Beware the Allure of Mission Modularity
I Have been a consistent advocate for modularity for the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN). I have written a number of articles for Defence Security New Zealand and in the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy about the benefits a modular approach could bring to a small navy. It is good to see informed commentators weighing in on this important topic.
Modularity will, of course, be very challenging for high-end missions such as area air defense, and the author is right to point out that not every capability requirement has a modular solution. But even at this stage in the modular technology journey, a wide range of capabilities either are or can be made modular: antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, expeditionary reconnaissance, and long-range strike come to mind. NATO has promulgated standard modular interfaces—what the author means by interoperability.
Modularity offers a way for small to medium-size navies to contribute to distributed maritime operations with credible capability. This increases the number of networked platforms and thus complicates an enemy’s targeting problem. It is potentially affordable, particularly on a through-life basis, but not cheap. Modular platforms require the same networking capabilities as other platforms, as well as meaningful self-defense. Combat management systems need software that supports all modules the platform might need to embark—again, not cheap. In addition, mission module signature management must be considered.
Using land combat vehicles and aircraft as exemplars of failed modularity approaches may not be valid. I am neither a vehicular nor an aircraft engineer, but it seems their sizes make the mutual interference and compatibility challenges more significant compared with the much larger design space of a modern ship.
If the author’s point is that modularity is not yet the answer to all naval force structure prayers, then I agree with her. But for a small navy, modularity offers an unparalleled opportunity to acquire capability that is credible, flexible, and sustainable through life.
—CAPT A. G. A. Watts, RNZNR
Navy Information Warfare Needs Requirements Officers
Congratulations to Lieutenant Commander Reiffen on placing first in the Information Warfare Essay Contest!
I was pleased to see this topic get the attention it needs and deserves. Echelon I duty on the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) staff, where we do policy, requirements, and resourcing, is not glamorous duty. However, it’s where the Navy starts! I spent many years somewhere else in the fleet asking “Why don’t we just get . . . ?” Plug in there any good and obvious idea to make us more effective or lethal. But that work starts with requirements officers turning requests and outright demands from the fleet into “requirements.”
Requirements officers make the case for new or continued investments in capability. Sounds boring, sounds easy—but when it comes to spending the nation’s treasure on anything, it will receive rigorous and brutal scrutiny.
It is a competition; there is a fixed topline; and it is a year-plus-long multistage process of justification of why one investment provides more value to the Navy than another. What we need and want far exceeds what we can fund; therefore, we make tough
decisions about what will have the most impact.
To be successful in a warfare area requires a team of people who have experience in the field, can articulate and demonstrate—with data—the value proposition of an investment, and work effectively in the planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) process.
All of that discussion is my whole-hearted agreement with Lieutenant Commander Reiffen regarding the importance of not just a tour with the OpNav team in N2N6 as a requirements officer, but a carefully managed group of information warfare officers who will get second tours as commanders or captains who can compete, complement, and run with multitour officers in other communities to provide the best platforms and capabilities we can field for our sailors and our Navy.
Bravo Zulu!
—VADM Jeff Trussler, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare (N2N6)
Hunger Games: Forward Provisioning in the Indo-Pacific
As a career logistician, I really appreciated what Lieutenant Colonel Tsukano wrote. In the Australian Army, our troops’ water supply is always a major consideration (as is stealing any rations from the Yanks, as ours are, er, “rubbish”). This article identifies how far we have lost basic capability today.
A long-ago predecessor in my civilian job, Major Fredrick Lawson, was the engineer for Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage in Perth, Western Australia, immediately before World War I. He joined up in 1915 and carried out effectively the same duties (with many of the same staff) in France and wearing khaki as he had done in Perth. In 1917 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (equivalent to the U.S. Distinguished Service Cross) for maintaining the water supply to the Australian Corps during the Battle of the Menin Road and carrying out repairs under heavy artillery fire.
By March 1918, Lawson—as corps water supply officer—was responsible for supplying drinking and washing water for the 110,000 men and 80,000 horses (which required ten times the daily water supply provided to a soldier) of the Australian Corps.
He constructed and maintained pipelines, pumping plants, purifying works, and reservoirs for the Corps, which had troops changing their positions almost daily. During the 1918 Autumn Offensive from Villers-Bretonneux to the Hindenburg Line, for example, the Australian troops advanced 50 kilometers in three months.
It was noted that during Lawson’s tenure, there were no cases of serious disease in the Australian Corps that could be attributed to the water supply.
