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Yes, there will be a U.S. Navy fleet tommorow. But after a Bottom-Up Review from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it will be decidedly slimmer and trimmer. Compared to the other services, however, the Navy came out of this round fairly well.
The aftershocks from President Bill Clinton’s “mandate for change” continued to reverberate throughout the defense and national security arenas into 1994. Only with the release in early September 1993 of the Bottom-Up Review results from the Secretary of Defense did the broad outlines of the post-Cold War military become known.1 Even so, many observers charged that the review had not gone far enough in restructuring the U.S. Armed Forces and that it amounted to little more than a scaled-down Cold-War military, while others remained unconvinced about the President’s pledge voiced during his inaugural address to keep the U.S. military the best-trained, best-equipped, best-prepared fighting force in the world.
All things considered, the Navy Department emerged with its most valued plans and programs largely intact.2 The combination of a well-articulated and forcefully presented strategy, “. . .From the Sea,” coupled with an almost ruthless internal program of “right-sizing” and “recapitalizing” the Navy for the future, set the framework and foundation for tomorrow’s fleet.
Bottoms Up?
The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review was to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure required to support the nation’s armed forces in the post- Cold War era. A benchmark “nearly simultaneous, two-major regional conflict (MRC)” scenario involving Persian Gulf and Korean conflicts helped identify building blocks of Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps forces needed for joint and combined operations. (Sorry,
By Scott C. Truver
Coast Guard. You’re not a key player in the calculus . . . except perhaps for the admission in the 1994 edition of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Force 2001 publication that “the Navy is working closely with the U.S. Coast Guard to better incorporate Coast Guard resources and special competencies into the nation’s naval force structure.”) Peace enforcement and crisis-intervention operations were also included as increasingly important missions that required additional shaping and sizing of forces. Finally, the review concluded that a critically important final set of requirements—forward presence in pivotal world regions—can impose demands for naval forces, particularly aircraft carriers, that exceed those needed to win two such regional conflicts.
Notwithstanding Secretary of Defense William Perry’s commitment to a strong military and defense industrial base, the future of the nation’s armed forces may yet be thrown into disarray.’ The two “nearly simultaneous” conflicts probably will be discarded in the next round of bot- tom-up or top-down reviews.4 And the fiscal year 1994 congressionally mandated “roles and missions” study probably will reopen wounds not yet healed since the last roles-and-missions study was sent to Congress in February 1993, especially between Navy and Air Force proponents of “on-call” air power.5 In an 18 February 1994 speech to an Air Force Association Symposium, for example, Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak directly—albeit without explicit reference to the U.S. Navy—challenged naval strategy, plans, and programs by asserting that “air and space power [read ‘the U.S. Air Force’] holds title on our ability to fight abroad.”6
The fiscal years 1995-1999 Future Years Defense Program outlined in the January 1994 Annual Report to the President and the Congress from the Secretary of Defense continues the decrease in real purchasing power that began in fiscal year 1986. Indeed, in the ten years to the proposed fiscal year 1995 program, DoD top-line budget authority has endured a negative growth of more than 35% as measured in fiscal year 1995 constant dollars, from $390.5 billion in 1985 to $252.2 billion in fiscal year 1995. When projections to fiscal year 1999 are included, the cumulative real decline will be 42%. And as a share of the U.S. Gross
Tomorrow’s Fleet: Part I
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Domestic Product, defense spending wi1 be reduced from slightly more than 6C in 1985 to less than 3% in 1999, whd the administration estimates it will ne& $253 billion in Defense budget author ity.7 This has been a serious concert c within the U.S. defense industry, whid' ^ is bracing itself for some 1 million to ■ million jobs lost—800,000 in the elec (' tronics industry alone—as a result oi DoD downsizing.8
Of the $252.2 billion requested for 1 1995, $43.3 billion is for procurement 4 a decrease of $1.2 billion compared tc J 1994 funding; research-and-developmed' accounts will receive $36.2 billion, aborU ' the same amount as last year; and open I ations and maintenance would increase [ by 5.6%, or $4.9 billion more than in fiscal year 1994. The threat of a hollow mil- ■ itary is being taken seriously, especiall) as congressional hawks led by $enatoi John McCain (R-AZ) continue to warn of the dangers. In a July 1993 report- for example, McCain cautioned “that readiness is beginning to evaporate. In spite of the efforts of our services, we are going hollow. We are losing the combat readiness and edge that is an essential aspect of deterrence, defense, and the ability to repel aggression.”5 This perception was underscored in early 1994 congressional testimony, as Rear Admiral James Prout, III, admitted: “As the Navy’s topline comes down, and the various components struggle to live within shrinking budgets, we occasionally find ourselves robbing Peter to save Paul.”10
