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That we are not winning the war on drugs is obvious. Supplies of marijuana and cocaine are plentiful, and production of both drugs remains unchecked. While the trend of drug usage by U. S. citizens may be down a bit, the demand for drugs in this country is high. What, then, has been the result of our considerable effort to stop the flow of illicit drugs into the country?
Five or six years ago, the profile of the typical “druggie” vessel was something like the following: a former fishing vessel, now streaked with rust . . . some gear or rigging still carried, but quite obviously not recently used ... 65 to 75 feet in length ... a crew of eight to ten males. The drug runners stowed bales of marijuana in every nook and cranny, and even left some in plain view. Coast Guardsmen on cutters approaching such a vessel from downwind could literally smell the marijuana even before boarding to conduct an inspection. These smugglers sometimes would greet our boarding parties with their bags packed and “muster” without a command being issued!
Today, only a small percentage of seizures involve vessels that carry the contraband in so obvious a fashion. Typical of today’s drug-running vessels are hidden compartments: false bulkheads, double hulls, false keels, compartments inside fuel or water tanks, compartments welded to the external hull or keel, containers strung beneath the hull (sometimes equipped to be jettisoned, in the event they are about to be discovered or, perhaps, as a method of “delivery” at a precise location for later recovery). The advent of ingenious secret stowage schemes, which represent the considerable costs associated with installing them, is irrefutable evidence
that at-sea interdictions were hitting the narco-traffickers where it counts with them.
While we know our current efforts have, for certain periods, resulted in the seizing of 60% or more of the marijuana some trafficking organizations were smuggling, we do not know our overall success rate. Some politicians and government number crunchers seek a formula to translate effort expended into results achieved, but they will not find it. 1 think our maritime interdiction rate for marijuana is somewhere between 2050%; I have no such estimate for cocaine, but it must be very small.
Narco-trafficker organizations are businesses, with profit (greed) the only concern. There are production, packaging, transportation, and distribution networks. Large shipments of cocaine are assembled from several sources to minimize the potential loss (by interdiction) to any one supplier. These “businessmen” can, and do, afford the best of communications gear. They have counterintelligence capabilities, exploiting signal and human intelligence sources. They quickly devise new tactics to counter our efforts.
One method of smuggling that is becoming more prevalent (or, perhaps, we are just becoming more aware of it) is the shipping of drugs in cargo containers, mixed among or hidden in legitimate cargo, behind false walls and ceilings, even, for cocaine, inserted in the hollow metal frames of the container structures themselves! Hundreds of thousands of containers enter U. S. ports annually (more than 250,000 in South Florida alone), and Customs Service (CS) inspections are manpower intensive. Only a very small percentage of the overall container traffic can be inspected.
Use of private aircraft is common among the narco-traffickers, with deliveries made either to land sites or to boats at sea. While the interdiction steps required remain the same (detect, identify, escort, and apprehend), the time available is short, and close coordination amonf the participating enforcement elements is vital to success. A typ>ca scenario could involve: Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Customs, or Coast Guard detector assets; Federa Aviation Agency (FAA) flight services; Coast Guard or Customs escort aircraft; Army, Coast Guard, Customs, or Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) apprehension helicopters carrying DEA and Royal Bahamas Strike Force (RBSF) p0' lice officers. If the air-drop is mad1- to a boat in or near Bahamian waters, additional coordination could include a Coast Guard patrol boat (sometimes carrying a Royal Bahamas Defense Force [RBDF] rider)’ or RBDF boat (sometimes carrymS a Coast Guard rider), a Customs Service boat with U. S. Coast Guardsmen and Bahamian police >n the crew, or a Navy missile patrol hydrofoil (PHM) with a Coast Guard law enforcement detachmet^ (LEDet) on board. (As this is beitU written, a three-month deploymeth of PHMs to Grenada is half over, LEDets are part of the crews of m2 Navy’s Aries [PHM-5], Taurus [PHM-3], and Gemini [PHM-6])- . All such coordination would be if tiated and monitored through three operations watch-center facilities. C3I (Customs Service and Coast Guard); Seventh Coast Guard Djs' trict Operations Center in Miami, and OPBAT (DEA and Coast Guard) in the U. S. Embassy in Nassau. (OPBAT stands for Opcra tions Bahamas and Turks and Caicos, a DEA-directed program
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Proceedings / Naval Review
Tw, This steady decline reflects
. • reductions of foreign fishing adoptions within the EEZ. As domestic phing concerns have replaced foreign nes, the Coast Guard has correspond- P increased its boardings of U. S. Is Ing vessels. Coast Guard personnel I’nductcd 2,414 fishing vessel boardings tne U. S. EEZ during fiscal year 1987, issuing 96 written warnings and 349 civil penalties.
