In the nearly 18 months since Russia invaded, Ukraine has surprised many observers with its battlefield success. Among the factors contributing to this success, one of the most frequently cited is Western training of a noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps to act independently based on commander’s intent, as opposed to Russia’s Soviet-style command-and-control structure.1 However, as the U.S. military considers lessons from the Ukraine conflict, it should be careful not to mistake this training approach and independent NCO corps as an enduring and wholesale advantage. Based on my experience as a Navy junior officer and subsequent work and study in the science of learning, I believe it imperative for the Navy to reconsider how it trains NCOs to maintain and improve the advantage demonstrated on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Motivation theory is a well-known concept in adult learning science. It is the “why” of training, which matters as much or more than what people are trained in. Different incentives not only influence whether training will be successful; they can also influence the types of lessons learned. Consider what motivates Navy NCOs to train. One of the most powerful incentives is qualification. Any Navy watchstander knows that qualification is highly valued: Once qualified, a sailor can stand watch and alleviate the watchstanding burden on fellow sailors. Furthermore, every sailor is expected to qualify in increasingly senior watchstations to earn promotions and additional pay, making qualification both reputationally and materially valuable.
But relying on extrinsic incentives such as peer pressure and pay may do more harm than good. Multiple studies have shown these rewards subtly communicate that the incentive is the only thing that makes the learning objective worthwhile. As a result, learners are encouraged to do just enough to earn the reward—and no more.2 By contrast, Ukrainian NCOs are intrinsically motivated to advance Ukraine’s interests on the battlefield. Obviously, it is neither practical nor desirable to fight a war for the sake of motivating training. The Navy should experiment with environments in which learning is paired with additional opportunities to exercise autonomy, do creative work, and even enter hyperproductive (and pleasurable) “flow states.”3 Instead, what often follows qualification for senior watchstations are ever-more complex procedures requiring rote memorization and compliance.
Bolstering Self-Efficacy
Another helpful concept is self-efficacy theory, which states that learners’ perceptions of their own abilities contribute to their success or failure in learning new tasks.4 Put another way, learners may be more likely to invest the significant effort required to learn difficult subjects if they believe they can be successful. Factors such as past performance, social standing, or feedback can inform learners’ sense of self-efficacy.
The unfortunate truth is that many forces conspire to erode Navy NCOs’ self-efficacy. For example, rating and rank are sometimes deployed as shorthand for what a sailor is capable of learning. As the chemistry and radiological control assistant on a fast-attack submarine, I was responsible for training the crew in fundamentals of nuclear reactor plant chemistry. One of the greatest obstacles I faced was convincing sailors they could master the material. Most had been taught that chemistry was uniquely difficult and that only officers or specialists (engineering laboratory technicians) could or should bother to learn it. It is imperative that sailors of all levels be encouraged to explore subject matter above and beyond their rates. Time and resources for training are limited, and perhaps not all sailors would take advantage of the opportunity, but those who do would distinguish themselves as future leaders, and the investment would pay off in an intellectually curious NCO corps capable of applying broad knowledge in novel situations with minimal direction.
Insidiously, the Navy’s own training approach can sometimes exacerbate the self-efficacy problem. As a student at the Navy Nuclear Power Training Command, I repeatedly observed that my classmates with prior training and deep theoretical knowledge of science and engineering struggled to learn the material the “Navy way.” Relative dunces in science and engineering such as myself, on the other hand, had fewer qualms memorizing class materials and regurgitating them on exams. Incorporating non-Navy reference materials and implementing grading criteria that reward comprehensive understanding instead of rigid adherence to a particular approach would be meaningful steps toward encouraging self-efficacy and greater engagement with the material. Greater engagement and deeper understanding, in turn, would help sailors apply what they have learned in novel situations, improving performance and creating a virtuous cycle of increased self-efficacy.
Nonetheless, I made the same mistake when serving as the chemistry and radiological controls assistant. I tried to “demystify” plant chemistry by reducing it to procedural steps that could be memorized, contributing to my sailors’ low self-efficacy by effectively “dumbing down” the material. Even worse, my procedural approach to the material could have reinforced stereotypes about the types of tasks suitable for enlisted sailors (adherence to procedure) and my shipmates’ perception that a more comprehensive understanding of the material was out of their reach. Many sailors I trained went on to qualify for senior watchstations, and my commanding officer credited the training I designed for helping to increase qualification rates. But I also received feedback that while some participants felt more prepared for their qualification exams, they did not understand the material any better. Essentially, they felt my training had taught them how to “fake it” in front of the commanding officer.
In the years since my Navy service, I have led innovative learning programs in the public and private sectors and conducted postgraduate study in adult learning theories and the design of learning environments. This experience has given me a greater understanding of how Navy NCO training could be improved and a greater appreciation for the obstacles to doing so: limited time and resources, competing imperatives, and resistance to change. Nonetheless, if the Navy desires to cultivate the kind of NCO corps that has proven such an advantage to Ukraine, it behooves the service to try.
1. U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Officials Hold Media Briefing on the Training of the Ukrainian Military,” 4 May 2022; and Helene Cooper, “Russian Military Is Repeating Mistakes in Eastern Ukraine, U.S. Says,” The New York Times, 31 May 2022.
2. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, How People Learn II: Learners, Contexts, and Cultures (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2018).
3. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1990).
4. Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience.