Smart AAV Planned
Martin Marietta’s proposed autonomous air vehicle is a cruise missile that will use advanced avionics and computational techniques to locate and attack targets with submunitions, perform damage assessment, and return to base.
to avoid. The treaty under which the U. S. technology was origin3® transferred to Britain mandates U. S. approval for retransfer, and g0l).
time it seemed that this might be withheld. In 1988, then-President aid Reagan personally assured Canadian Prime Minister Brian rooney that he would support any Canadian request for the relevant nology.
Mui-
tech-
The submarine program provokes some dissent in Canadian cirde
Canada Cancels Nuclear Subs
The Canadian Government has cancelled its plan to acquire 10-12 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) owing to the great cost. Several other military programs, such as the purchase of additional maritime patrol aircraft, were also abandoned or scaled down. The Canadian mine countermeasures program has been retained, as has the program to purchase a second “flight” of six City-class frigates.
The nuclear submarine program had been the most spectacular element of the 1987 Defence White Paper. The program was justified as the only way Canada could ensure the sovereignty of its northern waters, much of which are covered by ice for much of the year. It was argued that Canada had a NATO (and North American) responsibility to prevent Soviet nuclear submarines, which can operate under ice, from using such passages into the Atlantic as the one around the Western coast of Greenland. In the absence of a NATO barrier in these waters, at least some Soviet nuclear attack submarines would be able to end-run the main barrier in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, a problem that grows worse as the proportion of Soviet submarines that are nuclear-powered grows.
There was a tacit argument that unless Canada took on this responsibility it would have to allow U. S. submarines to operate freely in its territorial waters, because only those submarines could prevent such Soviet operations.
In addition, it was believed that the nuclear program would benefit Canadian industry, because the submarines would be built indigenously, albeit to plans developed in Britain or France. It appeared that the boats would have an all-Canadian combat system—traditionally a specialty of the Canadian Navy.
The nuclear submarine program was always controversial. Some in the U. S. Navy argued that the propulsion technology of the British Trafalgar-class submarine could not be re-exported without U. S. approval, and that such approval would be tantamount to legitimizing an export market in nuclear submarines—something the United States would want
ital
grounds. Canada does not have nuclear weapons, and some claimed that having submarine reactors (necessarily outside the nu ^ nonproliferation regime) would have created an unfortunate arms c°n precedent. It was widely believed in Canada that when Defence M'nl Perrin Beatty, a strong supporter of the program, was removed frorn post in January of this year the program was in jeopardy. ^
The nuclear submarine program was so important to the Cana^ Navy that the government will have to develop some alternative- 3 possibility would be to fall back to the pre-SSN program of buy1"^ third “flight” of frigates and three diesel-electric submarines to ref’ j the existing units. Another would be to buy new Arctic bottom arrays additional patrol aircraft equipped with a new generation of Arctic s buoys to prosecute contacts.
Brazil and India Plan Nuclear Subs
Several other navies have announced plans to acquire nuclear sUj^ rines. The Indian Navy leased a Soviet Charlie-class guided-missile presumably to acquire nuclear operational experience. The Indians stated publicly that they will not acquire additional nuclear subma ^ from the Soviets; there have been claims that such craft will be bu ^ India. Clearly this is a long-term aspiration, because to date In®1 -c found it relatively difficult to assemble German-designed diesel-e ^ submarines. Reportedly the Charlie has proven less than satisfactory’ it may be returned. . {e-
Nevertheless, the advantages associated with nuclear submann ^ main. Indian policy envisages effective dominion over the oceadj extending from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. The Indian arg . is that a strong India protects the entire area from outside interior indeed, that had India been strong in the 16th and 17th centuries, east Asia would never have fallen under foreign dominion. This ^ ment is used internally to support a growing naval program. I* |St,f used to justify the Indian plan to make the Indian Ocean a ' z°^aV3| peace,” i.e., an area relatively free of foreign (such as U. S.) forces. bj|«
Nuclear submarines are well suited for such a policy. They are • , ..
esent •
mainly because of its projected cost, but also on supposed environm^
enough to cover the vast areas of the “zone of peace” and presc- eign naval forces with an impressive deterrent. Now that Pakistan' y marines carry U. S.-supplied Sub-Harpoon missiles, the Indians^, also fear that their surface fleet will not be as survivable as it has ^ On the other hand, the Indian Ocean’s shallow depth and warm complicate antisubmarine warfare.
