CG 41332: Surfmen, the Cape Disappointment Motor Lifeboat School, and the Forgotten Tragedy That Transformed U.S. Coast Guard Boat Operations
John Kopp. Middletown, DE: Remis Velisque, 2023. 586 pp. Illus. Notes. Biblio. Index. $29.99.
Reviewed by Captain David L. Teska, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)
About the time I started at the Officer Candidate School in the early 1990s, a saying once in vogue among small-boat crews was losing its luster: You have to go out, but you don’t have to come back. While heroic sounding, the motto also trivialized the inherent hazards and risks Coast Guard small-boat crews took when getting underway for search-and-rescue cases, one of the service’s bread-and-butter missions.
John Kopp is a former Coast Guardsman who qualified as coxswain and surfman and has gotten underway on some the most perilous U.S. waters on the Columbia River. His book, CG 41332, tells the story of one of the Coast Guard’s worst small-boat catastrophes. On the night of 15 November 1977, ten Coast Guardsmen attending the Motor Lifeboat School (MLBS) at Cape Disappointment set out for a nighttime navigation test on a 41-foot utility boat (UTB). Things went horribly wrong when the boat capsized after it strayed into breaking surf on the Columbia River Bar. Of the ten men, one was swept away while on deck and the remaining nine huddled in the forward compartment as it filled with water. Ultimately, seven swam to safety and two drowned.
Kopp has undertaken an exhaustive task in researching and writing this book. His love for the Coast Guard and his understanding of the boat crew community—especially those who crew the many stations along the coast in Oregon and Washington—is clear. In his book he breaks down the story into three sections: the development of the MLBS and the evolution of the surfman qualification, the tragedy of the CG 41332 sinking, and what the Coast Guard learned and has improved since.
Like most disasters at sea, the CG 41332 accident is a mix of human and systemic error. At the time of the accident, the MLBS trained small-boat crews in heavy surf, borrowing boats from neighboring boat stations, as it had none of its own. The plan was for the students to use one of two 44-foot motor lifeboats to complete the navigation test required to complete the school’s search-and-rescue coxswain course. However, both were down for maintenance, so permission was granted to use a 41-foot UTB instead; post-accident investigations found troubling dissension among boat crews on the use of 41-foot UTBs, especially in the vicinity of the Columbia River Bar.
Kopp’s time on small boats gives him solid credibility in telling the story of the Coast Guard’s small-boat community in the Pacific Northwest. He pulls no punches regarding the issues the service let fester in the run up to the events of 15 November 1977: the decision to take the 41-foot UTB out for the navigation test, the status of surfmen billets and the requirement for sea time to advance that pulled qualified boatswain’s mates off small boats for duty on cutters, the relationship between the MLBS and the Thirteenth Coast Guard District, and the lack of a strong advocate for the small-boat community at Coast Guard Headquarters.
The Coast Guard undertook two investigations of the tragedy—the Thirteenth District’s Vessel Safety Board and at headquarters the Commandant’s Vessel Safety Board. Chief among the findings of the latter was that the “Cape Disappointment MLB School is an informal school. Some instructors are neither professional nor well trained and the school was loosely run and not well supervised by any authority.” The Coast Guard made major changes to its boat force following the tragedy, from professionalizing the MLBS into a truly National Motor Lifeboat School and analyzing the state of the motor lifeboat fleet, which led to the development in the early 1990s of the 47-foot motor lifeboat, and to better protective clothing. Both boards also found that Coast Guard policy on the 41 was “too vague about when to employ what boat in the first place.”
Kopp shines a spotlight on this community and deftly tells the story of the CG 41322’s foundering in a holistic sense, always mindful that, at the end of the day, the men and women who set out in heavy surf—both in the years before the accident and years since—do what they love and in the best way they can. His book is a testament to that courage and, in some cases, sacrifice.
Captain Teska retired from the Coast Guard Reserve in June 2015. He works for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in Kansas City, Missouri. He is a previous book reviewer for Proceedings.
The Tragic Mind: Fear, Fate, and the Burden of Power
Robert D. Kaplan. New Have, CT: Yale University Press, 2023. 152 pp. $24.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Kyle Cregge, U.S. Navy
Robert D. Kaplan’s latest book, The Tragic Mind, is a thought-provoking and timely exploration of geopolitical crises through the lens of ancient and modern tragedy. A renowned journalist and political analyst, Kaplan offers an insightful look at world events. Drawing on his extensive knowledge of history, literature, and international politics, he weaves together themes from classical plays, philosophical works, and modern events to provide a fresh take on the complexities of global leadership.
