The Iran-Iraq War, attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf, and U. S. naval operations in the Gulf region continued to command much of U. S. and world attention in 1988. From a U. S. Navy perspective, four dates in 1988 were milestones: On 14 April, the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) was almost cut in two by a mine, but was saved by the damage-control efforts of her crew. Four days later, U. S. Navy forces in the Gulf achieved a lopsided victory against Iranian forces in the U. S. Navy’s biggest battle at sea since World War II. On 3 July, the USS Vincennes (CG-49), in the midst of a battle against Iranian speedboats in the Strait of Hormuz, mistakenly shot down a civilian Iranian airliner flying over the Strait, sparking an intense review of the performance of U. S. naval equipment and personnel. And on 20 August, almost eight full years after it began, fighting in the Iran-Iraq war was halted under a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire, setting the stage for the suspension in December of formal U. S. Navy convoy operations in the Gulf.
Whether the cease-fire of 20 August can be translated into a durable peace between Baghdad and Tehran remains to be seen. But for now, at least, ships are plying the waters of the Persian Gulf without fear of attack, and U. S. naval forces in the region are winding down their operations after a year and a half of heightened activity. The following updates last year’s review of the Gulf tanker war and surveys U. S. naval operations in the Gulf region.1
The Final Months of the Tanker War: Table 1 provides a final box score for the number of ships attacked by Iraq and Iran in the tanker war. Iraq was responsible for about three-fifths of the attacks overall, but Iran drew even with Iraq in 1987, the peak attack year, and surpassed Iraq in 1988. Iraq’s annualized rate of attack in 1988 was about one-third lower than its rate of attack in 1987; Iran’s was about one-ninth lower. Somewhat different overall attack figures compiled by the U. S. Central Command show that Iraqi attacks from 1984 through early 1988 destroyed or heavily damaged their victims roughly 20 to 25% of the time; the figure for Iranian attacks was about 10%, a statistic partly reflecting Iran’s use of light arms in many of its attacks.2
Attacker |
1981 |
1982 |
1983 |
1984 |
1985 |
1986 |
1987 |
1988* |
Total |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Iraq |
5 |
22 |
16 |
53 |
33 |
66 |
89 |
38 |
322 |
Iran |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
14 |
45 |
92 |
52 |
221 |
Total |
5 |
22 |
16 |
71 |
47 |
111 |
181 |
90 |
543 |
Sources for 1981–87: The Washington Post, 13 October 1987, p. 12, and The New York Times, 10 January 1988, p. E3. (Data from Lloyd’s Shipping Intelligence Unit for 1981-86, and Center for Defense Information for 1986 and 1987.) The two sources differ slightly on the numbers for 1986. Since the publication of last year’s version of this chart (Proceedings, May 1988, p. 31, Table 1), the numbers for 1987 have been revised, adding one attack for each belligerent. Source for 1988: Center for Defense Information, 13 January 1989. Numbers compiled by other sources vary considerably from the numbers presented here. |
Table 2 shows the number of ships attacked by the two sides each month in 1988. The data do not obviously reflect it, but there was a lull in attacks on ships from mid-February into the first week of March. A second quiet period on both sides lasting almost three weeks began in June and ended in early July. In April, Iraq slowed its attacks on shipping but carried out a successful land offensive against Iranian forces occupying Iraqi territory.
Attacker |
Jan. |
Feb. |
Mar. |
Apr. |
May |
June |
July–Aug.* |
Total |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Iraq |
8 |
5 |
6 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
11 |
38 |
Iran |
7 |
7 |
13 |
7 |
5 |
3 |
10 |
52 |
Total |
15 |
12 |
19 |
7 |
12 |
4 |
21 |
90 |
Source: Center for Defense Information, 6 July 1988 and 13 January 1989. *Separate figures for July and August were not available. Cease-fire went into effect 20 August 1988. |
Iraq continued to rely on missile-armed jets for its attacks in 1988. These included not only Mirage F1s armed with Exocets, but also Soviet-designed Badger bombers armed with air-to-surface versions of the much larger Chinese-made Silkworm antiship cruise missile. The range of the Badgers made them particularly useful for attacking targets at the Iranian oil transfer facility at Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq continued to report many of its intended victims as “large naval targets,” suggesting that Iraqi pilots continued to launch some of their missiles from beyond visual range, on the basis of radar data alone.
