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When this young man reaches enlistment age, will he choose the Navy? Probably not, if the force reduction trend continues and the Navy must do more with less. Operational requirements for naval forces worldwide are increasing, even while end strength is shrinking.
‘Too Many Chiefs?’
By Midshipman First Class Kennon A. Artis, U. S. Navy
Congress discovered a dramatic fluctuation in the enlisted-to-officer ratio for the six-year period 1980 to 1985. Historically, that ratio hovered around 7: 1, but by the beginning of fiscal year 1986 that figure had dropped dramatically to nearly 5.5:1, an overall 6% shift. As Chairman of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John Glenn (D-OH) developed a plan to reverse the increase in officers. After an extensive investigation, he concluded that the military spent too much money and too many resources on its officers. In addition, Senator Glenn believed that too many leaders would cause the overall operational efficiency of U. S. military units to deteriorate significantly.
Senator Glenn’s original proposal to Congress involved a 2% cut per year from fiscal year 1987 to fiscal year 1989 to counter exactly the 6% growth rate in officer end strength between 1980 and 1985. After much deliberation, Congress rejected this proposal but adopted a similar one: a 1% cut in fiscal year 1987, 2% in fiscal year 1988, and 3% in fiscal year 1989. The new bill, which became law with the 1987 Defense Authorization Act in November 1986, gives the military more latitude by deferring the most severe reductions.
The law requires the armed forces to meet these cuts by the close of fiscal years 1987, 1988, and 1989. Congress has left the decision of whom to cut from which services to the Department of Defense (DoD). Thus far, DoD has hit its target by reducing its officer strength by 3,088 by the end of fiscal year 1987. DoD foresees a problem, however, in making the 2% and 3% cuts in the next two years. Officers at the Pentagon are trying desperately to buy more time from Congress. They believe that they cannot make the required cuts in the relatively short periods allotted. DoD has gained some support from the House, which is willing to extend the deadline. The Senate, however, is standing firm with its original requirements and deadlines.
The Argument: Before presenting Congress with the 6% reduction plan. Senator Glenn tasked DoD to answer three questions:
► How does DoD determine the number of military personnel it needs to function?
► In what specific areas did the officer corps grow between 1980 and 1985?
► Will the armed forces be as capable after the proposed reductions?
According to sources on Capitol Hill, DoD dragged its feet in providing answers, and Senator Glenn forwarded his proposal with a strong recommendation for congreS' sional action. Now that the proposal has become law, Pen tagon officials are working to prove that the law is counterproductive. “It’s one of the stupidest things congress has done,” observed former Secretary of the Navy Lehman.1
The driving force behind the reductions is money- Col gressional officials admit that enacting the law was an easy way for Congress to reduce the budget.”2 Mil*taI^ officers and their families are costly to support. Pay. a lowances, and other benefits all add up. With the 1% *lS cal year 1987 reduction, for instance, Congress figures on saving $55 million.3
DoD eventually submitted a series of reports to Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee, responding t0 Senator Glenn’s three questions: .
► Each of the four services employs its own methods >n determining necessary officer strength, depending on |IS respective mission. All the services consider such imp°r tant factors as force readiness, current military threats, an the budget, and plug those variables into elaborate eqaJ tions. Some factors may be more important to one servlC‘ than to another. Rapid deployment capabilities, f°r stance, are of prime interest to the Marine Corps, wh* they may be less important to the Army.
► According to studies conducted by DoD, 77% 1
growth in officer end strength was in combat or cornbjt related areas. This is the reason for DoD’s energetic reSlS tance to the reductions. The remaining 23% increase calT1 in the support areas.
► DoD argues that the military’s capabilities will e greatly impaired because of the required reductions-
The Clash: Are the projected cost savings worth a p°sSl_ ble compromise of our national defense capability ’ cording to former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinbe ger, in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Comrnitte on Armed Services, “The 1987 DoD Authorization ^ would carve 15,000 officers out of (military) forces in ‘ ^ 88 and FY 89 and cause grievous damage to the defe111, structure.”4
But Congress pushes on. The situation has caused mllC friction, both in the Pentagon and on the Hill. After crea ing a schism within DoD, for instance, the Navy and Ma rine Corps found themselves in hot water with the Arrri'_ and Air Force. Upon passage of the law, Navy offic'a approached Congress alone, with a plea to leave their of1 cer corps intact. The Navy contends that it needs all 011 officers to operate a 600-ship navy efficiently.
