This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
We cannot maintain our commitments in other areas of the world with fewer than 15 deployable carriers. Fiscal austerity must not be allowed to weaken the force structure that supports our national strategy of forward-based coalition defense.
For more than 40 years, the national military strategy has successfully underwritten worldwide security and stability. Today, while that strategy remains unchanged, acquiring the means to execute it faces rigorous review and challenge. The new administration is faced w*th difficult choices driven by a dynamic threat, compet- lng national priorities, and restricted fiscal resources. As ne administration formulates defense policy and makes Programmatic decisions, our military leadership can assist y forcefully articulating the strategy and its supporting 'nvestment plans and programs.
Given the uncertainty of future alliances and associated and-basing rights, and the resolve to maintain our de- enses forward and away from our shores, a strong Navy is essential to our national security strategy. In recent years, he Navy and Marine Corps have usually been selected to ^esP°nd to crises that required the use of military force, 'nee 1946, 80% of such responses were tasked primarily to these two services, because maritime forces offer a de- §ree of flexibility no other national asset can provide.
They can easily be sized to match a specific threat or counterforce. They can make their presence known, then sail away across the horizon when tensions subside.
We currently have and need to maintain the capability to deter and, if necessary, prevail in any conflict involving U. S. interests, whether it is a low-intensity one (e.g., combating state-sponsored terrorism), maintaining freedom of the seas (e.g., the Persian Gulf), or fighting an all-out war with any adversary. As an island nation, we need freedom of the seas for our security and economic well being.
The world has become increasingly interdependent, multipolar, and militarized over the last 40 years. Today, we are confronted by innovative initiatives that seem to portend a revision of geostrategic goals, as the Soviets restructure military forces and amend long-standing political objectives. These initiatives are accompanied by a comprehensive Soviet naval arms control agenda, which seeks to “capture” or restrict our conventional deterrent capabilities without a commensurate reduction in Soviet
—
offensive capability. In addition, during the past several decades, our nation’s overseas base structure has shrunk from some 2,000 bases worldwide to less than 800, often in response to host-nation initiatives. At the same time, the threat of global war is accompanied by an increase in the potential for lower level conflicts involving highly capable modern weapons. The combined effect of these two factors—basing limitations and the need for long- range power projection in defense of our interests abroad— is likely to place an ever-greater premium on the availability of flexible, mobile naval forces.
Concurrent with the world’s changing political makeup, the face of naval warfare has changed dramatically. We have moved from short-range engagements, often controlled with strictly visual sensors, to weapon engagements 1,000 miles or more from our battle forces, with electronic means providing the only evidence of action.
From this perspective, we maintain and shape our Navy of the future. We must proceed cautiously in implementing fiscal savings, to avoid weakening the force structure directly supporting our national strategy of forward-based, coalition defense. To execute the U. S. Navy’s missions of strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and strategic sealift across the entire range of possible threats, we require high-quality, capable forces. If we are not prudent in developing and maintaining these forces, our ability to deter global war and to accomplish national objectives successfully may lessen.
Security Environment: The trends in the future security environment suggest changes in the way we use our maritime forces to meet national security commitments. Today, we meet those commitments through a policy of flexible response that satisfies our forward deployment and surge readiness needs while fulfilling our alliance and treaty obligations. Working within the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) process, we have taken advantage of the inherent flexibility of naval forces to fulfill national tasking outside the NATO Guidelines Area. If, as a matter of NATO policy, U. S. land-based forces in Europe were reduced in the future, our naval forces—naval air forces in particular—would be even more in demand to counter Soviet forces along the boundary areas. Such a drawdown in forward-based posture, even with an accompanying Soviet withdrawal, would incur additional risk and force greater reliance on allied capabilities, because the Soviet Union would still be able to reconstitute its massive land- based forces more rapidly than the Alliance could.
Restructuring the land force balance in the European Theater raises the strong possibility that our naval commitment to NATO will grow in importance—both to provide the necessary response to tension or crisis in Europe and to continue cementing the Alliance’s maritime strength. At the same time, such competing peacetime requirements as contingency operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercises, and drug interdiction duties will have an increasing impact on our naval operating units and on the shore establishment.
Reducing the existing force structure without a concomitant reduction in our worldwide commitments will inevitably lead to a repetition of the descending readiness spiral of the 1970s. During that time, the high-value men and women who manned the fleet were so overextended that they departed in record numbers. At the same time, ships and aircraft were allowed to deteriorate to unsafe levels of readiness. We are, therefore, presented with a hard choice: either maintain adequate naval force levels to meet forward-deployed presence commitments, or selectively abandon them.