Iran, meanwhile, continued to employ a mix of speedboats, frigate gunfire, and naval mines to carry out its attacks in 1988. It was thought that Iran tapered off or ended its mining campaign following the September 1987 U. S. attack on and seizure of the Iranian landing craft Iran Ajr, which Iran was using to sow mines. But the mining attack on the Samuel B. Roberts demonstrated otherwise.
In spring 1988, Iran also reportedly began building a new Silkworm launching facility on Abu Musa island near the Strait of Hormuz, and resumed work on other launching facilities on the Iranian side of the Strait. It was reported that upon completing the construction work, Iran would have an ability to fire Silkworms into the Strait with minimal warning time to ships in the area. It was this development that largely prompted the deployment of the Vincennes to the area. (A second reason cited was to respond to increased activity by Iranian fighter planes flying out of Bandar Abbas. This activity was thought to be aimed primarily at defending against Iraqi air attacks. It should also be noted, however, that several weeks earlier, on 2 February, an Iranian F-4 reportedly attacked a tanker near the Strait, apparently using two line-of-sight, air-to-surface missiles, which missed. This was the first reported Iranian fixed-wing air attack on shipping since December 1986.)
U. S. Naval Operations in the Gulf Region in 1988: In the first six weeks of 1988, the threat to U. S. forces in the Gulf that attracted the most attention was the one posed not by Iranian speed boats or mines but by Iraqi pilots. Following the Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31) on 17 May 1987, the U. S. and Iraqi governments worked out procedures to prevent further Iraqi attacks against U. S. ships. By the first of the year, however, it was clear that Iraqi pilots were not always adhering to these procedures. The result was a series of incidents in which Iraqi planes flew alarmingly close to U. S. Navy ships. These incidents came to a head on 12 February, when an Iraqi plane fired two missiles within eight miles of the USS Chandler (DDG-996), which was participating in a U. S. convoy. This action prompted the Defense Department to send a team of officials to Iraq, presumably to get Iraqi pilots to comply better with the previously established procedures.
Iran claimed that on the same day as the Chandler incident, its antiaircraft gunners on Sirri Island drove off several U. S. helicopters that it said were flying ahead of a U. S. convoy near Sirri and Abu Musa islands. The Defense Department said it had no evidence of the incident, but U. S. reporters in the area heard antiaircraft gunfire at about the time in question.
In the second half of February, the U. S. Navy’s presence in the Gulf region was reduced slightly when the USS Okinawa (LPH-3) rotated out of the Gulf without replacement and the battleship Iowa (BB-61) and two escorts similarly departed the Northern Arabian Sea for home without replacement. The Okinawa was serving as the platform for the Navy’s RH-53D Sea Stallion minesweeping helicopters in the Gulf. The helicopters, it was said, were no longer needed, given the arrival several weeks earlier of the Navy’s oceangoing minesweepers (MSOs). The end of the battleship presence in the Northern Arabian Sea was ascribed to both a reduction in the assessed military threat and the almost simultaneous replacement of the USS Midway (CV-41) by the larger and more capable USS Enterprise (CVN-65). It may also have been related to battleship availability: The Navy at the time had only three battleships in commission (the fourth, the USS Wisconsin [BB-64], was commissioned in October 1988), and deploying one of the other two to the area might well have strained battleship operational and personnel tempo.
With the departure of the Okinawa, the Navy was left with a force in the Gulf comprising one command ship, one amphibious transport ship, eight major surface combatants (mostly Oliver Hazard Perry [FFG-7]-class frigates), six MSOs, roughly 14 smaller patrol craft (mostly Mk-III 65-foot patrol boats), and two or three mobile sea bases carrying Marines and special forces personnel. With the departure of the Iowa surface action group, the Navy’s presence in the Northern Arabian Sea was left at one aircraft carrier battle group. This general force level in the Gulf region was maintained for the next several months.
