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Superpower leaders Reagan and Gorbachev, despite their respective moraleboosting appearances on board the Tomahawk-armed New Jersey and the massive Typhoon-class SSBN, are pressing for two key nuclear arms reduction agreements. Where will this leave the U. S. Navy?
In the weapons track? In the strategy track? Or in both?
Last December, U. S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed an Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement in Washington. They are expected to sign a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) accord later this spring in Moscow. Both agreements will have profound effects. One military analyst even predicts the end of the nuclear era.”1 While that may be going too far, major changes are bound to occur. INF has eliminated two complete classes of nuclear weaponry and START would eliminate 50% of strategic weapons.
Is the U. S. Navy—is, in fact, the United States— prepared to cope with these changes?
On the military level, the U. S. Navy appears well prepared. It has the only long-range nuclear system not currently restricted: the nuclear Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM/N). And the Navy’s leg of the Triad, the wet leg, has been modernized recently and most systems are deployed. Most weaponry in the ground- and air-based legs of the Triad are, by contrast, still in the research-and- development stages and their escalating costs have already caught the eyes of budget cutters.
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ac'k that has proved most important in determining the Ccess or failure of past arms control agreements.2
t recent INF accord is a good example of the inter- y ln'n8 of strictly military and strategy tracks.3 The nited States will eliminate 108 ballistic Pershing-IIs and ^ §r°und-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)—a total of
570 warheads. The Soviet Union will eliminate 441 SS-20 three-warhead and 112 SS-4 single-warhead intermediate- range systems, and 120 SS-12/22 and 20 SS-23 shorter- range missiles—a total of 1,575 warheads. Thus, from a strictly numerical “bean-count” viewpoint, the Western advantage is three-to-one. Clearly, as supporters of the treaty constantly point out, it is a major victory for the United States and NATO.
Why, then, have former Supreme Allied Commanders, Europe, Generals Bernard Rogers and Alexander Haig; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former President Richard Nixon; chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI); and, at one time or another, most Western European leaders, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, expressed concern?
They have done so for strategy reasons. As General Rogers argued, by removing the U. S. systems, especially the Pershing IIs, NATO has removed the credible nuclear threat that has deterred the Soviet Union for more than 40 years. This, not just the SS-20s, was NATO’s reason for modernizing the nuclear force.
Now there will be only two theater systems left: the Air Force’s and Navy’s dual-capable aircraft (DCA) and, more important, the Navy’s TLAM/N sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). While the DCA are important, they have some limitations. First, they are “dual,” which means their other, perhaps primary, mission is conventional. In any major confrontation, the Air Force planes, already outnumbered, will be stretched thin. Second, with the massive, layered Soviet air-defense systems, aircraft will have a difficult time penetrating too far into Eastern Europe, much less all the way to Soviet territory. The Navy’s DCA might prove more useful, therefore, since they are considerably more flexible. For this reason, the recent budgetary decision to delay and perhaps kill the A-6F might, in this author’s opinion, prove very shortsighted.
Total
System |
Launcher (SNDV) |
Number of Warheads |
ICBM |
|
|
MX |
50 |
10 |
Minuteman-II |
450 |
1 |
Minuteman-III (300 with Mk-12A) |
500 |
3 |
Subtotal ICBM SLBM |
(1,000) |
|
Warheads
500
450
1,500
(2,450)
Trident submarines (8 x 24)* Poseidon with Trident (12 X 16)* Poseidon (18 x 16)*
Subtotal SLBM Subtotal ballistic missiles Bomber B-1B
B-52G (ALCM)
B-52H (ALCM)
B-52G B-52H
Subtotal bomber Totals
192 |
8 |
192 |
8 |
288 |
10 |
(672) |
|
1,672 |
|
100 |
1 |
98 |
12 |
46 |
20 |
69 |
1 |
50 |
1 |
(363) |
|
2,035 |
|
Table 2
System
ICBM
MX
Midgetman Subtotal ICBM SLBM
Trident (20 X 24)
Subtotal ballistic missiles Bomber B-1B (ALCM)*
B-1B
Advanced-technology bombers Subtotal bombers Totals
‘Maximum allowable (full load) under proposed START restraints.