Despite its relative good fortunes in
1994- 1995, the Navy should expect stormy weather in the years ahead, it for no other reason than the ultimate costs of its “recapitalization.” According to then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso, the Navy confronts a $3.5 billion annual shortfall for the fiscal year
1995- 1999 shipbuilding and aircraft procurement programs alone, and justification for even that agenda is daunting.11
As a result of the continuing budget adjustments and anticipated restructuring throughout the rest of the decade, the Navy Department is planning for a force structure comprising:
> 11 active and 1 reserve/training large- deck aircraft carriers
> 10 active and 1 reserve carrier air wings
> 12 active and 9 reserve maritime patrol (P-3) squadrons
l’rocmlinHs/Junc11994
► 110-116 multimission surface warfare combatants
► 42 amphibious ships providing lift capacity for 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades
► 26 mine countermeasures (MCM) ships and one MCM command-control-support ship
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► 43 combat logistics force and 22 aux- iliary/support ships
► 18 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines
► 55 nuclear-powered attack submarines
► 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces, including one based in Japan (with 3 air wings)
► 1 reserve Marine Expeditionary Force (with air wing)
From the late-1980s’ Cold War Navy force structure, comprising 15 carrier battle groups, three Marine Expeditionary Forces, 566 battle force ships, 5,400 aircraft, and 782,000 people in uniform, by the end of the decade the President will have at his disposal 11 “Naval Expeditionary Forces” (NEFs—a new acronym that might not always include “aircraft carrier”), 11 amphibious ready groups, and three Marine Expeditionary Forces—330 ships, 3,700 aircraft, and 568,000 people.12
To get there from here will require a significant increase in decommissionings of current ships, some of which clearly have significant service life remaining but which either cannot be afforded or do not make operational sense in today’s littoral warfare environment: 65 surface warships, 13 nuclear-powered attack and ballistic- missile submarines, and 35 aircraft squadrons will leave the fleet in fiscal year 1994 alone. From fiscal year 1991 through 1994, the Navy will decommission 203 surface ships, more than the 1994 active surface forces of the Japanese, French, and Royal navies combined.
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As outlined in the Department of the Navy 1994 Posture Statement released in late February, the total Navy program estimates of $77.5 billion in fiscal year 1994 and $78.6 billion requested for fiscal year 1995 represent about an 11.5% decrease in buying power compared to the $85 billion appropriated in fiscal year 1993. For Navy shipbuilding and conversion accounts, the near-term future looks grim. The fiscal years 1995-1999 plan requires an average of about $6.4 billion in annual appropriations, and the “future years requirement” beyond 1999 calls for about $8.4 billion per year. The fiscal year 1995 program for four new
ships, two conversions, and a nuclear refueling and complex overhaul will cost approximately $5,586 billion:
> CVN-76 | $2,447 billion |
► DDG-51 (3 ships) | $2,698 billion |
► AE (conversion) | $0,031 billion |
► AFS (conversion) | $0,023 billion |
► Nuclear Carrier RF/COH | $0,038 billion |
► Other costs | $0,349 billion |
Future years’ shipbuilding and conversion will reportedly see three Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-missile destroyers per year, the third Seawolf (SSN-21)-class nuclear-powered attack submarine requested in fiscal year 1996 and the first unit of the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) requested two years later, the lead unit of a new amphibious transport dock ship class (LX/LPD-17) in
1996 with two more requested in 1998 and another two in 1999, one ocean surveillance ship (T-AGOS) in fiscal year
1997 and a second in 1999, and a “miscellaneous command ship” in 1999: 26 new ships.
Aircraft, weapons, and other acquisition programs will be similarly constrained, although Navy research-and-de-
velopment will enjoy some modest growth. Aircraft accounts will decrease to $4,786 billion in fiscal year 1995 compared to $5,565 billion one year ago, when the Navy bought 100 aircraft. Only 56 aircraft have been requested for fiscal year 1995. The fiscal year 1995 program requests $2.4 billion for Navy weapons.
a decrease of $500 million compared to last year. The weapons account, however, should increase in the future, as increased buys of the advanced medium-range air- to-air missile are proposed and the Navy requests the initial acquisition of the joint standoff weapon. Total Navy research- and-development was proposed to increase from $8,301 billion in fiscal year 1994 to $8,935 billion in 1995, with the greatest decrease coming in undersea warfare programs—perhaps reflecting what President Clinton described as a budget “stripped of Cold-War relics”—and operational assistance elements. The Defense Department set 1995 funding for the new attack submarine to be requested in 1998 at $507 million, but other submarine and undersea warfare programs endured significant cuts.
