This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Editor’s Note: Captain John Byron took a stand in his December 1987 article, “The Surface Navy is Not Ready.’’ In every issue of Proceedings since, other contributors have shared their views on this subject [1] Because of the quality and quantity of comments received, a collection of edited responses by serving professionals is offered here. We also asked Captain Byron to respond.
The Surface Warriors Respond_____________________
Captain Byron uses the “mugging” of the USS Stark (FFG-31) as a springboard for an indictment of surface force readiness and as a rationale for his remedies to the “major issue facing the Navy today.” As a surface warrior who has served in the Persian Gulf, I must agree with most of his proposals, but I take strong exception to the vehicle he chooses to justify his arguments—right idea, wrong reason.
The “Stark Incident” is an anomaly in the surface force. To claim that it is representative of an across-the- board lack of readiness is an injustice to all members of the surface community. In particular, it implies that given similar circumstances, no surface combatant could have adequately defended herself in such a situation. This is simply not the case. The United States has maintained a surface combatant presence in the Persian Gulf since 1949. And since 1979, U. S. warships assigned to the Middle East Force have operated in the most dangerous naval theater in the world, requiring a combat readiness and vigilance second to none.
In the Gulf, there are no “friendly” aircraft or surface contacts—every unknown must be considered hostile and its intentions determined before it is too late to counter a threat. Aircraft or surface ships that close U. S. warships are interrogated, warned, and fired upon in accordance with the rules of engagement (ROEs). Any deviation from this formula is a sure ticket to disaster. Since 1980, at least 60 U. S. frigates and destroyers have operated in the Gulf’ logging innumerable “close calls” with unknowns. Suffice it to say that the surface warriors on board these ships have served with distinction and will continue to do so.
A review of the ROEs for U. S. Navy ships operating the Gulf reveals that the Stark had clearly worded directions to deal with potential and actual threats. Because of strict vigilance and adherence to the ROEs, most, if not all, aircraft and ships that have closed upon U. S. warships in the Gulf have been turned away before they had an opportunity to pose a threat.
Most of the current discussion surrounding the attack °u the Stark questions the ship’s ability to acquire incoming Exocet missiles. In fact, only the Stark’s fire-control radar is believed to have the capability to detect an Exocet. weapons doctrine or standard operating procedure can fight what cannot be seen. Thus, vigilance and strict adherence to ROEs are the shields against such attacks in future.
Does the Stark's “mugging” have anything to do with surface readiness? No, no more than the loss of an aircra' does with aviation readiness or the loss of the k'S-’ Thresher (SSN-593) or Scorpion (SSN-589) did with submarine readiness. Tragedies, yes—but indicative of Na^y combat readiness, no. —Lieutenant J. K. Kuhn, U. S. N“vo1 Reserve
No organization takes kindly to gratuitous criticisur from an outsider. Captain Byron’s article is certain to raise the hackles on many a surface warrior. It’s not that Captain Byron won’t find agreement in the community °n several of the issues he raises. However, there is a tefl' dency to reject ideas from someone who, through lack 0 familiarity with surface operations, misses the real issue5. There is also a tendency within any tight-knit community not to air dirty linen in an open forum, both out of loyalty and the sure knowledge that there are more product^ ways to spend one’s time.
The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate design was admittedly a “least-worst” compromise for a ship that was to operate in a “low-threat” environment wit stated missions “supplementing” those of other corriba platforms. At the time of her design, there were those wh°
din -
scream like boiled owls,” to quote Captain Byron, f ery°ne knew that these ships would be expected to permissions much more demanding than those stated. n>°r surface warriors, in the positions responsible for aCa decisions, declared that the FFG-7 was the wrong I ^er; that the Navy needed a ship fully mission capable, 1>uc fhe earlier versions of the Kidd (DDG-993)-class (h^d-missile destroyer, which the Navy had requested in v . 1960s. Their better judgment was rejected; these
ersCes *n the darkness were declared not to be team play- nth atK* eased out- Compare this situation with ones in •c.Cr communities, where those suggesting units of ni,esser ’ individual capability (for example, diesel sub- atines and small aircraft carriers) are similarly treated. Co hFG-7’s electronic warfare (EW) system was also a jn ^Promise. When the Navy gulped at the cost of procur- >.? adequate EW suites for all ships, it came up with C()Csi§n-to-price EW.” As a result, the small surface Sj ^hatants got the low end of the EW spectrum—a ver- j^11 which, by authoritative reports, did not detect the 1, °und Exocet missile and could not have dealt with it it been detected.
be Stark’s captain, Glenn R. Brindel, knew when he
The U. S. Navy’s surface ships have shown the flag in the Persian Gulf for 39 years. The Stark incident and the Navy’s current escort mission underscore the necessity for preparedness—as this fire controlman checking the Phalanx system of the Ford (FFG-54) well knows—but in matters of surface readiness there is no need to reinvent the wheel.
took command that if anything went wrong on his watch, he would pay the price. That’s one of the responsibilities of command, true in every community. If the official finding is ‘‘pilot error,” then faith in the system and in the equipment is preserved. The official investigation could not have found other than it did. In the long term, the careers of a few officers are a small price to pay for preserving the faith. The tragedy was that it cost so many lives to bring about the changes instituted afterward.
But what would have been the outcome had the Stark declared the Iraqi F-l hostile before missiles’ launch and shot it down? Most likely, Captain Brindel would have lost his career in that case as well, although saving the lives of his crew. There is a reluctance on the part of professional warriors to take the life of another. The advertisers and amateurs can glorify how efficiently tanks, ships, and trucks can be blown up. The professionals know that human beings are inside those targets, and, in the field, wait until their opponents show some obvious hostility before engaging them with weapons. That concern has cost us dearly in the Gulf, in Beirut, and elsewhere; it may be the price of our American heritage.
