In January 2015, Admirals Tom Rowden, Peter Fanta, and Peter Gumataotao wrote in Proceedings, “If U.S. naval power is to reclaim maritime battlespace dominance in contemporary and future A2/AD environments, the surface Navy must counter rapidly evolving missile, air, submarine, and surface threats that will challenge our ability to sail where we want, when we want.”
“Every Ship Is a Shooter”
Recognizing the surface navy’s withdrawal from sea control capabilities, Vice Admiral Rowden introduced the “distributed lethality” operational concept which was adopted and adapted by Fleet Forces Command into the Navy-wide “Distributed Maritime Operations” concept. Central to these theories is the imperative that “every ship is a shooter,” and they have led to increased interests in purchases of Harpoon, Advanced Harpoon, Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and the Naval Strike Missile, and testing of the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) in surface combatants.
“Increased Lethality”
The new National Defense Strategy (NDS) was released by Secretary of Defense James Mattis in January, and one of its three central themes is “increased lethality.” Also, the President’s proposed 2019 Defense Budget emphasizes increased weapons purchases.
Are distributed lethality, distributed maritime operations, and increased lethality only about more and longer-range weapons? We believe there is more to increased lethality than weapons, and these concepts must be centered around tactical situation (TacSit) management. More and longer-range missiles can be rendered meaningless without consciously practiced TacSit management.
Echoing retired Navy Captain Wayne Hughes’ timeless maxim to “attack effectively first,”1 TacSit management refers to the tactical measures taken to gain targeting-level information on an enemy while denying the enemy targeting-level information on one’s own forces. TacSits are categorized as:
One: Forces located and targeted
Two: Forces’ location known, disposition unknown
Three: Forces not located
Achieving TacSit One: The challenge becomes one of achieving TacSit One criteria against one’s enemy while maintaining one’s own forces in TacSit Two or Three from the enemy’s perspective. We believe unmanned platforms (air, surface, subsurface) should and will play important roles in both cases. In 2016, the former head of unmanned systems Rear Admiral Bob Girrier, U.S. Navy (Retired), wrote on the Naval Institute Blog,
Unmanned (systems) bring game in each phase of the process (scout, decide, engage, assess) across all domains, and in so doing improves [SIC] the speed of response and subsequent ability to adapt---faster than the adversary. Unmanned systems are key elements in realizing a learning warfighting system that senses, evaluates, acts, and adapts continuously.
Land-based and ship-based UAVs, such as DARPA’s “TERN,” have shown promising results in recent table top wargames in achieving TacSit One on enemy forces at tactically advantageous ranges. Long endurance and the ability to be tasked at the tactical level proved to be valuable attributes in antisurface warfare (ASUW) scenarios. The Navy should double down on research, analysis, experimentation, wargaming, and prototyping for unmanned systems to achieve TacSit 1 on enemy forces. In the meantime, the Navy should consider the viability of targeting from tactical air units to bolster ASUW fires and increase standoff. The Navy also should review the availability of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data from national and theater sources to ship and group commanders, overcoming obstacles such as datalink flows and classification mismatches.
An additional consideration is the timing of quality ISR. Arguably such targeting is not necessary until one is on the verge of using it. Maintaining TacSit One criteria on the adversary for protracted periods could overtask available ISR resources. But there may be a solution: the network. Network-enabled weapons may contribute greatly to the calculus. Net-enabled weapons may make it possible to achieve TacSit One “just in time” (i.e., the final 20 minutes of an hour+ time of flight) and successfully engage a target. Or, weapons may develop and finalize their own targeting solution based on the fusion of onboard/offboard sensor data generated inflight.2
Remaining in TacSit Two or Three
The second TacSit challenge is how to maintain one’s own forces in TacSit Two or Three (i.e., untargeted by enemy forces). Emissions control (EmCon) and active deception techniques choreographed among dispersed units—including unmanned “deceptors”— could up the ante on the operational deception techniques used during the Cold War. A limited analysis of deception techniques suggests significant value in the use of unmanned platforms for deception. The careful placement of deceptors could be valuable in deceiving an adversary. However, poor distribution may reduce the probability of “blue” forces remaining in TacSit Two or Three.
In the short term, perhaps as part of the reborn Fleet Problems mentioned by Admiral Scott Swift in the March Proceedings, carrier strike groups and surface action groups should practice EmCon and careful use of radio frequency transmissions. The Navy must prove to itself that its tactics in emissions-denied environments will meet the threat. As deceptive technologies and unmanned systems develop, they can also be incorporated as parts of the force battlespace preparation plan. In a situation where the duration of one satellite orbit can make the difference, the fleet must be ready to use unmanned deceptors when the time is right.
There Is More
Long-range-precision TacSit One information requires more than just accurate ISR. Employing long-range over-the-horizon (OTH) missiles requires renewed and hard-headed empirical analysis of existing organizational architecture, hierarchy, communications pathways, and internal analytic and feedback processes. Why? An underlying question that is now brought to the forefront is what will happen after target “x” or target “y” has been destroyed. The assumptions are that: (1) destroying such targets will lead to specific military results such as the defeat of enemy forces in a region; and (2) destruction of the set of target types, over a specified period of time, will lead to military defeat of the enemy and political surrender. This is the character of warfare in general, but with growing awareness of targets and the ability to strike at range, more options will present themselves to a commander than ever before. Determining the range of target sets whose destruction will lead to military and political victory is an important product of empirical analysis, wargaming, experimentation, and operational analysis.3
Another timely challenge is integrating kinetic and non-kinetic weapons: it is not just OTH kinetic weapons that can cause an explosion. The Navy and the other U.S. armed services are pursuing multi-domain operation initiatives that combine intelligence, sensors and kinetic and non-kinetic effectors to detect opportunities and act on them in domain-agnostic fashion. This will not only present wider and more agile engagement alternatives to commanders, it will help preserve finite and expensive hard-kill weapons for those targets for which they are the only solution. Again, much remains to be done in the area of integrated effects analysis and optimization.4
Are new long-range kinetic weapons sufficient to enable the Navy to regain its margin in sea control? By themselves, the answer is no. Just adding more over-the-horizon weapons will not enhance lethality sufficiently. Ships and their commanders must be armed with high-quality targeting data on the adversary and, at the same time, be able to control outgoing information to prevent the adversary from targeting them. Thus, TacSit management is an imperative.
1. Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 27.
2. Special thanks to Captain David Prothero, U.S. Navy (Retired) for his contributions to this section.
3. Special thanks to Dr. Mark Mandeles at the Center for Naval Analyses for his contributions to this section.
Captain Harris is a former surface warfare officer who commanded the USS Conolly (DD-979) and Destroyer Squadron 32. He was a key contributor to the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1980s, executive director of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, and has written numerous articles for Proceedings.
Mr. Kerr is a former submarine officer and a 2009 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He currently works as an operations analyst.
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