Carriers and Aircraft
Two nuclear-powered carriers are currently under construction at Virginia’s Newport News Shipbuilding: the John C. Stennis (CVN-74), expected to join the fleet in fiscal year 1996, and the United States (CVN-75), to be delivered in fiscal year 1998. The Navy requested full
COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR
4
Proceedings/June 1994
Carriers
OSS Saratoga (CV 60)
USS Independence (CV 62) USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) USS Constellation (CV 64) USS Inter prist- (CVN 65) USS America (CV 66)
USS J. F. Kennedy iCV 67] USS Nimitl (CVN 681 USS Fisenhowet (CVN 6V) USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) USS Roosevelt (CVN 71) USS Lincoln (CVN 72)
USS Washington (CVN 73) USS J.C. Stennis (CVN 74| USS United States (CVN 75) CVN 76 |
CV/? 77 I CV/? 78 T Total CV/ CVN
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Carrier force projections indicate a constant complement of 12 or 11 active +1 reserve/ training. If construction of the CVN-76 is impeded, the Navy will have reached a bottleneck from which it will be hard to navigate.
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 01 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
12 12 12 12 12 17 17 17 17 17 1 7 |l 7 17 17 I 7 JI 7 11 711 7 (1 7 11 7 12 12
89
funding of the CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995; the Navy received $832 million long-lead funding in fiscal year 1993. Last year Congress appropriated $1.2 billion for the strategic sealift fund but then granted (albeit without prior congressional authorization) the Navy the ability to transfer the funds to the ship con-
As the island swung over the flight deck of the John C. Stennis (CVN-74) the future of the entire Navy carrier program was under a cloud. Some in Congress say the nation does not need carriers when large-deck amphibious ships, which can handle helicopters and Harriers, will do.
struction account for CVN-76 advance procurement.13 If this goes forward— and the fiscal year 1995 request of $2,447 billion assumes it will—the Navy will gamer greater efficiencies in production, reducing the total cost for the next nuclear-powered carrier ship by some $200 to $300 million, compared to the original $4.5 billion sticker price.14 Still, the CVN-76 accounts for about 42% of the ship construction funds requested in fiscal year 1995, which prompted the House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA), in late February to question the need for the ship: “There is serious doubt whether the muscular naval battle groups bought for the Cold War—centered around nuclear aircraft carriers—are necessary or even appropriate for many of these [post-Cold War] missions.” The Congressional Research Service also weighed into the debate, suggesting in a January 1994 report, “Military Preparedness: Principles Compared with U.S. Practices,” that the Navy should consider using large-deck amphibious ships embarking AV-8B Harriers as substitutes for carriers.'3
A delay or rejection altogether of the CVN-76 will create a significant bottleneck in carrier construction during the early years of the next century, as the Navy confronts the challenge of replacing six oil-fired carriers with new ships. For example, long-lead funding of $1,015 billion was to be requested in fiscal year 1999 for a tenth Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carrier, the CVN-77, with balance funding coming in fiscal year 2001 for a 2007 commissioning. But the Bottom-Up Review concluded that advance procurement for the CVN-77 will be deferred until after fiscal 1999, pending completion of a study evaluating alternative carrier concepts for the 21st century.
The Navy will request about $1.5 billion per year during fiscal years 1995- 1999 for the nuclear refueling and complex overhaul of existing nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The Nimitz herself will begin this process at Newport News Shipbuilding following the completion of the refueling and overhaul of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). Many of the ship’s older weapon systems and equipment will also be replaced with systems now going in the new-construction ships. This will give the Nimitz, which was commissioned in 1975, more than 20 years of additional
service life. The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), commissioned in 1977, will follow in a program intended to sustain a critical core capability of nuclear- powered large-deck aircraft carriers well into the next century.
During the mid-1980s, the United States labored to maintain a “minimum essential” force of 15 large-deck carriers (one of which was undergoing an extended service life extension overhaul and not considered deployable)—although more than 20 carrier battle groups were required to execute operational plans at low risk levels in a global conflict with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. Since then, force levels for all elements of the U.S. military have been reassessed, taking into account the dramatically changed international environment, the potentials for regional crises, and U.S. budget constraints. By mid-1994 the United States will have a force of 12 active aircraft carriers, with one to be focused on meeting training requirements but ready—so the Navy claims—to surge to a crisis.