Based on a recent conversation with Captain Byron, it seems that one of his objectives is to get the “hazardous duty” pay for surface warriors similar to that which now goes to the other communities. This, however, is not the answer. The Navy does not need another mercenary force and cannot afford to pay the surface warfare community what it is worth. The surface fleet must continue to excel through leadership in the wardrooms and on the deckplates rather than by extra dollars in the pipelines. It would be nice, though, if some of those who collect the extra pay for hazardous duty would go in harm’s way with the surface force. There are not many nuclear-powered attack submarines or carriers in the Persian Gulf. There may also be those on destroyers and frigates who would enjoy submerging below the air and missile threat and rough weather, or heading to a base ashore for a quick “refueling” when the seas build and the sand-filled monsoons blow. But that is just not going to happen.
Surface combatants will continue to represent the United States on the dangerous front lines of freedom. Captain Byron is right: surface warfare officers are cut from a different cloth. They steam where this nation dares not send others, because the job has to be done—despite the risks and a system that has provided them with less than the best. And there will always be men like admirals Isaac Campbell Kidd, Daniel Callaghan, Norman Scott (whose namesakes patrol the Gulf today), and the noble crew of the Stark, who will be expected to pay the price. —Captain David G. Clark, U. S. Navy, Director of Continuing Education, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
Captain Byron uses the Stark incident as his primary example and bases his arguments on a less-than-authorita- tive source, the House Armed Services Committee Report. The inaccuracies in his assessment indicate that he did not research the incident very well. Among them, he writes that because of an upcoming inspection, the Stark “was carrying twice her allowance of damage control equipment.” This is not true.
Beyond this, the Stark is a poor example to use in a readiness discussion. The Stark tragedy is not as much a condemnation of surface warfare readiness as it is of those who did not have to answer for their actions: the senior military and civilian leaders who put the ship in an impossible position without adequate support or guidance.
The author writes that there are no organizations in the surface navy, as there are in the submarine and aviation communities, that exist to develop “a total commitment to excellence in training for combat.” This is nonsense. There are numerous organizations within the surface navy that fulfill precisely this function, including destroyer squadrons and amphibious squadrons, to name but two.
With regard to the establishment of surface warfare standard operating procedures, Captain Byron is correct but is behind the power curve in his proposal. These procedures exist in the class combat systems doctrines and the surface navy’s battle orders—both of which have been in development for some time and continue to be refined today.
“The problem of adequate funding for operations and training is not the fundamental problem,” Captain Byron states. In this brush-off, he shows a submariner’s unfamiliarity with the problem of leadership and management in a resource-limited environment. Money is a basic problem, and with the prospect of further funding reductions, it is going to become even more significant. To treat this issue so lightly is to ignore the reality faced by surface warfare commanders and commanding officers every day.
Captain Byron’s argument for single-purpose, mission- specific surface ships shows a great ignorance of the resources available and the current mission of the U. S. fleet. The U. S. Navy today is straining to meet commitments with highly flexible, multimission ships. Where would the money come from to build the single-purpose ships which would be required to meet these commitments?
Certainly, the surface warfare community has readiness problems and needs to work on them. Captain Byron, however, misses one of the major shortcomings: a personnel system that drives officers through billets too fast. For example, the typical department head on a surface ship spends only 18 months in his job. About the time he is comfortable in the assignment, he moves on to a new one. In many ways, our personnel assignment and promotion policies have made us a Navy dedicated to pushing officers through an artificial pipeline, rather than a Navy whose personnel policies are dedicated to fleet combat readiness.
If I have learned anything as a tactical destroyer squadron commander and as a battle group ASW commander, it is that there is a positive trend in the fleet—the increasing willingness and ability of submarines, aircraft, and surface ships to work together in combined arms naval warfare- The Navy is improving in these combined-arms techniques every day. This approach—that is, Navy professionals working together with mutual respect, knowing and appreciating the others’ capabilities and limitations^ is the way to naval warfare excellence. It is also the main reason why I find Captain Byron’s article so discouraging- If the article were a true representation of the submarine community’s view of surface warfare capabilities and talent, it would represent a return to the dark ages of close- minded intra-community competition and prejudice. I Pre” fer to believe, however, that the article represents one frustrated Pentagon staff officer’s view. It also proves that Washington staff officers need to get out of their iv01^ towers more often and return to the fleet, where they can learn firsthand what is going on in readiness.
I offer Captain Byron a challenge: Come with me on ouf next fleet exercise and see a Navy in which all communities are “first team.” This is the fleet in which the business of readiness is tested and where officers of each community are combining their talents and skills daily in ordef to win future battles at sea. —Captain Mike Miller, U- s- Navy, Commander Destroyer Squadron 24
Byron’s Theory and Proposals Examined______
Captain Byron asserts:
The submariner and the aviator constantly dwell whl1 danger in worlds far more hostile than the surface of tbe sea. . . . [t]he aviator and submariner must constant do the right thing. . . . Surface ships float. Compla cency [in the surface force] is survivable. . . . Submaf iners and aviators get killed if they are not ready. ■ ■ •
Indeed, aviators and submariners face danger. Yet, posit that surface sailors face no comparable danger in environment “with no enemy present” is absurd. Surface crews operate complex and potentially dangerous (1,2^0 pounds-per-square-inch steam, gas-turbine, and nuclei powered) engineering plants daily, steam in close proxim ity to merchant ships day and night, when a wrong maneU' ver could cost the lives of all hands on board both ships’ and routinely fire and maintain extremely complex a° potentially dangerous combat weapon systems. Eve0 while surface ships are in port, flooding and fire are co° stant dangers, and, absent proper training and comma0 emphasis, costly and life-threatening accidents can occuf- Indeed, in most situations, surface officers are responsible for many more lives than their aviation and submari°e counterparts. Yet, despite complexity and inherent, evef present risks, the accident rate in the surface Navy is low--'' not because the environment is more benign than the sub marine and aviation milieu, but because of the surface force’s high level of professionalism and readiness.