We did it more than 100 years ago. How difficult is it now?
—MAJ Perry Beor, Western Australian University Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel Tsukano proposes several novel remedies to the lengthy and fuel-intensive logistics chain required to provide food and water to forward-deployed Marines. He proposes a superb idea that could be instituted almost immediately: supplying modern personal mess kits to all forward-deployed troops. This recommendation is spot on, and detractors concerned about cleanliness and health issues of poorly washed utensils need only look at the Boy Scouts’ procedures at its high adventure camps. Water filtration and purification systems also are universally available and reliable—Scouts and backcountry campers have used them for decades.
The author also proposes obtaining food from local “grocery stores, markets, and retail farms” to reduce the unit’s signature regarding “strength, composition . . . and location of friendly forces.” It is not clear how the appearance of uniformed foreign troops in the local markets will not inform inquisitive local observers that a troop concentration is nearby, however. U.S. troops buying all the vegetables at a farmers’ market are sure to attract lots of unwelcome attention.
Foraging, as defined by Merriam-Webster—“to wander in search of food”—can reduce overall troop signature by obtaining nutrition from the field. And the first edition of the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations supports this, stating: “At the lowest level of employment, planners must consider operational contract support, which enables expeditionary units to develop a foraging mindset enabled by micro purchases.” This is the approach needed in these situations.
Buying produce and protein from a (one hopes) sympathetic farmer, as well as trapping or hunting game and fish and preparing it at the squad or platoon level, may result in a lower troop signature. Scattered cooking sites seen from above a jungle canopy may look more like local farmers or hunters than high-troop-density field kitchens. Winning the hearts and minds of the locals—or at least warming them—is critical in these ventures. Having a Marine conversant or at least stumblingly competent in a local language (admittedly difficult in multidialect areas) will go a long way toward this.
—Jeff Funderburk, Life Member
Needed: Body Armor Built for Women
Commander Hessert illustrates what is fundamentally flawed in the Pentagon. The physical characteristics of women have not changed in the past hundred years.
If a fashion house were in the business, it would have had women’s body armor out in mass many years ago. Until we fire some of these bureaucrats who see their mission as collecting a paycheck, rather than protecting our women service members, things will not change. The “working on it” mentality will only ensure we will lose the next conflict. Thank you for bringing this to our attention.
—Howard Richmond
Flexible Frigates: The FFG-7’s Lessons for the Constellation Class
It is probably not often that something in an issue of Proceedings lets you laugh out loud—in a good way! Paging through my June 2023 copy, I discovered the nicely done artwork for this article. In the background behind a rendering of the new FFG-62, is the USS Sides (FFG-14).
I had the great privilege of commanding her in 1997 and 1998. She was a very fine ship with a wonderful ship’s company, and this was the most memorable time in my career. I am curious why the artist selected the Sides among the 50-plus FFG-7s built. Whatever the reason, it both is a beautiful illustration and truly made my day. Thank you!
—CAPT Rick Dubberly, USN (Ret.)
Editor’s Note: We chose that image to match the approximate course and speed in the artist’s rendition. The midshipman author’s idea of lessons from the FFG-7s for the Constellation class inspired us to pair the two frigates. Our photo researcher found that the image of the Sides starboard side to, moving left to right, was the best option.
Leadership, Not Liker-Ship, Starts with Authenticity
Leadership is a critical subject as the military and the nation try to address the mass of ill-will, pettiness, and unending problems that our country seems to find itself in today. Maybe the authors made the issue more complex than it is, though. I say this after 26 years as a naval officer trying to struggle with contemporary leadership issues in the crucible of the U.S. Navy.
The authors listed 7 relevant issues of leadership, and if they thought about it at length, they could probably think of 20 more. Colin Powell listed 13. How do you remember all these things in the heat of battle?
I have found that all leadership stems from one thing: integrity. But integrity is the cornerstone we apparently have abandoned in our rush to find power, influence, money, and a vacation house in Aspen. Integrity causes men and women to follow their leaders through thick and thin, because they trust them to do the right thing, tell the truth, take care of the people under their charge, protect and inspire them, and make tough decisions in their defense. Perhaps I am old school, but it feels as if we have defined leadership by a handful of buzzwords and marketing terms instead of returning it to where it belongs, in dignity, honesty, clarity, courage, and courtesy.
That used to be what the Navy stood for up and down the ranks. Why don’t we focus on that?
—CAPT Chris Johnson, USN (Ret.)
