient 'gates to carry it out? Can the ships do their wartime job meet the developing threat? If frigates are to be mod- 'zed, the required resources must be prioritized with , 8 ru to total Navy resources and the priority of a particu- ^ modernization, i. e., AAW versus ASW. The priority r any frjgate modernization program must be ASW, spe- 1'cally the SQQ-89 weapon system and the LAMPS-I n 'Hi helos. The priority for SQQ-89 modernization
av°U. ^ Fe the active and reserve FFG-7s. If there is money sh * i e *n ASW mission area, first consideration SI°Fd^ 8'ven t0 improving the FF-1052 ASW system; a should be secondary.
for 6re are a nurr|her of reasons for this priority. First and m°st is the fact that the Navy is entering a period of
austerity, thus every mission area must make the best use of allocated resources. Unfortunately, a proper SLEP will be expensive and will produce only a marginal gain. Both the Navy and industry have proposed excellent SLEP programs for the FF-1052s. However, the FF-1052s are powered by 1,200-pound steam plants. Even if they were given a full engineering SLEP, it is doubtful that the service life of the engineering plants could be extended to 35-45 years. The Navy should remember the painful lessons of the destroyer fleet rehabilitation and modernization (FRAM) program. The destroyers that received FRAMs had engineering plants with great redundancies. Nevertheless, after 30 years in the fleet they were operationally unreliable and notorious sinkholes for people, money, and other resources. Fortunately, the FRAM destroyer had more than one shaft to come home on. The FF-1052s were built with only one shaft and have almost no auxiliary machinery redundancies. They were built in the late 1960s on the premise that “one shaft-one pump” was good enough. This concept may have been satisfactory then, but to SLEP these steamships now or later would be a waste of time and money.
Replacing the FF-1052 steam plant with a gas turbine is an attractive option, except for the cost. It would be more cost-effective and make more war-fighting sense to buy a new hull than to modernize a marginal old one. The Navy should wait for the revolution at sea program to produce new concepts in hull design and materials before embarking on a new frigate building program.
Another frigate modernization scheme, one of many proposed by industry and Congress, is CORT (coherent receiver transmitter), a program to improve the FFG-7s’ Mk-92 fire-control system. CORT, however, is the wrong program, on the wrong ship, at the wrong time. It is the wrong program because it makes a “good enough” AAW
system into a very expensive “good enough” system. CORT improves AAW capability very little for the investment. It is the wrong ship because the FFG-7s’ mission is ASW; we need to modernize the ASW system, not marginally beef up AAW capabilities. The time is wrong because every dollar must be allocated where it can do the most toward deterrence and putting ordnance on target. CORT falls into the “nice to have capability” grab bag.
The NATO Frigate (NFR-90): The concept is simple— design a ship that meets the needs of the NATO navies and can be built cheaply in numbers. The U. S. Navy cannot win a future battle of the Atlantic alone. This was true in World War II and is just as true today. Only if the NATO nations retain effective war-fighting naval capabilities will the alliance meet the threat. The NFR-90 complements the highest war-fighting priority and need in the U. S. Navy— battle force-capable ships capable of meeting the threat expected around the European land mass. They must be built in numbers, so they must be affordable to many nations. The U. S. Navy and NATO must not fall into the position where only the United States can afford the NATO frigate.
The best way for the U. S. Navy to contribute to the NFR-90 is to do everything possible to help make the ship affordable and capable. This requires that the U. S. Navy, as a matter of policy, recognize that the ship must be designed to meet European NATO naval, and not U. S. Navy, requirements and standards. The U. S. Navy may be hesitant to commit to buying such a ship, but it will cost less and thus have a better chance of succeeding. This does not mean that the NFR-90 will be an inferior ship. The goal is a ship that is “good enough” to meet the European NATO threat and requirements.
U. S. Navy participation in designing and integrating the NFR-90 weapon system is a different issue. The U. S. Navy should lead from its strong position in this area, and
Aegis technology should be the touchstone. The NATO AAW program as currently envisioned is a short-range (40 miles), least-cost detection system that will meet the threat, particularly targets with low radar cross-sections- Program costs will be shared by the participating NATO nations. The AAW threat requirements of both the NFR- 90 and the U. S. Navy are complementary. Because the AAW project is a NATO project, it will be subject to the push and pull of national interests. This will challenge the system designers to accommodate a variety of weapons and sensors. But the cost and schedule risks are outweighed by the advantages of a NATO development project to produce an integrated weapon system. Without the U. S. Navy’s participation, it is doubtful that the other NATO navies—even in concert—could afford to put together a weapon system with the power of Aegis. On the other hand, if the technical challenge of accommodating a number of different weapons in an integrated system can be met, the total cost to NATO and the United States should be less than if the U. S. Navy develops its own short-range AAW weapon system.
Quo vadis the frigate? The answer is not clear. In the near term, the force building requirement is for multipurpose, battle force-capable ships. The need to build neW frigates, including the NFR-90, and modernizing old ships is not clear. The issue is complicated by a matrix of threat, politics, and resource priorities. What is clear is a need f°r frigate and surface-ship contributions to the U. S. Navy's sea-control mission.
Recently retired, Admiral Metcalf was the Deputy Chief of Naval Op' erations (Surface Warfare). His command at sea duty tours include" Commander Second Fleet; Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group EigW’ Battle Group Two, Sixth Fleet; Commander, Naval Surface Group Pacific; Commander Destroyer Squadron Thirty-Three; USS Bradley (FF-1041); Commander, Landing Division Ninety Two; and USS West' Chester County (LST-1167); and USS King County (AG-157). In Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Metcalf served aS Director of General Planning and Programming Division, and Head' Planning Branch, Programming Division. He also served several tours in the Bureau of Naval Personnel and was an instructor at the Naval Acad" emy. He graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School and the Nava Academy.
72 Proceedings / Naval Review 19*$
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