Force Levels—the Reality: Today’s force structure and operating tempos make it difficult to maintain adequate levels of responsiveness. Remaining within current guidelines for number of days under way, number of days in home port during non-deployed periods, the length of time between deployments, and six-month overseas deployments, the Navy cannot continuously maintain the desired number of forward-deployed carrier battle groups (CVBGs). More than 15 deployable CVBGs would be required to meet fully our current commitments in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean. During the past decade, successive administrations have studied our carrier force level requirements in every conceivable budget scenario. The unalterable reality is that we cannot maintain a totally adequate war-fighting presence and force in every area of the globe which requires our interests and commitments with fewer than 15 deployable carriers (CVs). Throughout future service life extension program and CV nuclear refueling overhaul periods, we will continue to compensate for our shortfall in CVs by reducing our CV commitment in the Mediterranean or by easing the Indian Ocean requirement and scheduling battleship battle group deployments as gapfillers.
The relationship between CV force levels, overseas commitments to vital national interests, and the amount of time away from home port is a straightforward equation. If commitments do not significantly change—which is unlikely since deployed CV battle groups signify vital national interests—and force levels do not achieve minimum requirements, the only solution is unsatisfactory: increase the burden on our sailors and our current inventory of ships and aircraft by keeping them deployed longer and reducing their time in home port.
Fiscal Environment: Future budget reductions portend changes to our existing force structure and readiness. As a result of the 1988 budget submission, the Department of the Navy submitted an amended fiscal year 1989 budge1 which, after normalizing for the two aircraft carriers in fiscal year 1988, included a reduction of $11.6 billion from the fiscal year 1988 budget, a decrease of 3% Real Program Growth (RPG). The Navy is just now beginning to execute the fiscal year 1989 budget. In the coming fiscal year, we will draw on the operations and maintenance accounts, which are funded to about fiscal year 1982 funding levels, to support today’s more robust force. The fiscal year 1990-91 Navy budget effectively represents less than 1% RPG from the fiscal year 1989 appropriations level-
Consequently, the starting point for future reductions reflects currently austere funding levels. A zero growth budget in fiscal year 1990 and onward requires cutting an
additional $37.9 billion in programmed funding over the five-year defense program period with a $3.5 billion cut from fiscal year 1990, increasing to a $12.5 billion cut in fiscal year 1994. These decrements cannot be accommodated without impact. The financial flexibility we once had is gone. There is no latitude to fund competing warfare or support options. Efficiencies and economies have already yielded their greatest return. A continued trend of no real program growth, despite an expanding threat, will require difficult decisions on production, development, and deployment of systems we still need to put on line.
As the result of the Amended Budget Submission and the fiscal year 1990-91 budget, we may not achieve the 600-ship force structure in the next few years. In addition, the shore infrastructure required to give the ships we do have at sea the best possible support has not been funded
° the extent originally deemed desirable. Nevertheless, e need for an active, ready, and responsive Navy com- P°sed of 15 CBVGs, four battleship battle groups, and the I'ttendant forces to support them remains a national policy
'Operative.
, ^orce Structure: Any fundamental decisions made on
e way to absorb zero or negative RPG revolve princi-
PdllY around readiness levels, force structure, and the de-
hree of force modernization desired. The remaining pro-
§rarn will flow from these basic decisions. Maintaining a
rger force can be counterbalanced by decreasing the
. °dernization of older ships but this would increase the risk frv r
^ 'or a portion of the force. This risk would be offset by
^continued investment in top-of-the-line platforms. Another proposal would lower the readiness posture for Portion of the fleet or decrease the size of forward- Ployed battle forces. But it would also significantly inease the risk to mission fulfillment and national security.
In principle, a reduction in the threat against which our force structure requirements are predicated could ease requirements pressure. In reality, without positive verification of the reduced threat and the assurance, in each instance, that we are dealing with the threat’s actual capability and not its stated intent, premature self-imposed reductions in readiness are not prudent.
In addition, the rapid proliferation of high technology weapons throughout the world means we must fully equip ships against the full threat spectrum to maximize their survivability and minimize the possibility that they might be subjected to a “cheap kill.” For those ships that cannot be so equipped, we should, as we have done in the past, employ them selectively, prudently assessing the threat against which they will be matched. If we determine they should not be so employed, we should consider assigning them to the reserve force or retire them.
