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^ian Gulf Lessons
Operationally, the most important the^ ^eve*°Pments °f 1987 occurred in I e ^sian Gulf, in connection with the J*n'Iraq War. Though this war has been .] ,CeiVed primarily as a land war, both „aes found it necessary in 1987 to turn to st j Warfare to try to break the land-war f0rernate- Shipping attacks had occurred l9si0me lime, but they intensified during jnar>d expanded to include minelay- §■ They also became less controllable, C| ne Iranian naval forces grew to in- t|Qe ihe paramilitary Iranian Revolu- ^ nary Guards in small boats, armed to th infantry weapons, in addition ® regular Iranian Navy, staine situation is reminiscent of the \yoe|mate °n the Western Front during r<l War I. Neither side could muster 5 latl(j ol°gy or the tactical skill to win hopg. , altle- Iran and Iraq apparently other ik rea^ eacl* other by denying each hot s06 res°urces for further warfare— ships ^Uch by sinking weapon-carrying S°Ure'p ,Ut ky destroying each other’s Por ir fUnds'
*he jra -an’ the source is oil exports, so ^raniarj 1S - Vc attacked tankers carrying 01 ■ Denied the export route
through the Gulf, the main sources of Iraqi funds are the neutral, conservative Arab states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In 1987, Iran began to attack those sources by imposing its own blockade on Gulf shipping. This was in addition to Iran’s attempt to destroy Iraqi backers by spreading its religious-political revolution across the Gulf. From a naval point of view, the Iranian position has been that there are no real neutrals, that states such as Kuwait, which are nominally neutral in the war, are really supporters of Iraq.
The West considers these tactics to be attacks on vital neutral shipping, so Western navies increased their protective presence in the Gulf in 1987. The situation has interesting implications for defensive tactics in future wars in the Third
World, in that none of the Western powers can really hope to end the threat to shipping—be it missiles or mines—at its source (as we sometimes hope to do in a war against the Soviets). That leaves only escort and minesweeping tactics, with their risk of intolerable peacetime losses.
Perhaps the most interesting naval feature of the Gulf War last year was the increasing presence of the Western European navies in support of their own merchant fleets, rather than as elements of NATO. Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands sent mine countermeasures forces into the Gulf. Though these governments sent ships specifically to protect their own merchant ships, in effect they were helping keep the Gulf clear for all merchant ships. The operation was run not through NATO, but through the nearly moribund Western European Union. That seemed to symbolize a European determination to develop a policy independent of the United States. However, the NATO powers took note of the drain on U. S. forces entailed by the greatly increased U. S. naval presence in the Gulf. Although the West German Navy did not deploy any minesweepers to the Gulf, it sent ships to the
NATO navies—the British frigate Andromeda and a nest of British mine countermeasures ships (above)—responded to the threats to their countries’ merchant ships in the Gulf. Changes in the Indian Ocean included the first-ever transfer of a nuclear sub; the Soviets gave India a Charlie-I SSGN.
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Mediterranean to reinforce allied naval forces there.
This was the Belgian Navy’s first operational out-of-area deployment in its history. Although the Royal Netherlands Navy has a long history of overseas operations, it has largely been limited to the North Sea since the loss of Dutch New Guinea (now West Irian) in 1962. The Italian Navy has only recently conducjed extensive out-of-area operations, including support for the Italian contingent of the international peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The Italian force in the Gulf included a substantial part of the Italian fleet. French and British presence in and around the Gulf is of longer standing.
The attacks in the Gulf also led the Japanese Government to consider sending minesweepers, which could have been manned by civilian crews to avoid the Japanese constitutional provision against overseas military deployments. Although this idea was soon dropped, it
was the first time that a postwar Japanese government has even publicly discussed such a deployment. This was also the year that Japan broke through the political barrier of limiting defense to 1% of its gross national product, albeit by a very small amount.
The Gulf war also provided some important technical lessons. It demonstrated just how difficult it is to destroy a large tanker or a large oil installation such as Kharg Island. For example, Exocet missiles hitting tankers generally exploded in their cargo tanks and, in the absence of air fires, were not ignited. Damage was so limited that in most cases it cost less to repair a tanker than to buy another antiship missile on the international market. This is relevant to any future antishipping war, although the missiles would presumably have different effects on, say, container ships.
