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The U. S. Navy entered 1987 riding the crest of a weapon development wave, but ended the year not knowing what systems would get into the fiscal year 1989 budget. The year encompassed the resignation of arguably the most influential Navy Secretary since James Forrestal, appropriations for two new Nimitz (CVN- 68)-class carriers, the signing of an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) arms accord, and the gutting or cancellation of several naval weapon development programs—all of which have had, or will have, an enormous impact on the Navy’s future—in particular, its capability to carry out basic warfighting tasks.
The Impact of the Changes
John Lehman ran the Navy as no Secretary of the Navy had done in modern times. He imposed his will on what he perceived to be a hidebound Navy acquisition bureaucracy. He changed that bureaucracy, seeking to create personal accountability where there had been none before. At the same time, he made himself the cle facto Navy acquisition executive, making weapon development and acquisition decisions that had normally been made at far lower levels in the Navy’s organization. His aggressive advocacy of the “Maritime Strategy” as a force-sizing framework ultimately made him an issue, right along with the 600- ship Navy for which he was fighting.
Lehman relinquished the Navy’s helm at a propitious time. He left behind a relatively streamlined acquisition bureaucracy and the task of paring down the number of weapon system development programs that he had set in motion to fit imminent government-wide fiscal constraints. Neither by temperament nor track record was Lehman suited to manage the budget contractions that the sea services were about to face. By leaving, he removed probably the most contentious issue facing the Navy for congressional approval of the Navy’s fiscal year 1988 budget: himself.
Secretary Lehman’s successor, James H. Webb, Jr., was sworn in on 10 April 1987. His approach to the job differed
markedly. Webb made his Under Secretary of the Navy his acquisition executive and retained only an overall acquisition decision-making function—a stark contrast to Lehman’s hands-on style. Examples of the change in management included: countermanding Lehman’s directive that a variant of the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, the SV-22, would succeed the Lockheed S-3B Viking for carrier antisubmarine warfare (ASW) missions, pending detailed comparative analyses of their capabilities; and easing the Lehman-directed accelerated (and frenetic) introduction of the Pioneer remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) to the fleet. The most obvious difference in approach was Webb’s failure to embrace the Maritime Strategy as the justification for the 600-ship Navy. Rather, Webb consistently referred to the Navy’s historical roles in peacetime presence and crisis-response activity as the yardsticks by which to measure the Navy’s usefulness and determine its force structure.
Secretary Webb supported strongly what he perceived to be the principal goal of the Reagan administration’s naval policy, 600 ships. Central to that goal are 15 carrier battle groups. Prior to his departure, Lehman programmed the attainment of the 15-carrier goal by submitting a budget request for long-lead items for two Nimitz-class carriers. Secretary Webb later defended successfully that portion of the Navy’s budget before Congress, getting authorization and appropriations not just for long-lead items, but for the two carriers themselves. While at first glance a major victory for the Navy, the appropriation for the carriers is symptomatic of the somewhat perverse way in which Congress is now measuring the effectiveness of the budget-reduction process mandated by the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings Act. The appropriation actually hurt the Navy’s fiscal year 1988 aircraft and weapon development and procurement accounts, and here’s why.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings attempts to control outlay, not obligational authority. This makes eminently good sense because it is the actual spending in any fiscal year (outlay), when compared with
! fisca*
the Treasury’s income in that same year, that determines whether the gove ment has a deficit or a surplus. Gram111 Rudman-Hollings was designed to red the deficit, thus the emphasis on outlay This legislation does not con obligational authority, which is amount of money Congress author' and appropriates for the services to o gate against expenditures, not necess® for the fiscal year under review. 1° , case of the two aircraft carriers, the
U>
miHi0"
ministration requested $644 milli°n.
obligational authority and a $6 - .. outlay for fiscal year 1988 obligatl_V against long-lead items, but Congr appropriated the full $6,325 billion c ^ of building the two carriers. As a res
the early approval of the carriers 1
mated the obligational authority av:
deci
ailab‘e
to the Navy under its budgetary ce
ilinS’
of1'
crowding out other programs whose - . lay as a percentage of their obligat'° authority would have been higher
The problem is not so much statu10.,
for
as it is perceptual. Those responsible ensuring the executive branch is pliance with Gramm-Rudman-Holl|0j will always focus on outlay and means to reduce it. This means that ture systems—those that are about to ^ procured through expensive prodUc . wherein outlay virtually lV^c ,3| authority for each *l
runs obligational
year—run a greater risk of can'
in c0<n'
i <9 1
tltf
cella<
I
ariy
or deferral than systems in the
stages of research or development, g, have lower outlay versus oblig3*’
aradlgbl,t
authority ratios. Under such a par:
a lot of programs may be started, those few that finish will be very
. cos'
both in dollars and the effect on ^ Navy’s capabilities and readiness-
example, as the outlay-versus-obl^
tional authority of the two new carr'
on°
grows over the next few years, both might be cancelled by Congres ^ keep outlay down, if outlay remain8 ic
C_______ _ . IT.If A *c ^ .1
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act s
budgetary indicator. Then the Navy
vvt"
have neither the carriers nor the prog' ,
budge
those ships displaced from the
Beyond budget problems, the . harms control agreement, signed in vv
gton by Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gor- a^nev and President Ronald Reagan on a ,ecember 1987, will undoubtedly have S|gnificant effect on Navy weapon pro- (I)I(L['-)1CntS dbc Department of Defense s .°;y 's investigating ways to “compen- thee lor the loss of the U. S. forces that call treaty traded away (the Soviets are amS this an attempt to circumvent the rf^e,Tlcnt)' Two of the many options CoP°rtedly under consideration are to att'11'?'1 nuciear-tipped Tomahawk land- ]amissiles (TLAM-N) to ground- andnched cmise missile (GLCM) targets to pSU^marine'iaunched ballistic missiles in„ ^shing II missile targets. Substitut- age f '^’N t°r any significant percent- 0 the 464 GLCMs will have an enor-
s'gnin ands*tip missile. In addition, as- tttarjn15.Atlantic Fleet ship- and sub- Pean tu'based TLAM-Ns to NATO’s Euro- °PcratiCater nucicar-strike plans will place naval 'n® constraints on Atlantic theater
TWmmanders-
ever 'mmediate considerations, how- tepp’ Pale hy comparison to the longer dosoPhy that may prevail in the the a ° tbe tFIF accords. Even prior to arid .reernent’s signing, many Air Force ■nercasrniy officials were calling for an e ln the conventional force posture
on European soil to compensate for the withdrawal of the GLCMs and Pershing IIs. Apparently Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci has agreed. When Deputy Defense Secretary William H. Taft IV apportioned the budget cuts required of the services in their already completed fiscal year 1989 requests in November 1987, he assigned a 10.7% ($11.6 billion) cut to the Navy, 10.6% ($9 billion) cut to the Army, and 9.8% ($10.5 billion) cut to the Air Force. In January 1988, Secretary Carlucci changed those percentages for cuts to reflect his emphasis on conventional warfare in the European theater to 11.3% for the Navy, 8.1% for the Army, and 9.3% for the Air Force.