The Bottom-Up Review assessed nine aircraft carrier program options—three different modernization programs supporting three force-level objectives— within the context of war-fighting and forward presence requirements. Although rumors throughout 1993 warned that carrier force levels of eight or fewer ships were being studied, the Bottom-Up Review actually addressed the capabilities of 12, 11, and 10 carriers to satisfy national needs. Interestingly, the ten-carrier force (including two carriers in overhaul) could meet the war-fighting requirements of two “nearly simultane
ous” major regional conflicts but was inadequate to satisfy other important less- than-war tasks. Peacetime forward-presence and crisis-response needs and training requirements drove the 11-plus-1-car-1 rier solution.
The Bottom-Up Review’s analysts recognized, however, that the affordable force of 12 carriers cannot meet the Cold- War continuous-presence goal in three world regions, a requirement that drove the previous 15-carrier force-level objective. In March 1993, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, implemented a global naval presence policy of flexible presence that recognized the inevitability of carrier gaps and the need for other naval expeditionary forces to complement the carriers. By permitting carrier forces to be within a week or so of a potential crisis spot or traditional deployment region (what General Powell dubbed the “tether policy”), the Navy reduced the required number of carrier battle groups from 15 to 12. Navy and DoD analyses have shown, however, that a reduced force will not meet the presence, crisis-response, and war-fighting needs of the commanders-in-chief, and would result in a significant decrease in what is described as “continuous/flex- ible presence” in the three principal areas of responsibility, which in turn is driving initiatives for innovative uses of other naval forces—as well as Army and Air Force units—to fill the carrier gaps in forward-area deployment rotations.16
90
Proceedings/June 1994
These war-fighting and peacetime requirements must be met, however, within the constraints of an austere fiscal environment that is affecting all elements of government today. Considering all ele-
ments of the equation, the Navy has decided to dedicate one of the 12 aircraft carriers, the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), as an operational reserve/train- ing carrier. Eventually to be homeported in Mayport, Florida, the John F. Kennedy will serve as a training carrier and a ready-asset, surge-carrier for deployments and short-notice crisis response when she completes her complex overhaul at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
The Navy has also structured an aircraft modernization and investment program that senior naval aviators note will replace an aging inventory and meet the needs of future roles and missions in a cost-efficient manner.17 One important goal is to reduce the number of different types of aircraft on board future carriers, especially aircraft with a principal mission of putting ordnance on target. Instead of the three strike aircraft types in the fleet today, the Navy intends the multimission F/A-18E/F Advanced Hornet and the F-14 “Tactical Strike Fighter” (more colloquially known as the “Bomb- cat”) to be its prime power-projection aircraft until the joint advanced strike technology (JAST) initiative bears fruit, sometime after the turn of the century.
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The all-weather A-6 Intruder attack aircraft entered operational service in 1962—with the average age in 1994 being about 22 years. The F-14 Tomcat fleet air defense fighter entered the scene in 1973, making the F-14 inventory average 13 years of age. Both aircraft have received upgrades, but naval aviation officials note that available technology permits even more impressive capabilities for the fleet. The Navy will phase out the A-6 aircraft by 1997, and the F-14 will be upgraded to include a strike capability, at a total cost of about $1.5 billion for 210 aircraft. These aircraft will receive forward-looking, in- frared/laser designator pods, integrated inertial navigation/Global Positioning System installations, a night-vision capability, improved displays, and a high- resolution ground mapping radar, enabling the Bombcat to use “dumb” and “smart” weapons in air-to-ground missions.
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One important goal is to reduce the number of different types of aircraft, especially aircraft with a principal mission of putting ordnance on target.
The Navy argues that the F/A-18C/D Hornet has demonstrated both tactical excellence and superb reliability as a multimission strike fighter, but admits that it has a constrained mission radius, limited endurance, and lack of growth potential for future systems. The Advanced Hornet, the F/A-18E/F, will capitalize on more than 20 years of design and operational experience and the unquestioned success of the basic F/A-18 airframe, replacing the aging F/A-18C/Ds begin
ning in the first decade of the next century. The Navy’s program for the Advanced Hornet ensures common avionics and software with the F/A-18C/D variants, and takes advantage of an efficient in-place support infrastructure. When it reaches the fleet in 1998, the F/A-18E/F promises 35% more range, 80% increased endurance, and a 300% enhancement to ordnance and fuel bring-back capability, while preserving a margin for growth in capabilities to meet operational needs.18
The realities of the budget and uncertainties regarding need killed the high- tech A/FX in 1993, and the Navy is now working closely with the Air Force on the F-22 and JAST programs.'1' According to Rear Admiral Brent Bennitt, Director Air Warfare (N88), technologies developed under this initiative could be incorporated into requirements documents for both services as early as 1997. The program’s goal today, however, is to guide the development of common subsystems that would be needed by a new generation of affordable multirole tactical aircraft, perhaps to replace the Navy’s A-6 and the Air Force’s F-l 11 and F-l 17
aircraft. Other Navy aviation planners have indicated that such a future “joint” aircraft might be available between 2005 and 2010 (perhaps even with Royal Navy support), while a joint Navy-Marine Corps demonstration project will pursue advanced short take-off and vertical-landing designs to address a lightweight, affordable aircraft to meet future sea- and land-based tactical requirements.
