Perceptions of the problems of manning the 600-ship Navy are as varied as the solutions. The most popular view holds that a national manpower shortage exists, and the population of the key age group is too small to meet service recruiting requirements. Admittedly, there is a great deal of competition in the marketplace for qualified, recruitable individuals—among the services, and also in the civilian sector. The all-volunteer military force and its attendant benefit packages, mainly pay, makes military service at least marginally competitive with the civilian sector.
At present, to meet the manning requirements of all the services, the Department of Defense (DoD) must recruit one of every 39 qualified youngsters. When we reach the bottom of this demographic valley in 1995, one of every 34 recruitable youngsters will have to be enlisted to maintain manning levels. Therefore, even though the recruitable base is small now, it is not going to get much worse. For eight years, the Naval Recruiting Command has met its goal each month. This impressive statistic indicates that a well-led recruiting force, properly manned and offering challenging work, can man the 600-ship Navy. The problem is not a demographic one.
Some people on Capitol Hill believe that the number of personnel required to crew 600 ships is the manning requirement for the 600-ship Navy. When sea-shore rotation is explained to these individuals, they start talking about feather-bedding and gilding the lily. It is an enormous challenge to make people truly understand the Navy’s manning requirements.
When news of Senator John Glenn’s (D-OH) officer reduction proposal became public, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services were very concerned. They immediately asked Senator Glenn and his staff to share their analyses. But no data were or have been shared. In the early months of arguing this legislation, enlisted-to-officer ratios were highlighted as proof of “brass creep” and an “officer rich” military. All the services were hungry to learn the congressionally desired ratio, which Senator Glenn and his staff stated as 6.5:1. The current ratios by service are:
Marine Corps |
8.9:1 |
Navy |
7.1:1 |
Army |
6.1:1 |
Air Force |
4.5:1 |
Congress left distribution of these reductions to OSD. The Joint Chiefs of Staff all signed a letter addressed to Senator Glenn that strongly objected to such unstaffed officer reductions. The Secretary of Defense stated that DoD would not make any reductions in officer end strength. This was a curious position, since the reductions were made law by congressional enactment.
They achieved some success when the percentages were changed to 1% in fiscal year 1987, 2% in fiscal year 1988, and 3% for fiscal year 1989, equalling the overall 6% reduction. While early arguments were politely received, the bottom line remained that the apportionment of the reductions was the responsibility of OSD. The Navy hoped that its officer corps would be spared any cuts, since it was launching ships, which require officers and crews. Its hopes were realized in 1987. However, the approved congressional growth of 1,576 in Navy officer end strength for fiscal year 1987 was zeroed by OSD. Thus, the end result of this “nonreduction” was a 2.14% reduction in the Navy’s planned officer end strength for fiscal year 1987. If ships are added to the inventory without commensurate personnel increases, those currently serving must bear the additional burden for manning these ships.
Officer Reductions: The issue of officer reductions is extremely contentious within DoD. The service secretaries and service chiefs make repeated assaults on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, each with their own service’s special personnel requirements and the reasons for the existing officer-to-enlisted ratios. Looking down the barrel of a 2% reduction in the officer corps in 1988. they have spent untold hours in the past year trying to persuade Senator Glenn and the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Personnel Subcommittee to rescind the reduction. But the artificial precision of the enlisted-to- officer ratio proved much too conclusive for OSD and congressional decision makers.
The requirement for officer justification then became a zero-based requirements study for each service’s officer corps. The Navy began a billet-by-billet review of each officer requirement. The review validated the Navy’s officer manning standards. The only soft spot in the analysis was the requirement for 7,000 restricted line and staff corps officers in shore billets. Capitol Hill staff members argued that civilians could fill those medical, dental. Civil Engineering Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, and supply billets. There is no question that civilians could perform these particular functions. But they might not be available to serve as forward replacements in time of conflict. Furthermore, would Congress be willing to appropriate the dollars to hire these civilians? As expected, congressional staff members zeroed in on the “lack of rigor” in the military justification for the shore, staff, and restricted line requirements. Consequently, they found the zero-based officer requirements study flawed and granted no relief from the required officer reductions. Following this drill, the services resumed efforts to convince OSD that sharing the reduction equally among all the services was not in the best interest of national defense. The Navy found it particularly difficult to understand why arbitrary reductions should be made to its officer corps, when the enlisted-to-officer ratio exceeded Congress’s stated goals. In January 1988, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci allocated the congressionally directed officer reductions, sparing the Navy any change from its current end strength.