No one in the administration has yet rationalized how increased conventional force commitments to the European theater will “compensate” for the loss of the GLCMs and Pershing IIs. Originally, the GLCMs and Pershing IIs were introduced in Europe to counterbalance the SS-20 missile deployments on the eastern side of the frontier. NATO’s missiles had little warfighting utility, being primarily a “political” weapon to link Soviet nuclear strikes on NATO Europe to European NATO nuclear strikes back onto the Soviet Union. The GLCMs and Pershing IIs were to deter the SS-20s; soon, they will all be gone. In fact, far more intermediate-range Soviet nuclear weapons will be eliminated by the treaty than NATO nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons will remain, as will the unchanged conventional force structures that served deterrence so well prior to the introduction of the “Euro-strategic” force of GLCMs and Pershing IIs. It is difficult to visualize the conventional “compensatory” measures that are required under these circumstances. Yet such measures in the current era of fiscal constraint will assuredly continue to be at the expense of
Navy Secretary Webb stayed in office long enough to help christen the Navy’s fifth Nimitz (CVN-68)-ciass carrier, the Abraham Lincoln (CVN- 72), and see two more funded. He stayed as long as he could, watching budget cutters set adrift the administration’s 600-ship goal. The INF agreement Reagan and Gorbachev signed in December likely will further reduce Navy weapon procurements.
the Navy’s budget.
Secretary Webb attempted to refocus the debate from simple program cuts to one that addressed U. S. national security requirements in an era of reduced government spending in a speech at the National Press Club on 13 January 1988. The only way to address these issues properly, according to Webb, was to start from a zero base, requiring each element of the current force posture to justify its existence in terms of the worldwide and domestic economic and politico-military realities facing the country. Webb advocated a more mobile and flexible posture for the U. S. armed forces as a whole, and a greater commitment of defense resources on the part of America’s NATO allies and Japan. He failed to move Secretary Carlucci, however, and the 1989 budget sent forward in February 1988 reflected a $12.3 billion cut from the Navy’s fiscal year 1989 program submitted in early 1987, $600 million more than Deputy Secretary Taft identified last November as the Navy’s share. In the meantime. Secretary Carlucci reduced the Army and Air Force cuts by $2.1 billion and $500 million respectively. Webb resigned on 22 February, citing, among other things, the Defense Secretary’s betrayal of the administration’s goal of a 600-ship Navy.
These events contribute to a negative trend in the Navy’s ability to stabilize its
related to the Norwegian
Cal'
technology-transfer affair, Secretary lucci assured Norwegian Minister ot
mb'
ment budget. The Penguin will P1
roY*1
,rne
aircraft and weapon research, development, testing, and acquisition programs. The repercussions will be felt immediately in many accounts, such as ordnance stocks, as well as over the long term, when programs such as the naval airship would have begun entering service. The following sections evaluate the impact of these events on Navy capabilities by naval warfare mission areas.
Strike & Antisurface Warfare Missions
Central to future naval capabilities in these mission areas is the advanced tactical aircraft (ATA), now formally designated the A-12. The Navy announced on 23 December 1987 that the full-scale engineering development contract for the A-12 would go to the team of General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas. On 13 January 1988, the Navy awarded the $4,379 billion fixed-price incentive contract to the General Dynamics-McDon- nell Douglas team, which will split at the end of the A-12 development program and compete for the Navy’s annual buys. Little else is known about the program since it is largely classified.
The fact that the contract contains a $4,777 billion ceiling, only 9% above the base-contract price, implies that the Navy and the contractors have confidence in the maturity of the technology going into the A-12 and do not consider it a high- risk development. Such confidence had to be a major factor in the Navy’s willingness to sacrifice A-6F Intruder production funding to protect the A-12’s research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding during the late 1987 budget-cutting frenzy. With that sacrifice, the Navy can ill afford to run into design difficulties with the reportedly stealthy A-12.