The incident with the Chandler and the U. S. response induced Iraq to suspend its attacks on ships. Iran followed suit. The ensuing calm lasted until the evening of 5 March, when the USS John A. Moore (FFG-19) reportedly fired on some radar contacts believed to be Iranian speed boats moving toward one of the Navy’s mobile sea bases. The targets reportedly disappeared after 20 minutes; there were no reports of casualties.
The next evening, U. S. helicopters flying off the USS Simpson (FFG-56) on a routine reconnaissance mission in the central Gulf reportedly were fired upon by machine guns from an oil platform and several unidentified but presumably Iranian boats. No damage or casualties were reported.
On 14 April, the Samuel B. Roberts steamed into a minefield while on patrol about 65 miles east of Bahrain. The ship struck one of the mines while trying to avoid others. The mine, according to U. S. Navy testimony before Congress, was a 385-pound device; mines found nearby were reportedly made in Iran in 1987. The mine exploded on the port side of the keel by the engine room, reportedly, at about frame 270-275, opening a hole 30 by 23 feet, destroying about 15 feet of keel, shoving the reduction gear off its mounting, and pushing the shaft back about 18 inches. Extensive damage from the explosion and subsequent fire and flooding was inflicted between frames 250 and 292 below the second deck. Ten crewmen were injured, some seriously. In assessing their efforts Rear Admiral George N. Gee, director, Surface Combat Systems Division, commented, “Her crew was able to save the ship and most knowledgeable people would say that we probably should have lost her.”3
After completing initial repairs in Dubai, the Samuel B. Roberts departed the Persian Gulf in early July on board the chartered heavy lift ship Mighty Servant II. She arrived back at her Atlantic-coast home port at the end of the month, sailing the final approach to port on her own. In October, Bath Iron Works began repairs on the Samuel B. Roberts, cutting out the extensively damaged areas and inserting replacement modules up to the second deck. The modules include the engine room and auxiliary machine rooms two and three. Repairs are scheduled to be completed by November 1989.
Upon concluding that Iran laid the mine that damaged the Samuel B. Roberts, the U. S. government ordered a retaliatory attack on Iran’s Sirri and Sassan oil platforms in the southern Gulf.4 This action, carried out on the morning of 18 April, sparked a day-long naval battle in the lower Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz in which U. S. ships and aircraft dodged Iranian missiles and delivered crippling return blows against Iranian ships and boats. (For accounts of the retaliatory action and ensuing naval battle, see “Operation Praying Mantis,” pp. 54–70.)
Apart from being the biggest battle at sea the U. S. Navy has fought since World War II, the 18 April engagement was the first battle at sea in which U. S. naval forces both evaded and fired several guided missiles. It demonstrated that the Standard missile could be used in its less well known surface-to-surface mode (added in the late 1970s) as an effective, quick-draw, supersonic, antiship missile. And it confirmed the reliability and effectiveness in battle of several other modern U. S. weapons.
The battle was noteworthy for other reasons, as well. First, the U. S. attack occurred at almost the same time that Iraqi ground forces were retaking Iraq’s Fao Peninsula, which Iran captured in February 1986. Iran was thus confronted with almost simultaneous major military setbacks on land and at sea. Second, the battle featured at least two instances in which technically impressive U. S. communication links allowed U. S. leaders thousands of miles away in Washington, D.C., to direct part of the course of the fighting on a near real-time basis. In the first
instance, President Ronald Reagan gave permission for an A-6 to attack Iranian Boghammers that it found near the Scan Bay, a Panamanian jack-up barge in the Mubarak oil field with 15 U. S. civilian workers that reported itself under attack. In the second case, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci directed that the attack on the Iranian frigate Sabalan be broken off after the one hit by the Mk-82 laser-guided bomb.
The request to attack the Boghammers reportedly went from the A-6 to President Reagan and back again in just a few minutes, being routed both ways through the Enterprise, the commander of the Joint Task Force Middle East, Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, the Pentagon, and National Security Advisor Colin Powell in the White House. This capability impressed some officials. But the potential that communication links of this kind might one day be used by someone far from the battle to participate in moment-to-moment tactical (as opposed to policy) decisions concerned others.