Captain Byron “proposes” the use of standard opera1 ing procedures (SOPs), declaring that “. . . the surface navy traditionally has resisted application of SOPs.”1 AP parently, he is unaware that many surface warfare co°' manding officers have developed detailed battle order
t'ons
ranges at which targets will be engaged for soft or
■ •”> Ia“gt
rc* kills, types of ordnance to be employed, and the "ttrnber of rounds, missiles, and/or torpedoes to be deliv- ered^—all tailored to the threat. My own battle orders pro- Vl(ie SOPs, yet Captain Byron suggests that SOPs are non- e*tstent in the surface navy. Moreover, nearly every de- P r°yer combat information center, for example, has SOPs r recovering a man overboard, naval gunfire support, ‘""'ship cruise missile defense, sea and anchor details, and derway replenishments, etc.
the subject of training, Captain Byron observes:
Each submarine squadron has a deputy commander tar readiness and a deputy commander for training. ; • • Their role is to create better readiness. . . . Noth- lng of this nature exists in the surface force.”
yes and no. It is true that destroyer squadrons do not ("Ve deputies for readiness and training. Yet, in the Atlan- " Fleet, there are readiness destroyer squadrons edRons), which are dedicated wholely to material readi- Less- These RedRons do not deploy; their entire focus is to and the material readiness of assigned destroyers and Sates. RedRon commodores are major-command cap-
'ains
squad
• On the other hand, Atlantic Fleet tactical destroyer
'raii
drons (TacDesRons) are dedicated solely to tactical
p ""ng and the employment of battle group units (sur- Ce> aviation, and submarine). TacDesRon commodores (e niajor-command captains, who are respected as the top cac'icians in the surface force. The RedRon and TacRon "Cept has been in place for ten years and is successful. ^ Eaptain Byron boasts that ‘‘just two officers—the two es' Warriors [When were submariners last involved in nc^taat?] in the force—run the prospective commanding
offi,
tails
com
Cer training for the entire submarine navy.” Yet, he
to mention that just one officer (a post major- Hand captain) heads the Surface Warfare Officers
ail^Os) School Command and is responsible for training Ut^acc warfare officers. The fact that three consecutive j k) School commanding officers (including the present "mbent) have been selected for promotion to rear admi-
ral is no coincidence. As confirmed by the fiscal year 1989 rear admiral selection board, only the finest surface officers are detailed to head SWO training. —Commander R. Robinson Harris, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Conolly (DD-979)
Captain Byron views the Stark's “mugging” as a clear signal that the surface force is not ready. The conclusion is seriously flawed. Stark's antiair “quick-draw” proficiency was inadequate, but the article does not explain how that inadequacy equates to a “not-ready” call for the entire surface navy, composed of logistics ships, amphibious ships, and many other cruiser-destroyer type combatants quite unlike the Stark.
Captain Byron asserts the superior readiness of submariners and aviators. His evidence is that they remain alive in a dangerous business and that no submarines or aircraft have been mugged. These facts, however, do not necessarily indicate superior readiness. Keeping the number of takeoffs equal to the number of landings is the beginning, not the end of readiness. And could a submarine on trail operations in peacetime thank readiness more than luck or God if she managed to evade a bolt-from-the-blue torpedo from her quarry? More to the present point, how valid would it be to assert, if that sort of bushwhacking occurred, that the entire submarine force was thereby proven unready?
Captain Byron believes that the surface force almost missed the Vietnam War because of poor engineering readiness. He offers no data to support the assertion. I was there year after year, on four different ships and did not see or hear of many commitments missed from 1966 to 1976. The horses were ridden hard and put away wet, especially the carriers. This operational tempo ran down engineering readiness, but did not keep the surface force
imply that the SWO is a generically inferior brand of navaj officer is a cheap shot, oversimplifies the problem, an
not be expected to know anything about ASW. He wou
Id
out of the war. Not only were the ships deployed and on station when needed, so, too, were the men of the “brown-water navy.” Many surface warriors fought ably from craft whose service life expectancy was less than a maintenance cycle. They certainly did not miss the war. 1 later commanded a destroyer named for one of the many who went but did not come back.
Carrier-duty experience makes me skeptical of Captain Byron’s view that surface warriors have a unique resistance to SOPs and will not push hard enough to obtain adequate resources. Carriers are part of naval aviation, so by Captain Byron’s reasoning carriers should be superior in readiness. That was not what I encountered: In 1973, I faced the same problems in a carrier engineering department as I had faced in a destroyer engineering department. 1 did not find a better world of SOPs and increased resources available to solve those problems.
Captain Byron also gets it wrong when he prescribes single-mission design and training for surface ships. That already exists to about the greatest degree practical. The logistics and amphibious forces exemplify that approach. And frigates like the Stark were designed primarily for ASW and typically emphasize that specific mission in their training.
Today’s Navy must be fully responsive to national policy, even if that means carrying out tasks that do not lit neatly into mission-area specialization. Neither a nuclear submarine nor an F-14 Tomcat squadron gets sent off alone to demonstrate U. S. concerns in some hotspot. The submarine’s invisibility rules it out, and the F-14 squadron needs a carrier battle group home. On the other hand, “gunboat diplomacy” always requires surface forces, and commanders cannot respond, “Sorry, 1 don’t have any ships designed or trained for that job.” What Captain Byron derides as “mission du jour” tasking is not only inescapable but necessary in the surface navy.
Let’s be clear, though: The Stark’s moment of truth did not find a crew that was being asked to perform an impossibly complicated or esoteric mission. The ship did not get basic AAW right, apparently not because of too much complexity, but because of a few individual failures.
Captain Byron would complement single-mission design and training with “a major change in the way surface officers are recruited, trained, and paid” in order to attract a larger share of the best and the brightest. That would be nice. The complexity and challenge of these tasks warrant increased resources. But the Navy’s senior leadership is pragmatic enough to know that throwing larger amounts of money at surface warfare in a time of reduced defense budgets is a non-starter, no matter who “bands together and screams like boiled owls,” as Captain Byron urges.
