The Navy's Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents (CR) noted that some commanding officers (COs), especially at the 0-5 level and below, could benefit from a formal mentoring program. Specifically, under the incredibly important heading of “Sustaining Change”, the CR directs the Navy to:
“Establish Commanding Officer mentors in surface ship homeports. Assign senior mentors with proven at- sea leadership experience to develop leadership skills and improve organizational capacity. The key components of this mentorship program will focus on seamanship and navigation, team building, and operational safety.” [Commander Naval Surface Forces, 31 March 2018]
Based on my own experiences as a commanding officer, as well as those of some of my peers, I think a mentoring program is a great idea.
First, what is a “mentor?” Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines a mentor as “a trusted counselor or guide” who “because he is detached and disinterested, can hold up a mirror to us.” This may drive some of the decision process as it is applied to various options. One of my former bosses used to start all conversations with a question: “What problem are you trying to solve?” If the conclusions of the CR are accurate—and I believe they are—there are a few issues that call for such a solution:
- Due to the long interval between sea tours, the variation in background and experience, and some of the limitations of the XO/CO fleet-up model, some prospective COs may lack self-confidence or breadth of experience relative to their peers. Conversely, some may be overconfident and not realize it.
- The same factors can cause atrophy of seamanship and navigation skills. If this is the case, it may be difficult for some commanding officers to admit, given that seamanship and navigation are core competency requirements of the job.
- The culture and demands of the Surface Navy’s operational environment, combined with the competitive nature of command within a squadron or strike group, can result in a “can-do” attitude that makes a CO reluctant to ask for assistance from his or her chain of command or to say “no” to a task that feels is too risky.
- A commanding officer may internalize problems and issues to the point where fatigue, endurance, or mental health becomes an issue. Every few years a Navy CO simply “walks away” from command. I can recall at least one CO suicide during my career. I spent a few nights sleeping on the couch as my cruiser headed into INSURV and I saw the end of my career in the cards; the stress of command takes its toll.
Each of these is a valid concern and is worthy of consideration. I have discussed this topic with many senior surface warfare officers; some agree and others feel that having mentors is complete nonsense. Looking back at my own experience, I was fortunate to have a set of mentors—mainly former COs and XOs—who were willing to take my calls and e-mails and give advice any time. None of those mentorships was an ongoing, real-time relationship; they were more of a “crisis hotline” for me. We old salts sometimes forget that during the first year in command, we all were just learning how to be COs and had plenty of self-doubt. I was scared to death of making a wrong decision at my first captain’s mast. The weight of my decision on a Sailor’s life and career kept me up the night before. My first underway in command was to cross the Atlantic, which was a little scary. I made some mistakes during that tour—including hitting a buoy (not just any buoy – the Ambrose Light buoy in New York Harbor!), and falling asleep standing up on the bridge during a strait transit. I also flipped a rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) during an exercise, injuring two Sailors and dumping six in the water. I was simply trying to do too many tasks at once, and I missed the opportunity to say “no, this is just too much” to my boss and to the exercise coordinator.
My second CO tour—this time as an 0-6 in major command—while not mistake free, went more smoothly. I had learned a lot about my own limitations, about the importance of listening to my XO and command master chief (CMC), and stopped to think before taking on too much tasking. In at least one case, I said no to an assignment based on my assessment of the risk—something I did not do during my first CO tour. In retrospect, I may have pushed back at the idea of an off-ship mentor sticking his nose in my business, but I would like to think that I would have accepted and even welcomed one. Perhaps today’s COs are more savvy and mature than I was. Most probably are, but what if they are not? As with any new program, the return on investment may be difficult to capture, especially in terms of accidents avoided or careers salvaged, but if the SWO community does not try it, and another mishap occurs, that would be a shame.
What would a CO mentor program look like? Minimum requirements for mentors should be two successful at-sea command tours, a proven professional record, and specific endorsement from the Naval Personnel Command and the Type Commander. An interview should be required. What type of individual could perform this duty? There are several viable options:
Active Duty. There are post-major command SWOs who have completed two command tours and are not either eligible or not interested in flag rank. They often end up on staffs or at an ROTC unit for a final “twilight tour.” They would be potential mentor candidates, assigned to TYCOM staff or Afloat Training Group, free to mentor COs in a squadron, strike group, or the entire basin in some cases. Many would jump at the chance. There is some risk in this course of action. one retired Flag (who insisted that I call him by his first name) put it this way: “if you have to call me “sir,” I can’t really be your mentor.” An active duty person would be current in fleet issues and have real-time credibility, but an 0-5 CO may have reservations about being open with someone wearing the same insignia as his or her boss. Perhaps they could be retained beyond 30 years of service in a professional military trainer capacity.