The USS Scorpion
Comment and Discussion
Book Review: Scorpion Down: Sunk by the Soviets, Buried by the Pentagon
Once again Mr. Offley offers “proof” that the USS Scorpion (SSN-589) was sunk by a Soviet submarine. Perhaps he should read the comment signed by more than a dozen submarine and SOSUS experts in November 2007. To quote two key passages: “Extensive photographic coverage of the Scorpion wreck shows no structural damage consistent with explosion of a torpedo, nor any torpedo wreckage.” And “bottom line: there was no SOSUS detection of a hostile encounter between the Scorpion and a Soviet submarine.” There is more of value in their commentary.
Mr. Offley contends that the Soviet craft was a nuclear-powered Echo II guided-missile submarine (SSGN). In the 1990s, I had several lengthy conversations with Russian submariners and submarine designers. The Scorpion affair was mentioned, and while not discussed in any detail, it was stated that no Echo II was deployed in the western Atlantic at that time.
—Norman Polmar, coauthor, Cold War Submarines
Scorpion Down postulates that a Soviet Echo II, a first-generation SSGN, pursued the Scorpion for several days before sinking her with a torpedo on 22 May 1968, 400 miles southwest of the Azores. The Scorpion could not escape, Mr. Offley asserts, despite being a much more capable submarine, significantly faster and quieter and possessing better torpedoes and sonar. There was no evidence of a torpedo explosion found in the wreck.
My research, summarized in a 2007 review of Mr. Offley’s Scorpion Down, turned up no evidence that a search for the lost submarine was secretly started several days before she failed to return to home port on 27 May 1968, as Scorpion Down claimed. Vice Admiral Philip Beshany, then–director of Submarine Warfare, was the only senior submarine leader mentioned in Offley’s book who was still alive when I was researching for my book review. I talked with him in July 2007, and he was still sharp at age 92. Beshany vehemently rejected the various conspiracy theories.
—CAPT Jim Bryant, USN (Ret.)
The author of Scorpion Down is correct. I have a photo of the Soviet submarine returning to port on the surface with a badly damaged bow after the Scorpion collision.
I was on the USS Sea Leopard (SS-483) that was to relieve the Scorpion on patrol in the Mediterranean Sea. Instead, we spent two weeks looking for wreckage.
The whole story of the Walker family’s spying, the capture of the USS Pueblo (AGER-2), and deception by the Navy is unforgivable.
Vice Admiral Arnold Schade, commander, Submarine Force Atlantic, at the time of the loss, had a remarkable career. But there is no excuse for what he did regarding the Scorpion. He misled us as we departed for the Mediterranean and chased Russians still not knowing what really had happened. He placed us in grave danger.
—LCDR Steve Rogers, USN (Ret.)
Chinese Influence in Africa
Following a recent visit to our country of birth, South Africa, my wife and I boarded a cruise ship to take us from Cape Town up the west coast of Africa and ultimately to Lisbon, Portugal. Included in our port visits were Luanda, Angola; Takoradi, Ghana; Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; and The Gambia.
While I am not an expert on global developments, I am a keen observer, and the signs of Chinese influence were overt wherever we stopped. At the docks in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, China has its own separate facility to export cars it assembles there. In all our stops, signs of Chinese involvement were obvious: cranes, railroads, and all forms of transportation, even tourist buses. At the port of Walvis Bay, Namibia, China sends vast amounts of uranium to itself.
The infrastructure in most of these ports left a lot to be desired, reflecting the underlying poverty and corruption that exists. Tellingly, there is virtually no sign of any significant U.S. presence. The country appears to have lost any significant influence in Africa. We will pay dearly for this unless we wake up and recognize our lackadaisical approach.
—CAPT Walter D. Leventhal, USNR (Ret.)
Run Silent, Not Deep
Way back in 1991, upon installation of the Harpoon missile system on board the USS Reeves (CG-24), we immediately began learning and practicing passive-bearings-only plotting using our AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare suite. By the time of our Harpoon evaluation by Fleet Training Group we had pretty much perfected over-the-horizon targeting tactics and formed an antisurface warfare plotting team that worked well together. We proved the ship could function well in a total emission control environment, targeting and striking enemy targets with a high probability of success. We also practiced using passive sonar bearings based on enemy propeller beats.
It’s good to hear the fleet of the 21st century is catching up to where the Reeves’ iron men were in 1991.
—OSC(SW/AW) John M. Duffy, USN (Ret.)