A less lavishly funded but effective rebuilding effort is in progress, though—a renaissance of the spirit; a reestablishment of the esprit that disappeared sometime between the end of World War II and my own commissioning in 1965. In the 1960s, surface warfare existed but was unrecognized as a community by those within or without. It was simply the “all other” after the fliers, submariners, and restricted line/staff were accounted for. Except for the cruiser-destroyer force, there was neither identity nor pride beyond one’s own ship.
Today, there is both identity and pride—and it didn t take a lot of money, only a lot of leadership and chutzpah by a succession of Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare and others who saw both the need and an affordable way ahead.
Navy pride was both battered and enhanced by the mugging of the Stark. It hurt that the commanding officer- executive officer, and tactical action officer on watch were measured and found wanting when the Iraqi Mirage aircraft approached. It made us proud that out of the shock- heat, and horror of two Exocet missile hits, the ship's company, led by these same officers, brought the Stark back, despite the sort of damage that had previously sunk other similar-sized ships.
Captain Byron’s article is an appealing path to a wrong conclusion. But that conclusion is probably shared by many others less bold and articulate than he. His article is compelling evidence that the Navy should clear the air by publishing a “white paper” about the Stark affair, as was done after the USS Belknap (CG-26)-John F. Kennedy (CV-67) collision. The Navy needs to look it in the eye- take on board whatever specific lessons it provides, and get the information to those at sea and ashore, who need 4 to do their jobs. Until that happens, we will remain vulnerable from within and without to unfounded criticism and wrong conclusions about the Stark's mugging, and might fail to correct any specific problems the investigation documents.—Captain Douglas M. Norton, U. S. Navy
Keeping the Surface Forces Ready
Captain Byron's thought-provoking article will hopefully have the desired effect of stimulating change in the way the surface navy trains its combatant forces. He fails’ however, to fully assess the magnitude of the inherent differences between the three fundamental warfare communities. The SWO must operate and fight in a multidimensional arena and must bring to the battle a far more expansive knowledge of tactics and his own force capabilities than either his aviator or submariner counterpart. To demonstrates the very lack of understanding of the other guy’s community discussed in the article.
The very complexity of the SWO’s environment make* training him as an expert in all of his required missi°n areas much more difficult than, for example, the aviator- In a sense, we are comparing apples and oranges. F°r illustrative purposes, consider the following analogy-
The SWO equivalent of an F-14 Tomcat pilot or radaf intercept officer would specialize in one warfighting area- AAW, for example. He would then further specialize i11 one weapons system, such as the Mk-92 fire control system and Mk-13 guided missile launching system combina tion. He would train exhaustively for the first two and one half years of his commissioned life in realistic traininf environments, learning how best to operate his weapon system before being assigned to his first ship. He would
bat
'nformation center as tactical action officer (TAO)
all
lot
ihoi
lo
tronic
until
counter-countermeasures; and the submariner’s erstanding of the attack submarine in direct or associ-
n°t be required to become an expert in ASUW beyond the surface-to-surface capabilities of the Mk-92/Mk-13 sys- teiT1- His expertise in electronic warfare would be limited 0 Earning how best to operate his system in the electromagnetic environment presented to him. Communications gaining would consist of learning how to talk on a radio.
. e would not be required to become an expert in engineering beyond learning how to deal with various system casu- a ties or degradations, nor would he be expected to know anything about mine warfare, amphibious warfare, underlay replenishment, naval gunfire support, supply support, ^erhaul management, or the attack submarine’s role in ,lrect support. During his two-plus years of post-commis- s'oned training, he would not be a division officer, would n°t be constantly preparing for the next inspection, and w°uld not be trying to earn his warfare qualification. fiy comparison, today’s SWO standing watch in a com
Ust> in addition to being thoroughly well versed in the ^emy’s capabilities, possess a high level of expertise in Warfare areas. He must bring with him the fighter pi- knowledge of the AAW environment (including a r°ugh understanding of air-to-air tactics, such as vector ■ ,8'c, chainsaw, and retum-to-force procedures); the E-2C awkeye team’s knowledge of force management and the ■Javai tactical data system; the attack pilot’s knowledge of SUW; the S-3 Viking, SH-3 Sea King, SH-60 Seahawk ^MPS Mk III, and SH-2 Seasprite LAMPS Mk I, and "3 Orion crews’ knowledge of ASW and air ASW tactics; , e EA-6 Prowler crew’s knowledge of electronic surveil- ance measures, electronic countermeasures, and elec- ated support. This does not sound like a naval officer cut r°m inferior cloth. Compare this individual with the ’Shter pilot who flies over a Ticonderogci (CG-47)-class Aegis cruiser at mast-top height and isn’t sure what kind ship he just saw. There is no question that the SWO ^°nimunity is the breeding ground for the total-force ex- )Crf perhaps, regrettably, at the expense of his ability or °Pportunity to develop true combat expertise in a specific ^fare area.
Unfortunately, the very complexity of the SWO’s war- ^gnting environment makes training him to the same level 0j. exPertise as his aviator counterpart unrealistic in terms hme and money. The SWO has no training experience adable to him that can compare with, for example, an y r,al dogfight. The pilot who trains in that environment a °'vs immediately when he makes what would have been fatal mistake in actual combat and he also knows bether he won, lost, or fought to a draw. The SWO who
fights a simulated Harpoon surface engagement with another ship must always wonder if he would have won or been killed. By the time his ship receives feedback from the various data-mongers who reconstruct these events, he’s either been transferred, can’t remember in detail all his decisions and moves, or doesn’t have the time to read a two-inch-thick document.
While this complex war-fighting environment may dilute the SWO’s expertise in a specific area, it develops the ideal officer for command of battle groups. The SWO shows up on the battle group commander’s staff with a distinct advantage over his aviation and submarine contemporaries. He’s ready to step in and assume the watch as the flag TAO almost immediately. The environment also produces an officer with fierce pride in his ability to improvise, make do with less, and keep his wits about him in an intense and almost overwhelming environment, where he is bombarded with information from all sides and with threats from above, below, and on the surface.