As a U.S. Naval Academy English major, I appreciate Kaplan’s use of classical literature to illuminate the interplay of leaders in crisis and geopolitics. For example, he discusses Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Adolf Hitler’s rise and fall, informed by the timeless plays of antiquity. Having completed a data-driven master’s degree in public policy, I found Kaplan’s insistence on the value of literature in the geopolitical arena to be a balm and a refreshing reminder of the light and shadows present in all of humanity—the same light and shadow that data analysis obscures.
The Tragic Mind has several key themes, including the distinction between evil and tragedy, the inevitability of tragedy in life, the pursuit of virtue in the face of adversity, and the changing nature of global leadership. The exploration of these themes is concise yet powerful, offering readers a sobering look at the challenges and pitfalls leaders face in today’s increasingly complex world.
In his analysis, Kaplan highlights the strengths of his arguments while also acknowledging their potential shortcomings. By doing so, he provides a balanced and nuanced examination of the issues, giving readers a deeper understanding of the factors that shape our world. Key among them is his contemplation and attempt at intellectual penance for his support of the 2003 Iraq War, which he credits to a deep hatred of the Romanian and Iraqi regimes of Nicolae Ceaușescu and Saddam Hussein, respectively, from his journalistic days. Yet, the results of the Iraq War further reinforced his tragic sensibilities and the reality that “1,000 years of tyranny are better than 1 day of (true) anarchy.”
The book’s relevance to current events, issues, and trends is undeniable. For example, Kaplan discusses how the experiences of World War II–era leaders differ from those of today’s policymakers, who have not faced the same level of terror, challenge, and deprivation. This insight is particularly relevant as we navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics.
I wholeheartedly recommend The Tragic Mind to readers from all walks of life. Kaplan’s deep knowledge and purposefully wandering analysis make this book a must-read for anyone seeking a fresh perspective on the complexities of global leadership. Pick up a copy today and be prepared to be both challenged and enlightened.
Lieutenant Kyle Cregge is a surface warfare officer. He has served on a destroyer, cruiser, and aircraft carrier as an air-defense liaison officer. He is the prospective operations officer for the USS Pinckney (DDG-91).
The Decisive Decade: American Grand Strategy for Triumph Over China
Jonathan D. T. Ward. New York: Diversion Books, 2023. 291 pp. Notes. $28.99.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Brian Hayes, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
As U.S. national security leaders have identified China as a pacing threat, a host of authors have devised strategies to counter it. With The Decisive Decade, Jonathan D. T. Ward stakes out an unusually ambitious and aggressive proposal for a U.S.-led response to the threat. Unfortunately, his approach is long on rhetoric but short on serious analysis.
Ward argues that the United States must lead a coalition (which he terms the “Allied World” or “Free World”) to counter China in four “arenas”: economic, diplomatic, military, and ideas. Of these, he considers economics most important and gives it the greatest attention. He advocates an offensive coalition economic strategy to “roll back” China’s economic success, “dismantle” its economic alliances, and cut off its access to global markets and supply chains. Although Ward denies seeking China’s “financial ruin,” it is difficult to imagine any other outcome. The Decisive Decade is a blueprint for full-scale economic warfare against China.
Ward is highly critical of corporations and governments that have been willing to overlook China’s human rights abuses and unfair business practices. Of course, there is a reason for this: Most business and political leaders prioritize their economic self-interest over principles. Ward’s proposed economic containment plan would depend on persuading these businesses to forgo profits and access to Chinese capital because it is the right thing to do. To offset these losses, Ward proposes “‘moon-shot’ innovation industries” that he claims would add $10 trillion to the U.S. GDP over the next decade. He largely ignores how China might respond (a less sweeping economic offensive led Japan to declare war on the United States). Ward’s economic strategy seems naïve, and his failure to critically assess its chance of success is a significant shortcoming of the book.
With respect to military affairs, Ward breaks little new ground. He supports a U.S. military buildup to counter China, including policies that will be familiar to Proceedings readers, such as a reinvigorated U.S. industrial base, more shipbuilding, and increased deployment of unmanned naval platforms. He also endorses the “1,000-ship navy” and expanded maritime alliances. Here, Ward can again seem naïve, for example, by assuming India would abandon nonalignment to join a military alliance against China. His discussion of ideas is the weakest part of the book, amounting to little more than patriotic platitudes (including quotations from the Declaration of Independence, Emma Lazarus, and Martin Luther King Jr.).