A final notable aspect of the battle was President Reagan’s approval of the A-6 attack on the Iranian Boghammers found near the Scan Bay. A policy decision was needed from the President on this matter, because, although the Scan Bay had U. S. citizens on board, it was not U. S.-registered, and standing U. S. policy was to extend protection only to U. S.-flag ships. Previously, U. S. naval forces in the Gulf scrupulously adhered to this policy by not intervening in Iranian attacks on non-U. S-flag ships, even when they were in a good position to do so. The President’s mid-battle decision to allow the A-6 attack was the first step taken by the U. S. government to expand the scope of its protective umbrella to include platforms other than U. S.-flag ships.
For several months prior to this, the U. S. government had resisted repeated requests to extend its protective umbrella in this manner. These requests came from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, from U. S. oil shippers with hulls steaming in the Gulf under non-U. S. flags, and from frustrated U. S. Navy ship commanders in the Gulf, who believed they could do more with their forces than protect just U. S.-flag ships, and who had to stand by passively as Iranian units carried out attacks on helpless non-U.S.-flag merchant ships.
On 29 April, the U. S. government formalized the expansion of the U. S. protective umbrella begun by President Reagan’s decision on 18 April. Secretary of Defense Carlucci announced that henceforth:
“Aid will be provided to friendly, innocent, neutral vessels flying a non-belligerent flag outside declared war-exclusion zones that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search by a Persian Gulf belligerent. Following a request from the vessel under attack, assistance will be rendered by a U. S. warship or aircraft if this unit is in the vicinity and its mission permits rendering such assistance.”5
The United States was actually not the first Western country with forces in the Gulf to expand its protective umbrella in this manner; France did so three months earlier. French forces in the Gulf at first provided protection only to French-flag ships. But on 22 December 1987 and 16 January 1988, French ships reportedly stopped attacks on two Liberian-flagged ships by steaming in the direction of the attacking Iranian vessels. And on 20 January 1988, the commander of French forces in the Gulf said that French ships would fire on Iranian gunboats that refused to break off attacks on neutral merchant ships when French ships responded to calls for help. He said other Western governments should adopt a similar policy.
During April, the Reagan administration considered deploying as many as six of the Coast Guard’s 110-foot Island-class patrol boats to the Gulf to aid in shallow-water operations. The plan was originally considered in October 1987 and was rejected at that time by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. It was resurrected, however, because the Island-class patrol boats were seen by some as particularly appropriate for plugging a gap between the Navy’s large warships and its own much smaller patrol craft. But some members of Congress opposed the idea believing that the boats could be better used in drug interdiction operations—then a focus of strong interest. Congress’s apprehension also was fueled by the Defense Department’s then-recent decision to retire 16 of the Brooke (FFG-1)- and Garcia (FF-1040)-class frigates, some of which had supported drug interdiction operations. In announcing the expansion of the U. S. protective umbrella on 29 April, Secretary Carlucci said the administration did not anticipate an increase in U. S. force levels. Three days later, the Defense Department announced that, after reviewing the issue, it had decided that Coast Guard ships were not needed in the Gulf “at this time.”6
Some observers believed the expansion of the U. S. protective umbrella was long overdue. Others were concerned it could increase the frequency of U. S.-Iranian clashes in the Gulf. It wasn’t until several weeks later, on 2 July, that the newly expanded policy reportedly was First employed. That evening, the USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) responded to a distress call from a Danish-flag supertanker under attack by three Iranian speedboats about 13 miles south of Abu Musa Island. When the Elmer Montgomery arrived on scene, two of the speedboats had departed. The U. S. ship fired a warning shot at the third, which then left the area. No injuries or damages were reported.
The Iranian speedboat attack reportedly came hours after an Iraqi attack on two Iranian tankers. This was the first reported Iraqi attack since 10 June and the first reported Iranian speedboat raid since 14 June. The event involving the Elmer Montgomery near the Strait thus ended a brief quiet period in the tanker war. It may also have added tension to the atmosphere in the Strait the next day, when the Vincennes engaged Iranian speedboats that had attacked one of its helicopters and, in the midst of this surface battle, mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655.