I support Captain Byron’s advocation of SOPs, although the complexity of the threat makes a top-level SOP next to impossible to develop. We can, however, dictate the combat system setup for given threat scenarios and demand compliance at the individual operator level and at the TAO level. We do this now through the commanding officer’s battle orders, but we can improve upon what is, at this juncture, largely the product of each individual commanding officer’s expertise. Our best and brightest tacticians, by ship class, should be chartered to develop standardized battle orders for each class of warship. The ultimate decisions regarding the conduct of a given engagement will still rest with the commanding officer and his TAOs.
How can we improve our community’s war-fighting skills given the training artificialities described previously and considering the enormous depth and breadth of knowledge required? First, we need to return to developing experts and communities within our community rather than trying to produce a SWO who is a jack of all trades and master of none. In other words, develop officers who serve only in the cruiser-destroyer force or in the amphibious force, mine warfare force, or service force. Our cruiser-destroyer ships are enormously complex and sophisticated. The pace of life for the junior officer in a destroyer-sized ship is breakneck, as many a young lieutenant painfully discovers going to his first department head tour after an amphibious or service force upbringing. The officers who serve on board and command these ships should be specifically selected and groomed to do so.
The Navy made a mistake some 14 years ago when it decided to enhance the quality of its amphibious and service forces by diverting cruiser-destroyer officers to those ships. The feeling was that those ships were hurting, because the best talent was on board the destroyers. Well, that is where it should be. Our cruisers and destroyers are the ones at the front lines and the ones that go in harm’s way. Our best officers should man them. In practice, we detail our best officers to those jobs now; but taking it a step further to formalize the distinction is needed.
All aviators are proud of what they do and rightfully so, but when basic flight training is over and it’s time to make seat assignments, the cream goes to jets, and the cream of the cream goes to fighters and single-seat attack aircraft, and everybody knows it. The surface community should do the same thing and recognize the special skills and abilities required of a “destroyerman.” By the same token, the amphibious, mine warfare, and service forces each demand specific knowledge and expertise, which is similarly diluted under the current system.
Second, there is entirely too much emphasis on engineering. The steps we took after the Vietnam War were needed. We had run those old and tired steam plants into the ground out of necessity, and we had developed poor engineering practices and habits. The establishment of the Propulsion Examining Board and the insistence on the engineering operational sequencing system and checklists were much-needed steps. Twenty years ago, many of our commanding officers went to their ships with little or no knowledge of their engineering plants and readiness suffered. The Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course (SOSMRC) was the answer to that problem. Times have changed; gas turbine propulsion systems are more reliable, more forgiving, and less of a maintenance burden. Our younger officers, brought up on the engineering operational sequencing system and checklists, don’t have the bad habits to unlearn. Our prospective commanding officers got there via the SWO qualification process, which is heavy on engineering, and by way of the surface ship command qualification process, which requires that they qualify as an underway engineering officer of the watch (EOOW). Do they really need to go to SOSMRC and learn how to field strip a main feed pump? While the command qualification process requires an EOOW qualification, it does not require a TAO qualification. Is this how we train our warfighters?
The Propulsion Examining Board has become the predominant and most feared enemy on the waterfront. Ten minutes before that Exocet slammed into the Stark's side, if you had asked the commanding officer what he feared most over the next few months, it wouldn't have been mines, Exocet, or Maverick missiles—it would have been his upcoming outchop OPPE—an operational propulsion plant examination administered by the Propulsion Examining Board during a returning deployer’s transit home.
Third, we need to cut back on the number and frequency of surface ship inspections. SWOs run a continuous gauntlet of inspections, many overlap, the standards and requirements are often contradictory, and there is little time left for meaningful training. The administrative workload reduction effort begun in 1985 was a step in the right direction, but most of the administration at the shipboard level is inspection-driven. Let’s eliminate the ones not required by law, and turn the ship back over to the commanding officer. The “one size fits all” approach is particularly galling. Inspect the ships that have proven they can’t hack it; leave the hot runners alone, and Pllt them at the front lines, operating.
Fourth, we need to better attack the training problem- Annual missile-firing exercises do not occur often enough and are too “canned.” Surface forces need more training missile allocations and more and better targets. We need to stress and threaten our combat information center teams m the training environment. Range safety and ship safety |S important, but detracts from the training value. The aviators accept a certain amount of risk in their training environment as well as a certain amount of loss. It’s tragic and painful when losses occurs, but those who know the feeling of a cold shot of adrenaline to the heart, inspired by realistic training scenarios, are better for it in actual combat. Recognizing that budget constraints preclude throwing vast amounts of money at the problem, SWOs need to maximize underway training periods and continue to develop realistic pierside and at-sea combat training simulators. The 20B4 and 20B5 pierside combat systems trained are good examples of progress in this important area. The Naval Tactical Gaming System is not the answer.
I agree wholeheartedly that we must attract our best talent to the surface warfare community, but we cannot do this when:
► The SWO community is allowed to be a dump'11? ground for officer and enlisted washouts from the other two communities. Get rid of them somewhere else; the Navy may lose some good people, but the tradeoff is n(,t worth it.
► The SWO community is paid less than the other communities. Naval flight officer retention is the highest in the Navy—why then offer continuation pay? Do we really need two crews for nuclear-powered fleet ballistic-missis submarines? Must all of those billets in submarines be manned by nuclear-trained officers? If we “washed out unqualified SWOs, a shortage necessitating continuation pay would occur in that community as well.
► A double standard exists in the way the Navy outfits its
officers. Aviators and submariners are permitted “glamorous” organizational clothing, such as stylish flight jackets, wire-rimmed sunglasses, and “SWAT team” poopi*- suits, which are denied the SWO—although he is buffeted by the same wind and works in the same bright sun and the same shipboard environment. The young men we seek t° attract from the Naval Academy and NROTC are influenced by these seemingly petty considerations. “Birth- control glasses” don’t hack it. Image does make a differ' ence at service selection time. .
