Chief Petty Officers Can Fix the Surface Navy
Usually the phrase “loss of confidence” is used as rationale for commanders to quietly remove a subordinate from a position of authority. So what should happen when a loss of confidence occurs in the other direction and is deservedly earned through inaction?
Officers of the surface line community have lost the confidence of many. The problems are many, severe, and widely confirmed. The causes include resourcing, training, and culture. The word shipshape has taken on new meaning.
Consequently, should we expect those embedded so deeply in the problem to have the wherewithal to fix it? At the same time, the U.S. Navy can’t just close shop and declare bankruptcy. The officer corps must work to redeem itself.
Here’s my suggestion: I want an active, fleet-crossing, and authoritative surface-ship, lessons-learned program. One that focuses on warfighting readiness. One that boards ships and identifies trends, leading indicators, and causes. One that is manned by U.S. Navy chief petty officers.
They will ride every ship returning to port from real-world missions. They will work independently of the ship’s captain. They will talk to the crew. Their mission will be to determine whether each ship is battle-ready. They will report their findings to Fleet Commanders and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy. They will maintain a running tally of operational metrics that will be used for analysis—or analytics, as they call it today. Above all, the chief petty officers will be an honest barometer.
—Jerry Horton
WHAT HAPPENED TO OUR SURFACE FORCES?
(See K. Eyer, pp. 24–29, January 2018 Proceedings)
This isn’t the Navy I was in from 1954 to 1975. There is never an excuse for not standing a watch properly. As officer of the deck (OOD), I was always moving around the bridge and out on the wings of the bridge, even up on the flying bridge, regardless of the weather. I looked around constantly. As combat information center (CIC) officer, I plotted every contact around us and made recommendations to the OOD. When I made one a bad recommendation, the skipper, who was aware of what was happening on his ship, took action, as he did to teach all his young officers. Maintenance, training, scheduling, funding, and so on should never affect the standing of a basic watch.
When I served at Fleet Training Group, San Diego, we trained and tested crews for operational readiness inspections (ORIs). In those days, no ship was allowed to deploy unless it passed the ORI, and the captain of a ship failing the ORI was fired. Some ships did fail the ORIs, and we could tell when that was likely, for example if we saw in the trashcan handouts that had been intended to help the ship pass. A crew’s attitude can be affected by any number of problems, but it all begins with leadership, from the captain on down.
In all three ships and every base where I served, the prevailing attitude was can-do. “It can’t be done” was simply not allowed, and the skipper set the tone that made that happen. All bases and ships in the Navy were expected to meet the basic responsibilities, such as competent watchstanding: remain alert, look around, and report what you see. Heavy traffic or a ship bearing down on you must be reported to the captain—regardless of the time of day or night—and no captain should leave standing orders not to be awoken. If the radar is not operating because of parts failure, extra parts should be available.
There always will be problems, some of which—such as such as scheduling and funding—cannot be solved on board a ship. Those we can solve include operating a ship safely in basic steaming. This can be accomplished only by those on board the ship. It all comes down to the standards set by the captain.
—Lieutenant Commander Leroy Jones, U.S. Navy (Retired)
As the co-author of the study on reduced manning in DDG-51s along with retired Navy Captain Terry Glover, I comment on the portion of Captain Eyer’s excellent article dealing with “optimum manning.” First, the study, completed in 2004, was titled “DDG-51 Reduced Manning.” “Optimum” was a LaFleurism introduced later. We eventually introduced the term “absolute manning,” indicating they all had to be there.
The study had three basic tenets. First, if you are reducing manning for the money, then don’t do it. If we could not provide a commanding officer with a more mature, more experienced, better-trained crew, then we didn’t do it. Second, a portion of the identified savings was to be reinvested in the shore infrastructure to support the reduced crew size. Not only was the shore infrastructure not plussed up, their resources were reduced, as Captain Eyer points out. Finally, the third tenet was very simple: to ensure “absolute” manning, the Bureau of Personnel had to change the way it did business. It is a shame that it did not.
At a Retired Flag Conference, then-Admiral John Harvey, Director of the Navy Staff, was asked of the two cruisers that had recently failed Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv) assessments whether this was an anomaly or the tip of the iceberg. He replied that it was an anomaly. Obviously he found out later, as Commander Fleet Forces Command, that this was not the case—thus the Balisle Report.
