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For the Soviets, 1987 was the year of glasnost and perestroika. That national campaign that gave selected problems “publicity” to generate support for needed actions to “restructure” the bureaucracy and “rebuild” the infrastructure, also extended into the navy. Based on material in the Soviet military press, the two major challenges facing the Soviet Navy last year concerned how to alleviate the dissatisfaction of seagoing officers and conscript personnel with certain aspects of navy life, and how to respond to new operational commitments while maintaining ongoing operations in a period of limited resources.
The Personnel Problems of the Navy
By William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., U. S. Navy (Ret*1
ed)
When asked on Navy Day in July to name “one problem that requires immediate solution,” Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir N. Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, said:
“I would single out, as an example, the complex of problems associated with raising the prestige of seagoing personnel. The navy consists, after all, chiefly of seagoing personnel. It cannot be said that they had not been an object of our constant attention previously, but these problems need to be solved more energetically today.
. . . Problems in the officer corps ... do exist, and in great numbers at that. For example, during all the time that I served on board ship, I never met an officer who was disillusioned with his work. Today there are many such cases.”
The First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral Nikolay I. Smirnov, also indicated his concern:
“A phenomenon has occurred which was virtually absent before: Some graduates of higher naval schools trained for service on board ship seek a transfer to shore duty as quickly as possible. . . . That is why the question of how to recruit officers and petty officers who are sincere and committed in their devotion to the navy and who possess courage and
qualities of high morality and willpower is a particularly acute one today. It represents a real, vital need.”
Likewise, the Soviet Navy’s ability to acquire the quality of conscript sailor it desires is limited. Admiral V. I. Panin, Chief of the Navy Political Directorate, responded to the assertion that “there are no particular problems with the navy” by admitting: “I would not say that—even on the holiday [Navy Day 1987]. ... As is known, twice a year we have a partial change in personnel. New people arrive. If there have been shortcomings in their education at school, in the family, and in the labor collective, we sense this immediately.” Admiral Chernavin went further, saying, “As for the advance preparation of young people for service in the armed forces, including the navy, here too, there are shortcomings. . . . Some navy conscripts do not want to join the service, are not prepared either physically or mentally for difficult naval service, and do not like the three-year term of service. Clearly, predraft training needs improvement.”
Personnel Trends: These personnel problems acknowledged by glasnost are bringing changes to what the Soviet Navy calls “cadre policy.” The navy is making efforts to increase the privileges, benefits, and recognition of seagoing officers and paying more attention to the attitudes and preparation of conscripts.
Admiral K. V. Makarov, the Chief of the Main Navy Staff, announced that to improve the prestige of seagoing personnel, “a competent commission has been set up, which will carry out considerable work, generalizing local suggestions and developing the necessary practical measures.” Admiral Smirnov, who heads that commission, reported that its efforts will bring improvements in four areas:
►Service incentives—including improvements in warrant officer and commissioned officer career opportunities and better leave policies
► Morale incentives—focusing on
awards and uniform regulations
►Living standards—improving the pro
cedures and facilities for family housing spouses’ employment, and child cat® ^ ► Material incentives—covering Pay allowances
According to Admiral Smirnov, the c° mission has already made some pr°Sr
fnf ^
“establishing a ceremony 11 officer taking command of his s ^ . . . New regulations have drawn up for the award of the h® c of “Ship Commander” and “Su rine Commander,” and the desC11^ anew “Long Voyage” medal • • • ^ well as] the mandatory provision one day off per week for every 0s while his ship is at base. Instruc establishing strict monitoring 0' . • planning and use of leave by s ■ officers and petty officers and the y ority allocation to them of Passe*ters sanatoria, leisure and tourist ce have been issued.”
With regard to conscripts, most
changes required are beyond the
\
of the
author'1);
-noli(lCi
:al
of the navy. The senior military-p0- ollt leadership has already spoken ^ strongly against “a negative attitu , ward service in the armed forces onstrated by some elements of the P^jp and educators. The military leadC has discussed ways to improve the V draft training provided by the m ^ departments of secondary schools 3 ^ Voluntary Society for Support to ^ Army, Navy, and Air Force, and party Komsomol (Young Comm ^ organization. Further, attention has j focused on the conscript selection ^ assignment process conducted s
local military kommisariats. But c in all of these areas will require ne"/ and additional resources. tdo"
Meanwhile, the Soviet Navy mtis better job of motivating and discip ^ its conscripts. The responsibility * ^
■ - 1faSk^
officers and staffs, who have been ^ ^
has been laid squarely on comma officers and staffs, who have been ® with adopting a new leadership st-/, c0ir is more involved, cooperative, an ^ structive. As the Chief of the '0te, Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet ^
“Now, when the party has set a
course toward . activating the human factor
. an°
. restructuring • •
228
Proceedings
^rthe,
> D, 'mini.