The surface warfare community can overcome this
uture officers to the most complex and demanding war- arc area. On the positive side, the article provides much °°d for thought and will hopefully inspire the type of nnovative thinking needed to meet the challenges of train- ng for combat and then using our combined expertise to '"Prove overall combat readiness.—Commander Wil- l(nn D. Sullivan, U. S. Navy
Contrary to Captain Byron’s comments, complacency is n<n always survivable even on the surface of the sea. Night
Ce warfare. The Stark's failure to counter the Iraqi jet es not invalidate this principle.
* do agree with one point Captain Byron makes. The . dace navy needs to get more serious about combat train- 8- We don’t have satisfactory simulated Exocet targets; e don’t get enough realistic live-firing exercises; and too w of us understand our ships as an integrated combat ^stem. The emphasis for years in the surface navy has "er> on the propulsion plant. As Captain Byron points
'mage problem, thus attracting more and better talent, by: Emphasizing the exceptional skills required to fight and 'Vln in the three-dimensional environment Developing a truly elite cadre of cruiser-destroyermen Allowing only SWOs to command surface ships (Much credibility is lost when aviators and submariners are al- °Wed to briefly pass through a surface command in order 0 get their tickets punched.)
Promoting a pro-rata share of SWOs to all ranks, espe- emlly the highest
Increasing the number of lieutenant commander contends and bringing back the lieutenant commands. Sixteen to 18 years is a long time to wait for the ultimate exPerience of one’s professional career.
Captain Byron does the surface community and the avy as a whole a disservice by impugning the native ab|lities of our SWOs. Again, image is a key factor in the aPprentice officer’s decision to go surface, aviation, or Su.binarines. Such a theory published by a senior officer do little to attract young, proud, and impressionable
Plane-guard duty, refueling in sea-state five, or riding out p typhoon are not the trivial feats that he implies. In the ersian Gulf today, surface ships display professionalism, ^traint, and efficiency in escort operations that require "E preparation, and a high degree of readiness.
The surface navy is not without its problems, but the Pr°blems are not a lack of SOPs, poor training courses, crior personnel, or too complex a ship design. The ar|ique value of the surface ship is its flexibility and capa. 'hty to perform several functions. It must exist and fight 'n a multithreat environment and, therefore, must possess s<)rne capability to counter these threats. Captain Byron . aims there is something inherently wrong about achieves peak readiness in one warfare area at the temporary xPense of others. He cites the Stark incident as an exam- c °f an overly sophisticated ship, which could not main- a,n readiness in a critical mission area. The Persian Gulf ear-war scenario is one that demonstrates the value of Jaltipurpose ships. The ASW threat is minimal there, D'ch should allow surface warships ample opportunity to
Cak for the primary local missions of AAW and antisur- bc-
doi
out, engineering readiness has dramatically improved in the last 15 years. In the process, however, getting through the light-off examination (LOE) and the operational propulsion plant examination (OPPE) has become the primary goal of many commanding officers. Inspection and survey, surface warfare’s other major exam, focuses on combat system equipment readiness, but not training. The surface community is in danger of doing what it has accused submariners of doing for years: focusing strictly on the “back end of the boat.”
Though reluctant to propose mounting additional burdens on our busy ships, the success of our engineering
training and inspection system speaks for itself. It seems the only way to restore balance between combat training and propulsion readiness is to institute a series of combat system inspections that parallel the successful propulsion plant LOE and OPPE. These inspections should review team and individual training and adherence to battle orders as well as material condition. The surface forces have danced around this solution for years, and it is time to bite the bullet.
In 1982-83, the Commander Naval Surface Force, Atlantic, established a similar combat systems inspection and training program. However, it relied on dual-hatted local talent (squadron staffs, Naval Sea Systems Command technical representatives, and the like) in each home port for training and inspection teams. Under this new proposal, dedicated combat system mobile training teams (MTTs), much like our propulsion plant MTTs. would operate in each home port to help commanding officers prepare for these exams. An independent team, reporting to the fleet commander and modeled on the Propulsion Examining Board, would administer the examination.
As painful as this would be to ships already overrun with assistance visits and inspection teams, such a move is necessary. Getting serious about combat training is the true lesson we should learn from the Stark disaster. —Commander R. B. Shields, Jr., U. S. Navy
Byron Responds
Publishing a controversial article like “The Surface Navy is Not Ready” and the responses to it reflects the spirit of the professionals’ forum at work. If such an exchange benefits surface readiness, good. Certainly it benefits the Navy to hold open and serious discussions. Sometimes these dialogues sting a bit, but, as the author Susan George wrote, “If we make no enemies, we should question the worth of our work.”
Two fundamental concerns motivate my writing. One stems from my inability to find any surface warfare officer willing to engage the dual questions “why is surface readiness many points lower than submarines?” and “what can be done to close the gap?” In my search for answers, I encountered hand-waving and more than a little anger at my impertinence, but could find no one saying either that the questions had been studied and we know the answers, or even that the questions are valid and should be studied. The questions, in fact, are valid and must be addressed.
The second motivator is my belief that each percentage point of surface unreadiness equates to ships unavailable for full service. This translates directly to a requirement for additional ships to regain the readiness product needed. In this time of reduced spending, the dollar tradeoff between buying new hulls and fixing readiness in the ones we already have gives great leverage to readiness improvement—especially in those areas that we are now paying good money for: training and documentation.
Critics think my use of the Stark incident to make my points is wrong or unfair. They say the Stark was an aberration. “Bad skipper” is the line I have heard from just about every surface warfare officer I have talked to. Okay, but the submariners and fliers I have discussed this with also say “bad system.” It was the near universality of their opinion that the Stark highlighted systemic failings in the surface navy’s approach to readiness that prompted me to write. Unlike many of them, though, I believe that something can be done to fix surface readiness.
