Run Silent, Not Deep
Thanks to Chief Duffy for pointing out that the good ideas in “Run Silent, Not Deep” are quite valid but not new.
In 1991, on the USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) we used passive target motion analysis (using passive sonar to track submarines) with our SLQ-32 during a Fleet Training Group exercise. We put two constructive Harpoon missiles within the required 11-mile-wide envelope of our target, using entirely passive sensors, at a range of more than 50 miles. Prior to that, when I was on board the USS Antrim (FFG-20) from 1985 to 1987, we had the combat information center go to “combat footing” every time we put to sea, using the submarine service as our model. We routinely maintained a Harpoon-ready fire control solution on all surface tracks.
We practiced pretty tight emission control (which is not to say we were always “silent,” but we managed what was emitting). The midwatch practiced visual target identification when the watch was slow. On one occasion, we performed a passing exercise with a supply ship, achieving a totally passive, visual detection at night at a range in excess of 30 miles using night vision goggles. All this training stood us in good stead when we arrived in the Persian Gulf during the Tanker War. Chief Duffy, I agree with you: We have done this before, and we can do it all again.
—LCDR J. William Cupp, USN (Ret.)
The Lightning Carrier Isn’t Either
Why is it that, whenever a discussion comes about nuclear and conventional carriers, it’s always an either or proposition? No one is denying the capabilities of a nuclear carrier like the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). It is also colossal in size and costs more than $13 billion. That alone should give pause and encourage seeking more economical options for smaller threats and various circumstances.
No one doubts the need for or value of nuclear carriers in the western Pacific. They are invaluable given the size of that ocean and, in many cases, the lack of air support from nearby bases. But does NATO really need the help of a nuclear-powered carrier given all the air bases and land-based air assets within NATO? Is one really needed in the confined waters of the Baltic? Could not a smaller carrier, roughly the size of the USS America (LHA-6) or slightly bigger, handle those areas?
Captain Manvel brings up many legitimate points about the America being unsuitable as an attack carrier. Then again, it was never designed to be an attack carrier. But what if the America’s design was updated to resolve the structural, fire, damage control, and ordnance carrying problems? Redesigning the America class would probably cost much less than even refueling a nuclear-powered carrier, and those modifications could be incorporated into future ships of that class.
No one should be saying nuclear carriers must go. However, soon we may not be able to afford more carriers like the Gerald R. Ford without it consuming most of the Navy’s budget, forcing us to cut the acquisition of other badly needed ships.
—Remo Salta
Cohesion Is an Enduring Warfighting Advantage
The authors draw two conclusions from the programmatic diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiative of making the military “look like America.” First, it will bring internal cohesion to the services, and, second, it will bring external long-term stability to strategic competition. Neither will necessarily result from the initiative.
Diversity of race, color, and national origin may bring a wealth of regional knowledge, cultural awareness, and linguistic capability for military operations and strategic planning. But it does not follow that individual behavior will be cohesive. Cohesion is the result not of being outwardly diverse (“looking like America”) but of mental and philosophical commitment to the national team in hearts and minds.
Emphasizing differences and flying diverse flags under the banner of DEI runs counter to the goal. What does unity and cohesion look like? It looks like 1980 U.S. Olympic coach Herb Brooks taking a diverse group of hockey players and getting them to play for the United States. The “miracle” was leadership that brought the diverse team together to beat the previously invincible Russian Olympic hockey team.
The first step toward cohesion in military service is affirming the oath so that each member wears the national uniform for the same reason: defending the Constitution that organizes our government and establishes rights and liberties for all citizens. Such cohesion provides long-term effects for strategic competition. The Roman Army, the Mongols, Napoleon’s military, and even U.S. military services in the past did not operate under principles of diversity, yet they were very effective over long periods, demonstrating the falsity of the authors’ claim that nondiverse militaries are ineffective in long-term strategic competition.
Despite senior military leaders adopting a DEI path, potential recruits see the problem and are not signing up. Religious discrimination in COVID-19 policies highlighted violations of religious freedom flowing from military policy almost as soon as they were adopted. George Orwell’s allegorical book, Animal Farm, about a diverse egalitarian farm led by the pigs might be compared to the Pentagon’s DEI program. In the book, when confronted by violations of fairness and equality among the animals, the pigs unashamedly state the real policy: Some animals are more equal than others.
Offering large recruitment bonuses will not bring people into the services for long careers. Nor can commitment that must come from the heart be purchased with money. The more likely outcome of DEI is a growing lack of internal unity in an environment of isolationism and withdrawal that will have adverse long-term effects for the United States in strategic competition.
—CAPT Daryl Borgquist, USNR (Ret.)