All that has been accomplished in the A-6F development program is not lost, however. Most of that program has been completed, with two prototypes flying by late November 1987. With a fiscal year 1988 $500 million congressional appropriation for production A-6Fs, a conflicting congressional authorization to procure 11 A-6Es, and the DoD cancellation of the A-6F production program, the most rational course for the Navy appears to be a retrofit program for existing A-6E airframes with the intention of bringing them as close to A-6F standard as possible within the limited funding available. This provides both a hedge against stretch-outs of the A-12 program and enhanced capabilities for the Intruder against the growing sophistication of Soviet and Third World air defenses.
When the Navy’s budget is cut, the
Among the survivors in the fiscal year 1988 budget procurement were the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Penguin antiship missile, which will give LAMPS III helicopters a new antisurface capability.
account that always appears to take the greatest hit is ordnance. Readiness consequently plummets, leading to situations like those reported in the past, where Navy carriers heading home must transfer the bulk of their magazines to carriers going on deployment. The cuts in ordnance acquisition have occurred again, principally in air-to-ground munitions. Antiradiation missiles have been the hardest hit this time, with AGM-88A HARM (high-speed antiradiation missile) acquisition dropping from the 1,766 requested for fiscal year 1989 in the fiscal year 1988-89 request to 1,307 in the fiscal year 1989-90 request, and AGM-122 Sidearms falling from 269 to zero. This is particularly disconcerting given the necessity to suppress antiradiation defenses in order to get into position to employ other air-delivered ordnance on target. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Tacit Rainbow will eventually complement such antiradiation air-delivered ordnance, but the Air Force Milestone III production decision on that system is not scheduled until December 1988, and the Navy operational evaluation does not take place until later in fiscal year 1989.
Congress cut funding for general- purpose bombs, the low-cost method of
reducing targets, in the fiscal year y budget from $80.3 million to $64 miH*0^ and DoD reduced its request in the f>sC year 1989 budget from $89 milli°n 1 $31.3 million. Though Congress aP proved DoD’s request for 1,341 Rocke)^ cluster bombs in fiscal year 1988, D° reduced to zero its request for fiscal )'e 1989 from the original 992. Congress clj the CBU-89B Gator, an air-deliver^j scatterable land mine system, for f*sC , year 1988 from 775 units to 500, a" DoD knocked down its fiscal year 19 number from 1,091 to 563. The total dor lar saving from these cuts in both f*se. years was less than $100 million, th°u^f the cuts eliminated literally thousands individual air-dropped munitions ff0 the Navy’s inventory. j
In contrast, the fiscal year 1988 requ® for BGM-109 Tomahawk missiles, nl® of which were the land-attack var'^J amounted to $915.9 million for . rounds. The final fiscal year 1989 req11^ of $635.5 million for 510 Tomaha'*' accounts for more than 50% °* t Navy’s ground-attack munitions bud? request for the year. It is worth not* that acquiring 100 fewer Tomaha"' would permit the restoration of funds air-delivered munitions to target n* ^ than 3,000 additional aimpoints one-to-one round-to-aimpoint ratio)- 1 ,, is the kind of issue that is always p°°t addressed in quick-turnaround budcutting. did
The antisurface weapon accounts ^ not fare as badly as the ground-attac weaponry. Mine development R&P > counts retained more than 90% of * funding over the two-year funding 1^ riod. Despite the potential of sanCl'lrc
Kongsbels
fense Johan Holst in mid-February that Kongsberg’s Penguin antiship sile remains secure in the Navy Pr°c .jf
SH-60B Seahawk/LAMPS (light airb°:
'Purpose
system) Mk-III helicopters
with
bnce^1^ ^ecretary Webb's decision t
°r jUn^Very of the airship was scheduled Hie
would determine
System Name
Naval airship
^"45 Training System
Osprey
Osprey
P'3 modernization
F-14
“Pgrade
Strader Trident II Advj
“need A/L ASM Advanced SAM
aaam
^“n-acoustic ASW w Pb0ard latter weapon ^velopmem nvetnin,,^ munitions Sea Uce
an'Raam
r^'-LaunC, ASROC andard missile
""Ptovemems
mmahawk
Ram
S“bmarine sonar deveiopmem
AL\vpeVelopmem
A<ICap
Tacil Rainbow
Table 1 Selected Aircraft and Weapons in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Devel-
FY 88 Budget
FY 89
Nomen- | opment | Request in | Authori- | Appro- | Budget Request |
|
| |
claiure | Category | $ million | zation | priation | 1988/89 | 1989/90 | Past Milestone | Next Milestone |
— | 6.3 | 45.2 | 40.0 | 25.0 | 62.4 | 0 | 6/5/87 contract for | Cancelled |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| development model |
|
— | 6.3 | 96.0 | 96.0 | 94.6 | 87.8 | 87.8 | 12/23/87 pilot | 3/88 Rollout of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| production contract issued | T-45A prototype |
V-22A | 6.3 | 4.0 | 10.0 | 4.0 | 17.9 | 0 | See below | See below |
V-22 | 6.4 | 465.7 | 470.7 | 465.7 | 306.7 | 306.7 | 4/86 FSED | 6/88 first flight |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| authorized | |
P-3C | 6.4 | 126.9 | 120.0 | 100.0 | 152.1 | 204.8 | 7/10/87 FSED | 2/88 preliminary |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| contract for Update IV awarded to Boeing | design review |
F-14D | 2.5 | 184.8 | 184.0 | 164.0 | 143.9 | 151.9 | 11/23/87 first | Late 1989 first |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| flight of F-14D | production |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| avionics | F-14D deliveries |