Lieutenant J. K. Kuhn writes that the Stark7s “mugging” had no more to do with surface readiness than the losses of the Thresher and Scorpion did with submarine readiness. The difference among the tragedies is in what happened after the accidents. The submarine force essentially tore itself apart for two years after the Thresher's loss to ensure that every lesson would be learned and applied. The entire SubSafe program came out of the incident. Ships being built were stopped and rebuilt. Ships in commission were restricted in operation until the major modifications coming from the investigation could be backfitted in overhaul. The entire effort cost billions. The Scorpion's loss caused less change, because fewer details are known of her demise. Nonetheless, several areas, notably battery charging and weapons maintenance, were significantly changed because of the Scorpion.
What significant changes has the Stark generated thus far? Nothing can come from the attack if the surface force simply writes it off as “bad skipper.” That skipper came from a system. His ship was placed in harm’s way, trained a certain way to a certain level, and evaluated as ready to a particular standard by a particular process. The Stark makes these all suspect. I give Captain Brindel no sympathy at all, but he was right in one thing: the investigation stopped short of the true causes.
The writers’ collective opinion seems divided about evenly between a belief that submariners are too much the silent service when it comes to inter-community cooperation, and the opinion that everyone would be better off » this submariner would shut up. It takes two to hold a dialogue. Most senior submariners I know, like me, have made earnest efforts to offer ideas to the surface force, which they thought would help, but with little interest back. Surface warfare officers should accept that their comrades at arms in the two other major warfare specialties have useful things to say and are ready to work with the surface force to improve overall readiness. Let’s talk-
The matter of surface ship design and complexity lS much discussed. 1 share the writers’ belief that the versatility of multipurpose surface warships is a major plus, but I argue that crews must be capable inherently of tapph1? that versatility. A mismatch between a ship’s capabilitieS and its crew’s ability to exploit them fully places the surface force in a fool’s paradise, unless the force sets the firm standard of full readiness in all the systems all the time. Commander R. B. Shields says the primary thing that the Stark had to worry with in the Gulf was AAW and antisurface warfare, so slighting ASW was okay. Such a philosophy is dead wrong.
The enemy sets the standards, gentlemen. One day combat with the Soviets will test all the capabilities of out ships. And a longer conflict will render useless the first' response battle mode so often cited by surface warfare officers: one cannot counter a serious enemy in the long run by throwing all the ordnance into the air and over the side. Dealing with a full multidimensional threat will require total effectiveness in employing every capability designed into the ships. The point is basic: either make the training better or the ships simpler.
Commodore Miller makes me out to be a “frustrated Pentagon staff officer.” The fact is, during a 32-year Navy career, I have spent just 23 months in the Pentagon-" and I’m not there now. If I am frustrated, it’s because officers of the surface persuasion seem to believe that the truth of a message rests entirely on the surface warfare bona fides of the messenger. Fine, then pursue that. Ask for a frank assessment of U. S. surface ship readiness fro'11 your Dutch or British NATO counterparts. I have hear from both and know their opinions come close to mine-
Several commentators (notably, Captain David Clark) resent my “outsider” comments. Remember, I am a qua*' ified surface warfare officer—not an outsider. More in1' portant, no line officer should be held as an “outsider” b) his fellow officers, even if he or she is of a different line community . The essence of naval officership is intrinsic to the profession, not the platform in which the officer rides- Notions to the contrary are the reason we have so much difficulty sharing ideas. Having been forced by Congress to engage inter-service jointness, we now need to force’ ourselves to create “inner jointness,” to get back to a blue-suit definition of line officer that transcends platform parochialism.
Captain Clark also notes there are not any submarines or aircraft carriers operating where the Iraqis hit the Stark— obviously, because the Persian Gulf is a pretty dumb place to put a carrier, and it is too shallow to operate a submarine. But they are there nearby in the Arabian Sea, where they have been since 1979, when Indian Ocean operations started in earnest. To imply that surface ships are the only type to show at the scene of a scrap is poppycock.
Commander R. Robinson Harris says, correctly, that the surface navy knows danger in its daily work. My point was not that peacetime danger is absent in surface ships, but that submariners and fliers deal with danger's ever- presence in a fundamentally different way.
Many critics believe that I am foolish to claim that money is not the primary problem in surface readiness. I have two responses. First, resources are already Bowing to maintain surface readiness. 1 contend that if we were smarter in what we bought with these funds and copied from the submarine and air navies, we could improve readiness rather than just maintain it.
Second, the surface navy is not naturally impaired in its search for resources. All the platform barons get equal time at the trough—surface included. Every community is required to set its priorities and articulate its case for funds. In the surface force’s case, I believe its priorities are wrong and its articulation poor. The surface navy itself does not hold readiness issues to be important enough to warrant sacrifice of other surface spending priorities, notably ship acquisition.
The resources needed to address surface readiness in full are probably less than the price of one more warship. Whether that warship is an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)- or a Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class unit is a decision left to be made, but surface officers should recognize that the submarine force and the aviation community have been buying good readiness on the installment plan for a long time, now. Fixing surface readiness will take a big down payment. It is time to cut a deal to put some real resources into the readiness pot, and, regardless of whether that means a 599-ship Navy (or, as it seems to be going, a 583-ship Navy); that investment is good spending. No deal is possible, of course, if there is no problem to solve. The surface force will have to confess that it has a readiness problem to get funding to solve it.
For those who believe the submarine force is unfamiliar with resource restrictions, I can only say that it is raining on both sides of the line of scrimmage. The submarine force gets its money the old-fashioned way: it grovels. If it does the job better than the surface navy, it is not because the deck is stacked.
On procedural standardization in surface ships, my decision to pursue the issue came after I had studied the combat systems doctrine for the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate. Captain J. Michael Rodgers (see March 1988 Proceedings, pp. 20-24) presents well the progress under way to improve procedural standardization, in our surface warships. He describes an evolutionary process, in which the submarine and naval aviation communities are much further along than the surface force.
As goals, surface force combat-system procedures should:
► Come with the equipment, system, and class
► Be integrated for all sensors, processors, and weapons in a ship class
► Be standard throughout the force (Configuration control in surface ships should be improved significantly to permit procedural standardization.)