The Decisive Decade is worthwhile reading for strategists and scholars with a dedicated interest in contemporary U.S.-China competition, if only to understand the views of unabashed China hawks. It is a quick read, and Ward limits the use of Chinese characters in the text and notes. However, the general reader who wants to better understand Chinese strategy and potential U.S. responses should look to more sober works by authors such as Bernard Cole, Toshi Yoshihara, and James Holmes. Ultimately, The Decisive Decade will appeal most to those who already believe that war between the United States and China is inevitable.
Lieutenant Commander Hayes began his military career in the Army and later served as a Navy Reserve intelligence officer and judge advocate. His active service included deployments to Afghanistan, East Africa, and Kuwait. He has a master’s degree from Georgetown University and a law degree from William and Mary and has previously reviewed books for Proceedings and the Naval Historical Foundation.
Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of Artificial Intelligence
Benjamin Jensen, Christopher Whyte, and Scott Cuomo. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2022. 266 pp. Notes. Biblio. Index. $49.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Humr, U.S. Marine Corps
With projected investments that exceed tens of billions of dollars over the next several years, it is clear the Department of Defense (DoD) sees artificial intelligence (AI) as a critical component in its arsenal. Yet, given DoD has been investing in AI in some form for more than 70 years, why is AI still not a reality writ large? In their book, Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of Artificial Intelligence, authors Benjamin Jensen, Christopher Whyte, and Scott Cuomo help answer this question by providing a picture of how AI may emerge and influence military organizations in the near future.
The book gives readers a short history of AI and the development of their theoretical framework. The authors use an analogized version of Claude E. Shannon’s information theory as a means for understanding how military organizations innovate with information technology. Through four different case studies, they not only provide an analysis of both successful and unsuccessful military information technology efforts, but also demonstrate how such innovations alone were not enough to foster significant change.
Central to understanding the book is the idea that “AI is another manifestation of information technology—bundles of algorithms, rituals, and machines—that helps humans sense, make sense, and act in the world.” Abstracting AI to a more general level of information technology allows the authors to diagnose organizational behaviors that may support or deter innovation.
To support their ideas, the authors argue that both structure and tacit knowledge are significant organizational characteristics that determine the conditions for innovation. Structure is analogous to channel capacity, or the rate at which information is exchanged across an organization. The dimension of tacit knowledge is the sum of personal experiences, underlying assumptions, and conventional wisdom of an organization for how new technologies resonate with organizational ways of warfighting.
The book does a commendable job of demonstrating that technology alone is not enough to create change. The authors highlight the importance of key personnel within an organization who can influence structure and tacit knowledge. Characterized as “programmers” who can modify channel structures or reprogram existing networks and “switchers” who possess the tacit knowledge and the technical know-how to garner cooperation, these roles have an outsized effect on pushing innovations forward, the authors argue. Capped off by four forward-looking vignettes from the perspective of a future Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the book provides a circumspect outlook for how AI might change the character of future warfare.
Analogies, however, tend to breakdown when pushed to the extremes. Because information theory has a mathematical foundation, equating it to aspects of organizational and human behaviors felt strained, but this was not necessarily an impediment to grasping the connections. While generous details of each case were helpful, the accompanying analysis was wrapped within a thin conclusion section for each chapter, leaving the reader wanting more balance. Moreover, the authors’ chosen case studies were taken from a period before cybersecurity and access to data were major considerations. Therefore, current information-security restrictions may require updates of their model to address AI specifically. Nevertheless, Information in War not only expands Kenneth Galbraith’s work characterizing organizations as information processing and communication systems, but also provides greater fidelity and structure over frameworks such as Cohen, March, and Olsen’s well-known Garbage Can Model of organizational choice and decision-making.
Information in War is poignant in its approach for addressing the fundamental issues of organizational technology innovation. It should be recommended reading for leaders at all levels and especially those working across different agencies. Overall, it demonstrates that people are still the most important part of the innovation equation.
Lieutenant Colonel Humr is a PhD candidate at the Naval Postgraduate School as part of the Commandant’s PhD-Technical Program. His research interests include trust in AI, sociotechnical systems, and decision-making in human-machine teams.