A-6F | 6.3 | 124.0 | 0 | 111.0 | 78.1 | 0 | 8/25/87—first flight | Cancelled |
D-5 | 6.4 | 1,098.5 | 1,073.5 | 1,050.5 | 581.7 | 580.9 | 1/87 First dev. flight | 12/89 Sub launch |
| 6.3 | 37.4 | 47.4 | 32.6 | 26.7 | 22.6 |
|
|
| 6.3 | 76.1 | 65.0 | 65.0 | 102.2 | 100.7 |
|
|
| 6.3 | 34.6 | 30.0 | 17.0 | 87.6 | 30.4 | Source selection | 5/88 contract |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| for DEM/VAL of competing designs | award |
| 6.3 | 20.4 | 18.0 | 10.0 | 20.8 | 15.7 |
|
|
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.4
6.4
1.4
17.4
34.0
114.3
27.2
0
24.0
21.4
108.0
27.2
0
24.0 21.4
108.0
25.0
2.9
29.5
36.9
113.5
14.0
0
21.0
21.6
50.0
13.6
UUM-125A AIM-120
RIM-66/67
BGM-109
RIM-I16A
Mk-50
Mk-48
AGM-136A
6.4
6.4
6.4
6.4
6.4
6.4
6.4
2.7
40.4
47.4
14.2
34.5
10.6
85.2
32.2 14.7
40.4
65.0
13.0
34.5
10.6 149.2
30.0 14.7
45.0
30.0
45.0
13.0
34.5
10.6 140.6 ‘22.2
10.7
5.7
45.0 46.7
10.0
37.1
10.9 12.6 30.3
5.9
30.3
52.1
45.6 8.6
36.0
10.4 134.7
27.7 5.9
6/87 low rate production authorized
6/88 full rate production decision
Development of operational test
12/88 Milestone III production decision
time .n,ant'surfacc capability for the first tinues arP°on missile procurement con- eittw ?n Schedule with no funds cut in Navy ■ ‘SCal years 1988 or 1989. The Wa^ 'S a*so testing the antiship Hellfire b|e a | .^eveloped for Sweden for possibly ^ 'cations on U. S. Navy weap-
'^'-ji^rfare (AAW) Mission to
Probak]ine "aval airship program will the AAu/^aVe greatest impact of all Navy "mission-area budget cuts. The 'bust • awarded Westinghouse/Airship dti0na]rie^ Inc., a contract for an “Oper- airshiD development Model” (ODM) ^ 'vith°n ^ ^Une *^87. F‘rst flight was to an<l del "1 months of contract award.
1992.
°DM airship
whether the airship was the right platform to solve some of the Navy’s airborne early-warning problems in the age of stealth missiles and aircraft. Without an airship, the Navy apparently has no program underway to develop a platform that can physically accommodate an airborne radar with a sufficiently large aperture for detecting low-radar-cross-section targets. The lack of such a capability could limit greatly the antiair defenses of virtually any naval grouping by the year 2000.
The advanced air-to-air missile (AAAM) fared a little better in that it was retained in the budget, but Congress cut almost 15% from the Navy’s fiscal year 1988 development funding request and DoD slashed 65% of the original fiscal year 1989 proposal before the budget was submitted this year. Nevertheless, as of March 1988 the Navy was finishing its AAAM source-selection process in preparation for an April 1988 Milestone I decision and subsequent demonstration/ validation contract awards. AAAM is a program vital to the Navy’s future AAW capability, since it will replace the AIM- 54 Phoenix on the F-14 Tomcat and also arm the F/A-18 Hornet and, potentially, the Navy version of the Air Force’s advanced technology fighter (ATF). Navy plans included AAAMs for the A-6F, implying that the A-12 may also be so equipped as the A-6F’s successor.
Other important AAW programs have not been so adversely affected. The F-14 upgrade R&D program, though cut by Congress for fiscal year 1988 by more than 10%, actually had its budget request increased by DoD for fiscal year 1989 by more than 5%. The F-14 procurement budget has remained unaffected by the cuts. The first two F-14A+ production aircraft, with the new FI 10 powerplants, were delivered in 1987, with production deliveries set at three aircraft every two months until May 1988, then decreasing slightly to four every three months. The
of
A problem facing the Navy is ho will resolve the carrier-based ASW craft issue. In 1985, Secretary Leh1^ decided that a variant of the V-22 , prey, the SV-22, would replace the (See “U. S. Naval Aircraft and MPS Development in 1986,” May 1987 ' ceedings, p. 264.) The operational ef tiveness of that choice had not yet determined, however, and upon & tary Lehman’s departure Secretary *vJ rescinded his predecessor’s decision left the SV-22 question open. A stone I decision was scheduled gg made at a program review in March on whether the SV-22 is an effective Va form for the carrier-based ASW airC^ mission. The program was fully h111 in fiscal year 1988 appropriations- , The real problem lies in the existe ^ of too few S-3A/Bs for the 13 carricr
F-14D avionics testbed aircraft made its first flight on 23 November. First F-14D production aircraft are scheduled for delivery in late 1989.
The Navy is studying the two competing U. S. Air Force ATF designs to determine the suitability of each as a potential replacement for the F-14A/D in the late 1990s and beyond. Congress forced the issue when it mandated in its Fiscal Year 1988 Defense Authorization Bill that “. . .the Secretary of Defense assure the Congress that the ATF prototype design will be capable, in a cost effective way, of accepting all physical and structural modifications necessary to satisfy the Navy requirements.” Without such a certification, the Air Force cannot spend any of its fiscal year 1988 ATF R&D money. The intent of Congress was direct: “The conferees want to make it absolutely clear that the Navy will be required to adopt the ATF aircraft as its follow-on air superior [sic] fighter.” Similar language in the Fiscal Year 1975 Appropriations Bill forced the Navy into developing a “Navy Air Combat Fighter” based on the Air Force’s "Lightweight Fighter” program in lieu of continued purchases of the F-14A and development of the F-14B and F-14C. The result was the F/A-18.