Sbornik, Vice Admiral V. Zub,
,ri,T|and and political personnel [must] _ • translate party lines into the lan- r. °f practical affairs, carry the new and lrements to each serviceman’s heart sat' ?lnc*’ overcome the inertia of being CornK w>th mediocre indicators in end bat anc* political training, and put an to deficiencies once and for all.” ado 'S new leadership style must be tori i^’ because, as explained in an edi- n„'a Published in the Soviet military WsPaper Red Star:
pne of the main causes of shortcomings is the fact that some commanders ... are committed to administrative methods in the leadership their subordinates; have only a superficial knowledge of the processes Recurring within servicemen’s collec- .Ves [crews]; and underestimate the act that high standards of military Scipline can be ensured only through mbining strict demandingness with constant concern for people and their ^ucation. Some of them have failed grasp the simple truth: No success n be achieved by just noting in. nces of violations, issuing general structions for their elimination, and gaging in frequent inspections or Seless conferences.”
r, in the Soviet naval digest
ePuty Chief of Navy Combat * *8. called for “the creation of an
Ittidg Phere of cooperation and mutual arm standing between ships’ officers staffs.” Another article cautioned a w °n carrying out their inspections in rr^nj lat was not cooperative with com-
c °1 'fical department or staff officers ck: °n hoard ship and immediately
Uiand papers without going to the the ^ 6 ^ becomes clear that they see sittask °P thoroughly studying the ation on the spot as being one of sging up as many negative facts as
possible—the more acute and sensational the better—and, in the end, dumping them all out in a report and [then] departing the ship. ‘We,’ they say, ‘opened the crew’s eyes to the deficiencies, and the rest is up to you— correct them and learn from your own mistakes.’”
Two unconnected Red Star articles during 1987 provided contrasting examples of correct and incorrect, or successful and unsuccessful, styles of leadership by commanding officers and, also, of command-staff cooperation. Both were about the Baltic Fleet Kynda-class guided-missile cruiser Groznyy. One article reflected on the period “before Captain First Rank M. Pinchuk turned over his duties [as commanding officer (CO)].
. . . He came [there] as a lieutenant 16 years ago. ... He commanded a battery, which was an outstanding one. Under his command a division, a department, and, finally, the cruiser have been outstanding.” These successes were attributed to Captain Pinchuk’s leadership style, which was, evidently, a correct one of direct involvement with his crew:
“The CO invites you to visit him. Nervously, navymen have crossed the
While many frontline warships dressed up for Soviet Navy Day, Admiral Chernavin sprinkled his otherwise positive remarks at the day’s ceremonies with descriptions of morale problems among his seagoing personnel—both officers and conscripts, like these lining the deck of the Kresta 1-class guided-missile cruiser Sevastopol.
coaming of the CO’s cabin because they received such an invitation. They knew the conversation would be confidential, direct and open, as prescribed by the party.”
The second article described the current situation with respect to the Groznyy.
“In this past year’s evaluation, . . . the ship was praised at all levels, right up to fleet level. But a tendency toward lower indices was already noticeable in the collective. However, the fleet staff did not get to the bottom of the matter. As usual, they assumed that the cruiser’s performance level was as high as before. In a word, the staff officers themselves connived in the appearance of well-being.
“The illusion, however, was soon
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dispelled by life itself. Moreover, all °f the unfortunate things that occurred °n the Groznyy were not simply a chain of random happenings, but father the result of a self-induced Sense of complacency on the part of many crew members and officers of thc force staff.
"These matters on the ship are Presently being corrected. The best ^ments, as they say, have been thrown in to help. Yet the decline could have been nipped in the bud, if oe people responsible had viewed things realistically; if the negative tenancies had been made public imme- lately. In that way only would both he ship and the fleet as a whole have
benefited.
