This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
The “Gorbachev revolution’ ’ andpere- stroyka (restructuring) now dominate the U. S. view of the Soviet Union in its strategic competition with the West. This article presents several perspectives on the Soviet Navy in 1987 against the background of this “revolution.”
Gorbachev’s Navy
In early October 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, visited Murmansk and the headquarters of the Soviet Northern Fleet at Severomorsk on the Kola Peninsula. Accompanied by Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir N. Chernavin, Gorbachev made it clear that he will personally involve himself with naval affairs and longterm national security issues in the maritime arena.
In Murmansk on 1 October, Secretary Gorbachev laid out a far-reaching agenda for the Arctic region, which would further support Soviet national interests, counter the U. S. maritime strategy, and help strengthen the Soviet Navy in an area where it is relatively weak, antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Specific proposals called for, among other things, a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, restricting naval activity in the area; “limiting competition in ASW weapons”; and announcing all upcoming naval and air exercises in the region. Gorbachev also offered to remove the Golf conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines from the Baltic and make it a nuclear-free zone.
On the following day, Secretary Gorbachev toured Severomorsk and was filmed talking with the crews on board a Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and the nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov. He stressed that Soviet defense must remain strong to support his foreign policy initiatives, and that wherever he went “from east to west, north to south, the working people desire one thing, we should not skimp on the military, that everything should be reliably defended.”
The General Secretary’s three-day visit to the navy’s most modem units and his enunciation of national initiatives to check the Western naval threat in the Arctic were not the first of their kind.
Secretary Gorbachev’s July 1986 visit to port Vostochny near Vladivostok showed a hands-on politician who is using his naval and maritime forces as key tools to help him realize his long-term agenda.
Gorbachev had also surfaced other, similar naval arms control themes on the Pacific Ocean in his July 1986 speech at the Soviet Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Vladivostok, and on the Baltic Sea and Indian Ocean in his foreign visits to Helsinki, Finland, and Bombay, India. Clearly, Soviet naval forces will remain key elements of Gorbachev’s long-term foreign affairs agenda.
The Navy and Perestroyka
From the beginning of his tenure, Secretary Gorbachev has acknowledged that the competition between East and West extends beyond military power and that the Soviet Union must demonstrate a vital economy and sound social structure to achieve his Leninist agenda. Yet, perestroyka has not left the military untouched. As in the civilian sectors, the Soviet Communist Party wants greater efficiency from its armed forces.
Military restructuring thus far has focused on:
► Increasing leadership accountability
► Improving the combat readiness of forces
► Using resources more efficiently
► Enhancing party control
► Improving education and training
► Raising individual responsibility Overall, the navy’s status within
perestroyka is enigmatic: On one hand, the General Staff characterizes the navy as an expensive service in an era of tight budgets. On the other hand, it is, in peacetime, a vivid high-technology symbol—not unlike the Soviet space effort—fostering pride in the Soviet state and representing its worldwide interests. “Showing the flag” in support of the Soviet foreign policy agenda as well as
more directly protecting Soviet overseas interests, such as escorting Soviet mef chant vessels in the Persian Gulf, is l*^e - to remain an important naval miss'08' Moreover, this mission entails signin'-’8 fiscal costs as well as growing m'htafl risks, stemming from the burgeon^ advanced technology threat posed in Third World. Thus, the role of the ""D in Soviet national security policy with1 ’ inherently high costs seems likely to come a contentious issue in the context perestroyka.
Reasonable Sufficiency and Defe'’s^ Doctrine: Creating a vital Soviet civil'8 economy may come partially at the pense of the military. Thus, to help plement perestroyka, the Soviet Un' .
future force levels will be based on sonable sufficiency.” According Admiral I. M. Kapitanets, Comman in-Chief (CinC) of the Northern Fleet- ^ forces began implementing the Wars'.^ Pact’s defensive doctrine, adopted May 1987, during this past training yeS exercising against NATO targets of °P( portunity as they approached the S°v homeland. Soviet Defense Min's Dimitri Yazov has written that defend^ now the main form of Soviet opera" “when attacked.” He states that the viet Union would then regroup and cr^_ any aggressor. The navy’s role is t0 fend its strategic nuclear strike force, fend the homeland against NATO na . forces, and defend the flanks of the Army as it crushes the “aggressor.