The Hornet is once again involved in a politically mandated program. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger last October directed the Navy and the Air Force to study upgraded versions of the F/A-18 and the F-16 Falcon respectively for fielding in the 1990s. There was no Navy operational requirement for such an upgrade, dubbed the Hornet 2000 by McDonnell Aircraft Company. The reported rationale for the upgrade plan was to make the F/A-18 more attractive to foreign buyers, enticing them to share the expense of the upgrades as partner nations and securing additional sales abroad.
The Navy has expressed little interest in the extensive upgrades desired by the Defense Secretary's trade and defense cooperation advocate, because the service still has generated no formal operational requirement that would justify such large expenditures of money, undoubtedly at the expense of programs for which there are pressing operational needs. Consequently, the Navy recommended in February 1988 a double-upgrade package: one austere design for Navy use and a more extensive upgrade for sales abroad. The former dovetails completely with the latter, though the Navy would not then pick up any part of the extensive upgrade’s RDT&E costs for improvements it considers extraneous to its missions. By March 1988, the F/A-18 up-
Congress boosted the F-14A (plus) Super Tomcat R&D budget request by 5% for fiscal year 1989. Twelve aircraft, powered by the new FI 10 powerplant, have been delivered.
grade was not yet resolved.
Surface-based antiair weapons fared well in the budget. The advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) development program retained 85% of its funding through fiscal year 1988 congressional budget cuts and more than 98% of its funding through the fiscal year 1989 DoD slashes. Standard missile improvements lost 25% of their funding to 1988 congressional cuts, but regained some of that in a 15% increase in fiscal year 1989 funding. There were no cuts in either fiscal year 1988 or the fiscal year 1989 request for production SM-2 missiles. The U. S. Marine Corps was also able to hang on to 100% of its fiscal year 1988 SAM request and more than 98% of its original fiscal year 1989 request for Hawk and Stinger missiles. Antiair ordnance simply did better in the fiscal year 1988 and 1989 budgets than air-to-ground ordnance.
Submarine!ASW Missions
Platform issues in these warfare areas largely involve shipbuilding (see “Tomorrow’s Fleet,” p. 310). Yet aircraft, both fixed- and rotary-wing, are once again heading for preeminence in the ASW mission area after years in the shadow of the submarine. The acoustic advantage of U. S. attack submarines so necessary to their successful prosecution of Soviet submarines is eroding more and more as greater numbers of technologically advanced Soviet submarines enter their fleet, thrusting ASW aviation toward the limelight. The question is, can ASW aviation handle the job?
One of the programs for an ASW aviation platform is the long-range air-ASW- capable aircraft (LRAACA) to complement, and then probably replace, the Lockheed P-3C Orion in the shore-based,
maritime patrol/ASW role. Naval A1 Systems Command issued a request proposals (RFP) for LRAACA on - September 1987. The RFP specified sC\ eral performance requirements—all 0 which considerably exceed the curre P-3C’s capabilities—including a 40 nautical-mile increase in range to Lb ,
four hours, and the ability to drop an simultaneously monitor 56 sonobu°V using the P-3C’s new Update IV avion ics. The RFP was amended in Decem * to require additional technical data in ^ manufacturers’ responses, and the rC sponse date was extended from 11 Jan , ary 1988 to 16 February. The Navy Plajj to award a contract in September 19 While the LRAACA is the Navy’s W sion for air ASW in the future, the P' remains the Navy’s frontline air Aa asset. Procurement of the P-3C en°. with fiscal year 1987 orders for nine al craft, two of which are destined f°r ^ Royal Norwegian Air Force. Lockhj^ delivered nine other P-3Cs with .
III avionics in 1987. Reports indicate1, the Navy plans to retrofit 125 airframes with the Update IV avionl ^ package, now in full-scale engineer development at Boeing Aerospace- combination of the LRAACA and 1 , P-3C Update IV will carry the burden ^ land-based air ASW well into the ne century. Since both will employ UP ,5
IV avionics, the importance of three-year development effort cannot overemphasized. DoD has apparen . recognized this importance, increas1^- the Navy’s original P-3 modernize1* R&D request for fiscal year 1989 lr° $152.1 million to $204.8 million, than compensating for the $26.9 nm 1 Congress cut from the $126.9 milli°n cal year 1988 request.