► Contain step-by-step details for setting equipment optimally in all modes
► Embody doctrine
► Anticipate casualty situations by providing casualty procedures to counter all predictable equipment failures in a disciplined way
► Be sailor-tested in combat-like conditions
► Be authoritatively promulgated and maintained by the material establishment and the operational chain of coni' mand, working in partnership
► Be used as the basis for training at all levels
► Be accompanied by a mandatory standard of discipHne (Documentation without discipline is useless.)
Surface warfare officers should quit deluding themselves. Look at aviation’s NATOPS (Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization), the ballistic missile force’s strategic weapons standard operating pr°' cedures, and the submarine combat system documentation, produced by Submarine Development Squadron Twelve. These are the foundations on which battle orders can be built and doctrine exploited. Do not expect a ne"' commanding officer to have it right at the start of his tour nor probably really figure it out even by the end. Help him. Help yourselves. See how the other guys do it.
On the matter of surface force readiness training, the good things being done in the submarine and aviatiorJ communities contrast markedly with the perfunctory ritua that passes for combat training in the surface force. Some writers think I don’t know about Surface Warfare Officer School and its fine contribution. Certainly I do. But sending a prospective commanding officer to class is not the same as putting him to sea and beating his brains till he can shoot torpedoes proficiently in his sleep. Training the officers of a wardroom individually ashore is not the same as taking that wardroom, the crew, and the ship itself int0 a realistic battle training test as challenging as the human mind can make it. Go look at demonstration and shakedown operations, submarine torpedo certification exercises, Top Gun, Strike University, the Air Force’s Flag, the Army’s Fort Irwin, and the Marine Corps’s aviation weapons and tactics squadron. If there’s anythin? even remotely close to these in effectiveness in the surface force, I’ll eat my hat.
Several writers say that the surface navy’s reading squadrons and tactical squadrons fill the bill for reading training. Not without manpower they don’t. The subma' rine force puts two post-command deputies (front runners > all) in each of its squadrons and groups, giving them authority to evaluate the ships stringently and to train then1 hard. Naval aviation similarly invests its best commanding officers by next assigning them to readiness air squadron*
tient
a scalpel for appendicitis.
and carrier air wings. The surface force, by contrast, lets a lts skippers escape until they come back in major com- niand, where they are spread too thin to have the impact °n readiness needed. The surface force would be well ad- V|sed to be as selfish as the air and submarine navies in Putting its successful skippers right back to work improv- ln8 readiness.
Commander William Sullivan mentions the new pier- S|de trainers. These can help, but only if human beings 'Vlth training expertise come with them. The difference etween Harvard, for example, and your local community college is not the quality of the bricks or the superior strain
lvy on the walls. The faculty and its commitment to e^cellence make the difference. If the pierside trainers s °w up without the Navy equivalent of a Harvard faculty ln readiness instructors, the trainers are just so much more |Unk; the effort is nothing better than handing a sick pa
T°o much engineering emphasis, as several authors c°ritend? No, the opposite: no emphasis on combat skills ^uivalent to the engineering emphasis; no system as ef- etlve as the Propulsion Examining Board in demanding arfare performance. Consider Commander Sullivan’s demerit:
Ten minutes before that Exocet slammed into the Stark's side, if you had asked the commanding officer '''hat he feared most over the next few months, it Wouldn't have been mines, Exocet, or Maverick missiles—it would have been his upcoming outchop
As this statement (unfortunately true) shows, we have gotten things terribly backwards. But the answer is not to chuck the engineering progress so painfully gained, rather, it is to apply that same discipline and energy to a more important task, combat readiness.
Too many inspections? Probably. The surface force seems to think quality can be inspected into a system. It cannot. Hard-nosed combat training at sea and in the schools creates readiness. Rigid certification procedures, with teams of experts and time to look, can then verify that the minimum standards are met.
The positive comments made about points in my article add more conviction to my belief that surface force readiness needs fixing. I think we need a serious, strenuous review of readiness by a team of the best warriors we have, representing all communities. That may sound like a description of the Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Good. I urge that surface readiness be the focus of next year’s group. If not them, then a solid, comparable off-line committee.
Such a group would have four tasks:
► Set standards and goals for surface force readiness.
► Assess the current state of surface force readiness.
► Study the specific ways readiness is kept higher in the submarine and naval aviation forces.
► Present priorities and recommendations to the highest leadership of the Navy.
It is up to all of us, now. Let’s work together to improve surface readiness.—Captain John L. Byron, U. S. Navy
Reprints
Available
Low-cost, high-quality reprim Material published in Procee< and Naval History are availal 0r more information, please Write:
Production Manager Proceedings!Naval History U. S. Naval Institute Annapolis, MD 21402
?e sure to indicate the date of the jSsue in which the item was pub- lsned, the number of copies needed, and your daytime phone number. (Minimum orders: color—500 reprints;
“lack and white—100 reprints.)
Making 50 Hz a reality for shipboard electronic enclosures.
A & J Manufacturing Company’s nett) 50 Hz open rack takes vibration and payload requirements for shipboard enclosures to the cutting edge of technology. And like its recently developed 33 Hz enclosure, the new 50 Hz rack utilizes A & J’s unique, proprietary bolted construction which provides you the highest strength to weight ratio available.
For the severest of shipboard shock and vibration reqinrements, look to A &J’s neu> 50 Hz enclosure. Test reports available.
A & J Manufacturing Company
14131 Franklin Avenue, Tustin, California 92680, (714) 544-9570 Manufactured and distributed in Canada by the Devtek Corporation.
[1]See J. L. Byron, pp. 34-40, December 1987; R. R. Nebicker, pp. 16-20, January 1988; J. G. Stavridis, G. D. Pash, and R. O’Neill, pp. 28-30, February 1988; J. M. Rodgers and D. W. Meadows, pp. 20-24, March 1988; M. B. Sturgis, C. Johnson, and L. R. Brown, p. 22 April 1988 Proceedings.