Government Service (GS). A senior GS could serve in this role, given similar qualifications, in a model that has been used with success by the Navy’s submarine force. Many of the same advantages exist as for active duty, with the potential downside that if a GS proved to be a poor fit, it would be difficult to move them along, and there are requirements to find them another posting. Hiring a GS is a long-term commitment. That said, some of the barriers inherent in the active duty option would be less daunting for a GS in a coat and tie.
Contractor. Many retired SWO captains (including me) choose the contractor route because there are rewarding jobs in the civilian defense sector that contribute to the Navy in unique ways. Being a SWO mentor could be one of them. Advantages of this option include: the ability to serve part time (thus reducing cost), more selectivity (i.e., easy to fire if not performing), and perhaps a CO would be more inclined to open communications and trust than with the first two options. A model for this already exists as senior officer mentors at the flag level commonly are used for exercises and war games.
Volunteers. Many of my peers have shared with me that if a formal program were available, they would be happy to serve in a volunteer basis for a few hours each week. This might be enough to meet the requirement, and a program to screen and interview them could be established. This option also could be combined with any of the above. One possible place to use this option would be as augmentees to the Afloat Culture Workshop, which is manned by senior reservists and already serves in a mentorship role.
What would a CO mentor do? A few thoughts:
The CR is focused on safety, seamanship, and navigation. A full-time CO mentor for the ships in a destroyer or amphibious squadron could:
- Spend time each week with each ship CO—and with the rest of the ship's leaders on a less formal basis
- Observe routine briefs and evolutions on board the ship, monitoring the plan/execute/brief/debrief and operational risk management (ORM) processes
- Visit the Planning Board for Maintenance and Training on a regular basis
- Get under way with the ship for at least the sea and anchor portion of each transit
- Review command instructions, standing orders, temporary standing orders, etc.
- Observe qualification boards and other watch-related events
- Capture and share best practices and observations among the ships
This may all sound intrusive, and the scope and scale would need to be defined. A rigorous selection process would be mandatory, probably at the flag or chief-of-staff level, and an important consideration would be the frequency and type of reports, and to whom. By watching several ships do the same things, a mentor could share best practices and lessons, correct misconceptions, and provide advice. While confidentiality and trust are cornerstones of any mentorship, a “trip wire” could be established for the program whereby if something truly unsafe, criminal, or otherwise egregious were observed, an intervention or formal notification would be appropriate. The overall goal would be increased safety, seamanship proficiency, and sharing of best practices.
Counterarguments. One argument against this program is “We have ISIC’s [immediate superiors in command/commodores] for that.” Yes, that is true and mentoring is part of their job. Some of my friends had commodores who truly were mentors, and my friends and peers in these positions today are superb role models and mentors. There is variation, however, and many COs shift squadrons during a tour, commodores turn over every 18 months, and many are deployed while some of their ships are at home. I served under three commodores as an XO and CO, and, while I respected all three of them and all were good leaders, in many cases I did not feel comfortable showing weakness or deficiency to them based on previous comments or observed behavior. I refer to my own mentor’s statement: I had to call my commodores “sir.” The USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) each had a commodore and that did not prevent their mishaps. Some argue that those two ships were an anomaly, and that a wholesale change or “program” is not needed. Perhaps this is true. However, the Comprehensive Review team concluded that this was not the case, based on evidence and/or experience. Like any group of human beings, there is a “bell curve” of COs. Do they all need mentors? Maybe not. Do some? I say yes.
Other intangible benefits could be realized as well. A quick review of Navy Times over the past few years will show examples of O-6-level COs who were fired for leadership failures. Whenever such a firing was announced, Facebook would light up with former crew members saying, “I saw that coming” and “He never should have made it that far.” Their failings seem to have been known to some during their 0-5 command tour, yet they succeeded in hiding these tendencies. Other, more junior, COs have been fired for lapses in judgement or failing to correct an obvious command-wide leadership problem. A formal mentor program might head off some such catastrophes. If I have heard it once from a senior leader I have heard it 1000 times “I can assess your command climate within 5 minutes of walking aboard your ship.” If so, why not capture that ability and put it to good use? The potential benefits seem to outweigh the risks. A few young officers treat me as a mentor, at least in some situations. In my interactions with the fleet, I have heard individuals headed to command say, “I never had a tour in engineering and am a little uncertain in that area,” or “I have been away from sea for so long that I think my seaman’s eye has atrophied to the point that I can’t trust it.” These statements caused me to drop what I was doing and engage in long conversations; I felt compelled to help and honored that they trusted me with those fears. I wonder, however, if they would admit such doubts to their bosses.
The idea of a CO mentor program is worth trying, at least on a limited basis to see how it works. If you are a senior surface warfare officer and the fears expressed in that last paragraph cause you concern, you just proved my point.
Captain Cordle was a career surface warfare officer who retired in 2013 after 30 years of service. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and the USS San Jacinto (CG-56). He received the U.S. Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership in 2010 and served as the chief of staff of Naval Surface Forces Atlantic from 2012 to 2013.
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