Drones are changing maritime warfare and threaten to disrupt how the Navy moves, supports, and supplies Marines in the Indo-Pacific. But using existing personnel, training, and equipment, the Marine Corps could rapidly reestablish the Marine detachment (MarDet) to help protect the vulnerable maritime infrastructure, support vessels, and modern warships needed to carry out and support its amphibious and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO). Marines are trained and equipped to counter uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and uncrewed surface vessels (USV), such as those used successfully by Ukraine in the current Russia-Ukraine War.
Although the Navy’s Arleigh Burke–class destroyers are some of the most capable warships in the world at protecting an amphibious task force (ATF) from supersonic and ballistic missiles, their existing air defenses and new counter-UAS (CUAS) equipment are inadequate to defend themselves against swarms of UASs and USVs, much less an ATF’s landing and logistic ships. If these destroyers were to suffer proportionately similar damage to the Russian Navy from kamikaze drones, Marines in either an ATF or expeditionary advanced base would take losses before hitting the ground, lack naval support, and risk being cut off from resupply.
Savo and Sevastopol
Kamikaze attacks using UASs and USVs have increased in number and scale, evolving from the Houthi remote-controlled explosive boat that damaged the Royal Saudi Navy Al Madinah in the Red Sea in 2017 to Ukraine’s 2022 attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. At Sevastopol, Ukraine’s seven USVs and nine UASs damaged the frigate Admiral Makarov and minesweeper Ivan Golubets, contributing to the Russian Navy’s withdrawal from Ukraine’s coast. Russia began to rely more heavily on small craft and submarines, but the change in tactics left its naval auxiliary vessels and the critical maritime infrastructure needed to supply Russia’s Army vulnerable, specifically the Kirch Bridge into Crimea and the Olenegorsky Gornyak landing ship at Novorosiyk.
This dispersal of Russian warships and the vulnerability of supply lines following the Sevastopol attack is reminiscent of the fallout from the U.S. defeat in the 1942 Battle of Savo Island. The first in a series of naval battles during the Guadalcanal campaign’s Operation Watchtower, the Battle of Savo Island on 8–9 August was a night battle between an Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) force of seven cruisers and one destroyer and a U.S. and Australian naval force of eight cruisers and 15 destroyers. Unprepared to counter the IJN’s proficiency in close-range night battles and Type 93 “Long Lance” torpedoes, the Allied forces lost four cruisers and were forced to withdraw their landing ships and escorts from Guadalcanal.1 Subsequently, the Marines on Guadalcanal were exposed to Japanese naval and air bombardment and were left with only five days of food when the U.S. landing ships and escorts left with most of the Marines’ heavy equipment and supplies.2
The United States could face another Savo Island and its own Sevastopol in the Indo-Pacific if it remains unprepared to counter UASs and USVs. In addition to its large and modern People’s Liberation Army Navy, China could equip the paramilitary vessels in its People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia with a range of small and medium aerial and surface drones for use against U.S., allied, and partner forces. More important, China could use these drones in its gray zone activities against its South China Sea neighbors, for a joint blockade against Taiwan, and to deny access to U.S. naval forces attempting to intercede.
Remaking the MarDet
In addition to bolstering destroyers’ defenses, squads from 40-person MarDets could be detailed to additional assignments. Marines could be sent to augment security and counter-drone defense on commercial and auxiliary vessels that a destroyer is assigned to escort and protect, much like the Marine Corps security teams used by the U.S. Fifth Fleet to deter and prevent Iranian harassment and boardings. Marines also could supplement a destroyer’s boarding team to conduct noncompliant boardings or opposed boardings of unmarked paramilitary vessels suspected of launching or controlling drones. Finally, Marines could provide additional security and counter-drone defense of the maritime infrastructure—such as piers, oil tanks, and cranes—necessary to support and replenish destroyers in overseas ports.
With the Marine Corps eliminating three infantry battalions by 2030 and reducing the size of the remaining 26 battalions from 900 to 800 Marines, there could be up to 5,000 available Marines to staff a 40-person MarDet for each Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and naval auxiliary ship, and an 80-person detachment for each aircraft carrier. Although the last MarDets in the 1990s were assigned exclusively to much larger battleships and aircraft carriers, Arleigh Burke–class destroyers have room for a 40-person detachment, the same size embarked in the all-gun cruisers and battleships after decades of optimization reduced the required number of crew members.
These Marines could complete existing training on performing opposed boardings and employing vehicular and portable counter-drone systems in defense of the ATF. Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) and Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST) are trained and equipped for opposed boardings and security at sea and ports. In addition, Marines use the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS) CUAS from the flight deck of amphibious ships. For example, LMADIS was employed from USS Boxer (LHD-4) to protect the ship from an approaching Iranian UAS in 2019. While the LMADIS is too large for the flight deck of a destroyer, the Marine Corps fields the smaller Compact Laser Weapon System (CLaWS) and has tested the more portable installation-counter small uncrewed aerial systems (I-CsUAS), equipment suitable for employment from destroyers and designed to defeat small UAS.
Embracing Change
Not all MarDets would have to be ready to deploy, since only approximately a third of U.S. destroyers or auxiliaries are deployed at any time. However, the need for MarDets is not limited to the two or three surface action group destroyers tasked to support each expeditionary strike group, ATF, and EABO. Suppose a destroyer tasked with ballistic missile defense, protection of an aircraft carrier, or single-ship operations is damaged by drones. In that situation, there would be no replacements to pull from besides the destroyers assigned to the ATF or EABO. Therefore, the MarDets must be formed, equipped, and trained in sufficient numbers to help protect the Navy’s destroyers before great power competition turns to conflict.
Given the challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific, it is difficult to envision destroyers operating in or near hostile waters to support the Marines in amphibious landings and EABO if the destroyers cannot effectively counter drones. The answer to landing and resupplying Marines ashore amid gray zone operations and the threat of uncrewed systems may be detaching hundreds of Marines to operate from the destroyers, auxiliaries, and supply ships needed to protect and support the amphibious force and EABO. If tens of thousands of Marines could be employed on land in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight alongside the Army, then the Marine Corps surely could reallocate the Marines displaced by Force Design 2030 reorganization to return to the ships of the Navy to fight alongside its sailors.
1. CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 124; John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 399.
2. Michael T. Smith, Bloody Ridge: The Battle That Saved Guadalcanal (Novato, CA: Pocket, 2003), 15–16.