The attrition of enemy SSBNs, the ^ terdiction of enemy sea lines of con^ ^
has developed a “defensive doctrine and Secretary Gorbachev suggests
that rea- to ndet'
nications (SLOCs), and the conduct combined-arms amphibious assaun 1 ^ ings, however, continue as key themes^
oviet literature and training. Neither the lssions set out, nor the defensive termi- ologies used to describe them are new. ese are the missions that have ani- ated the Soviet Navy throughout the aast 20 years, and, overall, they do not PPear to have changed under this new d°c trine.
Current defensive doctrine, perhaps lacking operational im- tu?’ undoubtedly form the concep- oasis of the future implementation of easonabie sufficiency.
. he principles of this reasonable suffi- y c"cy doctrine include the following: b atlonal security must be based on b Political efforts and military Jtrength.
ofThe structure, scale, and deployment military forces must be adjusted so that
while
they
tack. but side ► '
are capable of defending against at-
they pose no threat to the other
Nuclear forces must be able to deal lln(]tCcPtahle damage to the enemy, even
The
h tk tbe nlost stressful scenario. ba|^c nuclear and conventional force
siv inCe slt°uld be maintained at progres- j6 y lower levels.
new '*e Soviets were t0 develop a really
defensive doctrine, in the context of caso
^le sufficiency, they might well e suitable and adequate for defense
■ difficulties in defining a naval pos- oni SUitab
ity ^ ^bc Inherent flexibility and mobil- (jQt^ Sea power allow it to be used in js offensive and defensive roles. This axially true of the modern Soviet fe ,. submarine force capable of defyln§ the Soviet homeland against tj0ern carriers, striking Western na- an<jS w'th their SS-N-21 cruise missiles, Severing enemy SLOCs.
in the Navy_____________
cj^h'le Soviet rhetoric on perestroyka, (l0cr°nahle sufficiency, and defensive cha r'ne 's highly visible, resultant I 8es in the navy itself are ambiguous. t^f^^nrship Accountability: Since Sec- Gorbachev ascended to power in hefc’ be has replaced the Minister of defense’ s'x °f the 14 deputy ministers of Co^nse’ half of the 16 military district Coders and the navy’s four fleet
•tin
"'erg!' ^hile some of these changes less a®e~ and health-related, it rieverthe- like ahPears that senior military leaders, are]e0ther key Soviet civilian officials, Or re(arn'n8 that they must either perform
MQa *he navy, seven of nine key- c°W-level, and fleet leadership
,l0|
s>0(
yWat,
ura billets have turned over
Since Secretary Gorbachev took power. e teplacing Admiral of the Fleet of
the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, Fleet Admiral Chernavin, as a technocrat and politically astute officer, has been in the forefront of supporting perestroyka within the Soviet Union and the navy. Most other flag-level changes have apparently stemmed from normal rotational issues. Exceptions were the sudden replacement of Admiral A. M. Kalinin as head of the Black Sea Fleet after two years in the post and the July 1987 appointment of Vice Admiral Vasiliy Panin as the navy’s political officer. Admiral Kalinin basically disappeared, probably in disgrace, while Admiral Panin’s appointment can be traced to the party’s public disapproval of political work in the navy and failures to deal with such problems as alcoholism. The appointment of Vice Admiral G. A. Khvatov as CinC Soviet Pacific Fleet in January 1987 was expected, as Admiral V. V. Sidorov had been in that billet since 1981 and was tapped for the key job of Chief of Naval Rear Services on the Main Navy Staff in Moscow.
Admiral Gorshkov’s age and long tenure as CinC of the Navy are well known, but the First Deputy CinC of the Navy, Fleet Admiral Nikolay Smirnov, has now emerged as the navy’s “old fox.” Smirnov, now 70, has been in the first deputy post since 1974, yet hangs on, apparently an adept behind-the-scenes player. Admiral Smirnov will likely soon join the General Inspectorate Staff, the Valhalla for retired flag officers.