Another lesson was that small, fast attack boats are vulnerable to air attack, particularly by helicopter. The U. S. strike against Iranian speedboats served as a reminder of the inherent limitations of such craft. The Iranians reportedly have obtained Stinger antiaircraft missiles, but it is not clear whether such weapons will be effective at night against very quiet helicopters, when the Stinger firer has little or no effective warning.
We also relearned the lesson—so easily forgotten—that identification friend or foe (IFF) is imperfect at best, and ineffective in a chaotic war situation. The attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31) can best be described as an IFF error by a very tired Iraqi pilot. The behavior of some of the Stark’s crewmembers can best be explained by their belief that IFF error was inconceivable: If the airplanes were indeed friendly (or semi-friendly), they could not possibly attack a U. S. warship. The pilot probably did not know he was firing at a U. S. warship, or he may have been firing at some more distant, legitimate target. The history of naval warfare is full of errors of identification, and of friends and neutrals killed by mistake; the Stark is a timely reminder.
The attack can also be seen in the context of a larger, indirect Iranian naval strategy to expand the war sufficiently to force the major powers to bring pressure on the combatants. The Iranians probably have reasoned that as fewer controllable forces were brought into action in the Gulfs international shipping lanes, the powers dependent on that shipping will find the war less and less tolerable. Both sides have shed far too much blood to accept a compromise peace without being compelled to. For example, a United Nations attempt to achieve a cease-fire
broke down because Iran demanded t a Iraq admit responsibility for the war.
Politically, the main lesson of the lran Iraq War appears to be that a major con flict in the Third World need not be base on underlying East-West tension. T should have been obvious from the 1° » history of Israeli-Arab relations, but rael is almost certainly considered a sp
cial case. U. S. policy in particular been to build up alliances designed
to
the
that
support us in a global war against Soviets; many local powers complain they are more interested in supP
against their local enemies.
For the Western navies, this means
that distant iriority in a
the future may look more like the past than like the recent past. The Prl01
may be to safeguard national interests volatile Third World (often in the face ^ Western-supplied weapons) rather than fight the Soviets or their proxies. the Soviets may find themselves > position. The significance of the B pean presence in the Gulf is that world is still very dangerous, and a na must still rely on its own military r° to protect its citizens and econ abroad. By law, this sort of protecti0 generally extended to merchant ships ^ ing the national flag, but not to flaS ^ convenience ships. Thus, one lesson ^ the Iran-Iraq War may be that flags ^ convenience are not as convenient as P viously imagined.
The Rise of the Indian Navy
The Indian Navy took delivery
Even in th's
the
of'he
HermeS:
former British light fleet carrier which became the INS Viraat. f, equipped with Sea Harrier V/STOL 1
She
tical/short takeoff and landing) ^teu,
1
modified British Invincible-class carr The Indians have stated publicly the ^ sign work on a new carrier about the of the Viraat has been under way f°r years.
These carriers may be intended prl jgi ily for the classical power projection ^ Aircraft from the older and smaller
lilt
with
the
and will operate in conjunction existing Indian carrier, the INS The Indian Navy has said that it hope
yikrt"'1'
build new carriers in the 1990s, portedly it is considering constru1
rant struck Pakistani ground ins
during the 1971 war. New
and
ctiof
of
tall30 ;
British
•bU)
- • „ sub"
Sea Harriers should make effective ^
stitutes, particularly when they^( js to be limited to antisubmarine w'a
launched from a ski-jump. The Vikra,,,
arf^
(ASW) and commando (helicopter
sault) operations.
if
India also completed negotiation.,,. 1987 to obtain nuclear-powered su ^ } fines from the Soviet Union. The »
220
Proceedings
Naval
Keviv"
t0 hav, years It
sees
e the requisite resources for many aPpears that the Indian Government
sin an<J India considers itself
sPhe° ^°Wer' Nations on the edges of its arepe .°f influence, such as Australia, itan e®lnn*ng to notice its expanding mil- forces.
gr0 ’fo past, India has emphasized and a're*ated forces, because Pakistan its ’ to a 'esser extent, China have been fecei||ln security concerns. The relatively gests *nterest in naval expansion sug- S[an {a‘lt India no longer considers Paki-
bid
main issue (although in 1971
|ave appear to have two motives: to Oceari/BIaen<f*y Power control the Indian s'8nifi Uengal and to maintain
*“binaCfe*t m'*itary power to the south of to U ’ e latter being roughly analogous againstsuPPort °f the “China Card” bardiy s C ^ov'et Union. The Indians are of Coov’et allies, but they are a source em to the Soviets’ enemies.