Inventory Late 1990s
Launcher Number of
(SNDV) Warheads
Total
Warheads
1,000
500
(1,500)
3,840
(5,340)
902
59
132
(1,093)
6,433
In light of INF, that decision definitely should be reviewed. Equally important should be the Navy’s new advanced tactical aircraft (ATA), currently a highly classified—i.e., “black”—program.
More crucial are the Navy’s TLAM/N Tomahawk cruise missiles. There have been three basic concerns
voiced on TLAM/Ns. First, that they will not be substituted for the nuclear warheads that INF eliminates; s£c ond, that they are not a “visible” means of deterrent®’ and third, that they do not adequately “couple” U- weapons to Europe’s defense.
All three concerns are specious. The TLAM/N has bee11
deployed for several years. Some are now on the new vertieal launch system-configured Los Angeles (SSN- 688)-class attack submarines. And while they are not “visible” in Europe, neither are they “vulnerable.” SLCMs will present no "use ’em or lose ’em” dilemma so, in the long run, they are more stabilizing than “visible” ground-based systems. Moreover, they do “couple” in two ways. First, if used, there will be no doubt of their origin, since the French and British have none. Second, the Soviets have responded with their own SLCMs that can reach the United States. While it might be chilling to find Soviet SLCMs off our coast, that should prove to Europe that the United States is, in fact, risking its soil to defend Europe.
But there is a final and more important reason why the SLCM is important: there is really no alternative. Aircraft are not adequate. And although strategic weapons and, in fact, some 400 Poseidon SLBM warheads have been allo-
cated for NATO’s defense,4 many observers, including General Rogers, have noted that using strategic weapons for a tactical, theater, mission raises the specter of misunderstanding and all-out nuclear war. In addition, those 400 SLBMs may no longer be available after a START accord- There have also been plans for new shorter-range U. S- systems, such as a follow-on Lance and shorter-range tactical air missiles, but these do not have the same deterrent effect.5
A simple, declaratory statement that the SLCMs will be available in any emergency should calm allied concerns and maintain the decades-old deterrent. The statement should be public, but exact numbers, locations, and other details need not be mentioned.
The essence of deterrence is uncertainty, but credible uncertainty. SLCMs satisfy that role. After INF, the a"' swer is INNF: Intermediate Navy Nuclear Forces.
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks _____
Whether or not a START agreement is actually signed this year, decision makers and analysts should begin to plan for the post-START world, since all the limits but one have been agreed upon.6 The major stumbling blocks remain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategy Defense Initiative (ABM/SDI) issues and, to a certain e* tent, verification.
There would be an overall warhead limit of 6,000 1,600 launchers (or strategic nuclear-delivery vehicle* [SNDVs], as they are called). At the recent Washing!011 summit, the Soviets and Americans established a 4,900' warhead sublimit on ballistic missiles (SLBMs an ICBMs), implying a 1,100-warhead limit on long-ra"gc bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). They also agreed on some limits on SLCMs, yet to be deter mined but outside the 6,000/1,600 limits. Within certain limits, final figures for each leg will be left to each country, but the United States will experience both short- an long-term problems.
Near Term: Table 1 shows the United States’s current ap proximate inventory of strategic weapons. Because of n°r mal attrition, the 1,600 SNDV limit should not be too hat" to live with. By the time any START agreement goes int° effect—in the early 1990s—the 450 Minuteman-IIs, oldejj B-52s, and earlier Poseidon SSBNs will all be near the e" of their 30-year life cycles. Retiring the early 1960s-ef Minuteinan IIs alone would bring the United States with"1 the 1,600 limit.
The major problem comes with the 6,000, and espe dally the 4,900, ballistic missile sublimits. There are f°" systems that would almost certainly be kept: the new TO dent SSBNs; the MX ICBMs; the 12 later-mode Poseid°" SSBNs of the Benjamin Franklin (SSBN-640)-class th"1 were retrofitted with the Trident-I (C-4) missile (beside5 carrying the C-4, these ships are quieter and have otne improvements); and, finally, the three-warhead M>" uteman-IIIs, modernized in 1979 with the new Mk-1- warhead. These four systems, alone, carry 4,472 'v’"r heads.