Operations: To date, the only apparent cutback in Soviet naval spending has been related to the operating tempo of Soviet naval forces. Out-of-area (OOA) days have declined by 6% since 1986, apparently as a cost-cutting measure within the 1986-90 five-year plan. Last year, for instance, marked the first in this decade in which no Soviet task force visited the Caribbean. In January 1988, the Soviet Navy admitted publicly that it had lost control of spending practices in the late 1970s and early 1980s both in the fleet and “especially in the naval/indus- trial and building organizations,” and had been tasked by the party in February 1986 to eliminate these problems. Thus, it appears that cuts in the navy’s operating budget are probably related more to
In 1987, the Soviets launched a third first-line Akula-class attack submarine, capable of carrying the torpedo tube-launched SS-N-21, when the Soviets choose to field it.
the navy’s own previous spending problems and not so much to reduced spending fueled by perestroyka and the drive to reallocate military resources elsewhere in the economy.
Despite the decrease in OOA days, the Soviet Navy still evidences a healthy interest in expanding and acquiring foreign bases. Most notable is the continued expansion of its Cam Ranh Bay presence and the recently completed agreement with Syria allowing the Soviet Navy to improve its naval facility near Tartus.
More broadly, a tension apparently exists between the Soviet Navy’s requirements to fulfill its missions, even as stated in its “defensive doctrine,” and the future constraints of Gorbachev’s “reasonable sufficiency.” From a military perspective, virtually all the following missions outlined by Defense Minister Yazov promise to become far more complex and expensive in the coming years.
►The protection of Soviet strategic strike forces, SSBNs, involves major investments in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems, including nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), advanced sensors, ASW aircraft and surface ships, and the other surface forces needed to protect them and the SSBNs themselves.
►The defense of the homeland continues to be a critical mission area for the navy. With the advent of long-range cruise missiles (potentially fired from a multitude of surface, subsurface, and air platforms), stealth technology, and precision-guided weaponry, the Soviet Navy faces an increasingly difficult task in defending the seaward approaches to its homeland in all four fleet areas. The solution, creating a high-tech, long-range integrated air defense system based on multiservice participation, is both expensive and longterm.
►The defense of the seaward flanks of the Soviet ground forces in a prolonged
ficiency is currently a subject of nation3 debate. The discussion focuses, however- on what is “sufficient” for Soviet na tional security, not on whether the ponj-- will be implemented. Indeed, it >s ,
the will be doc
of *haI
trine, the final Soviet definition
constitutes reasonable sufficiency success of Secretary Gorbachev’s nav arms control initiatives, and the succ Qf perestroyka itself. i.
The first three factors are interrelate^ the degree of success of Soviet na arms control initiatives will substantia affect force levels required for a del sive doctrine; and, indeed, the premise reasonable sufficiency will form the cl of Soviet negotiating positions on control issues. ,e
Admiral Gorshkov, the father of j. modem Soviet Navy, had a dim view naval arms control negotiations by P® , cians, noting that they never wot*
d,
conventional war requires naval forces to operate in a complex environment, well within range of enemy land-based aircraft. Task forces with indigenous air defense assets will need to be developed, particularly if the Soviets intend to operate outside the cover of their own land- based air support.
► The attrition of enemy SSBNs will demand the best SSNs the Soviets can produce, as well as a commensurate open-ocean surveillance capability.
► The interdiction of enemy SLOCs in wartime will require highly capable submarines, able to operate far from friendly ASW cover, as well as reconnaissance and effective command, control, and communications.
At this point, the Soviets do not appear to have radically changed the direction or curtailed the scope of the major naval weapon development programs aimed at meeting these mission requirements.
Naval Construction: The immediate demands of perestroyka will not easily alter long-term naval construction. Although some programs may be stretched out, it may be too soon to expect clear evidence of a decision to shift a shipyard or naval weapons facility to some task other than naval construction. Such a decision would, however, be a long-term indicator of Secretary Gorbachev’s resolve to make perestroyka and reasonable sufficiency work.
The Soviets continue to improve what Admiral Chernavin terms the main arm of the navy, the submarine force. Five Typhoon and five Delta IV SSBNs have now been launched, equipped with 20 SS-N-20 and 16 SS-N-23 strategic ballistic missiles, respectively. The improved range of the missile systems, the quietness of these modem platforms, and their ability to operate under the Arctic ice enhance the survivability of the SSBNs, particularly in a prolonged conventional war.