As mentioned, the United States sent the Aegis cruiser Vincennes to the Strait largely to counter an emerging Iranian ability to fire Silkworm missiles at ships in the Strait with minimal warning time. The Vincennes was dispatched from San Diego in late April and arrived in the Gulf of Oman on 22 May. It entered the Strait six days later, after Iranian naval units completed an exercise. (For a detailed discussion of the 3 July surface engagement involving the Vincennes and of its attack on the Iranian Airbus, see “The Vincennes Incident,” pp. 72–79.)
On 19 August, the Defense Department released the findings from its investigation of the Vincennes incident. The report concluded that the Aegis air defense system on the Vincennes performed properly in tracking the Iranian airliner’s altitude and in all other respects, but that the system’s information displays might not have given the CIC crew a clear enough picture of available radar data. The mistaken downing of the Airbus, the report determined, resulted primarily from errors committed by CIC crew members under considerable stress generated by the general Gulf operational environment and the surface battle then in progress. Congress accepted the findings of the investigation with relatively little comment.
After 3 July, the Vincennes withdrew from the Strait and rejoined the U. S. Navy carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean. The Vincennes remained outside the Gulf until she rotated home. On 12 July, U. S. Navy ships responded to a distress call from a Panamanian-flag tanker near Iran’s Farsi Island. The ships dispatched helicopters, which located and fired upon two Iranian gunboats.
Six days later, Iran announced that it would join Iraq in accepting U. N. Security Council Resolution 598 as the basis for cease-fire negotiations. Talks ensued, and on 8 August, U. N. Secretary General Perez de Cueller announced that the two sides had reached an agreement. A cease-fire went into effect as scheduled on 20 August, just days before the eighth anniversary of the start of the Iran-Iraq War.
Administration officials reacted cautiously to the ceasefire, stating that U. S. forces would be reduced only after it became clear that the threat to U. S.-flag and other shipping in the Gulf had, in fact, subsided. After observing the situation for a little more than a month, U. S. officials announced on 26 September that formal U. S. convoy operations would soon be suspended. Finally, in December, U. S. naval forces switched to a policy of “accompanying” U. S.-flag ships in the Gulf, operating in a more loose, “zone-defense” fashion akin to the British practice in the region. Soon after, U. S. operations were further downgraded to the simple monitoring of U. S.-flag ships in the Gulf.
After remaining stable for several months, U. S. Navy force levels in the region began to decrease slowly in November. It was expected that the Navy’s presence in the Gulf would be reduced gradually to a pre-Stark incident level—a command ship and four to six combatants. It was anticipated, however, that mine-disposal units might have to remain in the region for several months to clear an estimated 100-200 mines thought to still be in Gulf waters.
A Recap of Gulf Ops, 1987–88—Protection of Ships: U. S. naval forces conducted 136 convoy operations in the Gulf through December 1988. Of the 270 merchant ships escorted, 188 (69.6%) were reflagged Kuwaiti tankers, 60 (22.2%) were U. S. Military Sealift Command ships, 17 (6.3%) were other U. S.-flag ships, and five (1.9%) were non-U. S.-flag ships.7 Table 3 shows, on a monthly basis, the 127 convoys conducted from July 1987 (when the first convoy of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers began) through December 1988.
Month |
Number of Convoys Begun |
Number of Merchant Ships Escorted |
---|---|---|
1987 |
||
July |
1 |
2 |
August |
5 |
13 |
September |
4 |
9 |
October |
4 |
8 |
November |
5 |
16 |
December |
3 |
11 |
1988 |
||
January |
7 |
16 |
February |
7 |
18 |
March |
6 |
10 |
April |
7 |
18 |
May |
6 |
14 |
June |
10 |
16 |
July |
8 |
13 |
August* |
10 |
17 |
September |
7 |
17 |
October |
10 |
19 |
November |
12 |
22 |
December** |
15 |
20 |
Total |
127 |
259 |
Source: Department of Defense, 17 January 1989. * Cease-fire went into effect 20 August 1988. **Data for December include some “accompanying" operations. |
In the earlier months of this period, the convoys usually contained two or three merchant ships. By June 1988, the number of convoys per month increased, and the number of merchant ships in each convoy dropped to less than two on average. About one-third of the convoys were conducted after the 20 August cease-fire. With the exception of the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Bridgeton, which hit a mine during the first convoy operation, no merchant ship was damaged while under U. S. escort. (The reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City was hit on 16 October 1987 by an Iranian Silkworm missile fired from the Fao Peninsula, but this occurred after U. S. Navy ships had dropped off the Sea Isle City in Kuwaiti territorial waters.)