But, unfortunately, the present style [of the new CO] is, by far, not to everyone’s taste. We recently reproached Captain Third Rank A. Bez- 8°dov for shortcomings in organizing routine activities on the ship. Regret- .ab'y, Bezgodov could think of noth- jug better than to fence himself off r°ni responsibility on the basis of his Beers’ reports, which said that j^erything was in order. . . . This ■nd of psychology has got to be e|>minated.”
r^'ug the past year, the Soviet Navy ’he nuained forces on alert in defense of Opgrhomeland, continued its presence r a‘>ons in the Mediterranean Sea, and Per^jnded to new contingencies in the tho^Gulf. Among all its operations, ura|| ln defense of the homeland,” nat- 19§^’ receive the most attention. In PrCss’ f°r example, the Soviet military ^)nt‘nued to praise Captain Second ofth " Zhuravlev, commanding officer ate i ^rivak I-class guided-missile frig- Seip a^nyy, for his “strong nerves and preDCon’r°l and excellent commander’s Pair31'011'” March 1986, Zhuravlev activIClPated in stopping the espionage guid y °f the American ships, the arid IT1'ssile cruiser Yorktown [CG-48] 'he destr°yer Caron [DD-970], near v'etre°res °f ’be Crimea.” (For the So- tion act'°ns to those freedom of naviga- Co,. "Pcrations by the Yorktown and Njv/p sce “The Soviet View: Which ‘"Ik Gets More Press,” June 1986, and S°viet View: The U. S. Threat,” In p Cf ^^6 Proceedings.) arid (■ ebruary 1988, when the Yorktown d°Ui C\r°n uguin conducted similar free- area , navigation operations in the same ’ e commanding officers of another
Krivak-class guided-missile frigate, the Bezavetny, and a Mirka-class frigate demonstrated that the praise and example made of Captain Zhuravlev had not been lost on them. They certainly displayed strong nerve and, undoubtedly, considerable preparation, as they deliberately bumped the Yorktown and Caron when, in the Soviet view, the U. S. ships “did not react in response to Soviet signals and maneuvered dangerously in Soviet territorial waters.”
In the Pacific Fleet, according to the Soviet national newspaper Pravda:
“An amateur arts review was scheduled to take place on Sunday at the sailors’ club. The crew of [the Krivak I I-class guided-missile frigate] Rezkiy prepared a 120-minute program. However, they were not even halfway through when the ‘Alarm!’ call came over the loudspeaker.
“So, carrying the props, not knowing yet what happened, the sailors, petty officers, ensigns, and officers ran to the quayside. Only there did they learn [what] had disrupted the festive occasion. The culprit turned out to be the USS Arkansas [CGN- 41]
“The crew of the escort ship [Rezkiy] was given the task of closely shadowing the cruiser in international waters. The border was close by. Modern equipment registered precisely any approach of the uninvited guest to our territorial waters. As soon as the distance decreased to 20 cables, the alarm was given.
“What about the Arkansas? It tried to shake off the unwanted escort. However, Rezkiy did not give in.
“Again and again the Arkansas turned its sharp bow toward Soviet territory. Finally, as if to test our sailors’ nerve, it decided on an extreme action and crossed the line of the state border. Instantly, Fleet Mate Sergey Nemchenko came on the air: ‘Cruiser Arkansas, you have violated our territorial waters. I am asking you to leave immediately.’ ‘I do not understand,’ the answer came from the cruiser. ‘We are in international waters.’ . . .
“They were talking in English. But it was as if they were talking in different tongues. Nerve and responsibility for every word and action were needed from our sailors. After all, situations arose repeatedly when extreme measures were only a step away, as they say. The dangerous confrontation lasted two weeks until the Arkansas departed. ...”
In the Mediterranean, Soviet naval
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of
The crew
Zaryad has more than once operate on the brink of specia as they call them here, when it >s
had to
. to the Soviet
to
The
foreign vessels and warships
and ff
[CG-18], Reeves [CG-24],
termined the tactics of U. S. vessels and has permitted them
dr
ion*
“We had no threats or prov
ocatt°
operations continue because, as Morskoy Sbornik related:
“Our state is far from unconcerned about what happens in the regions immediately adjacent to the country’s southern borders. ... As a Black Sea, and therefore Mediterranean, power, the Soviet Union is exercising its indisputable right to presence in this region.”
Highlighting the importance of those operations, the magazine later noted that “Fleet Admiral V. N. Chemavin visited the Red-Banner Black Sea Fleet, checked the combat training and readiness of the Black Sea crews, and went out into the Mediterranean Sea on board the guided- missile cruiser Slava."
The operations that received the most publicity during 1987 were those in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. In July, Admiral Chemavin summarized Soviet presence in the region:
“There are no Soviet warships permanently stationed in the Persian Gulf. . . . Soviet warships are sta
Once sown, mines cannot distinguish friend from foe. The Soviets, no less than the United States and its NATO allies, have had to protect their interests in the Persian Gulf with ships like this Natya I-class fleet minesweeper.
tioned in the Indian Ocean in a small group of five vessels. Four of those ships [three minesweepers and one escort ship] are in the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. [The other is the tender-command ship.] Unlike the U. S. Navy grouping, our ships pose no threat to the Persian Gulf countries. They accompany Soviet merchant ships in the Gulf to ensure their security. Unfortunately, since the merchant vessel Ivan Koroteyev was fired upon last May by launches of unknown origin, we have been forced to protect our merchant ships.”