Manning the 600-ship Navy will require enlisted end strength growth if the Navy is to maintain an equitable sea-shore rotation. The matter of sea-shore rotation is critical to the retention of sailors and the proper manning of the Navy. In the late 1970s, the shortfall of personnel resulting from a no end strength growth policy coupled with the increasing requirement for a continued worldwide U. S. naval presence, placed naval manpower in dire straits. A sailor returning from a six- to eight-month deployment could not count on remaining on his ship until the ship’s next deployment. If he was a technician or in a poorly manned rating, he stood a good chance of being cross-decked to a deploying ship. Needless to say, this kind of treatment put reenlistment rates at all-time lows. By the end of the 1970s, with end strength constrained and the operational tempo increasing, the Navy had a shortfall of 22,000 petty officers. Recent actions taken regarding authorized end strength caps and the ever-increasing requirements for naval forces, indicate that the Navy might be forced to relive the experiences of the 1970s. The Navy cannot do more with less. The operational requirements for naval forces worldwide are increasing. Yet, in times of reduced appropriations, dollar savings always seem to be made at the expense of naval personnel.
Naval personnel deploy without their families, contrary to the other services. The 300,000-plus Army and Air Force personnel stationed in Europe have their families with them. Yet, there are no families with the sailors on the ships in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the western Pacific. The Navy is an operating, contributing element of U. S. foreign policy. It is flexible, and has a worldwide capability, which the administration has used time and time again. Our sailors at sea and their families should not have to carry this burden of unrealistic demands in the form of family separation brought about by a requirement to save dollars. The administration should either reduce the commitments or find other sources for saving money.
Women in the Navy: Currently, 48,000 enlisted women and 7,000 female officers serve in the Navy across the total spectrum of naval requirements, with few exceptions. The Navy is more than satisfied with the performance of its female personnel. The enlisted women are better educated, are promoted faster, and have fewer disciplinary problems than their male counterparts. They also miss far fewer days on the job. This is counter to the falsely held belief that pregnancy causes women to lose more time in the work centers than men.
Pregnancy does cause personnel management problems in the Navy, just as it does in the civilian sector. Some women use pregnancy to manipulate the command, and the actions of these few irresponsible individuals fuel the fires of discontent, generating outrageous stories on the waterfront. On the other hand, a well-led ship with a strong sense of “team” and commitment to success has a much lower pregnancy rate among its female crew members than a ship that lacks good leadership. The same general comment applies to the shore establishment, but to a much lesser extent. The ability of a commanding officer to exert his influence in the shore environment in the matter of pregnancy is not as dramatic.
Women’s advocate groups and the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service (DACOWITS), in particular, are continually seeking ways to expand the role of women in the military, and the services welcome the positive advice and suggestions of these organizations. As enlisted strength grew during the early and middle 1980s, female end strength increased proportionately. Beginning in fiscal year 1986, Congress approved less and less of the requested end strength. That which they did approve was done so with the stipulation that the numbers be added to the afloat forces. With these constraints, manpower increases did not permit the planned growth in female numbers. Women’s advocacy groups identified this necessary decision of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy as an antifeminist “freeze.” This is not true. It was just the necessary and responsible personnel management action required to control the worsening seashore rotation ratio of the sailors on ships.
The majority of women in the Navy serve ashore. If the number of women is increased, most of the extra women will serve ashore. Sea-intensive ratings are particularly sensitive to such female overmanning of shore billets. The Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities is one of the few shore assignments, in rate, for boilerman technicians (BTs), machinist’s mates (MMs), electrician’s mates (EMs), gunner’s mates (GMs), etc. If women in those rates fill these shore jobs, where do the men go for shore duty?
Where are the male BTs, MMs, EMs, and GMs who are going to relieve their fellows in rate at sea? The requirements for the sea-intensive rates’ skills at sea are far greater than ashore. The arduous nature of their duties at sea coupled with a shortage of shore billets makes these rates a retention challenge. Since shortages exist, the seashore ratio of BTs and MMs is currently five years at sea for two ashore. The objective for all rates is three years at sea for three ashore. The best that can currently be achieved is four years at sea followed by three ashore. This balance in sea-intensive rates vis-a-vis shore billets causes them to serve in jobs outside their rate ashore to permit time at home and away from the rigors of sea. Security guards, special services, and transportation pool drivers are typical jobs for them. Yet these same jobs are the ones that women can and do fill. More women in the Navy means more women ashore, more women ashore reduces shore duty billets that men in the sea-intensive ratings can fill and so impacts negatively on the ability to rotate men ashore.
Sustained combat operations at sea is the Navy’s mission. Any personnel decisions implemented that detract from that capability are wrong. The Navy’s recent announcement that it will assign women to Combat Logistic Force (CLF) ships is testimony to the influence of women’s advocacy groups. The aircraft carrier battle groups and surface force battle groups always have CLF ships with them. The battle groups need the fuel, food, and ammunition that these ships carry. At the precise moment the battle groups’ aircraft are engaging the enemy, the CLF ships could well be replenishing the battle group’s ships. To say, as was said in the recently announced change assigning women to the CLF, that these ships do not normally “seek out and engage” the enemy is technically correct. Yet they are in a combat environment and steam as part of a combatant force. The CLF ships’ crews think they are part of a fighting force. When battle groups are decorated for underway actions, such as in Lebanon or the Arabian Sea, the CLF ships are included.