System Name | Nomen clature | FY 88 Budget Request $M (No.) | Authorization $M (No.) | Appro priation $M | FY 89 Budget Request $M (No.) 1988/89 1989/90 | Total Delivered in CY 87 | Total Ordered in CY 87 | Comments ______ ___ | |
Aircraft: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Intruder | A-6E/F | 702.2 (12) | 376.6 (11) | 500.0 | 702.7 (18) | 0(0) | 6 A-6E | 11 A-6E | 11 upgraded A-6E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| auth.; $500M |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| approp. for A-6F |
Prowler | EA-6B | 336.1 (6) | 482.8 (12) | 456.7 | 470.8 (9) | 473.6 (9) | 9 | 12 |
|
Harrier II | AV-8B | 564.2 (32) | 427.8 (24) | 437.0 | 655.9 (32) | 479.2 (24) | 34 | NA |
|
Tomcat | F-14A/D | 676.8 (12) | 676.8 (12) | 650.0 | 790.3 (12) | 795.0 (12) | 6 F-14A | 15 F-14A+ | Early 1990 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 F-14A+ |
| F-14D ioc |
Hornet | F/A-18 | 2.316.6 (84) | 2,316.6 (84) | 2,248.7 2.134.5 (72) | 2,147.3 (72) | 48 to USN | NA |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 32 to USMC |
|
|
Super Stallion | C/MH-53E | 210.7 (14) | 210.7 (14) | 210.7 | 193.8 (14) | 195.0 (14) | 12 MH-53E | 10 CH-53E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 MH-53E |
|
Sea Cobra | AH-1W | 172.7 (22) | 135.0 (17) | 225.6 | 86.8 (12) | 0(0) | 26 | 44 |
|
Seahawk | SH-60B | 98.7 (6) | 144.8 (9) | 98.7 | 92.0 (6) | 91.6 (6) | 19 | 17 |
|
CV ASW Helo | SH-60F | 279.7 (18) | 279.7 (18) | 264.7 | 312.6(18) | 314.5 (18) | 2 | 7 |
|
EX Competition | EX | 179.8 (8) | 0(0) | 0 | 234.5 (8) | 0(0) |
|
| Cancelled in favor |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| of S-3 to ES-3 mt |
Hawkeye | E-2C | 370.2 (6) | 370.2 (6) | 350.2 | 305.3 (6) | 307.2 (6) | 5 | 10 |
|
Goshawk | T-45TS | 328.8 (12) | 328.8 (12) | 328.8 | 362.9 (24) | 375.1 (24) | 0 | 12 | IOC Sep 1990 |
Hermes | E-6A | 189.2 (3) | 126.1 (2) | 174.2 | 332.5 (7) | 334.5 (7) | 0 | 3 |
|
Blackhawk | UH-60A/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| HH-60H | 42.5 (3) | 42.5 (3) | 103.0 | 38.4 (3) | 15.6 (0) | 0 | 4 | First del. Sked 3/89 |
Missiles: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Trident II |
| 1,931.3 (66) | 1,931.3 (72) | 1,721.3 | 1,966.9 (66) | 1,629.5 (66) | 0 | 21 |
|
Tomahawk | BGM-109 | 915.9 (475) | 787.2 (475) | 775.9 | 941.1 (510) | 635.5 (510) | 300 | 315 |
|
AMRAAM | AIM-120 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 118.4 (50) | 59.8 (50) | 0 | 0 |
|
Sparrow | AIM-7M | 0(0) | 99.1 (600) | 79.0 | 0 | 0 | 1,763 | 1,716 |
|
Sidewinder | AIM-9M | 43.3 (288) | 25.8 (288) | 25.8 | 0 | 0 | 839 | 391 |
|
Phoenix | AIM-54C | 398.0 (430) | 358.4 (430) | 343.6 | 465.0 (560) | 465.3 (560) | 325 | 375 |
|
Harpoon | SGM-84A | 110.7 (124) | 110.7 (124) | 142.7 | 133.3 (138) | 169.7 (138) | 195 AGM-84 | 178 AGM-84 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 345 RGM-84 | 323 RGM-84 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 50 UGM-84 | 50 UGM-84 |
|
HARM | AGM-88A | 194.7 (766) | 194.7 (766) | 187.1 | 404.9 (1,766) | 302.7 (1,307) | 1,811 | 1,811 |
|
Standard | SM-2 | 583.1 (1,150) | 715.1 (1,500) | 583.1 | 816.4 (1,635) | 698.1 (1,635) | 595 | 1,194 |
|
RAM | RIM-116A | 44.9 (240) | 44.9 (240) | 44.9 | 51.8 (260) | 52.1 (260) | 0 |
|
|
Sidearm | AGM-122 | 25.4 (276) | 25.4 (276) | 25.4 | 25.0 (269) | 0(0) | 0 | 256 |
|
Hellfire | AGM-114 | 44.2 (1,393) | 44.2 (1,393) | 44.2 | 47.6 (1,410) | 9.0 (200) | 0 | 0 |
|
Laser Maverick | AGM-65E | 111.8 (1,099) | 9.3 (99) | 263.2 | 0 | 0 | 415 | 540 |
|
HR Maverick | AGM-65F | 103.5 (601) | 65.8 (425) | 60.0 | 106.2 (731) | 82.4 (731) | 0 | 248 | 1989/90 dropped |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| IIR seeker |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| for 731 missiles |
Penguin | AGM-119B | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33.4 (64) | 38.6 (64) | 0 | 0 | Design review |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Sked 3/88 |
Drones & Decoys |
| 63.6 | 24.8 | 24.8 | 125.5 | 40.7 | 16 Pioneers |
|
|
Torpedoes: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AdCap | MK-48 | 243.4 (100) | 243.4 (100) | 243.4 | 541.8 (350) | 431.0 (261) | 5 | 173 |
|
ALWT | MK-50 | 222.4 (153) | 108.4 (60) | 108.4 | 277.6 (224) | 162.0(140) | 0 | 0 |
|
Vertical-launch |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASROC |
| 57.5 (260) | 0(0) | 0 | 70.5 (340) | 17.6 (0) | 0 | 0 |
|
Sonobuoys: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT | AN/SSQ-36 | 4.1 (28,231) | 4.1 (28,231) | 4.1 | 5.1 (36,303) | 4.4 (30,173) | NA | NA |
|
DIFAR | AN/SSQ-53 | 58.7 (150,816) | 58.7 (150,816) | 58.7 | 50.8 (120,708) | 47.7 (108,666) | NA | NA |