Min
will
uteman-IIIs or the C-4 Benjamin Franklin SSBNs, soon have to be retired. But for the near term, the
The real challenge would emerge from the 6,000/4,900/
100
overall/ballistic/ALCM limits. The inventory cur-
y ... / Vav>’ systems are:
for K‘^ent~l (C-4) SLBM: The C-4 has been in production
This leaves only 428 slots left to be divided among 18 °'her Poseidons, 200 Minuteman-llls, and 450 single- ^arhead Minuteman-lls. Further complicating the prob- Cm is that by the time any START agreement takes effect, JJiore Tridents—each with 192 warheads—will be joining e Triad. It therefore appears that besides older systems, !?me fairly recently modernized systems, such as Mk-12A
■ S. Navy should be able to keep at least 20 SSBNs
LonS Term: Table 2 shows the currently proposed new ^stems: 100 MX, 50 in silo and 50 rail mobile; 500 ,ngle-warhead so-called Midgetman missiles; 20 'dents, which, although unofficial, is the number that as been cited for years; 100 B-l bombers; and 132 stealth ^anced-technology bombers (ATBs). nee again, assuming that all the older systems are re.. d, meeting the 1,600 strategic nuclear-delivery vehicle d should be no problem. In fact, the planned inventory some 300 SNDVs below that number. (This would °w the United States to keep some B-52s for conven- nal roles; they only count as one under the rules. But ves with multiple independently targetable reentry e 'des (MIRVs) would disrupt limits.)
^ The rf
J. I/UIUJUVM IIUUIO. 1IIV vui
, ‘y planned is more than 400 ballistic missile warheads le°Ve (hat limit. The future START weapon track probe > however, could well resolve itself. In examining tLCh *e§ of the nuclear Triad, it is clear that the Navy is in the best shape.
Na ^
Trident-/
run*1101^2 t*lan ten years an^’ 'n ^act’ 's near ent* *ts
p ' ,^he first C-4 went to sea in 1979 on board an older sLeidon SSBN, and C-4s are now on 12 Poseidon and f8ht Trident SSBNs.
"lo \^ent SSBN: There are now eight, soon to be nine, <5 ern, sophisticated Tridents deployed in the fleet. leen more have been authorized, bringing the total to at ^ 15. The five-year defense plan shows plans for 20.
fj /'de"t-II (D-5) SLBM: Research and development are test £<^ ^°r new SLBM; it has been successfully in 's currently slated to be introduced into the fleet
: The Navy’s nuclear Tomahawk has jjjj611 deployed for years. According to the joint cruise- T()SSl^e °ffice, there are now 29 submarine and 17 surface rri,'Tlahawk-capable platforms in the fleet (although all y not carry the nuclear Tomahawk).
'CBMs:
>< ® Stationary MXs: After ten years of searching for a hn ?| e” system for the MX, the Reagan administration 5(ja ^ decided to deploy the first 50 in existing silos. All ^ 5r[e sc^eduled to be deployed by the end of this year, dev MXs: The rail-mobile MX is still being
e °Ped, but its future is in doubt. Although the Air
Force prefers the MX over the Midgetman, the MX has never been a favorite on Capitol Hill.
► 500 Midgetmen: The mobile, single-warhead Midgetman is still being developed. Current cost estimates are $45-$50 billion and growing. The Midgetman has garnered a somewhat strange coalition of supporters from both the left and right, although not always for the same reason. It has never been popular with the Air Force, which views it as something forced on it by the Scowcroft Commission and Congress as a compromise to save MX. The Air Force has even offered the Midgetman to the Gramm-Rudman budget cutters.7
Bomber Leg:
► B-IB: The B-l, killed by the Carter administration, was resurrected by the Reagan administration as the B-IB. All 100 aircraft are scheduled to be deployed by the end of 1988, but the plane has developed major problems; the most serious being that the B-IB apparently cannot penetrate hostile airspace adequately because of faulty electronic countermeasures (ECM) devices. It is currently estimated that B-l repairs will cost $6 billion, a fact that has left Congress furious.8 The Air Force claimed it needed the B-l as an “interim” bomber until the ATB came on line in the 1990s, but the ECM problems will now probably take that long to fix. The problem could be resolved by placing ALCMs on the B-IB, which can carry 22, but then the numbers would exceed START ceilings and call into question the rationale for keeping the B-52s.