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demand. Since young, able Americans are in short UPPly, their ,rnnient
be
wages—and, therefore, their cost to the gov- have risen accordingly. In response, the Navy
Th
s representative of the Office of Force Structure, Re- 0fUICes’ anc* Assessment Directorate for the Joint Chiefs itiri 3ff bebeves that the Navy exercised good political a 8ment in approaching Congress alone: “The Navy has aif0oc* case: Compared to the other services, proportion- y> tts officer end strength didn’t grow as much.”5 tho PParent,y’ tbe Navy did practice good politics. Al- th0l\^ ^'onSress left the actual cut decisions up to DoD, tio *°St ^ewer officers in the fiscal year 1987 reduc- p ns than the other services. While the Army and Air °rce lost 1,635 and 1,255 officers, respectively, the ^aval service forfeited only 198, all from the Marine h0rps- la 1990, after all the reductions, the Navy will poVe *ost 1,949 officers, the Army 7,595, and the Air Chief ^18’ according to predictions made by the Joint
^ ne Reasons: A report issued by the Center for Naval r .a Yses blames the decrease in the enlisted-to-officer cru° °n a cornhiaation of All-Volunteer Force (AVF) reSin ln^ ant^ tbe enc* tbe babY boom some 20 years ago. co Cg military no longer has a draft, the Navy must high Cnbstecl personnel away from the private sector with 2| er Pay- Also, the report stated,“the number of 18- to t)£l Year-olds, the prime recruiting age for enlisted person- re ’ ^eH by over 6 percent between 1980 and 1984 (as a and babY bust).”6 It is a simple matter of supply
,0§an reducing the size of its enlisted population, relative ns officers.
sis ( h ^avY also claims that Congress based its hypothe- Sin Pat tbere are to0 many officers) on antiquated data. fetyCe l*le beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in 1972, jn ,er and fewer people have enlisted each year. Accord- Th tbe Navy has altered many long-standing practices. atg2 <aes'8n °f the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frig- fewfrov'des a prime example. The ships of this class need lQ</r enhsted men to operate them. The older Knox (FF- ^/dass frigate required an 18:1 enlisted-to-officer while the Oliver Hazard Perry class only needs 15 nllsted per officer.
ten ,t' ^^emma: In order to meet the fiscal year 1987 the’ 'rcrnent> the four services cut officers primarily from ]jIT|. suPply and combat support communities. There are nj ed numbers of supply officers, however, and begin- § w'th the fiscal year 1988 reductions, the military will have to dig deep into its combat officer strength to meet the required cuts. Members of Congress must realize that the military cannot maintain its effectiveness with such a drastic cut in officer end strength.
Alternatives: According to a member of the joint- service group that decides on relative force reductions, “The military has to make some choices. We need to decide if we’ll stick with officers or fill the slots with warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), or civilians. There’s a real dilemma.”7
DoD has come up with several alternatives to the problem. A popular one puts pressure on the military from the opposite direction. Under the Secretary of Defense’s plan, proposed to Congress, the armed forces would halt officer procurement until fiscal year 1989, when normal attrition should have them back within the limits imposed by Congress.
Another DoD proposal calls for shifting the 2% and 3% cuts back by one year. Therefore, instead of setting the deadline for fiscal year 1989, the military would reach the goals by fiscal year 1990. According to one Pentagon official, “That would give us the opportunity to better make our case. It is the breathing room we need.”8
In order to reach the overall 6% cuts, both Congress and DoD may well have to face the least popular of the alternatives—refilling some of the slots with civilian personnel. The armed forces would have to seek civilian employees to pick up the slack, at least in combat support areas. This alternative clearly presents problems. DoD would need to find thousands of non-sensitive and non-deploying openings in which to fit civilians. Since the reason for the end strength cuts is economic, civilian replacements cannot be the answer because we would still have to pay them competitive wages. One may argue that it is cheaper to support civilians than to support an equal number of military officers. But the conversion costs—to recruit, train, and, if necessary, relocate civilian replacements—would be astronomical. Right now, the armed forces are not in the position to pour millions of dollars into a relocation program, no matter what the long-term savings might be.
What is the answer? DoD has adopted a plan in which the services make cuts in proportion to their current officer strengths. At present, the Air Force is the most “officer rich,” with an officer-to-enlisted ratio of about 4:1. It would take the largest cut. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, in descending order, would be cut less.