Time to Recalibrate: The Navy Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons . . . Again
Commander Giarra covers the deterrent need for naval tactical nuclear weapons thoroughly, though he suffers from tunnel vision by focusing on one weapon system. While he highlights the importance of the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N) and its implications for the surface fleet, I am disappointed by the lack of discussion about returning B61-12s (tactical nuclear gravity bombs) to the air wing. U.S. Air Force F-35s are expected to be certified to use B61-12s, so the Navy’s F-35Cs should be well positioned to piggyback on those efforts. The B61-12 started production in December 2021 and may be ready to deploy faster than any SLCM-N as well.
Based on the history of the B61-12 and current nuclear weapon modernization programs, deploying tactical nuclear weapons at sea will be a resource-intensive enterprise. Between acquiring new equipment, systems, and training needed to support SLCM-N’s deployment, the program will be expensive for the submarine force and will not roll out quickly. If there is a “serious ‘deterrence-assurance-escalation’ gap,” then all options should be considered. However, most naval communities outside submarines would rather not again take on the expense and difficulty of this mission. Naval tactical nuclear employment will require a whole Navy effort, not just the submarine force with SLCM-N.
—LCDR Ben Massengale, USN
Commander Giarra clearly makes the argument for the urgent need to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to the Navy.
The knee-jerk reaction to the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War resulted in the removal of these weapons from the fleet, alongside a sudden drawdown in Navy personnel and base closures. Perhaps in that moment, Russia no longer posed the same threat as the Soviet Union did, but that did not mean Russia—or China—would never emerge as a greater nuclear threat down the road. This unilateral partial disarmament was a grave mistake.
I served on a destroyer, a couple of cruisers, and a battleship that carried tactical nuclear surface-to-air missiles, antisubmarine rockets, and land-attack cruise missiles. The safety and protection of these systems were ensured by well-run personnel reliability programs. Records exist to effectively reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons in time to meet the threat of war at sea with China. Expecting our conventionally armed Navy to go into battle against an enemy armed to the teeth with tactical nuclear weapons is setting our Navy up for possible failure. Give the fleet a fighting chance to win!
—OSC(SW/AW) John M. Duffy, USN (Ret.)
Diving & Salvage
I absorbed Mr. Clift’s article with great interest.
My involvement with diving and salvage goes back to the 1960s, when I first served under Rear Admiral Draper Kauffman, and it continues today. The Navy’s salvage force has changed significantly over the years since I served as the salvage officer (N4) at Service Squadron 8. At the time, there were 27-plus-floating salvage assets in the Atlantic. These were led mainly by limited duty and warrant officers who brought decades of experience, not unlike many of the individuals mentioned within the article. There were also submarine rescue vessels. Today, there are no dedicated commissioned assets (albeit four T-ARS-50-class ships are in reserve), and the deep experience has been lost.
At one time, divers came rated with skills, and an individual could not even apply for Dive School unless they had reached at least E-4. The Salvage Bosun Navy officer billet classification was retired in 1989.
I served, and sparred, with Master Diver Carl Brashear. That era had other colorful characters such as: Bosun Leon Ryder; Master Divers Charles “Wally” Wallis and Bill “Silver Fox” Lacree; Commander John McColgan; Captains Bill Searle, Bob Gibson, and Tony Esau; Bill “Moose” Milwee, and Chuck “Black Bart” Bartholomew. The age also produced some incredible women divers and salvors: Admiral Martha Herb, Captain Karin Lynn, and Captain Belinda Heerwagen, among others.
The operations conducted were momentous—Operation Nimrod Spar, Argus Island Removal, USS Belknap (CG-26) salvage/tow, and the MX 1 Deep Dive System descending to 1,148 feet seawater. Aircraft salvage was frequent and at times challenging, such as the F-14 Tomcat and its then-super-secret AIM-54 Phoenix missile, lost off the coast of Scotland in 1976 and recovered before the Soviets could recover them.
Today, the Navy has no active, organic salvage ships and only scarce salvage personnel; the mobile diving and salvage units are tenant commands under the explosive ordnance disposal groups. This raises a question: What is the future of salvage within the Navy?
—CAPT J. Kenneth Edgar, USN (Ret.)
Heavier & Lighter than Air
Mr. Clift’s retrospective was an engaging reminder of Proceedings’ historical chronicling of Navy aviation, yet it contained a genuinely surprising omission by observing that the “Navy’s adoption of rotary-wing aircraft . . . began in the 1940s.”
As a lieutenant, future Admiral Alfred Melville Pride (1897–1988) made three landings and takeoffs in a Pitcairn PCA-2 Autogiro (the XOP-1), a precursor to the helicopter, from the Navy’s first aircraft carrier USS Langley
(CV-1) off Norfolk, Virginia, on 23
September 1931.