► ATB: The stealth advanced bomber is still a “black” program, but numbers are starting to emerge, much to the chagrin of the Air Force. Current budget estimates range from $300 to $600 million per plane.9 Recently, the Air Force delayed the program for a year because of technical difficulties.
► ALCMs: The Air Force’s ALCM program is on track. ALCMs have been deployed for years, first on the older B-52Gs, capable of carrying 12, and now on the B-52Hs, which can carry 20. The ALCM—once hailed as the savior of the bomber, especially for older planes—will be rather severely restricted by START to a 1,100-bomber/ ALCM limit. What this limit does to the future of the B-52 is anyone’s guess, but the Air Force is now talking about a European role for B-52s.
Thus, most of the Air Force’s strategic ICBM and bomber programs are still in research and development, while the Navy has already deployed three of its four systems. It therefore appears the START weapon dilemma could well resolve itself, leaving room for 20 Tridents, or perhaps a few more. The real questions arise with regard to strategy and arms control concerns.
National Strategy
Nuclear strategy has always been important; it has usually “pulled” weaponry rather than weaponry “pushing” strategy. While often portrayed in rather simplistic terms not much above the bumper sticker level of “nuke ’em,” strategy is very complex. The current strategy, first enunciated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in the
early 1970s, refined by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in the Carter administration, embodied in a Presidential Decision PD-59, and confirmed by the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Directive 13, requires flexibility for all contingencies from regional, to limited, to protracted conflicts.10
Historically, there have been two basic criticisms of Navy systems: that they were not accurate enough and that there was inadequate command, control, and communications (C3) for quick response or sustained operations.
While perhaps once correct, both of these problems have been resolved.
The original Polaris SLBMs were not very accurate- Since they were generally considered second-strike (s0" called “counter value” or city-busting weapons), accuracy was not considered crucial. Each new SLBM generation, however, has been made consistently more accurate-" to the point that critics now fear the D-5 is too accurate- and can be considered a first-strike weapon. In theory, MX is slightly more accurate, but the gap has narrowe
A Treaty Verification Force?
“No precedents exist for finding, indoctrinating, and instructing treaty verifiers. . . . And there is little time to plan.”
Imagine that you have been given this mission: By 0800 tomorrow, forward to the White House three lists, totaling no more than 600 names, of people selected for special assignment to the Soviet Union. None of them can have an intelligence background. Yet most of them must know Soviet nuclear weapons, and many must be fluent in Russian. Some of them must be prepared to settle in the Soviet Union, with their families, for a tour of duty of undetermined length.
This mission is no fantasy.
The requirements come from the proposed Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that President Ronald Reagan has sent to the Senate for ratification. According to Section III of the treaty:
“ Within one day [emphasis added] after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with a list of aircrew members, a list of inspectors to carry out inspections . . . and a list of proposed inspectors to carry out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring activities. ... No list may include more than 200 individuals.”
The list of aircrews will be the easiest to draft. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) already has a number of pilots and support personnel who fly regularly to and from the Soviet Union and Eastern-bloc countries.
These MAC crews have been cleared by the communist countries to enter their airspace and use their airports to transport supplies and documents to U. S. embassies and other diplomatic missions.
The treaty inspectors, however, are a new breed. They must be technicians, linguists, and diplomats, trained in the mechanics of verification as spelled out in great technical detail in the 396-page treaty document. They must be alert to the ever-present potential for espionage and propagandizing. They need a grounding in Soviet history and some realistic training in spotting and outsmarting Soviet intelligence officers.
