As momentum builds to shift the U.S. national security focus away from counterterrorism and toward great power competition, the Navy is rethinking how to fight as a combined fleet in the Atlantic and Pacific against high-end navies. Transitioning to great power competition requires a fresh look at command-and-control concepts. The Navy must change the way undersea forces integrate with the fleet and joint force.
Command-and-control (C2) relationships are the lens through which a combatant commander or joint force commander can visualize the effects to achieve objectives in both war and peace. To synchronize maritime actions across the entire theater at the operational level, the maritime operations center (MOC) concept has developed over the past decade. Its purpose is to provide the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) with the battlefield situational awareness necessary to issue timely and relevant commander’s intent to subordinate task elements. Although the MOC concept has gained a foothold across the fleet, the character of undersea warfare (USW) has diverged from Navy doctrine.
Modern undersea warfare goes far beyond the traditional defensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) to protect the carrier against enemy attack submarines. USW seeks to integrate manned and unmanned undersea platforms to deliver effects against enemy forces from seabed infrastructure to surface and land targets. USW involves submarines, surface units, and air platforms and sensors.
Today, the theater USW commander (TUSWC) construct exists across all combatant commands to provide centralized coordination of U.S. and allied submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface ships, and distributed sensors. The TUSWC is the best C2 structure to maintain undersea domain awareness and ensure deterrence against near-peer submarines in peacetime and war, a fact borne out over the past two decades of real-world prosecutions against Russian and Chinese submarines.1 However, it must be integrated into Navy doctrine and practice at the operational level.
Current Naval C2 Doctrine
C2 doctrine confuses the concepts of undersea warfare at an operational level and the tactical practice of antisubmarine warfare. In the 2021 Joint Maritime Operations, USW is defined as military operations “conducted to establish and maintain control of the undersea portion of a maritime operational area” and to encompass “offensive and defensive submarine, antisubmarine warfare and [mine warfare] operations.”2 In Navy doctrine, Navy Warfare Publication 3-56 distinguishes between USW and ASW operations, which are “conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines” and are the responsibility of the carrier strike group (CSG).3
However, Navy MOC doctrine and the maritime operational-level C2 structure never mention USW.4 In addition, the governing Navy staff instruction defining baseline force compositions goes into detail about the task organization and units that make up carrier and expeditionary strike groups with no specific force structure aligned to USW. ASW is mentioned only in reference to strike group defense, and U.S. undersea forces such as submarines and maritime patrol aircraft are not included at all.5 Thus, while USW is a theater-scale core task of the naval component commander, Navy doctrine has a gap at the operational-level C2 of forces in the undersea domain.
The TUSWC Concept
Command at sea traditionally has been conducted with mission command, with higher headquarters providing a clear intent but leaving the “how” up to the officer in tactical command.6 This tendency toward decentralized command is felt bone-deep in the U.S. submarine community. During the World War II campaign in the Pacific, Admiral Charles Lockwood’s hunter-killer submarines departed Pearl Harbor largely on independent operations, raiding commerce and targeting the Imperial Japanese Navy as individual units or in small wolf packs. While long-range radio, radar and early electronic direction finding did enable some coordination with larger fleet actions, U.S. submarines typically stayed on patrol until out of torpedoes or sunk, with little to no expected communication with higher headquarters.
The Cold War ushered in the era of ultra-quiet nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) as the United States vied with the Soviet Navy for dominance of the Atlantic sea lines of communication. Undersea forces were central to the 1986 Maritime Strategy, which envisioned massive SSN barriers to provide ASW screens to flow carrier battle groups into theater.7 The carrier’s centrality in this strategy led to a C2 construct in which SSNs were under the tactical control of the CSG (then called carrier battle groups), with an embarked submarine element coordinator communicating directly with the submarine.
In the 1990s, focus shifted to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and land-attack strike missions, and the experiment with C2 from the CSG was abandoned in favor of a dedicated USW watchfloor.8 In the early 2000s, a comprehensive strategy was developed to counter the acoustic advances of Russian Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines. Key to this “full-spectrum ASW” was the continual presence of U.S. and allied SSNs in the contested waters as well as persistent awareness of adversary undersea threats.9 As this mission was at the operational level, it required coordination across military services, combat service agencies, and with allies and partners; thus the TUSWC concept was developed to coordinate theater-level USW.
Today there are four TUSWCs across the numbered fleets, dual-hatted with the commander, submarine group, who holds submarine operating authority. The TUSWC staff coordinates U.S. and allied submarines in the assigned waterspace, provides tactical control of assigned U.S. and allied ASW surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft, and processes acoustic information from fixed and mobile sensors.
