Much has been made of the disconnect between the deckplate and the senior leaders developing Navy policy, specifically with regard to junior officer retention. “Get Real, Get Better” bridges the gap on some issues but widens it on others.
Get Real, Get Better addresses one of the biggest reasons many junior officers leave the Navy: overly burdensome administrative processes. It abolishes some of these processes; however, its “data-driven improvement cycle” ignores the frustration of trying to
use antiquated technology to analyze data. The solution here is relatively simple: Give personnel the tools they need to complete the task at hand, improving work-life balance and therefore retention.
Get Real, Get Better also aims to raise the Navy’s warfighting capability by narrowing the gap between the service’s strongest and weakest performers. But its focus on raising the standard of the weakest performers is flawed. Successful teams are defined by their ability to recognize, promote, and thus retain high-performing individuals.
Some might argue that fitness reports (FitReps) do not support the contention that the Navy is retaining lower-ranking officers. This is untrue, and the situation is exacerbated by Navy Personnel Command’s (PERS’s) approach, which seems to be “How can we retain more officers?” rather than “How can we retain the right officers?” The service should revamp two administrative policies: FitReps and performance-based initiatives.
FitReps
My experience with FitReps is not one of feedback but of fluffy adjectives and an arbitrary score that is supposed to increase, with no transparency in the ranking process. Worse, the process seems to emphasize ranking officers who are committed to staying in higher than their counterparts, even if they are less deserving. FitReps need to reflect a person’s abilities. A proposed solution:
• Instead of assigning categorical scores, list an individual’s top three strengths and weaknesses. Not only would this develop a self-correcting culture, but it also would help PERS assign people to jobs that play to their strengths.
• Build more transparency and feedback into the process by implementing a ranking system based not on just the captain’s decision, but on a combination of peer, superior, and captain input, with weighted values assigned. This would help counter any bias based on whether a junior officer intends on signing a department head contract. Desire to stay in the Navy should not be a criterion on which to evaluate a person.
• Remove the rigidity of specific months to rank individuals and instead rank individuals based on time at the command. For example, a newly reported officer would not be ranked against an officer who has been at the command for a significant time.
• “Embrace the red” and provide objective feedback. Not all junior officers are meant to be department heads, not all departments heads are meant to be executive officers, and so on.
• Get rid of one-size-fits-all FitReps. Let each community assign attributes based on competencies for its war-fighting area. For example, submariners would get a rating in engineering, navigation, tactical (weapons), strategic (if applicable), and leadership categories.
Performance-Based Initiatives
Joining the military is, in large part, a selfless act; however, separation decisions sometimes are based on disillusionment with the promotion system. For example, assume junior officers A and B are assigned tasks. Junior officer A completes his task earlier and with better quality of work. Next time they are assigned tasks, A is given a heavier load, and B is assigned a lighter load—which becomes a consistent cycle. Both officers promote at the same time, and, while junior officer A was given a higher ranking, junior officer B receives the shore tour he desired because he signed a follow-on contract, and junior officer A decides to separate.
There are solutions to this problem:
• Institute a meritorious advancement program, similar to the enlisted model. Give junior officers who outperform their peers something more meaningful than an award. Promote them ahead of their peers.
• Institute performance-based bonuses and reduce contract bonuses. This is an opportunity to retain high-performing junior officers by showing the Navy values them. Bonus decisions would be made by the immediate superior in command on the recommendation of the captain.
• If a junior officer is doing the job of a department head, recognize him or her by removing the “acting” title and allowing brevet promotion to the appropriate rank.
• Base shore duty selection on ranking, strengths and weaknesses outlined in the FitRep, and fit. In addition, design shore tours to address weaknesses. For example, a submarine junior officer with a high engineering rating would choose from various weapons instructor or operations billets.
Raising warfighting capability is done by retaining and rewarding top performers. The Navy has maintained its status as a global power through the quality of its personnel, and it cannot afford to lose that; wars are not won by numbers alone. The Navy must choose between peacetime bureaucracy and wartime competency. There is no in between.