These programs will support the Navy’s restructured air wings, which will be reduced from 60 to 50 offensive/tac- tical aircraft per wing. Naval aviation will continue to support such initiatives as the integration of special-purpose Marine air- ground task forces on board carriers, as tested during summer 1993 by the integration of fixed- and rotary-wing Marine Corps aircraft and 600 troops on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). Similarly, today’s naval aviation “vision” encompasses broad support to a joint family of standoff weapons, including the joint direct attack munition, the joint standoff weapon, and the triservice standoff attack missile. “Brilliant” weapons technologies will also be pursued with the other services, to ensure near-single-
shot kill probabilities.
Beyond the still-uncertain V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and the apparently moribund program for upgrading the LAMPS Mk III SH-60B/F helicopters to the SH-60R configuration, the Navy’s programs for rotary-wing aircraft look bleak, indeed: only the Marines’ AH-1W Cobra attack helicopter will remain in production through fiscal year 1997.
Although firmly endorsing the construction of the CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995, the Bottom-Up Review put mid- and far-term future carrier acquisition plans in limbo, pending the result of a carrier alternatives study. The Director Air Warfare (N88) in late 1993 undertook a two-month study of possibilities for future tactical aviation-capable ships and other sea-basing concepts. The future sea-based air platforms study group linked the Navy’s strategy, policy, resources, requirements, research-and-de- velopment, and acquisition activities, the offices of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, representatives from the office of the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Advanced Research and Development Agency, and industry. The group reviewed numerous previous studies and analyses related to aircraft carrier design and operations, placing this audit within the context of current national security strategy and defense planning guidance and projections of future concepts of operations and threats.
The Navy plans for a two-year analysis, assessment, and research- and-development program that will address a wide range of ideas and alternatives for sea-basing concepts and tactical aircraft. These efforts will commence in fiscal year 1995, with goal of putting in place by late 1996 a long-term plan for future aviation sea bases. That plan will include a sea-basing technology development program and a road map for how the Navy and Defense Department could evolve from today’s carrier force to the tactical aviation sea basing force of the 21 st century.
Submarine Warfare
91
Proceedings/June 1994
The Navy began to retire the first units of the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear-powered attack submarines in fiscal year 1994, about 13 years earlier than originally planned and with half of their intended service lives remaining. The submarines will continue to be retired in a schedule that previously had them going into the yard for mid-life nuclear core refuelings and overhauls. The Navy figures to save about $250 million per boat for the fleet’s recapitalization for the 21st century. These accelerated retirements
could continue at a rate of about two to four per year, with the attack submarine force leveling off at 45 to 55 units by the end of the decade, if the Bottom-Up Review prevails.
By then, all but one or two of the Navy’s special mission-configured submarines—six "long-hull” Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class and two former Lafayette (SSBN-616)-class nuclear- powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSN-642/645) modified to carry dry deck shelters—are also expected to be decommissioned. This projection has driven still another requirement for the New Attack Submarine, and perhaps four or more modified SSN-688s, to to accommodate Navy special-operations sea-air-land teams (SEALs) and the dry deck shelters that house submersible delivery vehicles and other equipment. The Navy is also investigating the prospects for modifying the Seawolf (SSN-21)-class attack submarines to support SEAL operations, noted Rear Admiral Tom Ryan, Director, Submarine Warfare (N87). The design of the third Seawolf will be modified with a “reconfigurable” torpedo room that could accommodate up to 50 SEALs, while the sub’s lockin/lockout chamber will be enlarged. These modifications might be back-fitted into the SSN-21 and -22, as well.
Workers such as these autographing the flag-draped bow of the new nuclear-powered attack submarine Toledo (SSN-769) are thankful that they still have jobs. The defense industrial base remains a key issue in the future of submarine construction.