The Russian Undersea Threat
Despite significant questions about the Russian military’s ability to conduct combined arms warfare raised by the Ukraine conflict, the Russian Navy submarine fleet has a number of very capable platforms. The three operational Yasen-class nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines (SSGN, NATO designation Severodvinsk) exhibit quieting and acoustic performance on par with U.S. SSNs. Operating in the Russian Northern Fleet with the venerable but still capable Oscar II SSGNs, Akula SSNs, and Kilo diesel-electric attack boats, the Severodvinsk class considerably complicates the ASW problem in the Atlantic. It is estimated there eventually could be eight Severodvinsk-class submarines operating in the Atlantic and Pacific.10 Russia also has a capable SSBN fleet, which conducts deterrence patrols at regular intervals.
The Russian strategic approach also has transformed since the Cold War, now focusing on long-range cruise missile strikes against infrastructure. The Kalibr cruise missile has a range of more than 1,500 kilometers, allowing the Russian Navy to strike into NATO territory from the security of the Russian High North. In addition, Russian SSGNs that can slip across the mid-Atlantic ridge have enough range to threaten the U.S. Eastern Seaboard from the deep ocean.11
This Russian strategic shift toward conventional and nonconventional targeting of key infrastructure extends undersea as well. The Russian Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research operates a fleet of specialized deep-submersible submarines and a number of specialized surface vessels. The dual-use capabilities of these undersea systems threaten seabed infrastructure along the European coast, including the cables carrying most of the world’s telecommunications traffic and key energy pipelines.12
USW Against China
The PLAN attack submarine fleet consists largely of conventionally powered diesel submarines. This is a mix of older indigenously built Ming- and Song-class and more modern Russian-built Kilos as well as the Yuan-class air-independent propulsion subs with advanced quieting. Most of this undersea fleet carries either the Russian export SS-N-27 or Chinese-made YJ-18 submarine-launched antiship cruise missiles, providing an effective range of 100–300 nautical miles.13 The six Jin-class SSBNs carry the JL-2 ballistic missile, capable of striking the continental United States from the western Pacific.14
China’s strategy of defending its “home waters” in the South China Sea and solidifying its regional hegemony with its area-denial capabilities rests on its massive shipbuilding program, with a projected battle force of 425 combatants by 2030. Deploying cruise missile systems into contested maritime waters in the South China Sea means U.S. air and surface platforms will be under threat anywhere within the first island chain and beyond. Thus, U.S. and allied submarine forces may be required to establish sea control independently in the initial phases of a conflict with China.
TUSWC During Large-Scale Combat Ops
As both Russia and China vie for the advantage in the undersea domain, the Navy must consider how TUSWC should be conducted in large-scale combat operations. Should C2 be a subordinate function under a CSG/expeditionary strike group (ESG) commander, or should USW be the specified task for a dedicated task force subordinate to the JFCC? TUSWCs experience commanding submarines to maintain deterrence every day and several recent fleet-level exercises point toward the latter.
The challenges inherent in undersea warfare remain unchanged since the dawn of the submarine age: Com-
munication at speed and depth is largely impossible, remaining undetected is a mission essential-task, and finding and killing adversary submarines in challenging acoustic environments is exceedingly difficult. In a combat scenario in which the carrier or high-value unit will undoubtedly be operating in denied and degraded environments, two-way communication with submarines will be difficult. SSN mission success depends on an efficient, timely communication of commander’s intent, fusion of external sensor data, and water space allocation while remaining at depth to the greatest extent possible. The TUSWC construct allows efficient and survivable communications with submarine forces and has proved this by maintaining undersea domain awareness and deterrence in the Atlantic and Pacific for decades. The transition between strike group ASW and TUSW water space and C2 is a skill baked into modern USW doctrine and practiced frequently.
The TUSWC construct is flexible enough to tailor the force composition and operational tempo to match the threat. For instance, in the north Atlantic and High North, Task Force 69 (CTF-69) conducts continual operations and exercises with NATO submarines and surface ships to maintain an understanding of the Russian Navy undersea threat. U.S. and NATO maritime patrol aircraft fly from airfields throughout the region. In the eastern Pacific, Yokosuka-based CTF-74 coordinates activities with allied submarines, especially the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Republic of Korea and Australian navies. In both theaters, wide-area search capabilities include U.S. ships deploying towed-array sensor systems and other fixed and mobile sensors. At the same time, TUSWCs are uniform enough to seamlessly hand off assets and contacts across C2 boundaries, ensuring continuity of operations.
