Question: Could you describe the sequence of events leading up to the explosion on board the Bridgeton?
Seitz: We had taken advice from outside experts before we arrived on the scene, so I am convinced the route was compromised. The routes are now classified. And the movement time was known, thanks to some U. S. politicians who came out of a meeting with President Reagan, walked right over to a bank of microphones, and said, “The convoy is under way.” Press helicopters were all over. So with the route coordinates, departure time, and speed of advance known, it was a simple military problem for Iranians to come out from Farsi Island and lay a relatively small minefield at a choke point and have a very high chance of hitting us.
Question: Did you have any warning at all before the explosion, and what was your reaction when the mine exploded?
Seitz: There was no warning. Afterward, I had a pretty good idea it was a mine. It felt like a 500-ton hammer hit us up forward. First, you heard a metal-to-metal clank. And then you felt the same motion on the ship as you get in big ships in a heavy seaway. They undulate, as the shock wave moves back and up the ship into the bridge and superstructure. In fact, we parted all the stays on our radar mast. ‘We all had to hold on so that this shock undulation didn’t knock us off our feet. A lot of stuff went flying. So there wasn’t much question that we had hit a mine.
The Navy liaison officer radioed the escort commander to report that we’d been hit. Then the escorts—the Kidd (DDG-993), slightly abaft of my port beam, and the Crommelin (FFG-37), slightly forward of the starboard beam—stopped. The Fox (CG-33) was following way astern. I stopped the Bridgeton's engines, but 1 couldn’t stop the ship. Even on a crash astern, it takes me 30 minutes and three miles. We were trying to assess the damage, still trucking along at 16 knots and covering a lot of ground through a minefield.
After about five minutes, we knew the ship was in no real danger and that we could proceed. I radioed the escort commander and said, “I don’t know if you realize the force of this explosion here. It almost knocked me off my feet on the bridge of the ship. I would strongly advise that the escorts get in behind the Bridgeton." I’m sure that that had occurred to him before the convoy, that I didn’t invent this tactic, but I don’t know if the Navy folks realized how strong that explosion was and what it would do to an escort until I reminded them. Then, they did quickly get in line behind us.
Question: How did you discover what type of mine it was?
Seitz: By piecing together evidence afterward, mostly from the naval intelligence people. The other good confirmation came from the people who surveyed the damage in the shipyard. They’d seen all of the others—there had been four other minings before us, including the Marshal Gheykov, the first Soviet ship chartered by the Kuwaitis, who got her calling card. The damage was the same.
Question: What type of mine was it ascertained to be?
Seitz: It was an M-08, a 1908 Russian design, bottom-moored, floating contact mine with contact horns, chemical horns, and a 115-kilogram charge.
Question: How far below the surface was the mine moored?
Seitz: Well, we were drawing seven meters, so it had to be somewhat less than that. I think the water there was about 30 meters deep.
Question: What size was the hole in the Bridgeton's steel plating?
Seitz: The plating is 27 millimeters thick, which is an inch and one-eighth or so. The hole was about ten meters long by five meters wide. Shrapnel went through several deck levels and through the main deck, about 90 feet away, which is also 27-millimeter plate.
Question: That would have sunk an FFG, wouldn’t it?
Seitz: It would have done a number. A naval warship has five-eighths of an inch steel hull plating.
Question: Once you determined that you could go on, what was your next course of action?
Seitz: We had to clear it with the escort commander and see what he wanted to do. The main concern was that we complete the damage survey and determine if the flooding had stopped or was controlled. When it Was finished, we said, “Let’s proceed at reduced speed and go on up to Kuwait.” We wanted to complete the mission.
Question: Did you have any limitation on how much oil you could take because of the damage?
Seitz: Yes. Naturally, we couldn’t load it in the broached tanks, and we chose not to load it in any of the tanks adjacent to damaged tanks, in order to leave a sort of cofferdam.
Question: Were any repairs made to the ship before the return voyage?
Seitz: There were some temporary repairs made to the internals, pipelines, and so on. Divers in Kuwait conducted a thorough survey and some temporary repairs Were made.
Question: Did you also go out with a lighter draft because of concern that there might be more mines?
Seitz: No, it wasn’t the mine threat that limited the draft. It was the damaged tanks, with the exception of one of the tanks all the way over on the starboard side forward that we could have loaded. The tank didn’t fall under the damage exclusion, but it was all the way forward, where we might have hit another mine, and we opted not to load that one because of pollution risk.
Question: What minesweeping measures were taken before your return trip?
Seitz: The Navy put regular paravane minesweeping gear on board two 150-foot commercial work boats that were employed in oil Fields, along with a Navy crew to tend that gear. And we followed them out.
Question: What was the crew’s reaction after the ship was hit?
Seitz: Well, I had assured them that it was going to be a safe passage because the Navy was there, so I had to take a little ribbing on that. But, no, they took it all right. They were most cooperative, even in the cleanup. It was a very difficult tank-washing job, cleaning around that mine damage.
In fact, when the U. S. ensign went up previously in our little reflagging ceremony, there was a round of applause from the crew. They were glad to see those gray hulls out there, because almost all of them had been on ships that had been either threatened or attacked before. The chief engineer had been on a ship where a missile had come into the engine room and didn’t explode. That’s the only reason he was there to tell me about it. So they were all very aware of the threat and very happy to see the naval escort there.