|
Special Purpose | AN/SSQ-57 | 2.8 (11,947) | 2.8 (11,947) | 2.8 | 3.0 (12,378) | 2.8 (11,564) | NA | NA |
|
DICASS | AN/SSQ-62 | 18.7 (12,229) | 18.7 (12,229) | 18.7 | 26.0 (17,464) | 23.0 (15,026) | NA | NA |
|
VLAD | AN/SSQ-77 | 33.4 (51,663) | 33.4 (51,663) | 33.4 | 24.5 (34,874) | 23.6 (32,644) | NA | NA |
|
Low Cost |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sonobuoy |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 27.3 (310,000) | 0 (0) | NA | NA |
|
Air-Launched Ordnance: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Skipper | AGM-123 | 37.0 (1,520) | 37.0 (1,520) | 37.0 | 37.4 (1,550) | 0(0) |
|
| 10/87—New prod. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Skippers ordered |
GP Bombs |
| 80.3 | 105.3 | 64.0 | 89.0 | 31.3 | NA | NA |
|
Laser-Guided Bomb Kits |
| 4.4 (286) | 9.9 (650) | 4.4 | 6.3 (540) | 0(0) | NA | NA |
|
Rockeye |
| 6.8 (1,341) | 8.3 (1,341) | 8.3 | 5.5 (992) | 0.9 (0) | NA | NA |
|
Gator |
| 19.8 (775) | 12.7 (500) | 6.4 | 20.9 (1,091) | 13.4 (563) | NA | NA |
|
IJ. S. Marine Corps: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Main Battle |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tank | M-l | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 159.3 (66) | 36.0(14) | 0 | 0 |
|
Hawk |
| 137.0 (525) | 123.0 (525) | 123.0 | 118.0 (526) | 105.5 (467) |
|
|
|
Stinger | FIM-92 | 137.4 (3.067) | 137.4 (3,067) | 93.0 | 173.1 (3,115) | 145.0 (3,115) |
|
|
|
Dragon PIP |
| 7.9 (4,259) | 7.9 (4,259) | 7.9 | 9.7 (5,258) | 9.7 (5,950) |
|
|
|
TOW | MGM-71 | 26.9 (2,680) | 26.9 (2,680) | 38.4 | 28.4 (2,585) | 28.4 (2,585) |
|
|
|
sion
the Navy appears to have are to: erate an SV-22 program, accepting a
ASty
"titiai
°mitant reduction in carrier-borne
case “,£U matcnes or even, in some $HooeXceeds that of the SH-60B. The the n 'S needed desperately well into cOrnbCXt century to equip some 80 Navy ?ati0tiatants (and, during wartime mobili-
cann, ’2<U’ ° J
2^ *2- S. Coast Guard cutters) that Wilh'u|t acIcomm°date the larger SH-60B
lS will be retired from the ASW mis
sion °Ver t*16 next t*lree years f°r conver- tu to ES-3A configuration (to replace
for ecrePh EA-3B Skywarriors now per- pl . In8 the tactical airborne signal ex- a*'0n mission)—further reducing the Sv *leet '0ng before a replacement tions .i-C0U^ ava‘lable. The only op- accel, conci
Capability until the SV-22 achieves the c °Perational capability, or reopen S.3 , ^ Production line to fill the ASW Cr0rtfall and other carrier support air- requirements as well.
ces;,e 'CoPter platforms had mixed suc- Nav °Ver tde iast two budget years. The LAMnot re9uest any new SH-2 l9gq ^ Mk-Is in fiscal years 1988 and c0pte ^he last six new production heli- l9^rs were ordered in calendar year lived ^ 6t t'1e latest upgrade to the long- With • . . series is now in production Sliop"1'3* developmental testing of the 19^9 \«Var'ant exPected to start in mid- and/ Many °‘ the upgrades programmed Will ,r. Panned f°r the new Seasprites mannn8 the aircraft to a level of perfor- e that matches .CCo . LAMPS III system. Congress in er.niZec* the importance of the SH-2G those SUr'n8 the ASW effectiveness of year |q°mhatants and cutters in the fiscal lion f0 budget, appropriating $55 mil- Pom r Slx SH-2G upgrade kits and sup- materials.
SH-6ofS imPortant are the SH-60B and Neitb carrier inner-zone helicopters, in eit?r Program suffered significant cuts sion7er the fiscal year 1988 congres- review or the fiscal year 1989 internal DoD budget reductions. The SH- 60F entered operational evaluation in 1987 preparatory to a Milestone III decision on entering full-scale production scheduled for March 1988. Some of the SH-3 Sea Kings that the production SH- 60Fs will replace in the fleet will by then be in their fourth decade of ASW service.
ASW ordnance suffered some rather significant, though not debilitating, cuts at the hands of both Congress for 1988 and DoD for 1989. The Mk-48 AdCap (advanced capability) torpedo weathered congressional scrutiny for 1988 only to lose 25% of the fiscal year 1989 request in numbers, which, in the end, only dropped the cost by 20%. The Mk-50 ALWT (advanced lightweight torpedo) lost 60% of its numbers to Congress for fiscal year 1988 and 37.5% to DoD for fiscal year 1989. First Congress, then DoD, cut production of vertical launch ASROC (antisubmarine rocket) to zero only to have DoD increase its original R&D funding request for fiscal year 1989 by a factor of five. Sea Lance, the only significant submarine-launched ASW weapon in advanced R&D, did little better; after taking a small 5.5% cut from Congress, it suffered a 60% internal DoD cut for fiscal year 1989.