—Rear Admiral James Hinkle, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Don’t Micromanage Response Boats
(See P. Null, pp. 64–67, January 2018; R. J. Brown, February 2018 Proceedings)
Coast Guard boat forces and shore forces communities are both comprised of search-and-rescue (SAR) professionals. As such, we must hold ourselves and our discourse to a high level of respect and accuracy. In that regard, this article falls short because of misrepresentations of the SAR system and a tone of disrespect.
Throughout the article, operations specialists (OSs) are referred to pejoratively as “professional radio watchstanders.” Understating and oversimplifying the contribution of the third-largest Coast Guard rating does not foster teamwork or esprit de corps. For example, the article asserts that “junior officers and professional radio watchstanders seem to view [advances in technology] as an opportunity to get documented involvement in a crisis without getting physically involved.” Guarding communications to respond to mariners in distress is one of their crucial duties among many others. The tone in characterizations such as “radio and phone watchstanders, whose biggest interest is ensuring proper documentation of the response” does nothing to advance a constructive narrative. To improve the SAR system, we must start with productive and respectful communication.
Accuracy is equally critical, yet policy development and the SAR system are misrepresented throughout the article, specifically in relation to a perceived disempowerment of the SAR Unit (SRU). This is a result of a lack of understanding of the system beyond the SRU and the catalysts that have driven the evolution of policy. The SAR system has been shaped in an environment of technological advancements, post-9/11 reorganizations, and lessons learned from tragedies such as the Columbia River, Oregon, capsizing of the fishing trawler (F/V) Sea King in January 1991. Of course, all systems benefit from respectful critical examination and continual improvement. A starting point to accomplish this is constructive communication and partnership between stations and the command center (CC). To add value to the system, any subsequent policy recommendations must be specific and developed with comprehensive understanding of the SAR system.
The SAR briefing chain for an SRU (other than the station officer of the day) is very simple: they brief the CC. The CC watch team performs the SAR planning and asset management role of the SAR mission coordinator (SMC), and the CC reports directly to SMC in the execution of SAR. The response officer and CC supervisor are not part of the SAR chain and do not require a brief unless the sector does not have command duty as part of the watch team, which is rare. The SRU’s role is not to brief SMC directly, but to do so via the CC.
A main theme of the article is that “authority” should rest with SRUs. This dismisses two decades of advancements in SAR designed to minimize crew risk and maximize the probability of mission success. The idea also runs counter to lessons learned from mishaps such as the February 2016 capsizing of a 25-foot twin-engine Coast Guard response boat off Jones Beach, New York, which highlighted the need for employment of risk management at all levels of the SAR system. SRUs conduct their own risk assessments, have authority over whether to take a mission, are allowed to take on-scene initiative, and absolutely have a role in determining the best tactics for accomplishing a goal. However, SMCs must have visibility and final authority on the SAR plan, not simply because they are responsible for the case, but to provide a second layer of safety oversight.
CCs use wind and surface currents to model drift to optimize the use of resources and maximize probability of success. This greatly increases the chances of survival for the person in distress. Because this cannot be done at the SRU level, it precludes the idea of simply “providing SRUs objectives.” What the SRU can do is provide feedback to the CC, enhancing the CC’s ability to create an effective search action plan.
Any level of negative discourse is unacceptable, unproductive, and requires leadership (particularly senior enlisted leadership) to fix. Mark Twain famously wrote that “travel is fatal to prejudice.” Similarly, misconceptions in this article can be dispelled by having CC personnel regularly get under way with SRUs and by requiring coxswains stand watch in the CC prior to qualification. The CC and the SRU are part of the same team and are equally essential to the mission. Cooperation and mutual respect between SAR professionals are paramount to mission success and improving the system, which can be achieved through building greater understanding of one another’s roles predicated on constructive communication.
—Master Chief Matthew Couling, U. S. Coast Guard, Lead Instructor and Course Chief, Command Center Watchstander Course, Training Center Yorktown
UNRAVELING THE THRESHER’S STORY
(See J. Yurso, pp. 38−42, October 2017; K. Highfill, pp. 87–88, January 2018Proceedings)
Captain Highfill mentions major flooding as the likely cause of the Thresher’s (SSN-593) loss, echoing the Naval Court of Inquiry (NCoI) determination. Major flooding was not detected by the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) hydrophone array Fox, located 30 nautical miles from the Thresher’s wreckage site. The high-velocity water from major flooding striking the hull and internal structures would have created strong, unique narrow band signals on SOSUS displays. The escort ship, the USS Skylark (ASR-20), did not detect flooding on its underwater telephone.
The Thresher became heavy, slowed, sank, and imploded. Negative buoyancy from excessive leakage from multiple sources exceeded the capacity of the pumps. Speed and control surfaces were not used to go shallow.