Finally, the TUSWC is the only C2 node with the communication systems and access to safely integrate USW activities with U.S. SSBNs on continuous patrol. This key capability requires close coordination between Strategic Command and the supported commander at communication and classification levels not easily achievable by an embarked or in-theater C2 structure.
Challenges and Opportunities
There remain two major challenges with integrating the TUSWC concept with naval doctrine and into the MOC concept and as a subordinate task force: manning and undersea force allocation.
The TUSWC will require augmentation to command and control assigned forces. If a conflict shifts from deterrence to large-scale combat, the TUSWC will be assigned maneuver forces, including surface ships and aircraft. In a peacetime configuration, the sourcing headquarters would maintain command of these forces. However, to provide unity of command, a wartime TUSWC will need to be augmented with air and surface planners and enablers to provide subject-matter expertise and communication capabilities for assigned forces. Under current manning, this planning effort is largely borne by the dual-hatted submarine group staff. This is untenable, however, for any extended period during a large-scale conflict. The scale, source, and duration of this augmentation should be tailored to the situation and must be a planning factor for TUSWC active and reserve component manning. Communications and logistics enablers for these additional USW forces should be built into plans and practiced frequently during fleet-level exercises.
The undersea domain must be incorporated in the joint fires process. Over the past two decades, the joint fires process has been developed to shorten the kill chain between identifying and striking a target. The process is dominated by the air tasking order (ATO) cycle, allowing the joint task force commander to nominate targets and assign the best weapon to deliver the desired outcome across all domains. While Tomahawk-capable SSNs and SSGNs have been well integrated into this process, other undersea effects are not included. In particular, the heavyweight torpedo is the only weapon capable of sinking enemy nuclear submarines as well as high-value surface combatants with a single shot from a covert launch platform. As the submarine force continues to develop expanded capabilities in the near term, such as submarine-launched Harpoon antiship missiles and operation of undersea unmanned vehicles, the requirement to fuse the TUSWC within the broader joint fires process will only increase.
The joint fires process was developed, however, around the delivery of effects from elements with near real-time communication capabilities with higher headquarters. Thus, the pacing of the ATO and the expectations of connectivity with subordinate commanders are out of sync with submarine operations. Establishing TUSWC lines of communication up to the JFMCC can bridge this gap to other component commanders. A similar situation exists in the coordination between naval air elements and the joint force air component commander. To enable CSG and ESG unity of command over carrier-based aviation while coordinating with Air Force elements, a naval and amphibious liaison element is formally established within the Joint Air Operations Center. Having a similar undersea liaison element embedded in the MOC and enabling TUSWC inputs into the fires process could ensure efficient employment of undersea weapons.
The TUSWC concept, which has proven so effective in peacetime, must be formally included in maritime C2 doctrine at the operational level of war. The undersea domain will increase in importance in the era of great power competition, and the U.S. Navy must integrate USW forces in plans and operational structures. By organizing and designing the TUSWC concept as part of the fleet operational C2 structure, U.S. undersea forces will ensure control of the sea from the seabed up.
1. CAPT Dan Packer, USN, “Improve Undersea Domain Command and Control,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 147, no. 10 (October 2021).
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32: Joint Maritime Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2021), xv and IV-10.
3. Department of the Navy, Navy Warfare Publication 3-56: Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2015), 3-2.
4. Department of the Navy, Navy Warfare Publication 3-32: Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2008).
5. Chief of Naval Operations, OpNav Instruction 3501.316C: Force Composition of Afloat Navy and Naval Groups (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, 2017).
6. See Admiral Ernest King’s CINCLant Serial 053 of 21 January 1941, as quoted in Naval Warfare Publication 3-56.
7. “Maritime Strategy Presentation for the Secretary of the Navy 4 November 1982,” in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, John B. Hattendorf and CAPT Peter M. Swartz, USN, eds. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008).
8. CDR Mark Gorenflo, USN, and Michael Poirier, “The Case for More Submarines,” Undersea Warfare 2, no. 6 (Winter 1999).
9. CAPT William J. Toti, USN, “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 140, no. 6 (June 2014).
10. Sidharth Kaushal, James Byrne, Joe Byrne, and Gary Somerville, “The Yassen-M and the Future of Russian Submarine Forces,” RUSI Defence Systems, 23 May 2021.
11. CDR Joshua Menks, USN, and Michael B. Petersen, “The ‘Kalibrization’ of the Russian Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no. 5 (May 2022).
12. H. I. Sutton, “Russia’s Growing Secret Submarine Fleet Key to Moscow’s Undersea Future,” USNI News, 30 November 2021.
13. Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015), 15–16.
14. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), 15–18.