The Brazilian Navy has also expressed interest in nuclear sub"' ^ construction. Brazil’s national policy is to develop a medium-p0' |b; actor for civilian use. The main alternative source of electrical P°w jjjfl Brazilian rivers, is too far from the centers of consumption. A Br ^e( program to build large power reactors, comparable to those >n ^ countries, has been cancelled owing to a lack of foreign exchange- Brazilian calculation is that smaller reactors can be designed aneStiC duced domestically, and that fuel can be provided out of large do supplies of uranium oxide. . sUtr
The standard reactor is designed for possible alternative use m ^ marine. Moreover, the agency responsible for reactor developme" .flC Brazilian Navy. Plans call for construction of the appropriate sub reactor in about two decades.
114
Proceedings
/jub1
Night Attack Hornet Flies
The McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D Hornet night attack prototype made its first flight in May. Advanced systems, including an infrared navigation sensor mounted on the fuselage below the wing, will allow Navy and Marine Corps pilots to operate the aircraft more effectively at night and in bad weather. Production deliveries of single- and two- seat night attack F/A-18s will start later this year.
advocated on the ground that nonnuclear homing torpedoes—the on y alternatives—might be unable to pursue fast targets, particularly thos covered in anechoic tiles. A secondary advantage claimed is that su weapons could be relied upon to destroy submarines that might resist effect of small conventional torpedoes. Both arguments run afoul ofV1 political considerations. To field tactical nuclear warheads as backup against the likely failure of nonnuclear homing torpedoes would app6 to send a message to the Soviets that the West considers the naval env ronment different, i.e., that it might not be inhibited about initiatin nuclear warfare at sea. That in turn would undermine the basic Wes policy of deterring a Soviet initiation of nuclear war at sea by threaten reprisals against Soviet installations ashore. Yet general nuclear use
sea would be much worse for a Western alliance dependent upon
surface
shipping than for a Soviet Union that could cheerfully eschew any PoS tive use of the sea.
The three weapons are not the first U. S. naval tactical nuclear we-jP ons to be retired. In the late 1970s, the Navy retired its Astor (Mk nuclear torpedo. The Astor had a limited range of about 12,000 yar^ and within the fleet it was a standing joke that its kill probability two—counting both the launching submarine and the target. The Suu is fired to a much greater range, and so probably cannot endanger submarine firing it. Its retirement was occasioned by the general cha , from analog to digital fire-control systems. Although Congress some SubRocs modernized to keep them compatible with newer
SubRoc, AsRoc, and Terrier Retire
The U. S. Navy has announced it will retire three of its tactical nuclear weapons: the submarine-launched ASW missile (SubRoc) and the nuclear versions of the Terrier and the surface ship-launched ASW missile (AsRoc). All three weapons were conceived in the mid-1950s, a time far more conducive to expectations that nuclear weapons could be used very freely. Now nuclear weapons are tightly controlled. This is a consequence of the perceived political environment: The Soviet Union is heavily equipped with nuclear weapons and the government fears nuclear escalation. Although it is nearly impossible to make a logical link between, say, the use of a single nuclear ASW weapon and a full-scale exchange of strategic thermonuclear warheads, that connection is real to many decision makers. It is difficult for such decision makers to imagine that any particular tactical advantage, such as might be bought by using a small nuclear weapon at sea, is worth that risk.
Given that the U. S. government is unlikely to authorize the use of a tactical nuclear weapon at sea without extensive deliberation, two important operational disadvantages of these weapons become apparent. First, they take up scarce weapon stowage space that might otherwise go to more usable nonnuclear weapons. For example, ships typically carry only 16 (at most 24) AsRocs—and doctrine probably requires two weapons per attack—to achieve a high kill probability. Thus, even if all AsRocs are nonnuclear (hence easily usable), a ship can make only eight or 12 attacks. Any further reduction is difficult to justify.