Manpower: Manpower remains our most critical area. We must maintain sufficient end strength and quality to support our force levels and capabilities. Military manpower costs account for more than 22% of the Navy’s annual budget. Therefore, any substantial decrease in our resources would, almost of necessity, require a reduction in manpower. This would result in lower manning levels and less-ready ships and aircraft squadrons, or a smaller overall force. At the same time, any redefinition or reorganization of the reserves to increase their utility/peacetime importance should not occur without new legislation to improve access to reserve forces in time of national need. In any case, readiness for day-to-day missions would decline. Retaining quality active-duty manpower is vital to ensure the capability of tomorrow’s Navy. High-quality manpower incentives and retention initiatives have proven cost-effective, providing substantial savings in training and retraining.
Modernization: In a stringent fiscal climate, force modernization plans must be carefully tailored to match the most likely threat. In actual practice, fleet commanders have chosen to control or moderate the degree of risk individual ships and aircraft face by carefully tailoring battle group composition. As we consider the complex equation of a sophisticated threat versus modernization versus new construction, there are no easy answers. The decision to approve or forgo modernization must be made on a case- by-case basis, without delusion. If we delay or reduce modernization of our existing forces, while simultaneously reducing procurement of a replacement force structure, the Navy will not be able to keep pace with the threat and will lose its value as an instrument of national policy.
Science and Technology—Our Future: Research, development, test, and evaluation investment decisions we make today will determine the capability and utility of tomorrow’s Navy. We must fight to preserve and, if possible, increase our investment in science, research, and development. It is our seedcorn for the future. To ensure that we use our science and technology investment dollars to greatest effect, we are developing a carefully elaborated
plan that will identify key technology initiatives and provide a broad developmental roadmap to track those initiatives from concept to fleet introduction. The 1990s hold the promise of revolutionary technical progress in low observables, information management, beam weapons, electrical drive, and sophisticated munitions, which will begin to change the face of naval warfare. We must lead this change.
Conclusion: In an era when our continued free access to a limited number of overseas bases is periodically called into question, when the proliferation of high technology weapons increases the likelihood of conflict involving U. S. interests, and when political factors beyond our control may constrain the availability of other U. S. forces, our policy goals are clear. We must ensure that we have the means and the readiness to respond to any challenge across the entire spectrum of crisis or conflict. But how
can we achieve those goals in the future if we are currently unable to maintain desired levels of excellence in readiness, sustainability, and force structure?
Readiness results from a number of factors: the instantaneous state of training; the level of our ordnance magazines; the material condition of our engineering plants and weapons systems; and ample opportunities to exercise all of those capabilities together at sea. Over the past several years, we have developed innovative means, such as dockside trainers, to maintain high degrees of readiness while keeping costs in check. We must do more, but we can only cut back so far before safety of flight and the dangers of the sea increase to unacceptable levels.
Sustainability is equally necessary. Yet we cannot have it without providing funding for the conventional ammunition, fuel, and critical spare parts to ensure that we can go wherever required, stay as long as needed, and have the ordnance to deliver on target if necessary. It was required in the Persian Gulf during April 1988. We were not given advance notice of that requirement. Yet the required elements were on hand to support national policy and to defend our forces. They must be so in the future.
Force structure for tomorrow is paramount. The self- imposed reductions of the early 1970s taught us a lesson. In Afghanistan, in our own hemisphere, in the Horn of Africa, and in the volatile Middle East, weakness became an invitation to adventurism. Our sailors at sea paid the price, meeting the nation’s commitments despite the personal cost or risk. For many, the cost was too great. They took their expertise and professionalism into the civilian economy, leaving us to train replacements at much greater cost. Appropriate force structure is the sine qua non of sea power.
We must consider short-term versus long-term aspects of the ways we leverage our defense dollars. For example, 1950s funding decisions to build the USS Saratoga (CV- 60), which we still operate, and Wheelus Air Force Base, which Colonel Moammar Gadhafi now operates, illustrates the impact that forces beyond our control can have on long-term security investments. In the postwar era, this nation’s naval forces have borne a disproportionate share of the front-line tasking each successive president has been called upon to direct. Our country needs a strong Navy, and that need is unlikely to diminish anytime soon-
A precipitate rush to dismantle naval forces because of premature optimism over the presumed evolution of the global balance of power could be a most costly misreading of history. Stable funding, provided by the Congress on the basis of a close working relationship with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense, will enable us to attain necessary programmed growth. Such a prudent level of funding is affordable and will allow us to maintain the current operational tempo, procurement, and future development. It offers the best prospect that today’s highly trained, responsive naval forces will be available in the future as they so often have been in the past to the President and to our nation’s leaders.
Admiral Trost is the Chief of Naval Operations. A 34-year member of the U. S. Naval Institute, he also is president of the organization.