Retired Navy Lieutenant Commander Ray McCoole, ordered to miss sea trials to care for his injured wife, made many press statements over the years claiming he could have saved the Thresher from sinking. McCoole said he would have kept the main steam stop valves open after the reactor scram so that the main propulsion turbines could drive the Thresher to the surface. Using residual and decay heat from the reactor to generate steam after a reactor scram was a well-known procedure that naval reactors had tested, but not yet authorized; it was part of the Commanding Officers Standing Orders on some nuclear submarines, such as the USS George Washington (SSBN-598), but not on the Thresher. It is unclear how McCoole could have circumvented procedures without prior authorization.
A comprehensive test program would have found serious problems. A main ballast tank (MBT) blow test on the Thresher’s sister ship Tinosa (SSN-606) discovered the unauthorized installation of strainers and orifice plates, which were also installed on the Thresher. During the testing, intermittent ice formation on the strainers interrupted air flow. The orifices severely restricted air flow when not blocked by ice. A malfunctioning MBT blow system left the nuclear propulsion plant as the only means to get the submarine to the surface during a casualty at depth.
The following timeline reconstructs the final 10 minutes of the Thresher based on SOSUS, on the Skylark’s crew and on an incomplete and inaccurate underwater telephone communications log.
• 0909: The NCoI report says, “[I]t is known with reasonable certainty that she was at test depth (1,300 feet).” SOSUS detected an electrical bus line-frequency instability, likely a symptom of an ongoing problem in the engine room.
• 0909.8 to 0911.3: SOSUS detected a MBT blow of 1.5-minute duration.The Thresher had slowed and was sinking, requiring the MBT blow.
• 0910: The Thresher reported a course change to 090 degrees true. This was the Skylark’s course, standard surfacing procedure to minimize the chance of collision.
• 0911: SOSUS detected fast-speed main coolant pumps (MCPs) stopping, resulting in a reactor scram, which required the main steam stop valves to be shut securing steam to the turbines. The MCPs were not restarted. Sinking below test depth increased sea pressure and leakage rate.
• 0912: Communications check.
• 0913: NCoI reconstructed report using conflicting testimony, “Experiencing minor difficulties. Have positive up angle. Am attempting to blow up. Will keep you informed.”
• 0913.5 to 0914: SOSUS and the Skylark detected a 30-second MBT blow.
• 0916: Garbled report that was believed to contain the words “test depth,” possibly preceded by the word “exceeding.”
• 0917: Garbled transmission that was interpreted to contain the phrase “900 North.”
• 0918.4: SOSUS and the Skylark detected hull collapse.
The phrase “experiencing minor difficulties” is an enigma. At 0913 the Thresher was in an uncontrolled descent as much as 600 feet below test depth, if the 0917 reports of “900 North” are accurate and we accept the interpretation of this as meaning 900 feet below test depth. The pressure hull was compressing inward, making noises. There were no MCPs running, the reactor had scrammed, and main propulsion was lost. The MBT blow had stopped.
—Captain James B. Bryant, U.S. Navy (Retired)
THE NAVY CANNOT AFFORD LARGE CREWS
(See G. Galdorisi, pp. 70–72, January 2018 Proceedings)
As part of the pre-commissioning triad of the Zumwalt (DDG-1000), I read Captain Galdorisi’s article with interest. While enumerating strengths of the manning approach on DDG-1000, the article omits issues identified during implementation.
Implied in the standard stipulating a stable number of sailors is the requirement for a fundamental change in Millington’s Navy manning processes, from “fair share” to “crewed to 100 percent.” It also means relieving crew shall arrive at the ship three to six months prior, instead of up to nine months after a “planned loss.” Finally, it requires changing from Distribution and Primary Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) detailing to all assigned NECs for each individual billet, which results in longer training pipelines for significant numbers of incoming sailors.
Impacts of unplanned losses are amplified in this new manning approach. Reduced electronics technician (ET) manning from seven to four sailors was enabled by increasing the number of NECs each ET is required to hold, from an average of four to seven. In one instance, an ET nearing the end of a tailored training pipeline became an unplanned loss, and the identified ET relief had to complete a similar NEC training pipeline before reporting. This resulted in an unacceptable four-year gap.
The current crew of 147 is not the culmination of years of effort. It was the largest crew size allowed without violating the Key Performance Parameter of 175 total sailors, minus 28 personnel reserved for the aviation detachment. In addition, Human Systems Integration found that more crew members are needed to reduce everyone from “red” to “yellow” to meet the metrics for individuals’ total work hours allowed per week.