Second, nuclear weapons have environmental effects that may reduce their value. Exploded underwater, a nuclear depth bomb (i.e., an AsRoc or SubRoc warhead) will produce enough noise to disable sonars long after the initial burst. It has, after all, a finite (if large) damage radius, so that it will sometimes miss. In that case, the attacking ship probably cannot tell that the weapon has missed, and it almost certainly cannot reacquire the submarine target after firing. A missile exploding in the air, like nuclear Terrier, may black out nearby radars. Moreover, some fleet officers who are very impressed by the killing power of tactical nuclear weapons may fear that these same weapons will damage or destroy their launch platforms.
Tactical nuclear weapons do, however, have purely tactical advantages. The nuclear Terrier was retained in service because unlike a conventionally armed weapon it could destroy a missile diving steeply toward the surface. A conventional surface-to-air missile (SAM) would shred the wings and control surfaces of such a weapon. That would suffice against a conventionally-armed antiship missile, but not necessarily against a nuclear weapon. In addition, the threat of a nuclear SAM could force an enemy to spread out his aircraft or missiles, because a single nuclear warhead could destroy any concentrated formation. The spread-out targets would make much easier shooting for nonnuclear defensive weapons.
Nuclear ASW weapons such as AsRoc and SubRoc have always been
ordered subfl13'
rines fire-control systems, the Navy was forced to decide whether weapon was still of value. The nuclear Terrier similarly required
ization. There is no nuclear version of the more modem Standard
sile, Congress having refused to fund a nuclear version of the
SM-
and Terrier nuclei
Presumably the combination of problems with the SubRoc prompted a more general review, leading to the decision to retire AsRoc.
In 1986, the Navy decided to develop the Sea Lance, the - successor, primarily as a nonnuclear weapon, carrying the Mk-50 JS ^
SubR00
weight torpedo as its warhead. A nuclear version may later be devel p ^ The key consideration was probably that Sea Lance should be usabl ^ tactical deterrent, inhibiting Soviet submarines from using their a
uld*
-level
sonars or from moving at high speed. This inhibiting role wo1 impractical if anyone using the missile required specific high' approval before firing. j.
The Navy still retains its nuclear depth bombs, delivered by ^ wing aircraft and helicopters, and there is a program to develop a if depth bomb/strike bomb. Depth bombs generally do not compete usable nonnuclear weapons for limited numbers of magazine spots- can be stowed ashore until release is granted. ^en
The decision to retire the three tactical nuclear weapons was ^ without any reference to possible Soviet arms reductions; it was j pletely justified on tactical grounds. Some U. S. officers have ar? that the Navy required tactical nuclear weapons as a way of detern £ ^ Soviets from using their own substantial arsenal of such weapon*.'t|^ retiring the three weapons, the U. S. Navy has decided, at least ta that tactical nuclear deterrence at sea is to be achieved in broader ^ e.g., by the threat that nuclear attacks on U. S. warships wi answered by nuclear attacks on Soviet shore installations. , jo
It is interesting that the U. S. government has made no atteH'F | claim arms-reduction credit for these cuts as, indeed, NATO made much public relations capital of the reduction from about 7. about 4,000 warheads in Europe during the past decade. .^g
The Soviets have made much of their campaign of scrapping eX obsolete warships. For example, in May it was announced that (the Pepsi-Cola company) would be given a cruiser, a destroyer. 8 ^ ate, and 17 submarines to scrap in payment for its products. The ^ pany’s president joked that he was disarming the Soviets faster t*13” Western government. The final result of the scrappings will be a su jt tially leaner Soviet Navy, but one with much the same capabilities ^ present. It is remarkable that Western naval spokesmen have n served the parallel to the mass British and American scrappings 0vy, built ships in the late 1950s and through the 1960s. For the U. S- ^
retirements roughly halved the size of the fleet at the end of the 19 e
the time, no one described the scrappings as a gesture toward P^, f5 Instead, governments fighting the Cold War had to explain that nu were not everything, and that scrapping obsolete warships freed nie resources badly needed elsewhere. The Soviets are in much the position today.
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Proceedings