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. arlic-I-claSS tactical missile boat to be . for training, was handed over early . January and renamed the Chakra. '“a is also to receive four to six new clear submarines. That program may ^Plain reports that the Soviet Union is building Victor-III-class attack sub- annes, despite the shift to new quieter %s (particularly Sierra- and Akula- Ss boats). India continues to obtain Se‘ attack submarines from West Ger- (Type-1500) and the Soviet Union
^he Soviet transfer is the first in his- ['J °f a nuclear submarine, and it makes Ia the second Third World country— g er China—to obtain such a weapon.
■ ra?il has long claimed interest in build- o a nuclear submarine, but is unlikely
M ltself as heir to the British Raj, q °Se writ stretched from the Persian the 'n B*e west to the Malacca Straits in [r|(j.east. There are also indications that proja Wants sufficient power projection to formCct Indian nationals in Africa, who fall a.merchant class and have often dj(jen v'ctim to nationalist fervor, as they (j when Idi Amin ejected them from C nda. Britain has attempted to protect CjrmiT1onwealth nationals caught in such an Stances, particularly because their iSh ptors settled in Africa under the Brit- |essmPire. Now such protection seems h$in l^e^’ an£J India considers itself a the J1 naval forces did prove valuable in this3r W'1'1 Pakistan). As an example of ar,iiedXfanS'0n’ t*le 'n(J'an Government the p nc*'an merchant ships operating in Thersian Gulf.
rtianv°,U®*1 fbe Soviet Union supplies Nlavy’ ndian defense systems, the Indian tributpS, re*at've prosperity cannot be at- SovjetsSole|y to East-West rivalry. The h;
Soviet Navy Grows—Slowly
The U. S. Director of Naval Intelligence, in open testimony on 1 March 1988, reported that during 1987 the Soviet Union launched eight submarines: one Akula-class nuclear attack sub (SSN) (the third), one Victor-III-class SSN (22d), one Oscar-class nuclear cruise- missile sub (SSGN), four Kilo diesel attack subs (SSs) (17th through 20th, with three intended for export), and one Beluga-class, nonnuclear-powered, experimental submarine. No nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) were launched during the year, the fifth Typhoon having entered the water late in 1986. The fifth Delta-IV SSBN was launched early in 1988. The United States believes that some Delta-IVs will be home ported in the Pacific Ocean Fleet “within the next couple of years.” It was reported that the first Akula SSN, launced in 1984, was still in a trials status. The SS-N-21 strategic cruise missile was said to have become operational in 1988, with the modified-Yankee, Akula, Sierra, and Victor classes “assessed to be the most likely operational platforms.” No new class of SSGN for the SS-NX-24 has yet been launced, but the first unit is expected by March 1989.
The fourth Kiev-class vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) carrier, the Baku, was reported to have become operational in 1987 (although she has not yet deployed from the Black Sea), and the new large carrier Leonid Brezhnev should carry out first trials in 1989. The latter is expected to carry the new Yak-41 V/STOL fighter and by 1992 may employ the Flanker-B Variant-2 conventional takeoff and landing fighter.
Other surface programs were reported to be moving slowly. The Kalinin, the third KVrov-class nuclear-powered, guided-missile cruiser, is still fitting out, and the fourth remains on the ways. The third S/ava-class guided-missile cruiser is still fitting out, and the fourth is on the ways. The 11th Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyer has been launched and six more are under construction.This large number of destroyers could mean that some may be for export. The ninth Udaloy-class guided-missle destroyer has been launched and three more are on the ways. Construction of a new class of frigate began last year at Kaliningrad Shipyard as a possible follow-on to the Krivak class. A new amphibious landing ship, possibly a third Ivan Rogov, is being built at the same yard. Two wing-in-ground effect classes are in production: the Utka, powered by eight turbofan engines and mounting six SS-N-22 antiship missiles (the second is
V/STOL technological advances are making it possible for more nations to add carriers to their navies.