Defense industrial-base issues remained a key factor in last year’s decisions about future submarine plans and programs—although emerging threat issues, if soberly addressed, probably alone could justify the Navy’s program for advanced, nuclear-propelled submarines, according to some observers. The Bottom-Up Review split future nuclear shipbuilding programs between two yards: Newport News will continue with nuclear aircraft carrier new construction and overhauls, while Connecticut’s Electric Boat will receive all future attack submarine business. This “smart shut-down approach” at Newport News will cost approximately $300 million, but will ensure that two shipyards will retain the critical capabilities to build nuclear-powered ships.20
In early 1994, five Improved Los Angeles-class submarines were under construction at Newport News, and two were being built at Electric Boat; all will be complete by 1996. The Navy is also building two Seawolf (SSN-21)-class attack submarines at Electric Boat; these are scheduled to be completed in 1996 and
1998, but those dates may slip. Because of the need to ensure the continued health of the nuclear submarine industrial base, balance funding of $1.5 billion for the third Seawolf (SSN-23)—to be built by Electric Boat—will be requested in fiscal year 1996. (Since its genesis, the Seawolf program required approximately $10.4 billion in research-and-development and acquisition funding, and the total cost of the SSN-23 will be $2.4 billion, according to Navy data.) This ship will serve as a “bridge” until long-lead funding for the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) is requested in fiscal year 1996, with balance-funding currently projected for fiscal year 1998. Without the SSN-23, there will be a seven-year interval between the time SSN-22 was approved and the authorization of the New Attack Submarine.
The final submarines under construction at Electric Boat, the Louisiana (SSBN- 743) and the Connecticut (SSN-22), will complete in 1997 and 1998 respectively, presenting an abyss until NSSN construction begins, unless the SSN-23 “bridge” is in place. Uncertainty about the attack submarine program has continued to prompt calls for continuing with the Improved SSN-688 line or foregoing the NSSN in favor of more important programs.21
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Numerous post-CoId War missions were addressed in the NSSN cost and operational effectiveness analysis—peacetime engagement and forward presence-' covert surveillance/intelligence, minins and mine-countermeasures reconnaissance, battle-group and task-group support, ground-warfare support, special operations, precision strike, regional sea denial, and strategic conventional deterrence—all focused on the differences be-, tween the old “blue-water” paradigm and the new regional warfare environment." “We’ve always operated in the littorals,' Admiral Ryan confirmed. “We emphasize real-world requirements in regional theaters, including direct-support operations with every carrier battle group and numerous surface groups in the past 18 months, our long-standing ‘Exercise Dogfish’ in the Mediterranean with U.S. and NATO forces, and in practically every operation from Desert Shield to Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.”
The Navy in 1994 was in position to ensure that it will get the right submarine for the future- While underscoring the fact that the SSN-21 is an excellent design, Admiral Ryan stated that it was the “wrong submarine for the littorals. The Seawolf is not optimized for shallow-water, littoral-warfare operations against diesel submarines.” In addressing various options—12 individual concepts, including one non-nuclear submarine design, “we traded off speed for cost. The NSSN will have sufficient speed and enhanced stealth features to ensure survivability and operational success” in a difficult, complex shallow-water environment, Admiral Ryan averred, “and it will have space and weight margins for later inclusion of the full sensor capability of the Seawolf, should that become necessary.” If the Navy had decided on a nonnuclear concept, however, it would have to acquire three times as many submarines to satisfy the operational requirements of an all- nuclear-powered submarine force. The Navy received about $390 million for NSSN research-and-development in fiscal year 1994 and has requested about $507 million in fiscal year 1995. The lead NSSN is expected to cost a total of $3 billion; in production, the NSSN-class is expected to cost around $1.3 billion each. (The non-nuclear submarine variant reportedly would cost about $650 million each in production.) In February, the Defense Acquisition Board adjourned without making a Milestone I decision on the NSSN, instead
92
Proceedings/ June 1994
;jon< asking the Navy to address three areas of j Qp. concern: (1) the operational assumptions ,ace. in the analysis that led to a Navy deci- ,nce ■ sion to reject a smaller nuclear-propelled nin,, submarine of about 5,000 tons and ap- ! js! prove a design of approximately 6,800 sup. tons; (2) the level of technology to be in- 0p. corporated into the NSSN and whether a se3 wait of eight-to-ten years would result in >ter. a significantly better ship; and (3) the be. implications of moving funding for the and' NSSN to right in the current shipbuild- nt:: ing program and other alternatives.23 Ad-
(ls" miral Ryan noted that an independent )ha. verification of the operational and war- )nal fighting assumptions in the analysis was ;ra. already under way, with the result to be an(j delivered by late spring. He acknowl- U edged that the Navy had already sub-
0. .. mitted a report on the level of technol- 'ifh °gy in the NSSN, which concluded that
jn “it would do no good to wait as we have onl picked the correct technology.” Moving jn NSSN funding to the right would only exacerbate the shipbuilding and indus- isj.' trial-base dilemma, and would necessi- he tate continuing the construction beyond re the third Seawolf, the wrong submarine ia[, for littoral warfare.