► Monetary Cost: As reported last year, the above-normal cost of U. S. military operations in and around the Gulf (including but not limited to convoy operations) in fiscal year 1987 was $69 million. This expenditure was absorbed by deferring maintenance projects.
The above-normal cost for fiscal year 1988 was originally estimated at about $20 million per month. This estimate, however, was lowered in March 1988 to $10–15 million per month, or $130-150 million per year, to reflect the February reduction in U. S. naval forces in the region; a shift to a greater reliance on sealift (as opposed to much more expensive airlift) for sustaining supplies; and changes in tactics that reduced operational tempos a bit, such as sometimes leaving F-14 Tomcats on deck alert rather than in the air.
As it turned out, above-normal costs for fiscal year 1988 totalled $116 million. Congress in the fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution appropriated an additional $100 million to cover above-normal fiscal year 1988 Gulf-region operational costs. The remaining $16 million was absorbed through cuts in the operations and maintenance account. Above-normal costs for fiscal year 1989 will probably start at less than $10 million per month and then decline from there.
Other costs that could be added to these above-normal operational costs, might include the cost of repairing the Stark and the Samuel B. Roberts, the cost of replacing four helicopters and one EA-6B lost in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in 1987 and 1988, and, perhaps, the cost to repair or replace six aircraft damaged or destroyed in a flight deck accident on board the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) in the Northern Arabian Sea. The cost to repair the Stark, which the Iraqi government agreed to pay shortly after the attack, came to about $90 million. The repair work on the Samuel B. Roberts has been funded at $96 million, but may actually come in at about $60 million. The charter of the Mighty Servant II cost $1.35 million. Had the Stark and the Samuel B. Roberts been lost, replacement ships of the same general design would have cost about $400 million each. The four crashed helicopters—an SH-3 Sea King, UH-1 Huey, AH-1T Cobra, and SH-2 Seasprite— would each cost several million dollars to replace. The current cost of an EA-6B is about $45 million. The six aircraft damaged or destroyed on board the Nimitz—four A-6s, an EA-6B, and a KA-7 Corsair II tanker plane— would cost more than $200 million to replace.
Lastly, the U. S. government’s payment to compensate the families of passengers lost on board Iran Air Flight 655 might also be calculated into the year’s operational costs. This payment could amount to millions or perhaps tens of millions of dollars.
► Opportunity Cost: In addition to monetary cost, there was an opportunity cost associated with expanded U. S. naval operations in the Gulf region. Ships and aircraft sent to the Gulf were not available for duty elsewhere, and ships and aircraft elsewhere had their steaming days and flying hours reduced. Such reductions may have affected the ability of the Navy to carry out exercises, diplomatic port calls, and other planned operations outside the Gulf.
A rule of thumb often used in assessing U. S. Navy deployments is that to maintain one ship on station continuously in a forward position, there must be three of that kind in the Navy’s inventory (the other two being in overhaul, in training, or in transit). But the Gulf region is so far from the United States, and the operating conditions there—including frequent heat, humidity, and windborne sand—are so difficult, that it may require closer to four or five ships in the Navy’s inventory to keep one forward deployed in the region.