U. S.-built AV-8B Harriers will fly from the Spanish carrier Principe de Asturias, which commissions this month.
intent finally passed a law permit-
tin.
8 its
navy to operate fixed-wing air-
t0 ^ flexible small carrier, presumably Sea .equipped with some version of the nij,. . H’ier. The Spanish ship is to com- Witf1®" in this month and be equipped Sea S.-built Harriers and British-built ters *n8 airborne early warning helicop- ate . . ne Principe de Asturias will oper- ^n the new Spanish Oliver Hazard ASw C'ass frigates, forming a NATO group.
c Italian carrier will form the core of two sea-control groups. No plans
ft5***
the'eVe^ t0 un<^er construction), and and ^an’ fitted for amphibious warfare caPable of carrying 100 troops or Reeled cargo.
0eP°rted Soviet Naval Aviation devel- ents indued announcement of a new p(j'ane, designated “TAG-D,” with a lan S'b^e antisubmarine warfare/surveil- ce/mining role, and further deploy - ts of the Bear-J very-long-frequency ^'"munications-relay aircraft, which s entered service in 1985. The current w^10n of the Tu-142 Bear-F, the Mod.4, said to have “increased capability r 'ts predecessors.”
**L Aircraft Carriers
Ca .e newly acquired Indian V/STOL ent Was one three such ships just iane"n§ service. The others are the Ital- p 'usseppe Garibaldi and the Spanish
'Pe de Asturias. In 1987, the Italian adiar
craft at - -
fUj al sea, a right denied since 1923.
a f(il|tUrned the Giusseppe Garibaldi into
one for
n0l) second carrier have been an- everi(Cec*’ but it is likely that one will seCoany be proposed. Otherwise, the A$\y rouP wiH be supported only by p°SS| helicopters on board a cruiser. It is ber 6 **lat the question of a second car- V/s^ationalized by the need for 1^23 | ^ fighters—was moot until the -[•i aw was changed. begjn6 -new V/STOi: carriers may be the beCan,ng of a wave of such construction, ativC]S£ demonstrate that even a rel- nXe(J - sniall platform can support some the aircraft at sea. One reading of a f a Elands Conflict would be that even ^ake . sea'based V/STOL aircraft can a considerable difference.
In the past, the least expensive carrier a navy could obtain in peacetime was a British-built, World War II-vintage, light fleet carrier, because it was the smallest hull that could accommodate a reasonably powerful catapult. Ships of this type were operated by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, India, and the Netherlands. The survivors are all wearing out now, and for some time there have been reports of new carrier projects. V/STOL operation reduces the minimum acceptable size of a new carrier, because the catapult is not needed. It does not reduce the minimum efficient carrier size (the British light fleet was already much smaller), and the V/STOL aircraft is not an F-14 (or an A-6), but much of the world is not quite as hostile as, say, the Norwegian Sea or the Northwest Pacific.
Overall, the meaning of the Indian purchase and of the new Italian and Spanish ships is that the basic idea of the carrier— that naval forces must be able to take their supporting aircraft with them—is still valid and is still well understood.
Late in 1987, there were rumors that the Japanese are considering including a V/STOL ship (which they are calling a “through-deck cruiser”) in their 199094 Five Year Plan; it would form the core of a sea-control task force, escorted by the new Aegis destroyers. In the past, the Japanese have avoided carrier construction of any kind, on the ground that carriers are offensive weapons prohibited by the Japanese Constitution. However, in recent years the Japanese Government has accepted responsibility for shipping protection out to 1,000 miles from Japan’s shores. Interest in carriers may reflect the realization that shore-based aircraft are limited in their ability to protect against surprise attacks at such distances, and that surface ships cannot support the sheer number of ASW helicopters required for long periods at sea.
Thus, V/STOL carriers would be distinctly defensive ships. They would operate ASW helicopters and, perhaps, some Sea Harriers (again, there are rumors of Japanese interest in this aircraft, perhaps for license production). If the carrier could support airborne early warning in some form, perhaps only as a command center relying on shore-based aircraft, or as a terminal for the down-link from a blimp, then a heavy concentration of Aegis ships could help solve the force’s air-defense problems. Fighter aircraft would still be needed, however, to probe ambiguous contacts. They are also an efficient way of dealing with hostile surface threats.