While ASW ordnance is not consumed at a significant annual rate, the same cannot be said of sonobuoys. Peacetime monitoring of Soviet submarines likely consumes more sonobuoys than will wartime detection and localization efforts, because even though a targeting solution may be achieved in peacetime, the target submarine lives on, requiring the expenditure of more sonobuoys to keep track of it. Thus was born the concept for low- cost sonobuoys, the first 310,000 of which were to have been procured in fiscal year 1989. Internal DoD cuts, however, eliminated that $27.3 million procurement program. Five other sonobuoy procurements survived fiscal year 1988 congressional review intact, only to be
Boeing has joined Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas to compete for the follow-on to the Navy’s P-3 Orion ASW patrol aircraft, proposing a derivative of its commercial 757.
cut in the fiscal year 1989 request from 6.4% to 16.9% for a 10.7% overall reduction. In three of the five programs, 1989 procurement will be lower than that in 1988.
While acoustic R&D programs retained most of their funding in both fiscal years 1988 and 1989, the non-acoustic ASW R&D lost 10% to Congress in 1988 and 25% to DoD for 1989. Non-acoustic means of ASW, ordnance, and sonobuoys seem to be the big budget losers for these two mission areas of submarine and antisubmarine warfare.
Support Missions
Many naval aircraft provide multimission support. Most notable among these aircraft are the EA-6B Prowlers, which serve roles in strike warfare, antisurface warfare, and AAW. Both the 1988 and 1989 budgets recognized their importance, doubling the 1988 procurement from six to 12 and retaining the original 1989 request for nine new aircraft. A replacement for the EA-6B will fall under the advanced tactical surveillance aircraft (ATSA) program, successor to the advanced multimission sensor system (AMSS) program. Naval Air Systems Command submitted an ATSA development options paper to the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1987. ATSA likely will be a derivative airframe of either an existing carrier-based aircraft or an airframe currently under development. As critical as the EA-6B is to virtually all carrier air operations, ATSA will certainly be a very important program.
Other support aircraft accounts also fared well. The appropriations conferees
i
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The principal procurement issues
Navy Secretary Webb attempted to ral’L
of
be
failure. Yet such basic issues must addressed, as they drive such mundaf considerations as the number of son0
n°
friends and enemies alike, there are
that
defend the nation’s national security ,n
Na^
programs are critical to the mainten
,an°e
and weapons development obviou^
• tltf
exceed what DoD is willing to seek an
boosted the Navy’s $42.5 million for three HH-60H combat search-and-rescue helicopters to $103 million for all nine planned aircraft to “buy out” the program in fiscal year 1988, thus dropping the fiscal year 1989 request to minimal, program termination levels. The “EX Competition” (electronic warfare aircraft) line item was zeroed when the Navy decided on a “conversion in lieu of procurement” philosophy for the tactical airborne signals exploitation mission discussed previously. Congress appropriated $80 million to convert 16 S-3As to ES-3 configurations, thereby satisfying the Navy’s requirement for a “battle group passive horizon extension system” platform. And the E-6A Hermes TACAMO (take charge and move out) aircraft, providing support to the strategic missile submarine fleet, received sufficient funding from Congress for fiscal year 1988 and in the 1989 DoD request to finish funding the procurement program at 15 aircraft.
Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) used principally for support missions, are grouped together in the procurement request as “drones and decoys.” They are being developed in the Navy in three principal sizes for information collection roles: short range, represented by the Pioneer system; medium range, which Northrop and Martin Marietta will develop, according to contracts awarded in September 1987; and long range, represented by the Amber UAV, which is in advanced development. Tacit Rainbow, mentioned earlier under strike warfare ordnance, is a separate Air Force program for an autonomous antiradiation drone, in which the Navy is participating.
The fiscal year 1988 appropriations conference decided to eliminate UAV funding within the individual services' RDT&E accounts and to consolidate all efforts in a “Joint RPV Program Office” within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A total of $50.3 million was appropriated for the new joint program. Hopefully, this consolidation will combine service requirements into a few, commonly used platforms, a goal addressed in the 1985 Joint Resources Management Board “RPV Road Map” (described in “U. S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1985,” May 1986 Proceedings, p. 75) and individual service memoranda of agreement, and already on track as Tacit Rainbow, Amber, and the mid-range RPV demonstrate. It is difficult to imagine the cost- effectiveness benefits that can be derived from such a congressionally mandated arrangement, but not so difficult to imagine the effects of an extra layer of bureau-
The Air Force’s Tacit Rainbow, here carried by a Navy A-6E during fina testing, will eventually give the Na'.' an autonomous antiradiation defense capability.
cratic management on the development o hitherto low-cost, task-oriented supP°r systems.
Conclusions
debate in the fiscal year 1989 budget view process are not systems at all, 0 the U. S. global force posture. Forme the nitty-gritty budget-cutting debate late 1987-early 1988 to more basic issue* of defense philosophy and global stra egy, only to resign in frustration at 111
buoys to be procured. .
Beyond the question of force leve technology has become the key to nav global flexible response. Thanks to Pr® lific technology transfer on the part ol 0
low-threat areas where U.S. systems are minimally capable can survive an terests. Certain high-technology
of naval capabilities, which, in turn, Pr vide the great naval global flexibility quently employed by the National C° mand Authority.
The Navy’s requirements for airc^
Congress will fund. The debate over fiscal year 1989 budget promises to be ‘ interesting one.
Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., is a senior analyst Washington-arca research and analysis organ12?' / and is maritime editor and columnist for j Defense magazine. He is a regular contributor ^ number of publications and coauthor of two b including the Naval Institute's Military //e/ieof r. of the World. The author is a graduate of the U .. sity of Illinois and has a master's degree in ‘jltCjSa tional studies from The American University- ■*
commander in Naval Reserve intelligence.