In some cases, the armed forces can replace officers in combat specialties with experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs). But long experience in both war and peace shows that ordering enlisted personnel to the spots normally filled by officers is a temporary expedient that
eedmss / Nava, Revjew ]988
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Service |
FY 86 End Strength |
FY 87 Reduction Number(%) |
FY 87 End Strength |
FY 88 Reduction Number(%) |
FY 88 End Strength |
FY 89* Reduction Number(%) |
FY 89 End Strength |
FY 90* Reduction Numbcr(%) |
FY 90 End Strength |
Total Reduction Number(%) |
USA |
107,962 |
A; — 1,635(— 1.5) P: — 1.631 (— 1.5) |
106,327 107.958 |
—1,514(—1.4) -3,002(-2.8) |
104.813 107,815 |
—2,223(—2.2) -5,225(—4.8) |
102,590 107,815 |
-2,223(^2.2) —7,448(—6.9) |
100,367 107,815 |
-7,5951-70) _7,448(-6 9) |
USN |
72,051 |
A: 0(0) P: — 1,576(—2.1) |
72,051 73,627 |
+ 559(+0.8) —2,090(—2.8) |
72,610 74,700 |
—1,254(-1.8) —4.071 (— 5.4) |
71,356 75,427 |
— 1,254( — 1.8) —6,118( — 8.0) |
70,102 76.220 |
—1,949(—2-7) —6,118( 8.0) |
USAF |
109.048 |
A: - 1,255(—1.2) P: —1,653(—1.5) |
107.793 109,446 |
—2,255(—2.1) -3,533(-3.2) |
105,538 109,071 |
—2,254(—2.2) —6.331(—5.8) |
103,284 109,615 |
—2,254(—2.2) -8,662(—7.9) |
101,030 109,692 |
-8.018(-7.4) -8,6621-7.9) |
USMC |
19,735 |
A: -198( — 1.0) P: -300(-1.5) |
19,537 19,837 |
+ 122(+0.6) —194(—1.0) |
19,659 19,853 |
—445(-2.3) —635(—3.2) |
19,214 19,849 |
-445(—2.4) — 1,043(—5.3) |
18,769 19,812 |
—966(-4-91 -l,043(-5.3> |
DOD |
308.796 |
A: — 3.088( —1.0) P: — 5.160( — 1.7) |
305,708 310,868 |
—3,088( —1.0) — 8.819(—2.8) |
302,620 311,439 |
—6,176(—2.1) —16,262(—5.2) |
296.444 312,706 |
—6,176(—2.1) —23,271 (—7.4) |
290,268 313,539 |
-18.528(-6.0) —23,2711—7.4) |
A = Actual/Authorized P = Programmed as of the FY 88/89 President’s submitted budget.
often does long-term harm to both officer and enlisted ranks.9 In response to a suggestion that the military train NCOs to replace officers as aviators, Army Chief of Staff General John Wickham said that was a situation “I don’t think we want. . . .”1()
Necessary Measures: The “1988 Authorization Act was passed into law on 17 November 1987, and its contents deviate significantly from the requirements Congress initially set forth. The requirement to counter the 6% growth in the officer corps remains, but now the act empowers the Secretary of Defense with the authority to divert 2% of the reductions into fiscal year 1990, if “such [reductions are] necessary in order to avoid severe personnel problems in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. . . ,”n
On 8 January 1988, in a letter to the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote: “I certify that a 2 percent officer reduction in FY 88 will cause severe personnel management problems in the Department ... 1 have, therefore, chosen to exercise my authority” to extend the initial deadline for the reductions.12
Under the leadership of the new Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, the planned cuts are more equitable than previous ones. For example, in fiscal year 1989, the Army and Air Force are slated for 2.17% and 2.18% cuts, respectively, while the Navy will lose 1.76% of its officers.
Now DoD has the breathing room it needs. According to the Deputy Secretary’s revisions, officials in the Pentagon have until the end of fiscal year 1990 to trim “excess” personnel. The revised plans call for 1% cuts in both fiscal years 1987 and 1988 (which have already been met) and 2% cuts in fiscal years 1989 and 1990.
Sources report that where the cuts once were in response to decreased operational efficiency, they now center around the economic woes the armed forces have experienced. Because of this shift in emphasis, experts have
eliminated replacing officers with civilians as a viable a' ternative. Instead, DoD is looking into earlier retireme111 packages, especially for those officers with at least 1 years of service and who have been passed over more than once during their careers.
If the armed forces conform to all the restrictions set forth by Congress, however, something—somewhere will have to give. That something will undoubtedly be combat readiness and, consequently, the security of nation. Military officials present a convincing case; t(ie success of the armed forces rests with the ability of lts people to operate sophisticated equipment and to hand <and interpret great amounts of data while planning an undertaking extensive military maneuvers. This require^ capable leaders. If Congress expects the U. S. arme forces to perform as they should, then Congress needst0 ensure that they have enough of these leaders.
‘“It s Stupid, Defense Week, 5 March 1987.
2Ibid.
3Office of Senator J. Glenn, interview with the author.
4Rick Maze, Army Times, 6 April 1987. g7.
Lt.Col. Gene Austin, USA, telephone interview with the author, 28 October 1 6Donald J. Cymrot and Cdr. Robert L. Peck, USN, “An Analysis of ‘^r ' Creep (Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, August 1987), p- *-pg7 7Lt.Col. Jeff Cromar, USA, telephone interview with the author, 26 October “Caspar Weinberger, letter to Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), 16 April 1987. ^Cymrot and Peck, “An Analysis of ‘Brass Creep,”’ p. iii. pg7.
u,“ 10,000 Officer Slots Eyed for Elimination,” Army Times, 30 March * *'“1988 Authorization Act,” 17 November 1987. _ g
1-William H. Taft IV, letter to the Chairman of the Armed Services Commit ’ January 1988
Midshipman Artis is a First Classman at the Naval Academy, majoring economics. He will be a surface warfare officer after his graduation month. He has been class president for all four years as a midship01
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