Attack Submarines
The most striking submarine development was Canada’s announcement, as part of its first defense policy review since 1971, that it would buy nuclear attack submarines, primarily to defend the Canadian Arctic. The two candidates are modified versions of the French Rubis and the British Trafalgar. The latter incorporates some U. S. technology; all current British submarine reactors are descended from the U. S. S5W plant supplied for the first British nuclear submarine, HMS Dreadnought. The United States can therefore veto the sale of a modified Trafalgar, although it cannot affect a possible French sale. Historically, the U. S. position on the transfer of naval nuclear technology has been one of extreme reluctance. On the other hand, Canada shares most U. S. defense information. By late 1987, the transfer had been approved, at least in principle. There was some feeling in Canada that U. S. reluctance was motivated by a desire to deny Canada the ability to track U. S. nuclear submarines in its waters, rather than fears that information would be compromised. The announcement of Canada’s submarine design choice is not expected for at least a year.
Most navies continue to buy and operate diesel submarines. In 1987, Australia turned to the Swedish firm Kockums for its new diesel attack submarine. Reports persist of interest in new submarines from such countries as Thailand, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia.
The more interesting question is whether a revolution in submarine propulsion is at hand. Diesel-electric submarines have very limited high-speed endurance, based on their battery capacity. Although they are difficult to detect while operating at low speed on batteries, every day of such operation reduces their ability to dash away (on battery) after attacking.
combat system, particularly for warfare (AAW).
No single European navy appears ing to make the necessary investme
But together the group of eight Poten , frigate builders—Britain, Cana ■ France, Italy, the Netherlands, West many, Spain, and the United States
can
COStS'
only
(or
vide frigates and major auxiliaries '
rrent
self-defense system to replace the cu NATO Sea Sparrow. The U. S. Navy beginning work on what it calls NATO AAW missile system, whic both its candidate for the NATO h'? and its replacement for the U. S.-Nrv built Sea Sparrow. ,0p
France is seeking partners to de the family of air missile sysj (FAMS), including naval and air i ^ defense weapons. Italy, Spain, and t a ain have agreed to participate >n
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They must therefore keep their battery charge topped up by snorkeling periodically while on station.
Three alternatives have been proposed. The German submarine builder HDW recommends fuel cells, at least for low- speed cruising and possibly to replace batteries. Fuel cells have been proposed in the past for submarine propulsion, but none have been built with sufficient capacity. HDW is installing such a system on board an old West German submarine.
The second alternative, advocated by Kockums, is a Stirling external-combustion, closed-cycle engine—a dockside prototype for which has been demonstrated by a Swedish sub. Earlier closed- cycle engines were intended to provide dash power, so they were relatively large and used large volumes of fuel and oxidant. Kockums’s system is the opposite: a small engine allows the submarine to loiter without exhausting its battery or giving away its position by snorkeling. The Stirling system will be tested on board a Swedish submarine this year.
The third alternative, proposed in the context of the new Canadian submarine program, is a small nuclear reactor: a submarine incorporating this reactor as an auxiliary powerplant might be designated SSn, as opposed to SSN. Like the Kockums proposal, the reactor would relieve the loitering load on the battery. Canada might find the SSn attractive because a submarine so equipped could cruise (albeit at very low speed) under ice for a protracted period. However, the small reactor would not solve a major under-ice problem: oxygen for the crew. A standard SSN generates so much electricity that it can easily break down sea water to produce the oxygen it needs. The small SSn reactor would not have nearly enough power.
The SSn is being advertised as an inexpensive way to get one of the benefits of nuclear power—unlimited endurance. Some claim that the small reactor can even be installed in an existing submarine, as a hull plug.
All three schemes for auxiliary propulsion clearly have some merit, but the greater question is whether they are worth the extra complexity they entail. A submarine so equipped would be somewhat stealthier on patrol, but diesel submariners already know how to limit their use of snorkels, and their most important limitation—their lack of high-speed mobility—would not be affected. The Canadian Government has shown interest in the SSN, not the SSn.
A cynic observing the world submarine market would notice that most navies likely to buy new diesel submarines have already done so, and that the submarine builders must produce an innovative de sign if they are to remain in business- Auxiliary propulsion is only one of sev eral possibilities. Another is greater auto mation, to reduce crew size and tn manning cost, which must be particular y daunting to some Third World countries^ Yet another is a drastic improvemen in combat systems, particularly l°n= range detection and such long-run? weapons as submerged-launch, antis V missiles.