An unspecified number of technicians are also needed to carry out other aspects of the treaty, which calls for the destruction of nuclear weapons. Some missiles will be launched toward fiery oblivion in the ocean. Others will be wiped out by “explosive demolition or burning.” The treaty proposal states that the two nations’
2,611 missiles and their launching equipment “shall be burned, crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosion.”
Inspectors must be acceptable to security officials from each
complete an accelerated course in one of the most sensitive su jects in the U. S. intelligence curriculum: the manufacture, ^ maintenance, and deployment 1 Soviet nuclear weapons.
The INF document signed by President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met>c ulously describes the rules g°v"
By Thomas B. Alle°
side. The inspectors are sup- . posed to be verifiers, not intelligence agents. If caught engage in espionage, they would not only jeopardize the fate of the INF Treaty but also the Strategy- Arms Reduction Treaty.
This puts the intelligence community out of bounds as u likely source for inspectors. The next possibility is the military- The Army, which has a progran1 for developing specialists in ge0^ graphic regions, could find some candidates among its Soviet experts. The Navy, which has no such regional-specialist progi"11111' could turn to Russian language instructors from the Naval P°st' graduate School in Monterey, California.
An Army or Navy nominee for nuclear inspector, however- would have to be an implausib L type: a Soviet expert with no military intelligence or counte1' intelligence background. Assun1 ing that such a specimen exists- he or she would then have to
considerably. Furthermore, according to a recent General ccounting Office report released by Aspin, the MX’s trance is not working properly and will require millions of dollars to fix.11
The C3 issue is more complex and contentious.12 Strate- tlsts h&ve long believed that to maintain an adequate de- ctrent, the United States must have the capability to hunch under attack.” Because it takes approximately 30 ^or Soviet ICBMs to reach the United States, it w>dely believed that only the land-based ICBMs
could meet this requirement. This may or may not be true. While this author agrees that the deterrent capability to launch under attack should always concern the Soviets, trying to do the myriad of things necessary in only 30 minutes boggles the mind.
More important seems to be the question of whether C3 can be sustained with submerged submarines. Here, critics are simply wrong. As Rear Admiral W. J. Holland points out, there have been capabilities for two-way communications with submarines for some 50 years, and it is by
mng the duties of the verifiers ni k accorc*- Each side can , i short-notice inspections.
east two members of the inspection party must speak Rus. an' Other inspectors, probably cornpanied by their families, .«e exPected to live near the Portals” stations at the inspec- D P s*te> typically a factory ca- le of manufacturing the eaty-banned missiles.
^ oe treaty document calls for ng instruction of “a perma- t .continuous monitoring sys- ^ 1 at such sites within six ^oriths after the treaty goes into tj ct- These monitoring sta- rj as’ Seated at ‘‘an agreed pete eter around the periphery of lnspection site,” will be
°nt>nuously operated during the
13-
year life of the treaty.
No
Precedents exist for find-
in» 'ndoctrinating, and instruct-
e„ .treaty verifiers. No agency is fe,'Ppcd to create this corps of the^3* treaty enforcers. And
thc^- 'S t'me t0 P*an s*nce
CQnVanguard must be able to day ■UCt an Inspection within 30
effec a^CF t^le treaty 8oes into
Th >
tioas ^ *D*anners only ltave ques-
Perc
to work with so far. What
entage of inspectors will
thev H ge - •hil't faW ^rom t*ie uniformed ary? From Department of oth CtlSe civihan ranks? From Coner federal agencies? From tj0ne?e recruitment? From tradi- s0l,a ^deral employment e-es? From a Peace Acad, lEor a long time the acad- gre . as had widespread con- but Sl0nal support—as an idea n°t as an appropriation.)
What clearances will be necessary? Will standard background checks be conducted? If so, will the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) perform these checks? (DIS is currently running 32,000 background investigations a year, with a growing backlog of about 80,000 cases a year.)
Because of the need for Russian-speaking inspectors, will planners recruit Soviet emigres in the United States? And, given that the treaty represents U. S.- Soviet cooperation, will U. S. investigators in the Soviet Union attempt to gain background checks?