Question: Was the rest of the voyage then made without incident?
Seitz: Yes. We went out and lightered off outside the Gulf into a Swedish ship and went back to a shipyard in Dubai to have repairs done. We were in the yards for about a month. I left the ship there.
Question: Were there any other highlights from the time that you were in the Persian Gulf itself?
Seitz: Yes. My hat’s off to the Navy and the escort job they’re doing. The escort commander was Captain Dave Yonkers. The CO of the Fox was Captain Bill Mathis; the CO of the Kidd was Commander Dan Murphy; and the CO of the Crommelin was Commander Tom McGinlay. They’re very professional people, with good attitudes, and good to work with.
Question: Did you see any of the Iranian boats operating while you were making your voyages?
Seitz: Oh, yes. We never came across any of the speedboats that are making the attacks, but there were numerous encounters with Iranian warships. Most of the encounters were very pseudo-polite. “Good afternoon, sir, what are your intentions?” and so on. Until one incident where, apparently, the Iranian fire control radar trained around and locked on one of the Navy ships. All I heard over the radio was, “Don’t point your guns at me.” The Iranian promptly trained his guns away.
Question: Based on your experience, do you think the future mine threat is likely to be less, now that we’re more prepared for it?
Seitz: I think so. In fact, probably one of the biggest mistakes the Iranians made was mining that anchorage out by Khor Fakkan that everybody considered safe. I think when they did that they brought all the allies together. Now you’ve got probably the most effective minesweeping force the world has ever seen. There are more minesweepers than mines out there now. The Iranians had their day with mines, and now the mine countermeasures people are going to have their day. And I think they’re going to prevail for a while.
Training the Tanker Masters
Question: Who made the suggestion that a Persian Gulf scenario be instituted at the Computer-Aided Operations Research Center (CAORF)?
Seitz: Marine Safety International (MSI), the facility operator, Captain Herman Fritzke, the course director, and I worked on it jointly.
Question: How long did it take to develop the simulation package?
Seitz: A week by the time all the checkouts were over and so on. Part of it was a donation by MSI, and part of it by the Master Mariners’ Readiness Program, which is funded by the Maritime Administration.
Question: For the benefit of our readers who haven’t been in the CAORF wheelhouse, could you describe what this simulation covers?
Seitz: It’s a full-scale mockup of a merchant ship bridge, and you have a 240° screen in front of the bridge with a visual image of the Persian Gulf convoy and the naval escorts and the land masses through the Strait of Hormuz. And we simulated a four-ship convoy, including the tankers Bridgeton, Townsend, Gas Prince, and Surf City. As escorts, we simulated two FFG- 7s and a DDG. They were on the northern threat side of the Iranian Silkworm missile envelope. We then proceeded through the strait to give the prospective masters a feeling of operating in a convoy formation with emphasis on station keeping, turns, and convoy communications.
Question: What was the masters’ reaction to the training?
Seitz: Well, they soaked it up like sponges. And it was very satisfying for me to teach it, because I felt I could maybe make a little bit of difference in the ships’ crews being prepared for what they’re facing out there.
Question: I would think that the advantage of this kind of simulation is that if someone does experience trouble, he will at least have rehearsed it on your simulated bridge.
Seitz: Yes, to use the fancy word, it’s whole-task training. The whole thing is together in a package and it’s what it feels like to be in convoy in the Persian Gulf. That is the advantage.
Question: What is the tactic once the bridge people are warned that a missile is on its way?
Seitz: Well, you want to warn the rest of the crew. Naturally, you ring the general alarm, and get them into the take-cover stations. If there’s enough time, you try to bring the ship around to the direction from which the missile is coming. You hope to get a head-on hit or maybe hit some of the rigging of the ship or kingpost or mast or something like that.
Question: Is there any idea that you could reduce the likelihood of a hit by presenting a smaller profile?
Seitz: Well, all the big missiles, the really dangerous ones, are all terminal-phase, radar-homing missiles, which means they seek out the largest radar cross section of a ship, which means the accommodations/engine room on a merchant ship—or the bridge area on the Stark (FFG-31). The hope is that maybe you can get yourself around and it’ll come on a bow-on hit. Because if it’s coming in from the side, you know it’s going to go right back to the accommodations. That’s why we recommend that tactic if there’s enough time. The last thing is for the crew members to get face down on the deck with their mouths open, and stay away from vertical structures— all the things we try to teach them in the simulator.
Question: What was the reaction of the masters when they saw the simulated missile on in your screen?
Seitz: They did what we had told them to. They tried to turn the ship into it. The acting master said, “Hit the deck.” I was happy to see that maybe we have gotten it in their instinctive reflexes now.
Question: How soon will that group of masters begin taking convoys through?
Seitz: Some of them should be in place now. Over the next month or two, they’ll all be out there.
Question: It will be interesting to get their reactions and see how the real situation fits in with your preparations.
Seitz: Well, they’ll certainly be better prepared than the first group. There was no place to go but up from there. I’ll be interested to get some feedback from them. When they came up to shake my hand at the end of the course, I could see in their eyes that they’d gotten some good information. To me, that makes it all worthwhile.