Frigates n
The most important frigate issue 1 1987 was the fate of the NATO Fr*ga Replacement (NFR-90), a multination program. The big prize is not so much hull, which accounts for relatively m ^
of the total cost of the ship, but a nt.
antiair
will' tial
certainly afford development Without such a development, the capable Western naval area-defense local-defense) system likely will be so version of Aegis. The U. S. Navy !jaS(e_ additional stake in any future ni?
sized AAW system, in that it must P 3 - ; with a
defense weapons. Italy, Spain,
~
FAMS development, which may some British Seawolf missile techno Or The NFR-90 project is in trouble ^ cause its timetable does not coincide
i
those of the prospective partners, y^ has already ordered six more of lts . qy City-class frigates, and it seems unlt._ that it can buy both nuclear attack su rines and more frigates. West Germ urgently needs new frigates, and has nounced an intention to order four nr^ fied versions of its current-produc
Type-122. The NATO frigate may ‘|e conflict with the Royal Navy’s sC gpjs for Type-23 ASW frigates; the NFR" being described as a successor to tn isting Type-42 area air-defense destroy
0^nce seems interested in the NFR-90 V if FAMS is adopted as its primary ^aPon system. Potentially the biggest yer' the United States must question ^ ether the NFR-90 will meet require- J"nts being debated internally (for ex- P*e> in the context of the “Revolution ea ) and whether the U. S. Navy can
to continue to operate substantial
numb(
c°mb;
ne European partners may find it difficult to buy the NFR-90 if, tr "e Wake of the new arms limitation 0 y (°r treaties), they must spend more ground forces to put up a protracted """clear defense of Western Europe.
Uj? Conductors
rom a naval point of view, the new S(Jerati°n of relatively high-temperature ind °ndUctors promises much smaller lots tl'Uc^ more efficient electric genera- effi ant^ motors» and possibly much more inClent computers and sensors. Silenc- 0llsr®'^airements have already made vari- tr_ ,0rms °f electric propulsion more at- fVfc>Ve’ aS 'n t*le case °* t'ie E4ritish eXtr ^ f^nke-class frigate, despite the
'ers of small, second-rate surface atants well into the next century.
Some claim that future superconductors could drastically reduce the weight of submarine machinery, by eliminating reduction gearing and the associated sound mountings. In theory, the ultimate submarine engine would combine a means of directly converting nuclear power into electricity (without moving parts) with a lightweight electric motor.
In practice, the new superconductors
cannot yet be made in large quantities; they represent an important promise rather than a near-term reality.
Dr. Friedman is the author of numerous books on weapon technology and writes the monthly “World Naval Developments” column for Proceedings.
"tight
weight entailed. An all-electric ship
t0r~ °^er other benefits. If its genera >tors
i^otan(f motors are light enough, the P*aced Can *3e Fobbed, and the generators
da ~ anywhere in or on the hull. The tiov'-3* connection between prime
^sical connection between , rent|Er Propeller can be broken. Cur
ls c^’ t*le internal arrangement of ships shafl'^Pbcated by the need to provide lau k*6arances aft> limiting the depth of •he hflers anc* weapons at the after end of linJ )’ for example. In larger ships, it
tiits tv,
ne volume of after magazines; for j <,Pe, it complicated the design of nlv ’^battleships of World War II. It is to add that the U. S. Navy
tyar ]6c* tUrbo-electric drive during World abari|j^artly to improve survivability, and durj °nC(l it in capital ships only because a pr 1930s treaty restrictions placed . nium on weight savings, is t(,a( er benefit of an all-electric ship •he sab auxiliaries would be driven by Pr0p I!16 electric generators that drive the ar0(Jhers- They could be dispersed
aund
'attie .
antage a commander could choose
V
hep
the ship, so that in the event of
1
Say , toss of propulsive power and, hr,^ of sensors or weapons. This
lectern, of course, would be sub- trica] . e survivability of the ship’s elec- c°ttdu ,'Str'bution system. Because super- efficj Ct'n8 Power lines can transmit more Vsent'y ancl probably in smaller vol- dUpii’ hey migbt be easier to armor or
"cate
in a ship.
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