Some stopgap measures will probably be taken for setting up the vanguard force. (Both countries may even have to agree quietly to the interim use of some intelligence officers as the only personnel immediately available.) But serious thought ought to be given to the founding of something like a Treaty Verification Corps (TVC), a new kind of Peace Corps that will be responsible for the training and maintenance of the inspectors and the personnel who will manage and provide support for arms control treaties. The INF Treaty, for example, sets up Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to handle inspection requests.
The centers need to be manned continually. The TVC would also provide such specialized backup services as logistics and the maintenance of the weapons data bases that each country agrees to provide to the other.
A long-range source of TVC
recruits could be a training program modeled after the ROTC program, already in place in many colleges. In 1987, Representative Constance A. Morelia (R-MD) proposed such a ‘‘peace officer” program, aimed at training Peace Corps volunteers. Her idea was put forth in a bill that has drawn support from 56 cosponsoring House members from both parties. The bipartisan support for her plan suggests that Congress would accept an ROTC spinoff as a TVC training program.
The most appealing aspect of a TVC is its potential attraction to young men and women seeking a new form of government service. Like the Peace Corps, the TVC could be designed to provide an opportunity for short-term dedication rather than lifetime careers. Representative Morelia’s words about prospective ROTC-trained Peace Corps volunteers could just as well apply to TVC recruits:
“A major concern so often heard today, that today’s students are selfish or disinterested in the world that surrounds them, would be simply and directly addressed. And, as in the case today, Peace Corps volunteers continue to serve their nation upon their return: in government, international relations, education, medicine.”
Mr. Allen, former assistant director of the National Geographic Book Service, is the author of War Games (McGraw- Hill, 1987) and the coauthor, with naval analyst Norman Polmar, of Merchants of Treason (Delacorte, 1988).
choice, not capabilities, that the submarines do not broadcast. Moreover, SSBNs are constantly listening. And for most strategists, the invulnerability of the SSBN overcomes any C3 advantage an ICBM might have.
There is, however, another strategy-related question that has so far been virtually ignored. The current U. S. strategic doctrine requires more—not fewer—weapons, and it should include various types. The strategic force simply cannot be cut by 50% without affecting strategy. This seems to increase the SLCM’s importance for a couple of reasons. The SLCM is the only long-range system currently unrestrained by arms control counting rules. And, if current trends continue, the TLAM/N could well be the only long-range, single-warhead system in the late 1990s. Thus, any SLCM ceiling question looms large.
The Navy should avoid getting itself into the Air Force’s ALCM or, even worse, GLCM dilemma. Because of START, ALCMs are now severely restricted. Similarly, the Navy has 200-odd Tomahawk-capable platforms planned. The Air Force finds itself in a very real bind because, thanks to both INF and START, it will not be able to exploit the “conventional” aspects of either GLCMs or ALCMs. A recent Defense Department report suggests more accurate and longer-range conventional weapons are needed for the future, but START and INF essentially rule out the Air Force.13 The Navy systems do seem to answer most of the strategy questions. They are sufficiently accurate, or soon will be, and the C3 is adequate—perhaps even for a launch-on-waming strategy, but certainly for any retaliatory responses. And in the foreseeable future, it could well be that only the Navy will have the quantity and type of weapon that the U. S. strategy requires.
Arms Control
There is one final hurdle before success—arms control. The success or failure of arms control packages has always been based more on strategy and perceptions than just on military capabilities and bean counts. SALT I, for example, gave the Soviets a ballistic-missile advantage of approximately 2,350 to 1,700; and an SSBN advantage of 62 to 41. Congress was upset and passed the Jackson Amendment requiring future agreements to be “equal.” Yet, in fact, the U. S. advantage in warheads was three to one, because the United States had MIRV-configured systems, while, with one possible exception, the Soviets had none. No one, not even the late Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), would have swapped inventories.