Highlights of 1987 Operations
Coast Guardsmen work at complex marine operations that require extraordinary professional expertise and skill. Their duties are diverse and routinely hazardous. The following cases— selected from among the thousands of operational missions Coast Guard units performed in 1987—illustrate this diversity and the dangers, as well as the growing trend for the Coast Guard to coordinate with other agencies, especially in the effort to interdict drugs.
► Icebreaking in Antarctica: In one of
■umy area of responsibility con- ,irne'S u steac*y decline. At the same mere is less marijuana avail-
By Rear Admiral H.
able locally and the price is nearly double what it was two years ago.
That signifies success, though certainly we claim no final victory.
The cocaine news is bad. Although more is being interdicted, availability has never been greater nor the price lower. We believe the majority is smuggled into the country by private aircraft, plus commercial maritime methods under the cover of legitimate trade. Although some marijuana is similarly transported, the percentage is much lower.
Do we have enough resources?
Certainly not. And the effect of the fiscal year 1988 funding cut in the Coast Guard’s operation expense account was an immediate 55% reduction in scheduled patrols by our cutters; meaning less than half the routine presence in the choke points and throughout my area of responsibility. Between 70% and 90% of our interdictions result from “cold hits”—i.e., a routine patrol detecting and boarding a boat, without prior specific intelligence information. 1 imagine we will detect and seize in proportionate numbers to what we would normally have interdicted. Navy support capability has also been reduced.
Again, remember that we have no measure of effectiveness to show the impact of any specific change.
We may even see an increase in the amounts of marijuana and/or cocaine seized in the maritime zones, in spite of the drastically reduced law enforcement presence. Why? Because the odds for a successful transit have improved. If the drugs become more available, we are losing the war.
As in any major conflict, to win takes aggressive efforts on all fronts:
► Eradication at the source—i.e., the crops, processing plants, and “management”
DFaV*n^ ^oast Guard, Army, and q '' helicopters sited at Nassau,
DP°4^et0Wn’ anc* F|ecPort t0 carry w'th- ant* RBSF apprehension teams ro‘ hln Bahamian territory.) To cUat* out the possibilities, we also .°eu|d have a SEABAT deployed— with 3 • B. Coast Guard helicopter
be anc* RBSF team mem-
nJS' °Perating on the high seas q ar Bahamian waters from either a ast Guard or Navy ship. qu °.much for the uninformed who C()CSti0n cooPeration! As the senior y ast Guard officer in the southeast iiti States, * am responsible for P ementing the provisions of for- vicCoa« Guard and Customs Ser- asse dements and guidelines that roipn Coast Guard the lead agency eff 111 maritime interdiction •i r[s- A very close working rela- to th ^ W*t*1 t*lc *~*- B- Ambassador rj e Bahamas, in addition to expe- in oT <“oast Guard watchstanders f0r BAT’s operation center, allow p 9Ulck identification of problems, ou.s 6r soutB. we maintain continu- YU Presence in the waters of the $ag atan Ghannel, Windward Pas- quf anc* Mona Passage, with fre- (leent SUrges of heightened activity B Per into the Caribbean using Qu^'iient of Defense and Coast yer resources. For more than a Nay n°W’ a sclua(*re>n of U. S.
Ports p B11**5” periodically re- dje.S *0r duty involving drug inter- Co- °n *n Caribbean waters. With a °ne h ^uart* CEDet on board, each of aas toe jurisdictional capability sUpo 0ast Guard cutter. Year-round DrJ 0rt *or maritime surveillance is Pov'dedby Navy P-3s. to *)W.are we doing? With regard totalariJUana’ 9u'te well. The annual sea . amount of marijuana seized at
diUes
th
B. Thorsen, U. S. Coast Guard
► Sustained interdiction efforts in departure, transit, and arrival zones
► Punishment of traffickers, including incarceration and seizures of assets to strip them of ill-gotten gains
► Punishment of those who buy and use the drugs—i.e., hold people accountable for breaking the law
► Research into the physical and mental consequences of drug use
► Education of the population that informs and enlightens to reduce the demand
Victory on this last front will win the war, if we hold our own everywhere else. (Helping existing addicts is included in the last two fronts.)
Despite the frustrations, notwithstanding the long boring hours patrolling in search of an enemy unconstrained by the rules of law, the young men and women who so proudly wear the uniforms of the sea services remain eager and steadfast in performing the drug enforcement task. Each drug bust elicits a strong sense of accomplishment, a victory over those who threaten our national security. Each green leaf or white snowflake painted on the stack or bridge wing of a Coast Guard ship represents a threat to our way of life. Each red “X” superimposed upon those symbols proclaims, "Not on my watch!"
But before we win this war on drugs some things must change. The people of our great country must show the necessary resolve. We have not faced up to the obvious need for a truly national effort. Too many ignore this plague and its threat to the very fiber of our society. And too many lend only lip service—calling it a war does not make it one.
Admiral Thorsen is Commander Seventh Coast Guard District
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Cee<lings / Naval Review 1988