Another article described the incident:
“[The Koroteyev] was the target of ... an attack in the Persian Gulf on 4 May. The dry cargo ship suffered considerable damage. It was just by pure fortune that no one was injured. Just two weeks later, the tanker Marshal Chuykov struck a mine and was holed close to the Kuwaiti port of Al- Ahmadi. It was these two incidents, the result of the escalating armed conflict between Iran and Iraq and the subsequent buildup of tension in the Persian Gulf region, that raised the question of escorting ships.”
Subsequently, a spokesman for the Soviet Main Navy staff told Red Star:
“The motor ships Sovetskiye Prof- soyuzy and Ivan Shepetkov were fired on by some unidentified launches. The possibility of such incidents is growing all the time, so our ships are compelled to provide protection 0 Soviet ships. Incidentally, this protec tion is highly reliable. On no occasio has it failed.”
In describing these protection °Pcra tions. Red Star cited the following:
“The naval minesweeper Zaryad ■ ■ ' and its crew are now in the Per* Gulf escorting the tanker hachkala. Along with the danger tr0^. mines, there is also the danger • ■ ■ an attack from the air on the bo' tankers and cargo ships on v°ya® ^ carrying peaceful cargos. Au"c without identification marks o L overfly our merchant ships and son times even feign attacks on them- ■ • The air and surface detection cre have always operated efficiently 'V1 out a single lapse or failure to dete
target in time.
operate on the brink of special cas^
to distinguish whether an air attaC*\y taking place or whether it is simP'
another provocation.”
The other three ships deployed Persian Gulf, according to sources, were the Ladnyy and the Na - . class minesweepers Snayper and Kltr Komsornolets, which “successfully I ,. ried] out the tasks placed before t'ien’tjie The report continued, “In spite o large workloads and the unfav°ra weather conditions, there were no n rial failures.” (erS
Contrary to his previous encoun with U. S. Navy ships in the the Ladnyy's commanding office1". . tain Zhuravlev, found the situation c tense this time around.
‘We were indeed often close
large number of these warship®’ P ticularly of U. S. ones, was stn We encountered the cruisers
[CG-33], and the guided-missde ates Crommelin [FFG-37] and ^ ring [FFG-42], . . . Althoughi Persian Gulf is thousands ot 1 ,
from U. S. shores, this has not’ ,es ever, prevented the United j from declaring it a zone of interns ^
sending a veritable armada them-
presence of huge forces has jalso^j
vide up the Persian Gulf into mg ^g in which a U. S. ship operates- ^ they are in complete control 0 Gulf zone. i0„s
that
even the tender-command ship was
into escort duty, and that two
Pacific.
iu an article describing this turnover
® oQyiaf ___________ j r . • • <1 r-»
Sla|t Gulf
and
of
Hormuz as far as the approaches to : Port of Dubai. There we ‘handed °Ver the ships to one of our minesweeper or sman ASW ships, which
then
escorted them to their port of
cross our path—two or three w,Kers and almost a dozen warships. ,ony sail in such an armada? We had stop engines and let them cross Cn though, to be honest, our seamen ^ere not very pleased with that. The attleship Missouri [BB-63] regularly U 1 e(f into the Persian Gulf with all ta^r sw'tcIle(I on’ pretending to be a Ker- • . . The intention was to pro-
from U. S. ships, rather the opposite. For example, they greeted our ship, thanked us for combined work, and exPressed their friendliness. ... In short, they built relations as though We were acting together and were s°lving the same task.”