,n The Navy’s nuclear-powered ballistic- missile submarine (SSBN) force will be ]s the 18 Trident/O/iio (SSBN-726)-class
•or[1][2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] submarines, with the older “41 for free-
p. dom Polaris/Poseidon submarines” being
1, - phased out of operation by the end of
us 1994.2J While numerous ballistic-missile
s< submarine system alternatives had been
a_ addressed as part of the previous “Strat-
;cj Plan 2010” study efforts, and the New
f. 1 Attack Submarine analysis includes a
concept to add a ballistic-missile-launch- id ing capability to the baseline NSSN de-
t ; sign, today there is no program for a
). follow-on to the Trident SSBNs.
d The Navy had originally planned to r_ backfit the longer-range and more accu- II rate Trident I1/D5 ballistic missile into ft the first eight SSBNs that had received f ' the Trident I/C4 missile, beginning with the overhaul of the Ohio in fiscal year \ 1992, but that was delayed for cost rea-
s sons. The D5-backfit program has already been slipped for the first three Tridents, and now, with subsequent decisions to reduce significantly the acquisition of D5 ) missiles beginning in fiscal year 1994 and perhaps to terminate the D5 program in fiscal year 1997, it looks to be abandoned altogether. Alternatives to the D5- backfit plan had addressed a C4-service life extension program, but that, too, might be too expensive to be pursued. Some indications are, however, that the older missiles may be able to be retained until 2010 even without such a program. “The C4 missile,” Rear Admiral Ryan confirmed, “will be good well into the first decade of the 21st century. In any
event, our final strategic posture—both submarines and missiles—will have to wait until the conclusion of the Defense Department’s Nuclear Posture Review.”25 Conventional options for the Trident missiles remain a serious issue, with the Navy apparently intent on developing “brilliant” non-nuclear warheads for these missiles for both strategic conventional deterrence and conventional war-fighting in future major regional conflicts.26 That said. President Clinton in late February avowed that the Navy was not developing a conventional D5 missile.21
ment remain “living documents,” subject to continuing reassessment. See “Q&As on Navy Force Structure under BUR,” Inside the Navy, 28 March 1994, pp. 5-8.
'’“The CVN-76: The Ninth Nimitz-C\ass Aircraft Carrier,” undated (ca. April 1994), Naval Aviation Briefing Point Paper (N885).
l4“Dellums Questions Navy Plan to Use Sealift Funds for New Carrier,” Inside the Navy, 28 February 1994, p. 14.
I5“CRS: Navy Should Eye AV-8B-Equipped LHAs, LHDs as Carrier Substitute,” Inside the Navy, 31 January 1994, p. 15.
'““Miller Unveils Details of Joint Task Force ’95, Plugs Plan to CinCs,” Inside the Navy, 28 February 1994, pp. 1, 7-8; and “One on One” (interview with Admiral Paul David Miller) Defense News, 28 March- 4 April 1994, p. 54; see also “Larson: Adaptive Force Packaging Falls Short in Certain Environments,” Inside the Navy, 7 March 1994, pp. 18-19.
■’Director, Air Warfare (N88), “. . .From the Sea": Naval Aviation in the 21st Century, Briefing (February 1994); see also, “Naval Power Update,” Naval Aviation News (March-April 1994), pp. 8-15.
I8A 10 January 1994 Navy News & Undersea Technology article (pp. 5-6), “F-18E/F May Not Reach Promised Land,” describes the treatment in a Naval Institute Press book. The Pentagon Paradox, in which author James Stevenson questions the Navy’s estimates of the Advanced Hornet, claiming that the E/F variant will not have the performance characteristics of the original F-18A aircraft.
'•“Services to Cooperate on Future Aircraft Development,” Defense News, 13-19 September 1993, p. 10; Force 2001, 1994 ed. (op. cit., p. 42); Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1994), pp. 177ff; “JAST Program Office Lays Out Its Master Plan to Industry,” Inside the Navy, 28 February 1994, pp. 3-4.