SALT II allowed both sides equal SNDVs and the United States still had a considerable warhead advantage. Yet, among the many reasons the treaty failed were three words that are now forgotten (and could come back to haunt this administration)—“window of vulnerability.” Using a bean count, there is no question that the INF accord works to the U. S. advantage, yet some very respectable people are opposed—for reasons of strategy. What will happen during the START debate is anyone’s guess, but strategy will play a major role. It always does. On the weapon track, there seems little doubt that the
Navy is in extremely good shape. All of its systems have passed through research and development, most are in production, and many have been deployed. The key seems to be the strategy track, and here the Navy may not be prepared.
The organizational role of strategic weapons in the Navy has long been criticized. According to one author, the Navy treats strategic weapons like an “orphan.”1 his recent C3 article, Admiral Holland raised these same concerns. In the Pentagon, the Navy puts a one-star admi' ral in charge of nuclear strategy and makes a captain responsible for SSBNs.15 The Air Force, by contrast, has in these positions a four-star Strategic Air Command genera and a multitude of other flag officers both in the Pentagon and in the field. This emphasis is backed by 40 years o experience at the RAND think tank, which has produced such luminaries as secretaries Schlesinger and Brown (au' thors of the current nuclear strategy) and former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle.
If the Navy does play a greater role in strategic weap' onry and the Triad does become “wetter,” the Navy mus| give these weapons their proper organizational status. The Navy does, or soon will have, the lead in the weap°n track. It should, therefore, start to take the lead in ^ strategy track as well.
'Edward N. Lultwak, "Why the INF Pact Means The Nuclear Era Is Over,’’ TlH Washington Post, Sunday, 29 November 1987, pp. LI-2. ,jn
"A brief nomenclature note: the term "strategic" has been somewhat bastardize ^ nuclear arms jargon to refer to the long-range weapons—ICBMs, SLBMs, a" long-range bombers. Thus, to differentiate between the weapons and the0 “strategy” will be used throughout to refer to theory. -
Tor background to INF, see James L. George, “INNF: Intermediate Navy Nu°lea Forces," Proceedings, June 1987, pp. 35-39.
4Leon V. Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe, (Washington, DC: The Brookings I"5'1 tution, 1984), p. 33.
“Also remaining in Europe will be very short-range nuclear systems, such as11 clear artillery, but these, also, do not have the same deterrent effect. ->
Tor background on START, see James L. George, "START and the Navy, Proceedings, April 1986, pp. 30-38. , s
7John M. Broder, "AF Plan to Kill Off Midgetman Starts Battle," Los Times, 16 December 1987, p. 1. 7
"Hugh Lucas. "USAF confident in spite of B-l report," Jane’s Defense Wee^i" November 1987, p. 1039.
9 Stealth Delay,” Newsweek, 28 December 1987, p. 5. .
'°See Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modern'2 tion Program,” Journal of Strategic Studies, June 1983, pp 125-146. ,
"Molly Moore, "MX Guidance Flaws May Cost Millions," The Washington P°
II January 1988, p. A5. ..
"For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons see, “The Link to the Boonte" RAdm. W. J. Holland, USN (Ret.), "The Triad's Best!” and Richard B. Ke» " "A Bad Connection,” Proceedings, January 1988, pp. 41-51.
"Dan Obcrdorfer, "Report Urges Major Changes In National Security Strategy' The Washington Post, 11 January 1988, p. A13. „
"Captain William C. Green, USN, "The Navy’s Strategic Nuclear Role: Orp or Legitimate?” Proceedings, July 1982, pp. 103-105. l5The one-star group commander also commands attack squadrons.
Currently Director of Special Projects at the Center for Naval Analy5 . Dr. George graduated from the Naval Academy in 1961. Following ^ retirement for medical reasons, he earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in national relations from the University of Maryland. After graduation- ^ was awarded a public affairs fellowship from the Hoover Institution War, Revolution, and Peace, where he spent one year in the oft'ce Senator Bill Brock (R-TN). He later served as a congressional staff me ^ ber and an assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmain Agency. Dr. George edited The V. S. Navy—The View from the 4 ' 1980’s (Westview Press, 1985) and The Soviet and Other Cotnmdd^ Navies (Naval Institute Press, 1986). He also wrote "INNF” for the Ju 1987 Proceedings. The views expressed are his own.