A case could be made that an aircraft carrier is not a combatant. It does not seek out and engage the enemy with its own hull and deckplates. The ship’s aircraft seek out and engage the enemy. The carrier is simply a logistics platform. Perhaps it, too, could be considered part of the CLF. Then the problem of adequate opportunities for sea duty for women would be solved. But does it pass the common sense test? In submarine parlance, a CLF ship is a high-value target. Sink or disable that ship and the battle group is neutralized.
Some suggest that DACOWITS supports the assignment of more women at sea, and in combatant ships, more enthusiastically than the women in the Navy support the decision. While their actions are well intended, it is doubtful that the Navy’s fighting capability will be enhanced by DACOWITS’ politically pressured change in the assignment of women to sea. When a woman is assigned to a regularly steaming fleet unit, and not a tender, with a requirement of daily and weekly operations, it becomes difficult to imagine how this woman could manage her life if she had to meet the demands of being a wife and mother. How could this wife and mother deal with the regular six- month deployments made by virtually all navy ships and in particular ships of the CLF? She could possibly manage in the same way as the seagoing father who is supported by his wife, who manages the home, children, and work while he is away. There are Navy families now who have made such an arrangement work.
Wives and mothers have made successful six-month deployments on board tenders. But these numbers are small, and there is no record of a married woman with children making more than one deployment. Single parents who can leave dependent children with family routinely deploy. Thousands of single male sailors with dependent children deploy. In 99% of the cases, however, the children are in the custody of the divorced mother. A special problem exists for the single female parent without family support who is assigned to an operating ship. What does she do with her children? The Navy has many assignment problems now with single female parents who have custody of their children. When the number of females at sea is increased from 5,000 to 15,000, it is an understatement to say that the management of the problem will be a challenge.
Navy Flag Officers and Marine Generals: The number of Navy flag officers and Marine generals compared to the other services is as disproportionate as the officer-to- enlisted ratios. The Army leads with 407 generals; the Air Force has 334 generals; the Navy has 258 admirals; and the Marine Corps has 65 generals. The origin of these allocations is not totally clear but seems to have resulted as much from the Navy’s own conservatism as any plot to disproportionately limit the number of admirals and Marine generals. The other services have argued their case better before OSD and the Congress, which resulted in greater numbers of flag officers for the other services.
The Navy and Marine Corps together account for 26% of the total flag/general officer numbers. They also have 29% of the total DoD end strength and are appropriated 34% of the DoD budget. This lack of flag officers compared to the other services is most apparent in service representation outside the Navy and Marine Corps but is also disproportionate within the Department of the Navy (DoN). The DoN is often accused of not being interested in filling its share of joint and OSD billets. Such is not the case. The Navy simply does not have enough people to compete with the other services.
The total number of each service’s three- and four-star officers is directly proportional to their total flag end strength. The law provides that 15% of each service’s flag/general officer (F/GO) strength may be three and four stars. Twenty-five percent of that number is the limit on four stars:
Army: 15% of 407 = 61; 25% of 61 = 15
Air Force: 15% of 334 = 50; 25% of 50 = 12
Navy: 15% of 258 = 39; 25% of 39 = 10
Marine Corps: 15% of 65 = 9; 25% of 9 = 2
The three- and four-star officers are just not available. Naval forces are used most often as an instrument of foreign policy. But it is the generals from the Army and Air Force who are found in such great numbers in Joint and Unified Commands.
After lengthy discussions with OSD, the numbers were carefully examined and it was agreed that DoN was at a disadvantage. To correct the disparity, the Navy and Marine Corps were each authorized five more F/GO numbers for each F/GO officer assigned out of the service above the number serving on 1 September 1986. In the Navy’s case, 47 flag officers were serving outside the Navy. One was added until 53 was reached. This action increased the Navy’s three- and four-star numbers by one to 38 (15% of 258). Increasing the number serving outside the Navy was not easy. The Joint Staff did not suddenly turn Army and Air Force general officer positions into Navy/Marine Corps jobs. Therefore, the Navy had to find its own jobs in order for its number to grow. These jobs included: a watchstander at NORAD (North American Air Defense Command), an assistant to the DoD legislative assistant, etc. These are hardly significant assignments that need naval expertise. Yet one three-star authorization was added.
In the past ten years, more than 30 new three-star requirements have been created. During this time, all of the services’ F/GO numbers have been reduced. But the ratios have remained almost constant, resulting in the Navy’s three- and four-star numbers decreasing even more. The Navy has made the sacrifice internally to respond to the increasing out-of-service demands. The following Navy flag officer assignments that were once three-star are currently being filled at the two-star grade:
Deputy Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet
Deputy Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet
OP-94
President of the Naval War College
Superintendent of the Naval Academy
The Chief and Vice Chief of Naval Material were abolished. These seven admiral and vice admiral authorizations are being used to fill positions outside the Navy. Leadership at the higher grades is needed in those flag billets that were recently downgraded to two stars. The Navy is desperate to fill key billets in Joint and Unified Commands. Yet it simply does not have the numbers.
Manning a 600-ship Navy is possible, but it will take a total commitment—by the administration, Congress, the Navy, and the nation they serve.