'"Report on the Bottom-Up Review, pp. 56-57. ^“Competition Surfaces for NAS,” Defense News, 13-19 December 1993, pp. 1, 36; “Navy Submarine Construction Options for Congress,” Inside the Navy, 14 March 1994, p. 4; and “Congress Takes Aim at Seawolf Submarine,” Defense News, 4-10 April 1994, p. 2. See also, “Spence Cool to NAS,” Navy News & Undersea Technology, 21 March 1994, p. 5. "These missions have been addressed in numerous forums: America’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Key Elements of U.S. Naval Power (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/N87, September 1992); Around the World, Around the Clock, Always Ready: U.S. Navy Submarine Force (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Op- erations/N87, 1992); “. . .From the Sea: A Sub Overview,” Special Issue, All Hands, December 1992; Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 1993); and Report on the Bottom-Up Review, op.cit., pp. 55-56.
23“Deutch Tightens Scrutiny of Centurion,” Navy News & Undersea Technology, 14 February 1994, p. 8. See also, “NAS Start in FY ’98 Possible with Seawolf Funding, Prompt DAB Action,” Defense Daily, 14 February 1994, pp. 234-235; and “Industry Raps Deutch Policy on Subs,” Defense News, 14-20 February 1994, pp. 3, 37.
24Department of the Navy Posture Statement, p. 11. 2’On the Nuclear Posture Review, see Annual Report to the President and the Congress, op.cit., pp. 57-64. 26“U.S. Navy Tests Non-Nuclear Trident,” Defense News, 13-19 December 1993, p. 4.
27“Clinton Assures Congress Navy Is Not Developing Conventional D-5,” Inside the Navy, 7 March 1994, p. 20.
Dr. Truver directs the Center for Security Strategies and Operations, TECHMATICS, Inc., in Virginia.
For Part II of “Tomorrow's Fleet” and a look at the future of amphibious and surface warfare, see the July 1994 Proceedings.
93
Proceedings / June 1994
'The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1 September 1993); Report on the Bottom- Up Review (OSD: October 1993).
[2]Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, 1994 ed. (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Re
sources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment, February 1994), pp. 14-15, and all of Chapter 4, which reviews the status of many key Navy programs. ’“Navy’s ‘95-’99 Budget Set on Potential Risky Funding Assumptions,” Inside the Navy, 13 December 1993, pp. 1-3.
[4]Critics of the administration’s two-major regional
conflicts plans noted that throughout the post-World War II era, the United States never had to respond to such a daunting non-Soviet war-fighting requirement. For example, during the Carter administration in the late 1970s, the planning factor was for “one and one-half wars,” with a “swing strategy” to move fleet assets between Atlantic and Pacific theaters.
’“Perry Names Aspin, Six Others to Roles and Missions Commission,” Inside the Navy, 28 March 1994, p. 4; “Panel to Delineate Roles, Missions,” Defense News, 11-17 April 1994, p. 14; and “Air Force, Navy Dispute Roles Amid DoD Study,” Defense News, 7-13 March 1994, pp. 4, 30. See also Options for Reconfiguring Service Roles and Missions (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office Paper, March 1994).
“Chief of Staff Address to the Air Force Association Symposium, Orlando, Florida, 18 February 1994, p. 1.
Tor a congressional perspective, see Planning for Defense: Affordability and Capability of the Administration’s Program (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office Memorandum, March 1994). "“Industry Faces a Second Wrenching Wave of Cuts,” Defense News, 11-17 April 1994, pp 1, 24; “Study Says DoD Tilt Will Hurt Industry,” Defense News, 28 March-3 April 1994, p. 20.
^Senator John McCain, “Going Hollow: The Warnings of our Chiefs of Staff,” July 1993, p. 1; see also his 4 May 1993 report, “Beyond the Base Force and Defense Budget Cuts: Preserving International Stability in the Post Cold War Era.”
'"“Operators Warn Readiness Is Slipping,” Navy News and Undersea Technology, 21 March 1994, pp. 1-3; and “Marine Corps Warns that Readiness Is ‘Creeping Downward,”’ Inside the Navy, 28 March 1994, p. 11.
"CNO Briefing, “FY95-99 Program Review: Restructuring Naval Forces,” 18 January 1994; “Navy Chief Cites $3.5 Billion Annual Shortfall for FY ‘95- 99,” Defense Daily, 19 January 1994, p. 81; and “Planned U.S. Navy Reductions Fail to Close Fund Gap,” Defense News, 24-30 January 1994, p. 27.
[12]The Bottom-Up Review called for an overall Navy force structure of 346 ships by 1999. The 16-ship difference between the review and lower Navy projections for the end of the decade results from how ships are being counted ... the Naval Reserve Force and Military Sealift Command will assume some of the previous active-fleet assets. In any event, both the Bottom-Up Review and Navy projections contained in the Secretary of the Navy’s Posture State