Operating with about half the ships it had in 1989 (here, the USS John S. McCain in Vietnam in 2017, before colliding with the MV Alnic), the U.S. Navy cannot effectively serve as both international diplomat and warfighting weapon. The SecDef has to determine what is essential. (U.S. Navy Photo)
After last summer’s collisions in Seventh Fleet, it appears the Navy’s leaders found that a major contributing element to the disasters is the sustained exhaustion of ships and crews. Unfortunately, the Navy cannot decide what to do with its ships (and what not to do). Rather, the service must dance to the tune played by the geographic combatant commanders (CoComs)—the organizations that generate the authoritative demand signals for military forces around the world.
These requests for forces are based on the assessed needs of each discrete CoCom, and without reference to other CoComs. Further, they are not based on what is available in the military cupboard at any particular time. Not surprisingly in an era of military decline, the result is that these force requests have become something of a wish list that remains only partially fulfilled. In January, Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson testified at a House Armed Services joint subcommittee: “We’ve not been close as a joint force meeting Combatant Commanders’ demands for a decade. We traditionally meet about 50 percent of the requested forces, and that’s not just the Navy, that’s across the joint forces.”
In response to those CoCom requests, and insufficient forces notwithstanding, the Navy responds aggressively, even if that aggression fosters the seeds of further disaster. This begs two questions. First, why do we have so few ships in service? Second, regarding the CoComs’ demand signals, what is wheat and what is chaff?
In May 2016, Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, sent a letter to Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong, in which he “committed to helping build the maritime capacity of the Vietnamese Coast Guard and Navy.” Recently it was announced that the United States would be sending the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) to a port visit in Vietnam. All this pertains to sending a political signal to China, but it is difficult to see how it helps to mitigate over-tasking. Ultimately, the operational slack left by the Carl Vinson’s removal from the playing field must be taken up by other ships that are already too busy.
The situation is similar, though on a much larger scale, with the jewel in the crown of the Navy’s interaction with foreign navies: the Rim of the Pacific (RimPac) Exercise. RimPac is the world’s largest international naval exercise, taking place in June and July of even-numbered years. In 2016, 23 U.S. ships participated. While at-sea interaction with RimPac participants—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Tonga, and the United Kingdom—may be a great thing, diplomatically speaking, in terms of enhancing the warfighting readiness of U.S. ships, it is of decidedly less value. Once again, other ships are forced to fill the real-world hole left by U.S. RimPac participants.
Is the United States determined to keep trying to do the same tasks today, with 277 ships, that it did in 1989 with 589 ships? How “important” is that port visit? What is the “utility” of exercises such as Talisman Saber? Certainly the Navy has long been an important element of the nation’s diplomacy, but if given a choice between contributing to international relations and maintaining genuine warfighting readiness, which should yield?
The Secretary of Defense can aid this process by initiating a review of CoComs’ force requests to determine what is essential and what can be put on hold pending a dramatic increase in fleet size.
Captain Eyer served in seven cruisers, commanding three Aegis cruisers: the USS Thomas S. Gates (CG-51), Shiloh (CG-67), and Chancellorsville (CG-62).