While general quarters and underway wartime steaming scenarios were examined in very great detail, one significant area that the HSI team investigated far less rigorously for typical and most-likely environments was a continuous maintenance availability in homeport. Growth in force protection requirements after 11 September 2001, crew entitlements such as regular leave, maintenance “shadow hours,” and continuing requirements such as off-ship watch team trainers were not developed to the same level of detail as underway analyses. Without expanding the crew, the ship would have been in three sections under way and two sections in homeport, in a scenario assuming no leave for the crew and all training requirements could be done locally off ship to support standing duty after training.
Finally, reduced matrixed manning means that fewer sailors will be qualified for assignment, especially new accessions. In general, sailors departing Recruit Training Command finished basic training, completed an initial background security check, and passed a basic swim class. A not-uncommon example to maximize manning reductions was a “requirement” for one or two new recruits to hold final top secret/sensitive compartmented information security clearances and be qualified as search-and-rescue swimmers coming out of Great Lakes.
Contrary to Captain Galdorisi’s conclusion, these additional manning, training, and qualification issues have neither been adopted nor proven.
—Commander Jeff Hickox, U.S. Navy
With all due respect to Captain Galdorisi, I take issue with his holding up the example of the USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) as a successful basis model from which to expand manpower rationalization efforts in the surface Navy. The fact of the matter is that the ship is at present little more than an experimental prototype or technology demonstrator. She has yet to deploy or take part in any meaningful operations.
This is not meant as a slur against the ship or her crew; rather, to point out the fact that we simply do not yet know how her systems will function in a prolonged at sea environment away from major shore support, or whether the advertised manpower savings from her systems will really work. To base any future planning on the “success” of her paradigm is premature. The only real-world examples we have right now are from the manning reduction trials onboard the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)–class guided-missile destroyers and the littoral combat ship (LCS) program, neither of which has produced stellar results, and both of which have required a return to augmented manning.
In 1989 I was serving in the USS Kinkaid (DD-965) when we suffered a major collision at sea, followed by flooding and raging fuel oil fires. It took endless hours of effort by every one of the 300-plus crew on board to save the ship. Maybe we would have saved her with 100 fewer people. Maybe we wouldn’t have. Automatics don’t work especially well with a third of the ship either crushed, on fire, or flooded. Smart, courageous people still do, though.
Saying “we cannot afford” proper manning is a red herring. The Department of Defense delights in spending extravagant sums on questionable or unproven technology with nary a blink—that’s part of how we ended up with 155-mm guns on the Zumwalt for which we apparently cannot afford to buy ammunition, as just one example. Spending money on paying enough E-5s and lieutenants to do things the right way does not put retired flag officers in corporate board seats; buying F-35s and LCSs and other whiz-bang tech does.
The Zumwalt’s technology may be the right way forward, or it may be another debacle. We don’t know yet. Let’s wait to see how she performs before we start loading eggs in that particular basket.
—Nikki Burgess, Sonar Technician (Surface) Petty Officer 1st Class, U.S. Navy, 1981–1991
Can’t Kill Enough to Win? Think Again
(See D. Bolgiano and J. Taylor, pp. 18–23, December 2017; D. Scott, pp. 8–9, January 2018; D. Dolan, J. R. Storm, M. R. Strickland, Bolgiano and Taylor, pp. 11, 84–85, February 2018 Proceedings; and “Can’t Kill Enough to Win,” U.S. Naval Institute Blog, February and March 2018)
Editor’s Note: This article has generated a great deal of discussion. Responses are published on the U.S. Naval Institute Blog, 10 February and March 2018, https://blog.usni.org.
A MISTAKE SHOULD NOT KILL A SAILOR’S CAREER
(See E. Heck, pp. 14–15, December 2017; D. Bolgiano, p. 8, January 2018; J. McCandless, p. 86, February 2018 Proceedings)
Petty Officer Heck makes a point that present thinking on non-judicial punishment transforms sailors “from being assets to the Navy to being expendable.” As a former judge advocate officer and state prosecutor, I could not agree more.
Just consider the potential impact on naval history if this present line of thought on enlisted personnel had been applied to officers. Our country might have been deprived of the two greatest admirals of World War II. Fleet Admiral Ernie King made many mistakes as a young officer. Superiors noted King’s hard drinking, carefree behavior, and fiery temper, attributes that many young sailors display before they mature. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, as a junior officer, was court-martialed for what would no doubt be today a career-ending event—running the USS Decatur (DDG-73) aground in 1908.