In a Navy Day speech in July, Admiral Chernavin stated that the navy would not build any more attack submarines in addition to the number it now has, but that it would build high-quality units. There are now three SSN classes under construction, the Akula, Sierra, and Victor III, as well as the Oscar-class nuclear powered guided-missile submarine. The first-line quiet modem SSNs are highly flexible and can cany the Soviet strategic sea- launched cruise missile, the SS-N-21, when the Soviets choose to field it. These submarines are also designed to meet the increasingly difficult requirements of opposing U. S. SSNs moving into SSBN bastions and also operating far forward in anti-SSBN or anti-SLOC roles. These capabilities are increasingly important as the Soviets refine their doctrine toward longer conventional war scenarios. Likewise, the Oscar, with its 24 submerged- launched 550-kilometer range SS-N-19 missiles, becomes a more critical player in contesting control of the sea.
To balance its navy, the Soviet Union continues to build several classes of major surface combatants. The new nuclear-powered conventional aircraft carrier continues to be fitted out at the Black Sea Shipyard, Nikolayev (south), while the fourth A'/ev-class carrier, Baku, prepares to enter service. These units will provide air support for Soviet surface task groups engaged in defense of the homeland. ensure the combat stability of the SSBNs, and support Soviet ground forces operations.
A fourth nuclear-powered, SS-N-19- armed A7rov-class cruiser and a fourth conventionally powered SS-N-12-armed Slava-class cruiser are now under construction. These sea-control platforms will help provide echeloned defense of the Soviet homeland and SSBN patrol areas. They are supported by modem Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), designed largely for antisurface warfare, and Udaloy-class DDGs, primarily ASW platforms—both of which continue to enter the fleet in steadily growing numbers.
As their warfare capabilities are improved, the integration of these various surface units in task forces is becoming more important to the Soviets. The navy needs to achieve a synergy between the various units of the group to maintain the combat stability and effectiveness of the formation. Thus, its current training emphasizes task group evolutions, in contrast to previous single-unit workups.
In line with their increasing focus on conventional warfare, the Soviets are integrating the navy into theater warfare planning as never before. Admiral Chernavin notes, for example, that the navy has its own air defense units, fighters, and air defense complexes. A range of increasingly sophisticated assault air cushion vehicles, small missile combatants, wing-in-ground effect craft for assault landings, assault helicopters, and improved naval infantry capabilities all mark better naval support for the ground campaign.
A financial bright spot for the Soviet Navy with regard to construction is the ongoing emphasis on exports. The Soviets continue to export Kilo-class diesel submarines to allies and Third World customers. Poland, Romania, India, and Algeria have now purchased Kilos from the Soviet Union. A total of 20 have been built to date. The Indians also have leased their first nuclear-powered submarine, a Charlie I SSGN, from the Soviet Union-
Gorbachev and the Navy’s Future
Today, the effects of reasonable suit' ciency and a new defensive doctrine 111 not seem to have manifested themself to any great degree in the Soviet Navy- ** military posture based on reasonable su
cornerstone of Secretary Gorbachev national security policy.
Thus, the major factors affecting future shape of the Soviet Navy the implementation of a defensive
_ the naval
arn18
Secretary Gorbachev, however, may willing to give up facets of sea power gain advantages ashore. In the e though, the future of the Soviet Navy inextricably bound up in the issues ^ perestroyka on the grand scale, and ability of the General Secretary to reaja his ambitious political and social agen ^ If Secretary Gorbachev’s Perestr°l,i\. is successful, the military believes , in the long run, it will have an impm technological industrial base and mo society capable of supporting the c ^ plex forces of the next century as we providing an improved, technically a fighting man. As a high-tech service, ^ navy would prosper in such a conte* ■ perestroyka and Gorbachev’s larger 1'^ litical agenda fail, past experience sn that, in the Soviet Union, the mil' ' almost always gets the lion’s share-
Mr. Haver graduated from Johns Hopkins Un1 jjj in 1967 and served as a naval flight officer evaluator with Fleet Air Reconnaissance SQ cC One until 1971. He has worked in the inte 1 of field since 1973, and is now Deputy Direr Naval Intelligence.