The added monetary cost of U. S. Navy operations in the Gulf region can be recovered through supplemental appropriations. The opportunity cost, however, is not as easy to make up. Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, then-Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, touched on the issue in an interview last year. He noted that the U. S. Navy has
“had only 100 or so carrier days in the Norwegian Sea in the last 10 years. That is the harshest operating area in the world. No one there is sitting around in a short-sleeved khaki shirt with zinc oxide on his nose. You have to have the expertise to operate in an environment like that where machines break down, where spare parts usage is high, where in less than a minute it can go from bright sunlight to fog so thick you can’t see the forecastle of a destroyer from the bridge. You have to duck icebergs, and you are flying aircraft from the carrier where every landing in a 90-day period of the winter is a night landing. There are specific skills that go with operating in those kinds of conditions, and the only way to acquire them is to go there and do it. But because of the press of other commitments in other places which were considered at the time to be more important, such as the requirement to be in the Indian Ocean right now, we haven’t been able to get up there as often as we want. That raises issues of wartime readiness.”8
► Human Cost: U. S. operations in the Perisan Gulf in 1987 and 1988 cost 53 U. S. lives. Most of these deaths occurred in the attack on the Stark. Of the 16 other deaths, only two occurred during battle (the two on board the AH-1T lost during the U. S.-Iranian naval clash on 18 April 1988). In addition to the 53 who died, other personnel were wounded, including about 20 on board the Stark and ten on board the Samuel B. Roberts. The master of the Sea Isle City, a U. S. citizen, was blinded during the Silkworm missile attack against his ship on 17 October 1987.
Aside from the casualties, the U. S. deployment to the Persian Gulf took its toll, psychologically and otherwise, on U. S. personnel. The Gulf is farther away from the United States than any other major U. S. Navy area of operations, the weather in the region can be very bad, and there are very few good liberty ports nearby.
The heightened deployments to the Gulf region complicated matters for a Navy trying to meet stated personnel tempo goals of overseas deployments lasting no more than six months, two months nondeployed for every month deployed, and 50% of total time in home port. By carefully managing deployment schedules, the Navy was able to minimize the personnel tempo effects of heightened Gulf operations. According to one Navy Times report,
“More than 80 percent of Navy ships and aircraft squadrons spent at least half the year in homeport, about the same percentage as 1987. This is up from 67 percent reported in 1985. Only one ship surpassed the Navy’s limit on six-month deployments, the dock landing ship Mount Vernon [LSD-39], which spent 6½ months supporting minesweepers in the [Persian] gulf. Five ships and seven staffs missed the Navy’s goal for [the] turn-around rate between deployments.”9
Broader Benefits: In addition to the near-perfect record on protecting escorted ships, U. S. military operations in the Gulf region in 1987-88 helped accomplish two major U. S. national security and foreign policy objectives:
► They helped bring the Iran-Iraq War to an end without either side achieving a victory that could form the basis for further destabilizing aggression or coercion in the region.
► They helped restore U. S. credibility with the Gulf Arab states, whose faith in the United States was shaken by the revelation in November 1986 of U. S. arms sales to Iran.
In addition, U. S. Gulf operations generated a wealth of important operational knowledge and experience for U. S. forces working in the Persian Gulf/Northem Arabian sea environment; in carrying out extended contingency operations in overseas regions with limited local base assets in a cramped, littoral body of water filled with a mix of civilian and military surface and air traffic; in defending against attack from irregular, light naval forces; and in damage control. The operation also reportedly promoted U. S. efforts to secure better base access in the Gulf region for the future. Insofar as future U. S. military operations may focus more on Third World contingencies, this knowledge and experience may one day prove valuable, indeed.
1. Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1988, pp. 30–34.
2. Hearings on Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Part 1, p. 187. Of 230 Iraqi attacks recorded by Central Command from 1984 through 11 March 1988, 54 were rated as having destroyed or heavily damaged their targets; the Figures for Iranian attacks were 16 of 164.
3. Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989 before the subcommittee on defense of the House Appropriations Committee, Part six, p. 185.
4. The summary facts on the 18 April 1988 naval battle are based on RAdm. Gee’s testimony cited in footnote three, pp. 185–86, and on press reports.
5. George C. Wilson, “U. S. Role in Gulf Expands,” The Washington Post, 30 April 1988, p. A1.
6. See Robert E. Korroch, “Calling Cutters to the Gulf,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1988, pp. 58-61; and Pat Towell, “House Quiet on Wider Role in Persian Gulf . . . But Not on Diverting Coast Guard Boats,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review, 7 May 1988, pp. 1,214–15.
7. Source: Department of Defense, 17 January 1989.
8. “An Infinite Number of Hypotheses’—and a Finite Fleet”; Interview with VAdm. Henry C. Mustin, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy & Operations, Sea Power, June 1988, p. 18.
9. “Budget squeeze ruled 1988,” Navy Times, 2 January 1989, p. 6.