Also of note is the early career of Senator John McCain’s father, Admiral John S. McCain Jr., a decorated World War II submarine skipper and Commander in Chief of the Pacific (CinCPac) during the Vietnam War. Young McCain received a five-day punishment for eloping without authorization. Later, as commanding officer of the USS Gunnel (SS-253), the future CinCPac was admonished for “blowing off steam” at Midway Island.
The point is that both young officers and sailors make mistakes. Consequently, leaders should use their best discretion to preserve the careers of those who deserve a second chance. As a state prosecutor, I did that every day for many years with thousands of young offenders. In the military, the task is more complex given the importance that military justice vests in the commanding officer. The many I counseled often saw only the short term. They wanted to know whether their advancement was going to be jeopardized. This type of narrow thinking must stop. As leaders, officers have a responsibility to consider the long-term effects of all decisions we make on the branch we serve.
If we truly believe enlisted personnel are the heart and soul of our military, officers tasked with discipline must use their best instincts to preserve the careers of those they believe could grow into future chiefs, senior chiefs, or master chiefs. I recognize this as a tough task, but it is no more difficult than having the faith that a young Ernie King, Chester Nimitz, or John McCain Jr. would later grow into the naval legends they became.
I believe the staff judge advocates could play a bigger role in this most difficult task. JAG officers who advise commanders must have the courage to speak if they see someone with potential. A JAG’s advice must not be limited to what is lawful, but, because it is coming from a fellow military officer, it must ensure that each decision is truly in the best interests of the service.
The moment at which a JAG speaks up is also critical. Despite a string of courts-martial acquittals, I learned that the careers of my clients were often over when the charges were preferred. Yes, the military respects the presumption of innocence, but as Petty Officer Heck observes, “The military views service members in trouble as people who do not belong in the military rather than people who can be reformed.” So the time for a commander to preserve a career must be at the beginning, not the end of the proceedings. Indeed, it is our duty to the service whose uniform we wear to guide someone who makes a mistake, because, as Petty Officer Heck reasons, “Helping them overcome their mistakes not only strengthens the naval profession but also increases retention and brings credit to the service.”
—Michael J. Coughlin Jr., former captain in the Army Judge Advocate Generals Corps and Assistant District Attorney for Worcester County Massachusetts. Life Member, U.S. Naval Institute
DELIVER MORE RELEVANT EDUCATION TO SAILORS
The Navy will garner much more success in terms of sailor recruitment and retention by moving beyond “just” better aligning job fields that translate into the civilian sector and give transitioning service members something other than a few U.S. Military Apprenticeship certifications, Navy Credentialing Opportunities On-Line certifications, and an easier-to-relate job description. Currently the Navy has the Sailor-Marine American Council on Education Registry Transcript, but often it includes so much technical training that goes to waste.
For example, previously a cryptologic technician received X amount of credit for “A” school but none for a much more complex and technically demanding “C” school. The Navy having its own college would alleviate the need to worry about which academic institution accepts what credits, and we would not have to rely on outdated and inaccurate American Council on Education evaluations that have demonstrated time and again just how many schools and trainings go to waste.
I propose that the Navy adopt a system similar to what the Air Force has in the Community College of the Air Force. The Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force has said the service is open to sharing the foundation, the model of how this is done. The other services could essentially “copy and paste” that system, and the Navy could modify it to match its individual personnel system.
The idea is that all members will come into the service knowing they have the opportunity to receive an accredited AA/AS directly relatable to the job where they will spend the next three to four years. When they leave the service, they will do so with something concrete they can use to leverage a good career.
—Petty Officer 1st class Christopher Norling, U.S. Navy
Where Are You Going, Kings Point?
(See. T. F. McCaffery, pp. 56–60, November 2017; P. J. Prokop, pp. 85–86, January 2018 Proceedings)
THE VALUE OF more than 1,800 Navy Reserve officers any given year is clearly not recognized by Commander McCaffery.
They are obligated to maintain a license through at least one renewal or upgrade. Only a fraction of the state school graduates meet these criteria. In addition, they don’t have to be commissioned, and they don’t have an obligation to renew or upgrade. All this provides a Ready Reserve to support national emergencies, such as occurred in 1990’s Gulf War. And the U.S. Coast Guard Academy has its hands full just meeting the service’s manning needs. Kings Point has been and continues to be a source of innovation in the maritime industry, both nationally and globally.
—Mark E. Prose, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Class of 1972