Pride, who later headed the Bureau of Aeronautics in the late 1940s and commanded the U.S. Seventh Fleet during the Korean War, was a most unusual naval aviation pioneer in that, unlike most of his colleagues, he achieved flag rank without attending the Naval Academy or even graduating from college, although he later completed advanced studies in aeronautical engineering.
—CAPT Bruce H. Charnov, USNR (Ret.)
Editor’s Note: Thank you for pointing out this event, which Admiral Pride discussed in “Pilots, Man Your Planes’ which appeared in a naval aviation supplement to the April 1986 Proceedings.
USS SCORPION
(See E. Offley, pp. 99–100, June 2023; N. Polmar, J. Bryant, and S. Rogers, p. 97, July 2023)
Taking exception to my findings regarding the loss of the USS Scorpion (SSN-589) on 22 May 1968, Captain Bryant repeats an argument from his 2007 review of my book, Scorpion Down, that retired Vice Admiral Philip Beshany, director of submarine warfare at the Pentagon in 1968, “vehemently rejected the various conspiracies,” including my finding of a Soviet attack, concerning the submarine’s sinking. Captain Bryant also asserts that his own research “turned up no evidence” of a highly classified search for the Scorpion during the five-day period between the sinking and her failure to reach port on 27 May.
Had Captain Bryant asked, I could have provided him a transcript of my 1997 interview with Admiral Beshany in which he not only confirmed that the Navy was looking for the Scorpion prior to 27 May—an explosive revelation first made by Vice Admiral Arnold F. Schade and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas H. Moorer in 1983—but linked its disappearance to the Soviet warships the submarine had been ordered to surveil in the eastern Atlantic. Beshany stated:
My recollection is that there was some communications analysis conducted that led [Navy analysts] to believe that Scorpion had been detected by the group she had been shadowing. . . . There were some speculation that not only did they track her but attacked her.
—Ed Offley, Author, Scorpion Down
Upgun Cutters to Meet Today’s Naval Threats
The author noted that the U.S. Coast Guard “has more ships and aircraft than the Royal Navy or French Navy,” while the Marine Corps wants to get into the Navy’s core mission of sea control and denial. Meanwhile, the Navy has not replaced the capabilities of the F-14s, A-6s, and S-3s and has, according to many studies, an insufficient number of surface combatants to perform its mission with an adequate safety margin. An entire category of warship that at in recent memory numbered more than 100 hulls—frigates—was eliminated in the 1990s, while those types remain one of the most common combatants in foreign navies.
The Navy’s most effective naval weapon in any future maritime war will be the nuclear-powered attack submarine, and the Navy has only 53. By comparison, in the 1990s there were more than 100—and the primary opponent was a continental power! Today’s greatest potential threat to the United States has significant vulnerabilities that can best be exploited by submarines. So, why are there fewer today than in the 1990s?
Maybe in this time of increased maritime strategic competition, the time has come for the Navy to leave its joint force civility behind and make the case for a larger share of the budget.
—LCDR Tim Stipp, USNR (Ret.)
The missile shown in the top photo on p. 78 could indeed be an asset to a Coast Guard cutter that finds itself in actively contested waters, but it does not appear to be the RIM-162 Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) named in the caption. I believe the picture shows a RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).
—Ben Parker
Editor’s Note: Most Proceedings photos come from the Sea Services through the DVIDSHUB.net website. In general, we can depend on the captions to be correct and accurate—but not always. In this case, the Navy caption accompanying the photo identified the missile as an ESSM, although on inspection it does indeed appear to be a RAM.
MH-60R High-Frequency Sonar Kit
SAAB has been awarded a contract to build the Mk 39 EMATT training torpedo, a 22-lb, 36-inch long device. This recalls an idea I had some years ago to upgrade the MH-60R to fight in the littorals, such as that found in the rocky seas off Sweden’s coast. Why not take the small-diameter Mk 39 and add the Javelin missile’s shaped-charge warhead, an underwater camera, and the datalink float backend from a sonobuoy and adapt the system to launch from the MH-60R’s 25-round sonobuoy launcher? Then build a form, fit, and function high-frequency, high-resolution sonar array that can bolt on the end of the dipping sonar cable to provide a high-resolution sonar picture of the undersea arena.
Then, the next time the Russians or North Koreans try to run bottom crawlers or minisubs into the Karlskrona base or South Korea’s naval facilities, there would be a way to go after them and punch a hole in the pressure hull, allowing the offending vessel—and maybe even the crew—to be captured. (The North Koreans would probably commit suicide to prevent live capture, of course.)
This set up could also come in handy to conduct mine clearance of harbors or other close to shore areas from the air.
—MSGT Chris Dierkes, ANG