Eventually, the Soviet press reported
Pressed
jEhtional Sovremennyy-class guided- g sstle destroyers, the Stoykiy and t°yev°y, joined the Indian Ocean squad- and became active in Persian Gulf (Jd°? the end of the year, three
^ a'°>’-class guided-missile destroyers, ^haposhnikov. Admiral Tributs, ln.. Admiral Zakharov, arrived in the 7y(.'an Ocean. One of those, the Admiral YeU,s’ proceeded to Aden, South Wh t*1’ whcre she relieved the Boyevoy the p ’ ^en’ j°’necf the others, en route to
In
let mode of operation in the Per- was explained:
‘This is how we [the Boyevoy] (T®rated. We rendezvoused with our ^erchant ships in the Gulf of Oman escorted them through the Strait
the
estination and back through the mine anger zone. We sailed into the Per- M‘ln Gulf on a total of 16 occasions nd escorted 22 Soviet ships through. ave there been any incidents? Not a ^|ngle one. . . . The launches have ett as soon as they saw our ship. But ® Psychological conditions are . . . i ficult. The sudden appearance of Tvedboats affects the nerves. SOS .^gnals are broadcast continually. This • why two or three foreign ships usu- y attached themselves to us. ha -^ow are lhe U. S. warships be- ving? |n a challenging manner. . . . Pey provoke others with total disre- ar^ tor everything. We have had in- j ances like this: We would be escort- 8 our ship, and the Americans Would tanke voke an attack by Iranian speedboats and then open fire.”
Operational Trends: These continuing and new Soviet operational requirements come at a time when restructuring the economy and rebuilding the industrial base are making increased demands on national resources. Thus, the main trends affecting Soviet naval operations today have involved efforts to reduce the overall level of deployed force operations and increase the efficiency of those operations that are conducted. According to the Soviet press, “Combat Service on the world’s oceans is one form of a ship’s peacetime activity, . . . involving long voyages . . . and unremitting combat readiness over a long period.” (In other words, “Combat Service” is the highest peacetime readiness condition of the Soviet Navy.)
According to Admiral Smirnov, during 1986 and into 1987, the Soviets “have been rationally reducing the number of ships on voyages while maintaining the same Combat Service effectiveness [level of readiness] by means of improved planning and higher standards of performance of tasks during voyages.” Soviet effectiveness has been helped by such “improvements in its [combat service] planning, more accurate and dynamic consideration of the state of forces, the allocation of the optimum reserve [that is, probably reducing the numbers of ships on standby—the next level of peacetime readiness], and forecasting the [threat] situation on the world's oceans.” Such efforts, the Soviets say, demand better management.
“[The] improvement of management . . . must optionally combine rigid centralization with necessary autonomy at the local level. The fleets, for example, are now being freed from unjustified supervision when carrying out tasks in their operational zones. This will simplify the solution of many problems and enhance the responsibility of flag officers at the local level.”
In addition to better operational planning and management, Admiral Cher- navin believes that emphasis must be placed on “reducing inefficient use of time, engine life, ammunition, fuel, and lubricants. All-out justified economization is a necessary prerequisite of raising the effectiveness of military labor | that is, all fleet activities] today.”
Writing for the naval rear service forces responsible for accomplishing these economic measures, Vice Admiral V. M. Petrov emphasized that “economy and thrift [are] tasks of state importance.” He stated that in the fleet and ashore, there is an “unsatisfactory level of waste and mismanagement” and a need for “improved training in the management of supply and support.” The article cited the commanding and supply officers of the Northern Fleet guided- missile destroyer Sovremennyy as having made economic use of lubricants. And the supply department of the nuclear- powered guided-missile cruiser Kirov was praised for excellent technical and material work. The Pacific Fleet Kara- class guided-missile cruiser Petropav- lovsk, on the other hand, was exposed as having significant material shortcomings and accounting deficiencies. Nevertheless, other reports from that Pacific Fleet indicate that:
“Competition to conserve fuel, lubricants, electricity, and other material assets has taken on broad scope in the fleet. This work is best organized on the [KV'ev-class] ASW cruisers Minsk and Novorossiysk and [the Krivak-class] guided-missile frigates Retiviy and Letuchiy. Specialists have calculated that they are able to conserve up to 100 [kilograms] of fuel in each mile of cruising.”
Conclusion: These issues with which the Soviet Navy is now grappling may seem reminiscent of some of the personnel problems that the U. S. Navy has already successfully handled, or similar to operational constraints now increasingly being felt. But that resemblance is only superficial. Because of differences in the U. S. and Soviet societies and in U. S. and Soviet views on the nature of man and his relationship to organizational authority, the underlying causes of Soviet personnel problems and the steps they are taking to solve them are uniquely Soviet. Likewise, because of different U. S. and Soviet international commitments, military strategies, and readiness concepts, our respective operational issues will not be resolved in the same way.
The publicity given to Soviet naval problems and the restructuring taken to solve them affords an important opportunity. It permits the United States to develop a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Navy as a military organization and an appreciation of its capabilities and limitations as a combat force.
Captain Manthorpe is a former assistant naval attache to Moscow who continues to follow the Soviet press and writes the bimonthly “The Soviet View" column in the Proceedings.